Royal Canadian Navy Discussions and updates

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
The CSC’s main gun selection has been made and it is Leonardo’s Oto Malera 127mm. Thus, considerable diversity between the 3 EYES T26s continues. Will truly be interesting to see all three in future naval exercises.

I know this is going back a few years but didn’t the Tribal class originally have the Oto-Melara 127mm on them before they were converted to AWDs.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The CSC’s main gun selection has been made and it is Leonardo’s Oto Malera 127mm. Thus, considerable diversity between the 3 EYES T26s continues. Will truly be interesting to see all three in future naval exercises.

Given the smart ammo availability for that gun it is a good selection. Canada should acquire a license to manufacture the warheads in Canada so as to ensure a goodly supply of the warheads.
 

Albedo

Active Member
For pesky little drones, the standard 30 mm gun would probably do the job.
Marketing for the 30mm Typhoon does focus more on C-UAS capability compared to the 25mm Typhoon due to 30mm air burst munitions, higher max elevations for the mount, and newer tracking algorithms. Should be effective against small numbers of drones although there's no coverage at the bow of the CSC. I'm a little skeptical that the small burst area of 30mm ABM and slow rate of fire of the 30mm Typhoon compared to a true CIWS can effectively deal with drone swarms though. Despite Phalanx not being directly specified for the CSC, hopefully they've retained the structural, electrical, and water cooling infrastructural on the midship platforms so the Phalanx units from the Iroquois, which I believe were retained, can be installed on the CSC on a case-by-case basis depending on mission threat assessments.

The CSC’s main gun selection has been made and it is Leonardo’s Oto Malera 127mm. Thus, considerable diversity between the 3 EYES T26s continues. Will truly be interesting to see all three in future naval exercises.

Pleasantly surprised this went through given the 5" Mk 45 was already integrated in the Type 26 and BAE is part of the CSC design consortium. There were complaints in the media from Canadian defence companies/subsidiaries that the CSC process gave too much contracting authority to the CSC industry consortium (LM, BAE, L3, CAE, MDA, Ultra) who could just select their own products and not give products from competing companies a fair evaluation. General Dynamics Canada was trying to promote their sonar systems and Leonardo DRS Canada was promoting SHINCOM shipboard communications system which are systems Canada has heavily invested in and standardized on until the CSC. I suppose this 127/64 LW gun win helps satisfy Leonardo as a company and maintain jobs at Leonardo Canada although I'm not sure a technician currently servicing communications systems is going to be the same one servicing the future guns. At least it does suggest the CSC consortium considers products from competitors when awarding contracts.

In terms of capabilities on paper, the Leonardo 127/64 LW does seem superior to the BAE 5" Mk 45 in terms of firing rate, max elevation, elevation/training rate, and already-fielded extended range and guided rounds. My main concern is reliability. As I understand it, the USN previously used a 5" Mk 42 gun which could fire at up to 40 rpm but was unreliable so the Mk 45 was designed to maximize reliability and the slower 20 rpm firing rate allowed a simper design that contributes to this. Hopefully, the RCN has done due diligence consulting with Leonardo 127/64 LW and BAE 5" Mk 45 users to confirm and compare real-world reliability before approving the gun selection. Germany selecting the Leonardo 127/64 LW for the F125 frigates whose design prioritizes low maintenance for long-duration deployments and the 127/64 LW winning recent competitions for the Spanish F110 frigates and Dutch LCF upgrade does provide confidence.

My other concern is if the HyperVelocity Projectile does successfully reach production, whether the Leonardo 127/64 LW will support it? It'd be unfortunate not having HVP's guided anti-air capability to complement Vulcano's guided anti-surface capability although perhaps Leonardo will just develop a version of their DART for the 127/64 LW.

I know this is going back a few years but didn’t the Tribal class originally have the Oto-Melara 127mm on them before they were converted to AWDs.
Yes they were sold to the Dutch who are now replacing them with new build Leonardo 127/64 LW.

Given the smart ammo availability for that gun it is a good selection. Canada should acquire a license to manufacture the warheads in Canada so as to ensure a goodly supply of the warheads.
BAE did license their 57mm 3P round to GD-OTS Canada for local production so I image an agreement can be reached with Leonardo for their similar 4AP round. It'll be interesting to see whether they are willing to license Vulcano though.
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
“Less than (oddly small number like 1km)” ranges tends to be combined with the limitation of the radar, CMS, or even launcher. Tough to say, but inside that, usually one of those things becomes the limiting factor more than the actual missile itself, especially one with a tip over feature like CAMM. My money would be on the radar. But even without those other limits, at some point you start creeping into safe limits to detonate without fragging yourself.
Shooting something down doesn't necessarily set off the warhead, & even if it does, shooting it down a couple of hundred metres away must be better than it exploding on your ship. And what about little recce drones?

