Royal New Zealand Air Force

[gf0012-aust]

Darwin or Curtin – is hairs.

It's hardly splitting hairs when it provides an extra 800km mission cost benefit on a "return trip" and hence has a direct impact on time on target, mission fat and redundancy planning.

Curtin was not visible to the public and was closer to potential targets. Darwin was highly visible, and the Indons had an active network in the Darwin west timorese community who were quite happy counting ships and pallets on the docks, and who suddenly became avid plane spotters...

South mentioned Darwin I fired off a response to that. Where the Pigs were based at the time is inconsequential. Yes you may have seen the original air tasking for ET – I have never said 75th Sqd were part of the original tasking.

and you made the following claims which have triggered my input: "What is this Timor handled by the RAAF stuff? Maybe in the Air Superiority role - but what if it came to us needing CAS? There was always that understanding that the RAAF would provide the umbrella and the A-4's could do their specialist taskings at the tactical level." RNZAF had no involvement in air tasking and Australia was the force planner. If those assets were made available internally, then they never realised the light of day when actual ATO's were being run up - and indeed for the entire time that ET was hot. These weren't just interim TO's The TO's for fixed wing combat would have stayed active for months.

Again the point is this - 75 Sqd was placed on Standby by the Shipley Govt whilst they were in Malaysia. They were held there for two weeks before they eventually came home. That decision had nothing to do with what Planners in the ADF wanted, felt, thought or was drawn up on their plans. Placing 75 on standby was entirely made by the New Zealand Government as events unfolded.

Yes and thats been accepted. The issue is context and the AirSup-CAS reference. They were never offered to a level where they were visibly included for mission planning, or for standby effect etc.. They were never needed as RAAF Plan B included striking military targets in Jakarta with the Pigs, Hornets would then be rotated into Dili because the airfield was secured by special forces on D+0. If the indons had decided to send in fixed wing combat air, then there were a series of other strike packages formed up. RNZAF was never factored in outside of trucks and potential Orion backfilling. I imagine that RNZN would have got a look in earlier because they also made themselves "available" once we cancelled our training exercises at Shoalwater. The reason why we had 5000 Marines sitting off Dili Harbour was due the american naval commander "exercising initiative"

The first week in Dili was critical, and if it had gone to custard then there was no way that any RNZAF combat assets would have made it in time - and the Malays would have been reluctant to allow FPDA partners to use her facilities as well. Indeed if it had gone to custard D0-D5 then the US was not going to stay benign. They'd already read the Indon Military the riot act about their view of the situation.

Some people in the CCS, RNZAF and some National MP's were lobbying Cabinet to have the A-4's in Australia because they feared that with an election coming and a potential labour victory which would kill the F-16 deal and the ACF they wanted the the A-4's to be seen to be doing something.

Well, when I was last in Govt it was seriously touted that a short sqdn of Hornets should be based in NZ so as to assist in ensuring that RNZAF fighter skills did not degrade too quickly - both Govts agreed that once it was gone, the chances of reforming were going to be cost prohibitive.

 

[t68]

The first week in Dili was critical, and if it had gone to custard then there was no way that any RNZAF combat assets would have made it in time - and the Malays would have been reluctant to allow FPDA partners to use her facilities as well. Indeed if it had gone to custard D0-D5 then the US was not going to stay benign. They'd already read the Indon Military the riot act about their view of the situation. OTOH,



Well, when I was last in Govt it was seriously touted that a short sqdn of Hornets should be based in NZ so as to assist in ensuring that RNZAF fighter skills did not degrade too quickly - both Govts agreed that once it was gone, the chances of reforming were going to be cost prohibitive.

1, I was always under the impression that it was given in the first couple of days if it became a hot war the US was always going to support Australia and the Marines were part of the force package and give us satellite coverage before and after the landing’s.

2, if the NZ Gov were to give the green light to an ACF, is it still possible for Australia to place a short Sqn in NZ?

