On post 5861 above you spoke of the necessity for the next frigate to to have a "stronger area air defence capability as well, beyond what Sea Ceptor is supposed to provide." On the post above you now run a line that potentially the lefty types might not like it. They may or may not and I am none the wiser where these two statement converge into arguendum. The electoral math particularly with respect to long term polling trends even under an MMP system is against a pure Labour-Greens hard left government achieving power, which would downgrade or cancel frigate project in whole or in part - does not look promising particularly within the suggested timeframe. The Greens-Labour bloc have been relatively static within a 38 to 43% band since 2007 and pretty much require a third party such as NZ First, who are more hawkish or neo-realist to the Greens/Labour on Defence and National Security posture and act as present a handbrake to their traditional liberal middle class virtue signalling tendencies. The current opposition and former Govt have maintained a 44-49% polling band since 2007.
However, if a future RNZN frigate was to have for example Mk41 VLS which considering the numerous design options out there as well as new generation MFR systems that are emerging over the next decade, it would be abjectly sensible for any NZ government to "future proof" the future frigate (which will be scheduled to arrive around 12-15 years from now) to have the option of been able to acquiring for example SM-6 which would give the "stronger area air defence capability" you desired as well as the potential for other options such as anti-surface warfare and sea-based terminal ballistic missile defence in one solution. By the time the RFI is released at least 5 years away and the strategic outlook considerations will be more certain.
It is not likely it will be just Sea Ceptor providing the future ships defensive screen and that a CIWS even like the present Phalanx wont be part of providing the 1,300km² engagement envelope that even the upgraded Anzacs will have.
From my outsider's perspective, the concern has less to do with the political orientation of the NZG decision influencers and more to do with their values or what they consider important, though I acknowledge that often times one does start to resemble the other.
In this regard, I have concerns based on both past/current defence acquisition history, the degree of importance and methodology in establishing VfM for future major fleet acquisitions, and the scope of operational environments a future surface combatant would be honestly considered for. It is this last bit, where the ongoing tendency on the part of the Kiw public as well as gov't, is to be ignorant of or as we have mentioned many times over the years, is to demonstrate "sea blindness."
What I would like to see is an increased awareness among the general NZ population of the intersection between Defence and Trade and how they can impact their everyday daily life. A prime example would be that NZ is a net importer of oil with over half the crude oil coming from the Mideast, or that on average there are 15 - 20 tanker movements each month that bring crude oil, feedstocks and petroleum products to NZ.
Therefore I am attempting to spark a conversation which can hopefully be sustained and make a transition from just being within defence circles to the Kiwi population at large, which can see the parallels between emergency/contingency and defence planning and get people to ditch the all too common attitude of, "this could never happen to me," while also causing people to recognize that far off events can absolutely have a direct impact on their lives.
As an example of far off events, consider the following scenario:
The last several years have been a proliferation on AShM, to the point that there have been several successful launches in the Mideast carried out by non-state actors which targeted vessels in the Med off the coast of Lebanon (and sank an Egyptian freighter IIRC) as well as USN warships off the coast of Yemen. What would be the impact on both the international fuel commodities market and international shipping, if a loaded tanker departing or in transit past Aden was struck by AShM? I would imagine that such an incident would roil both the commodities market and shipping, causing significant spikes in the cost of shipping, as well as in the cost of fuel. Such spikes in cost, as well as the potential perception of threats, could also trigger hoarding and/or shortages of fuel in terms of international availability. If there were such market impacts internationally, those impacts would also reach the domestic Kiwi market, causing price increases, shortages, hoarding and/or all the above to take place within NZ. Now if the tanker which was hit was bound for Whangarei (location of the only refinery in NZ) then I suspect the impact upon NZ would be felt that much sooner and sharply. That is just a single, unlikely yet very possible example of a threat to NZ's SLOC which I suspect that most Kiwis would not even consider.
If we can get the public to consider what they regularly use of consume, where it comes from, and how it gets to them, then we might also get there to be more recognition of the Value for Money for assets which protect the source of goods consumed and routes taken to bring those goods to NZ.
However if that message cannot be conveyed to the public, then the decisions could rest solely in the hands of policy makers whose ignorance and/or ideological perspectives limit them from looking past the 12 n mile home waters limit, or perhaps the 200 n miles EEZ limit.