It's not only about minimum range. It's also cost effectiveness, & maximum number of targets.
 

CB90

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Shooting something down doesn't necessarily set off the warhead, & even if it does, shooting it down a couple of hundred metres away must be better than it exploding on your ship. And what about little recce drones?

It's not only about minimum range. It's also cost effectiveness, & maximum number of targets.
No question on preferable to kill the missile before a direct hit but safety panels don’t always exercise common sense.
But the other factors driving min range hold true. Radar min range to guide the missile is a physical limitation regardless of missile capability.
 

Calculus

Well-Known Member
Cool video, courtesy the Irving Shipbuilding Twitter feed, of the final mega block assembly (bow section) for AOPV hull 3 (HMCS Max Bernays AOPV 432): This activity was filmed inside the Ultra Hall section of Halifax Shipyard's covered shipbuilding facility. In the video (around 0:27) you can see the blocks (modules) for hull 4 (HMCS Willian Hall AOPV 433) already in place awaiting assembly into the larger mega block sections in the Ultra Hall.

It will shortly be moved outdoors to the landside final assembly position and joined with the other two mega blocks (see video below, courtesy Irving YouTube channel) for final fit-up before launch in the Fall.


Once the space currently occupied by the bow mega block is freed up, the start of the assembly of the mega blocks for hull 4 will begin, which in turn will allow for the cutting of steel and assembly of the smaller blocks (or modules) for hull 5 (HMCS Frederick Rolette AOPV 434) in the Assembly Hall at the front of the facility.

Final assembly landside allows for the concurrent construction of 3 ships instead of 2. CSC is to be built at this same facility, but to my knowledge all assembly for those hulls will be under cover, which suggests only two will be under construction at any one time.

At this point in time, hull 1 (HMCS Harry DeWalt AOPV 430) has finished all trials, including a very successful ice trial in the Arctic in February, and hull 2 (HMCS Margaret Brooke AOPV 431), is in the water and due to start builder trials imminently.

Photo courtesy Irving Twitter feed ( )
AOPV Hulls 1-2-3.jpg
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
No question on preferable to kill the missile before a direct hit but safety panels don’t always exercise common sense.
But the other factors driving min range hold true. Radar min range to guide the missile is a physical limitation regardless of missile capability.
Yes, but you've not addressed cost-effectiveness & number of stored rounds, both of which are arguments against all-missile air defence.
 

CB90

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Yes, but you've not addressed cost-effectiveness & number of stored rounds, both of which are arguments against all-missile air defence.
I wasn’t trying to address it one way or the other. It should be a given fact of life that they are not cheap when it comes to missiles, especially active ones.

If the concern is about having a cost effective way to engage small low cost threats, well there are numerous other solutions out there that don’t require a traditional gun CIWS which has its own limitations in that regard.

If you really want a way to knock out low cost threats with a deep magazine, start working on a laser.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Can't buy an operational, tested, anti-aircraft laser able to shoot down lots of targets in rapid succession off the shelf, AFAIK, so at the moment it's only of interest for the future, not for current requirements.

Yes, my concern is that Sea Ceptor, whatever its good qualities as an inner air defence layer behind ESSM, could rather quickly run out of rounds against an opponent with lots of small UAVs or the like, & that there are obvious disadvantages to using missiles such as CAMM against things cheap enough for a relatively poor adversary to afford significant numbers.
 

CB90

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Can't buy an operational, tested, anti-aircraft laser able to shoot down lots of targets in rapid succession off the shelf, AFAIK, so at the moment it's only of interest for the future, not for current requirements.

Yes, my concern is that Sea Ceptor, whatever its good qualities as an inner air defence layer behind ESSM, could rather quickly run out of rounds against an opponent with lots of small UAVs or the like, & that there are obvious disadvantages to using missiles such as CAMM against things cheap enough for a relatively poor adversary to afford significant numbers.
OK, no disagreement there but you then are describing a problem literally nobody else has fully cracked. In the context of the CSC, I’m not sure what you’re suggesting they should do otherwise.