 

[MrConservative]

"What is this Timor handled by the RAAF stuff? Maybe in the Air Superiority role - but what if it came to us needing CAS? There was always that understanding that the RAAF would provide the umbrella and the A-4's could do their specialist taskings at the tactical level." RNZAF had no involvement in air tasking and Australia was the force planner. If those assets were made available internally, then they never realised the light of day when actual ATO's were being run up - and indeed for the entire time that ET was hot. These weren't just interim TO's The TO's for fixed wing combat would have stayed active for months.

Yes and thats been accepted. The issue is context and the AirSup-CAS reference. They were never offered to a level where they were visibly included for mission planning, or for standby effect etc.. They were never needed as RAAF Plan B included striking military targets in Jakarta with the Pigs, Hornets would then be rotated into Dili because the airfield was secured by special forces on D+0. If the indons had decided to send in fixed wing combat air, then there were a series of other strike packages formed up. RNZAF was never factored in outside of trucks and potential Orion backfilling. I imagine that RNZN would have got a look in earlier because they also made themselves "available" once we cancelled our training exercises at Shoalwater. The reason why we had 5000 Marines sitting off Dili Harbour was due the american naval commander "exercising initiative"

The first week in Dili was critical, and if it had gone to custard then there was no way that any RNZAF combat assets would have made it in time - and the Malays would have been reluctant to allow FPDA partners to use her facilities as well. Indeed if it had gone to custard D0-D5 then the US was not going to stay benign. They'd already read the Indon Military the riot act about their view of the situation.

Well, when I was last in Govt it was seriously touted that a short sqdn of Hornets should be based in NZ so as to assist in ensuring that RNZAF fighter skills did not degrade too quickly - both Govts agreed that once it was gone, the chances of reforming were going to be cost prohibitive.

Thanks, but I do not need a history lesson on ET - or need to be reminded of the US intentions if it all went to a big pudding. It is pure supposition about whether 75Sqd could be there within a week from Malaysia. Further supposition over whether or not Malaysia would have allowed use of there facilities. They did not seem to mind guesting us over the 2 week period. Of course they could have simply flown to Darwin as they whole squadron had been under DLOC for the month. Heavan and earth would have been moved to get them into the game as the 75 sqd people I have talked to recall. I personally take more stock in their views on this. At least they had a bit of positivity over the capability of the NZDF and its people when it really matters. They might have own bias - but bias can reveal itself in a number ways by various people in various forums.

I prefer like many other Kiwi's - that the close air support of Kiwi's in combat is done by Kiwi's. It is a simple concept really. That has been a traditional policy and role up until about 15 years or so. That was the intention - it might not have been translated into reality during the last 15 or so years of NZDF - but that in a nut shell is it. Other larger air forces providing the umbrella (air superiority) so we could be self reliant. This has been confirmed again in recent years when tactical air support did not arrive in a timely manner due to a lack of air assets and package planning obviuosly unwinding.

I do know about the touting of the Hornets - I know the reaction to this from the Ninth Floor. I also know who else was briefed at the time and I also know that the debate continues over whether or not a ACF is salavageable. I have even seen a couple of papers on the topic. It is not really just about the money it is about getting the right personnel to deliver it and an organisational committment to make it happen.

 

[MrConservative]

1, I was always under the impression that it was given in the first couple of days if it became a hot war the US was always going to support Australia and the Marines were part of the force package and give us satellite coverage before and after the landing’s.

2, if the NZ Gov were to give the green light to an ACF, is it still possible for Australia to place a short Sqn in NZ?

1. True. Probably why the Indonesians behaved themselves.

2. Considering that the current NZ Government when in opposition were receptive to the idea about 4-5 years ago so it is possible - however not likely. If it did happen it would take sometime to organise as it would involve a shuffle of Squadrons between Bases - maybe CFS to WB which may happen anyway. Though I would think that when 3 sqd moves into their new hanger over by the old museum site at OH a short squadron could take over the old 75 hanger.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Thanks, but I do not need a history lesson on ET

you apparently do because you're making commentary about a RNZAF combat capability which didn't get factored into any planning. Again, Aust ran the combat and force management side of what was happening in ET, that was under UN imprimatur. RNZAF may well have planned whatever they wanted to, but getting assets into theatre and co-ordinated into theatre was an AusGovt and DoD responsibility. RAAF was the lead agency for all air movement in and out - and managed 13 other countries. Thats the bottom line. What RNZAF elected to contingency is irrelevant in that sense. NZGovt like every other participant would have planned for an escalation of resources. No doubt if things had gone differently then perhaps they would have been rolled into the debate and become another force element. The bottom line though is that any number of staged plans were not implemented as it was able to be contained. eg RAN had any number of solutions in place that would have been activated if necessary, but they weren't. ie they were contingency elements that were not activated.

- or need to be reminded of the US intentions if it all went to a big pudding.

Well, I'm glad you understand that element as it directly relates to getting combat air into theatre if Do+"nn" became messy. US Forces were the next closest available force majeur available. Its a logical extension of the prev discussion about getting combat air in place rapidly if things escalated

It is pure supposition about whether 75Sqd could be there within a week from Malaysia. Further supposition over whether or not Malaysia would have allowed use of there facilities. They did not seem to mind guesting us over the 2 week period.

There is a vast difference in RAAF, RNZAF, RAF being able to sally forth and prosecute violent events from Malay facilities under formal war conditions than from the members being in a state of obligation under FPDA committments. Unless FPDA was invoked then how was the Malay Govt going to legitmately extend services without becoming a proxy combatant? You seem to be oblivioys into what Malaysias attitude at the time actually was. In actual fact they were pushing for the lead force management role in the UN as they believed that they had greater clout due to religious issues. They were not interested in having any combat forces go active from their own territory as it would have disrupted their attempts to be seen as the regional peacekeeper.

Malaysias role was carefully handled as everyone was conscious of the fact that we didn't want to be seen as colonial offshoots belting the locals about - that's why UN sanction was critical and also why the UN was more than happy to let Australia take the role as they couldn't guarantee that they could get a formal UN force in place in a timely manner. Part of that embuggerance was that Matahir was twitching in the sidelines refusing to let Malay forces come under Australian designated UN control. He was still smarting over his spat with Keating and actyally did a lot of work into undermining the process. Malaysia would not have allowed any combat forces to operate from Malay facilities unless they had the UN defined lead role.

Of course they could have simply flown to Darwin as they whole squadron had been under DLOC for the month. Heavan and earth would have been moved to get them into the game as the 75 sqd people I have talked to recall. I personally take more stock in their views on this. At least they had a bit of positivity over the capability of the NZDF and its people when it really matters.

and I accept the fact that they could have easily flown to Darwin if necessary. I haven't challenged anything except the inference that they would have allowed foreign forces (esp anglo) to operate from their territories. They do regard the Indons as racial cousins, so there was a bit more to it from their perspective.

But, you seem to be under some vision that I'm maligning RNZDef, I'm most certainly not, what I am clearly stating is that RNZDefs capacity to get air combat elements into a formal role was never articulated at the overall force planning level - and that included Aust managing the military and para-military participation of some 13 other countries.

They might have own bias - but bias can reveal itself in a number ways by various people in various forums.

If you're accusing me of bias I suggest that you take it up with a bit more caution and less parochial enthusiasm yourself. I've made clinical event responses, I've not maligned RNZDef in any fashion. I have the strongest respect for what your lot bring to the table - again my points are not about capability but what was actually planned for and delivered. You make repeated comments about what NZGovt backplayed, well, thats no different from what we all do. NZ and Aust plan for events like what do we do at a military level if Fiji goes pear shaped, or if the chinese decide to have a brain phart and invade Vanuatu, or if PNG goes rogue. Thats normal contingency planning. It does not however mean zip until its formally acknowledged, signed off and directives given to execute it. They're all contingency planning events. Until execution, they are paper events.

I prefer like many other Kiwi's - that the close air support of Kiwi's in combat is done by Kiwi's. It is a simple concept really. That has been a traditional policy and role up until about 15 years or so. That was the intention - it might not have been translated into reality during the last 15 or so years of NZDF - but that in a nut shell is it. Other larger air forces providing the umbrella (air superiority) so we could be self reliant. This has been confirmed again in recent years when tactical air support did not arrive in a timely manner due to a lack of air assets and package planning obviuosly unwinding.

and I'm not disputing your Govts aspirational view - and thats not dissimilar to AustGovs view wherever possible.