There are other interim solutions short of an operational laser, and those have already been described (smart ammunition or air burst auto cannon ammo).

But if your force is seriously concerned enough about a swarming threat like Harpy, your best defenses are things like breaking the targeting chain, EW, or simply opening distance from potential launch sites. Simply matching it force on force is a losing proposition.
 

Calculus

Well-Known Member
OK, no disagreement there but you then are describing a problem literally nobody else has fully cracked. In the context of the CSC, I’m not sure what you’re suggesting they should do otherwise.

There are other interim solutions short of an operational laser, and those have already been described (smart ammunition or air burst auto cannon ammo).

But if your force is seriously concerned enough about a swarming threat like Harpy, your best defenses are things like breaking the targeting chain, EW, or simply opening distance from potential launch sites. Simply matching it force on force is a losing proposition.
Excellent point on EW, @CB90. EW (and ECM) is an area that doesn't get mentioned a lot when the discussion turns to drones and swarming. It should be relatively easy to disrupt the radio link for any kind of unsophisticated drone with ship EW systems. No missiles (or guns) required. EW is, after all, designed to work against even sophisticated targets like missiles and aircraft... If anything gets through your EW or other countermeasures, then your CMS will assign the proper resources to deal with the threat kinetically.



And there are emerging technologies such as this, which basically fry the "brains" in the drone:

 
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shadow99

Member
Excellent point on EW, @CB90. EW (and ECM) is an area that doesn't get mentioned a lot when the discussion turns to drones and swarming. It should be relatively easy to disrupt the radio link for any kind of unsophisticated drone with ship EW systems. No missiles (or guns) required. EW is, after all, designed to work against even sophisticated targets like missiles and aircraft... If anything gets through your EW or other countermeasures, then your CMS will assign the proper resources to deal with the threat kinetically.
How does one deal with drones while a ship is in port?

Use of high powered microwaves or guns with houses surrounding the port doesn't seem prudent.
The threat goes up with state sponsored actors using 3d printers to build drones and weapons within these homes in our own home ports.
Purpose designed drones around a warhead with short range and high speed could be devastating if unprepared for this type of attack.

The scary thing is any asset in our home country could be at risk not just ports.
I would think this would keep the intel community busy.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
How does one deal with drones while a ship is in port?
The same way as everywhere else where collateral damage is a concern. Electronic warfare and jammers.

ESG demonstrated their modular GUARDION system specifically for harbour protection to NATO navies during Open Spirits 2019. The system is operational with the German military for field camp defense since last year.
 

shadow99

Member
The same way as everywhere else where collateral damage is a concern. Electronic warfare and jammers.

ESG demonstrated their modular GUARDION system specifically for harbour protection to NATO navies during Open Spirits 2019. The system is operational with the German military for field camp defense since last year.
I think the security teams will be in for a rude awakening by having a false sense of security with such a system such as GUARDION and other similar systems guarding harbors and important infrastructures.

First thing I wouldn't underestimate the intelligence and determination and what our enemies are capable of doing and this system seems to be designed and built thinking the adversary will be coming high in broad daylight, using gps and being controlled from the ground. The adversary, especially state sponsored would add an anti-jammer to their drone if they would even use gps. Onboard electronics and electric motors would be shielded from HPEM devices.

Several drones out the back of a van, pickup truck or local delivery cube van coordinated from multiple locations could be launched very quickly and at close range from a public road close to its target. A drone flying low between trees and buildings gives operators very little time to react even against cots drones.

How well does the Guardion system detect against background clutter of trees and buildings?(I know this would be classified, but food for thought) Does it detect a drone flying low and fast across choppy water in the harbor at night towards your naval ship. Add in some inclement weather, rain, snow, sandstorm. What about heavy fog, dense smoke?

A harbor is a great collection of ships and infrastructure and to any adversary is like shooting fish in a barrel.
What worries me is the next Pearl Harbor won't be from aircraft carriers and dive bombers but from the enemy within. Small independent groups sponsored with the support of an outside state could be extremely devastating.

The Guardian system is a start, but I hope their not all patting themselves on the back thinking how great their system is in defending a harbor from an intelligent, capable and determined foe.

Even here in Canada our naval bases will be targets and should be well defended. When you look at the amount of capital spent on our warships and infrastructure, all in such a small radius, it begs the question, are our bases protected from a modern day Pearl Harbor from happening?
 