I do know about the touting of the Hornets - I know the reaction to this from the Ninth Floor. I also know who else was briefed at the time and I also know that the debate continues over whether or not a ACF is salavageable. I have even seen a couple of papers on the topic. It is not really just about the money it is about getting the right personnel to deliver it and an organisational committment to make it happen.

RNZAF AC is salavgeable if you cross the primary hurdle of political will and intent. Outside of that it becomes an issue of money and rebuilding (with all the associated skill development, cross training, asset selection, raise, train and sustain of new elements etc..., and the expectations of timeframe and what capability is expected over that timeline. The longer your force structure and training structures degrade, the harder it is to do a lazarus.

Finally, you seem to have this vision that I'm maligning RNZDef or NZGov, thats so far from the truth its not funny. Force planning in these events transits from aspirational to executable. I'm discussing the latter end of what actually happened in theatre for the life of the ET UN mandate.

 

[MrConservative]

you apparently do because you're making commentary about a RNZAF combat capability which didn't get factored into any planning. Again, Aust ran the combat and force management side of what was happening in ET, that was under UN imprimatur. RNZAF may well have planned whatever they wanted to, but getting assets into theatre and co-ordinated into theatre was an AusGovt and DoD responsibility. RAAF was the lead agency for all air movement in and out - and managed 13 other countries. Thats the bottom line. What RNZAF elected to contingency is irrelevant in that sense. NZGovt like every other participant would have planned for an escalation of resources. No doubt if things had gone differently then perhaps they would have been rolled into the debate and become another force element. The bottom line though is that any number of staged plans were not implemented as it was able to be contained. eg RAN had any number of solutions in place that would have been activated if necessary, but they weren't. ie they were contingency elements that were not activated.

Well, I'm glad you understand that element as it directly relates to getting combat air into theatre if Do+"nn" became messy. US Forces were the next closest available force majeur available. Its a logical extension of the prev discussion about getting combat air in place rapidly if things escalated



There is a vast difference in RAAF, RNZAF, RAF being able to sally forth and prosecute violent events from Malay facilities under formal war conditions than from the members being in a state of obligation under FPDA committments. Unless FPDA was invoked then how was the Malay Govt going to legitmately extend services without becoming a proxy combatant? You seem to be oblivioys into what Malaysias attitude at the time actually was. In actual fact they were pushing for the lead force management role in the UN as they believed that they had greater clout due to religious issues. They were not interested in having any combat forces go active from their own territory as it would have disrupted their attempts to be seen as the regional peacekeeper.

Malaysias role was carefully handled as everyone was conscious of the fact that we didn't want to be seen as colonial offshoots belting the locals about - that's why UN sanction was critical and also why the UN was more than happy to let Australia take the role as they couldn't guarantee that they could get a formal UN force in place in a timely manner. Part of that embuggerance was that Matahir was twitching in the sidelines refusing to let Malay forces come under Australian designated UN control. He was still smarting over his spat with Keating and actyally did a lot of work into undermining the process. Malaysia would not have allowed any combat forces to operate from Malay facilities unless they had the UN defined lead role.



and I accept the fact that they could have easily flown to Darwin if necessary. I haven't challenged anything except the inference that they would have allowed foreign forces (esp anglo) to operate from their territories. They do regard the Indons as racial cousins, so there was a bit more to it from their perspective.

But, you seem to be under some vision that I'm maligning RNZDef, I'm most certainly not, what I am clearly stating is that RNZDefs capacity to get air combat elements into a formal role was never articulated at the overall force planning level - and that included Aust managing the military and para-military participation of some 13 other countries.



If you're accusing me of bias I suggest that you take it up with a bit more caution and less parochial enthusiasm yourself. I've made clinical event responses, I've not maligned RNZDef in any fashion. I have the strongest respect for what your lot bring to the table - again my points are not about capability but what was actually planned for and delivered. You make repeated comments about what NZGovt backplayed, well, thats no different from what we all do. NZ and Aust plan for events like what do we do at a military level if Fiji goes pear shaped, or if the chinese decide to have a brain phart and invade Vanuatu, or if PNG goes rogue. Thats normal contingency planning. It does not however mean zip until its formally acknowledged, signed off and directives given to execute it. They're all contingency planning events. Until execution, they are paper events.



and I'm not disputing your Govts aspirational view - and thats not dissimilar to AustGovs view wherever possible.



RNZAF AC is salavgeable if you cross the primary hurdle of political will and intent. Outside of that it becomes an issue of money and rebuilding (with all the associated skill development, cross training, asset selection, raise, train and sustain of new elements etc..., and the expectations of timeframe and what capability is expected over that timeline. The longer your force structure and training structures degrade, the harder it is to do a lazarus.

Finally, you seem to have this vision that I'm maligning RNZDef or NZGov, thats so far from the truth its not funny. Force planning in these events transits from aspirational to executable. I'm discussing the latter end of what actually happened in theatre for the life of the ET UN mandate.

gf0012-aust

Yes I admit I am sensitive to the NZDF and quite touchy about it at times. Like many I will freely put the boot in as a Kiwi not on the NZDF itself - but the political decisions that have stuffed it up at times – naturally I do find criticism from non Kiwi’s hard to take and it gets my back up. I thought you were having a go – if you were not I accept that and it is good to hear otherwise. We agree then that we have the NZDF’s best interests and the RNZAF’s best interests in particular at heart.

In short I am peeved that the RNZAF ACF was sidelined by Australian planners and that it was not politically pushed hard enough by the NZ government at the time. Considering that it was the perfect opportunity to actually use them operationally. The very sort of operation which the ACF as a unit had a legitimate expectation to be used. It was that missed opportunity that gave the soon to be elected Clark Government the excuse to cull the ACF – so in some ways I do think that oversight and the consequences of it were very unhelpful. They should have never been formally left out of the planning mix in some form and it was quite a let-down at the time because many of us knew that their not being pro-actively used was going to be used against them down the track. In my view they needed to be in Australia at the time and not Malaysia (Which I do appreciate their PM’s view of both ANZAC nations at the time was not exactly sweetness and light – and I do recognise that one of the rationales of putting them on standby in Malaysia was domestic politics in view of the upcoming NZ election campaign that November - likewise I understand the FPDA enactment - I dont have time in posts to sign off on every nuance), with a role whether that be in reserve or otherwise. I think our government failed in pushing the point at the time that their demonstrable ‘non use’ would have serious consequences. I hope you recognise it is a raw nerve with me and others.

This has sidelined a question I put up a few posts back – a hypothetical question – if I could allow further discussion or invite it on that point.

What effect would there have been on the RNZAF if the ex Pakistani F-16’s were offered in say 1995 and delivered in 1998 rather than offered in 1998 and delivered in 2001? How would have that transformed or changed it and the NZDF in the scheme of things for the 2000-2001 decade?

 

[OPSSG]

Again the point is this - 75 Sqd was placed on Standby by the Shipley Govt whilst they were in Malaysia. They were held there for two weeks before they eventually came home. That decision had nothing to do with what Planners in the ADF wanted, felt, thought or was drawn up on their plans. Placing 75 on standby was entirely made by the New Zealand Government as events unfolded.

Yes and thats been accepted. The issue is context and the AirSup-CAS reference. They were never offered to a level where they were visibly included for mission planning, or for standby effect etc.. They were never needed as RAAF Plan B included striking military targets in Jakarta with the Pigs, Hornets would then be rotated into Dili because the airfield was secured by special forces on D+0. If the indons had decided to send in fixed wing combat air, then there were a series of other strike packages formed up. RNZAF was never factored in outside of trucks and potential Orion backfilling. I imagine that RNZN would have got a look in earlier because they also made themselves "available" once we cancelled our training exercises at Shoalwater. The reason why we had 5000 Marines sitting off Dili Harbour was due the american naval commander "exercising initiative"

The first week in Dili was critical, and if it had gone to custard then there was no way that any RNZAF combat assets would have made it in time - and the Malays would have been reluctant to allow FPDA partners to use her facilities as well. Indeed if it had gone to custard D0-D5 then the US was not going to stay benign. They'd already read the Indon Military the riot act about their view of the situation.

@MrConservative, I'm often reluctant to comment, as some of my comments can be easily misunderstood.

(i) Here's a link to Study Paper No. 304, ‘PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRIMARY RISKS: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor.' You should read what was said in this article about Malaysia's involvement and moves. After reading this article, it should be clear that the Malaysians would NOT have allowed NZ to use her facilities for the purposes you proposed.

(ii) As a third party observer, I would not have expected the RAAF to use NZ air assets in the manner you proposed, at the relevant time, as it have introduced unnecessary complexity in mission planning. IMO, to achieve mission success, planners have to use the assets of your partners so as to maximize their respective capabilities and strengths. The Pigs are a bigger stick, with a longer range than the A4s, so I would have assumed that the Pigs would be a preferred contingency planning tool for the RAAF planners.

 

[MrConservative]

@MrConservative, I'm often reluctant to comment, as some of my comments can be easily misunderstood (with reference to form members of other nationalities) .

(i) Here's a link to Study Paper No. 304, ‘PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRIMARY RISKS: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor.' You should read what was said in this article about Malaysia's involvement and moves. After reading this article, it should be clear that the Malaysians would NOT have allowed NZ to use her facilities for purposes your proposed.

(ii) As a third party observer, I would not have expected the RAAF to use NZ air assets in the manner you proposed, at the relevant time, as it have introduced unnecessary complexity in mission planning. IMO, to achieve success in planning, it requires the planner to use the assets of your partners such that the coalition can maximize their respective capabilities and strengths. The pigs are a bigger stick, with a longer range than the A4s, so I would have assumed that the pigs would be a preferred tool for the planners.

Thats all fine and good regarding the Mayalsian angle. They of course could not dictate when we could leave or went to next. But it does not placate me over the fact that my preference was for the RNZAF ACF to be included more in the game at the time and that their input into ET further than just the C-130's in terms of the Air Tasking. That is my expectation like it or not. It doesn't settle well with me that the RAAF planners could not cope with their inclusion with any greater difficulty in some general form even if in a formal and recognised Reserve role. It sounds like an excuse. They should have been included full stop! That oversight - that the RNZAF was notably absent helped kill off the ACF - that needs to be recognised as events turned out weeks later. That is not Australia's fault and I dont blame them for planning the way they did - its that I wished they had understood the implications of not formally including 75 Sqd or even formally assigning 2 Sqd at Nowra to some additional role within Australia. But as I have stressed before our own fault. We should have made ourselves more aware of contingency planning and more forthright in our expectations. We should have been abit more politically wise and less naive before the event.

 

[south]

The problem may not have been within the RNZAF. They were probably lobbying as hard as they could to get involved, however if the Govt wanted them to be killed off, keeping them in Malaysia out of the way was an ideal result for the Govt.

Nothing the RAAF could have done about it if the offer was not there from the NZ Govt. No point planning for something that isnt going to be forthcoming.

 

[t68]

I think what GF and south are saying from what little first hand knowledge into force planning i have for the event is,

1, RAAF planning for D0-d5 asset’s that were available at the time.

2, There would have been government to government communication on what assets could be used in planning.

3, in the event this did go pear shaped a United States Marine MEU was available and able to respond in a more timely matter, with NZ Governments knowledge it was there.

4, Other factor’s may have came into play if it was part of the planning is what sort of time over target the A4 could have if the were need, as Gf has pointed out the F111 were keep out of the preying eyes so as not to antagonise the Indonesians

5,I am sure if it did turn, that once Dili was secured i believe the NZ Government would have no choice but commit the A4 into the force planning.




Please do not take this as a personal attack on yourself, just trying to bring a friendly debate into the thread.
I also believe that the NZ Government should reinstate a credible ACF not only for CAS but maritime strike as well.2nd tier stuff

 

[Todjaeger]

Here is an interesting hypothetical question.

If the F-16 deal was offered 5 years earlier in 1993 (putting aside the Kahu upgrade) and we took it, including the ECM package and MLU. What impact would that have had to the NZDF and its operational relationship with other FPDA neighbours during the last decade?

Wanted to let you know I have not forgotten about this hypothetical... While researching what was done vs. what options were available in that time frame, I have been giving it a think. You are just too far away to smell the burning...:flaming

Unfortunately there is no emoticon of a smiley with just the top of its head on fire.

Hopefully I should have some thoughts to post in the next day or so.

-Cheers

 

[T.C.P]

Cant the New zealand govt just purchase some ex-us fighters, i mean for a developed country, not to have any combat aircraft in it is airforce is quite degrading

 

[MrConservative]

The problem may not have been within the RNZAF. They were probably lobbying as hard as they could to get involved, however if the Govt wanted them to be killed off, keeping them in Malaysia out of the way was an ideal result for the Govt.

Nothing the RAAF could have done about it if the offer was not there from the NZ Govt. No point planning for something that isnt going to be forthcoming.

You are absolutely right - the fault really does lie with the National Govt of the day and that is the point I am making - it was an own goal. They were not exactly great tactical thinkers - diplomatically and politically. In many respects Clark who took control at the very end of 1999, though I detested her politics and the direction she took the RNZAF down - was a brilliant political tactican and manager of what she wanted. She wanted the ACF gone. More for symbolic reasons more than anything else. It was the first calculated move, an authoritive stamp that was to begin the restructuring of the NZDF the way she thought it should be. All opposition was either buried or taken down. She played a major role in killing off the relationship that was ANZUS back in 1984-1986 as Chair of the Defence Select Committee via her pushing of the Anti-Nuke legislation, again a symbolic guesture and followed it up by killing off the most obvious use of NZDF combative power, the ACF. Shipleys Govt signed off the F-16 deal in 1998 with the US - a deal that Clark was using as political scare tactics and electioneered tirelessly against saying that an ACF was not needed in the post cold war world of peacekeeping. The Govt at the time in my view tactically blundered by not robustly responding. Even if the RAAF felt they could handle any planned for scenario in ET, which they undoubtly did, the precarious nature of the political situation involving the F-16 deal and the future of an ACF in New Zealand - meant that NZ should have informed and approached all the interested parties, namely Australia as main coalition partner and the US as the vendor of the soon to arrive F-16's, and put together a strategy to ensure the protection of the A-4's involving their use. The opportunity cost is the opportunity lost.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Even if the RAAF felt they could handle any planned for scenario in ET, which they undoubtly did

I'd add to that the fact that RAAF and AustGov as military oversightseer would have clearly not wanted any of our forces to become indirectly involved with NZ sovereign politics - and the health and sustainment of RNZAF combat air would have been a bright red warning light.

NZGovt would have needed to send clear and unimpeachable imprimatur to AustGov for RAAF to have started planning in NZ air combat elements

 

[MrConservative]

I'd add to that the fact that RAAF and AustGov as military oversightseer would have clearly not wanted any of our forces to become indirectly involved with NZ sovereign politics - and the health and sustainment of RNZAF combat air would have been a bright red warning light.

NZGovt would have needed to send clear and unimpeachable imprimatur to AustGov for RAAF to have started planning in NZ air combat elements

Yes and any overt interference would have worked out badly - the US-NZ experience in the 80's over ANZUS is the classic example. The Shipley Government at time should have sensed the danger coming as all the signals were communicated by Clark. Hindsight is a great thing, but both the US as the vendor and Australia as per the CDR arrangement should have been warned that their was a very real political risk and relationship at stake that may (did) have considerable downstream effects.

 

[gf0012-aust]

but both the US as the vendor and Australia as per the CDR arrangement should have been warned that their was a very real political risk and relationship at stake that may (did) have considerable downstream effects.

from my recollection there was certainly some urgent traffic going to and fro twixt australia and NZ re the US.

IMO, I'd argue that the NZG probably misjudged the extent of US attitude on feeling as though they were being held over a barrel over something which they considered to be unimpeachable.

The US was also peeved that NZ was happy to ban USN ships but still happy to take port fees etc from USNS ships on their way to McMurdo.

I'm not attempting to defend the US here, but they certainly felt as though there was a degree of hypocrisy in the fact that NZG was using wedge politics to appeal to the general public and appear to be sticking up for sovereign rights, but at the same time was willing to take non combat vessels as they were getting port and support fees etc....

I really think that NZG at the time thought that it would all blow over - and badly misread the tealeaves. It put Oz in a very difficult position because we still gave NZ as much intel as possible and at times the US pretended that they didn't know what we were doing - but at times there was clearly an inability to share all as we couldn't compromise our own intel requirements.

Happily NZ is starting to have greater visibility and certainly some of the material that normally wouldn't get to the Kiwis is now available to them, the US certainly made more efforts after the last change in Govt.

 

[MrConservative]

Dr Bassett was a Cabinet Minister in the Lange Govt at the time of the breakdown and squarely puts the blame on NZ. One of the few who were troubled over the anti-US direction some in the Cabinet took.

Dr Michael Bassett

Dr Michael Bassett

These are very insightful pieces that examine the issue of the ANZUS breakdown.

 

[stryker NZ]

Just heard on TV3 news that a local defence contractor is bidding for the contract to train air force pilots from Singapore out of Ohakea. Im not sure of the details as I cant find the info on the 3 news site yet and the radio new zealand link is currently broken can anyone else find any info on it?

 

[MrConservative]

Just heard on TV3 news that a local defence contractor is bidding for the contract to train air force pilots from Singapore out of Ohakea. Im not sure of the details as I cant find the info on the 3 news site yet and the radio new zealand link is currently broken can anyone else find any info on it?

This has been on the boil for months and it is news that I welcome. There has been an embargo on this for quite some time as negotiations like this are tricky. A Lockheed Martin and Singapore tie up will be great for the Manawatu where Ohakea is based. The NZDF has been looking for revenue streams from its infrastructure such as its bases. I note with interest that Whenuapei is the designated backup base. Good - as it means from time to time the odd aircraft may be seen from MrC's house on the Nth Shore. What no one knows for sure is what aircraft will be used. However either the F-16 or T-50 would be likely.

 

[htbrst]

More info here

the radio new zealand link is currently broken can anyone else find any info on it?

Here is the stuff article using the same info as the radioNZ release:

NZ eyed for Singaporean pilot training | Stuff.co.nz

Singaporean air force pilots could come to New Zealand to train in the future, according to the Government.

The pilots are currently trained in France by defence contractor Lockheed Martin, which is in the process of renegotiating its contract.

Under a new deal, New Zealand's Ohakea Air Force base was being considered as a potential training ground for the pilots, reported Radio New Zealand, with Whenuapai Air Force base as a back-up. ...

I think theres still a lot of water to go under the brigde yet. It would be somewhat ironic if they based Skyhawks here, but by the stage they would be setting up the Skyhawks will probably be replaces by T-50 Golden Eagles, or M-346 etc.

Given its Lockheed Martin arranging the contract, and they are offering a "total training package" with their bid for the T-50 in the RSAF competition , perhaps it will only go ahead if they win (and also select NZ)

I recall reading somewhere that the contract with france expires in 2013 - perhaps that indicates the deadline ?

It suprises me that Whenuapai is the backup - knowing how much greif noisewise the RNZAF got from Palmerston North residents when Skyhawks started using PN airport for practice. Perhaps the reporter has their wires crossed with Woodbourne?

I guess the question is - is this "good" for the RNZAF ? There are positives in there for NZDF in general (army/navy training), perhaps a bit of cash to spend so long at the govenernment lets them keep it . Depending on what they base here, we may see more visitors from other countries, as there are more tiys to play with.

But the RNZAF loses hangerage space and perhaps it also increases the perception of the RNZAF as also rans in the eyes of the public, with no fast jets of its own and another country sharing their workplace just to rub it in !

There may not be much opportunity for the RNZAF to help with armourers, avionics techs etc as these will probably be provided by the RSAF and/or contractors.

I've got to go so will try and come back later to add a bit more :type