Black Jack Shellac

Active Member
I think the security teams will be in for a rude awakening by having a false sense of security with such a system such as GUARDION and other similar systems guarding harbors and important infrastructures.

First thing I wouldn't underestimate the intelligence and determination and what our enemies are capable of doing and this system seems to be designed and built thinking the adversary will be coming high in broad daylight, using gps and being controlled from the ground. The adversary, especially state sponsored would add an anti-jammer to their drone if they would even use gps. Onboard electronics and electric motors would be shielded from HPEM devices.

Several drones out the back of a van, pickup truck or local delivery cube van coordinated from multiple locations could be launched very quickly and at close range from a public road close to its target. A drone flying low between trees and buildings gives operators very little time to react even against cots drones.

How well does the Guardion system detect against background clutter of trees and buildings?(I know this would be classified, but food for thought) Does it detect a drone flying low and fast across choppy water in the harbor at night towards your naval ship. Add in some inclement weather, rain, snow, sandstorm. What about heavy fog, dense smoke?

A harbor is a great collection of ships and infrastructure and to any adversary is like shooting fish in a barrel.
What worries me is the next Pearl Harbor won't be from aircraft carriers and dive bombers but from the enemy within. Small independent groups sponsored with the support of an outside state could be extremely devastating.

The Guardian system is a start, but I hope their not all patting themselves on the back thinking how great their system is in defending a harbor from an intelligent, capable and determined foe.

Even here in Canada our naval bases will be targets and should be well defended. When you look at the amount of capital spent on our warships and infrastructure, all in such a small radius, it begs the question, are our bases protected from a modern day Pearl Harbor from happening?
What do you think should be done? All of the bases are in the middle of well populated areas. Loading a ship with CIWS and having it fire off several thousand 20mm rounds, in a populated area, to take out some drones is madness. Ships will always be vulnerable in port, So don't keep them in port if there is a conflict.

The original question/comment was would you prefer to have CAMM or CIWS on the CSC. My answer still stands, if I have to choose, I choose the CAMM. A Phalanx holds about (feel free to correct my errors here) 1000 rounds and will typically fire off more than 100 at any given target. So you get about 10 shots (so 20 if 2 are mounted) with a range of 2 km or less. CAMM gives 24 shots with a range of ~25 km. CAMM is just a way better option. Yes, also way more expensive, but you are protecting a $2 billion ship.

If you want to shoot down drones, it would probably be best to fire 30 mm explosive rounds and radar guide them. One at a time. Drones are typically slow, so you don't need rapid engagement. Shooting them with a Phalanx (in port no less!) is like killing bees with a flame thrower...you killed the bees and destroyed your house while you were at it.
 

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
Drones in port, there are jammers available - and they're part of the force protection for at least some RN ships when in port. Soft kill is fine, by their very nature, they can't carry much in the way of transmitter power and even selectively degrading GPS will cause most of them to turn around and fly home, or to a safe place designated previously.

No need for a couple of hundred rounds of 30 mm :)
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Loading a ship with CIWS and having it fire off several thousand 20mm rounds, in a populated area, to take out some drones is madness.
There are some less "intrusive" options on the market and being tested, mostly going in the direction of fire control systems for small arms - from assault rifles up to a 40mm GMG with airburst shells (Kongsberg will sell you a RWS with integrated radar designed specifically for that).

The adversary, especially state sponsored would add an anti-jammer to their drone if they would even use gps. Onboard electronics and electric motors would be shielded from HPEM devices.
There is no such thing as an anti-jammer. If it's externally guided/piloted this guidance can be jammed. If it retrieves position information from external sources that can be interfered with. If it doesn't use either then with current technology we're no longer talking about Class I UAS.

Sure, "backpack solutions" are vulnerable in that regard, for the sake of mobility. But against an actual integrated cUAS system? No chance. Especially so when we're talking harbour protection for a ship with an actual electronic warfare suite in a port, or a containerized solution with similar-scale capability.
 

shadow99

Member
What do you think should be done? All of the bases are in the middle of well populated areas.
One would think for Canada, this would fall under "Strong Secure Engaged policy.
That is being Strong at home, and Secure in our boarders.

Make a list of every possible threat you can think of, that could be used against our Naval Ships in port and how you can effectively protect against everyone of those threats (Air, Land, Water and subsurface).
Having a command force structure in place and the authority to use lethal force in a timely manner can't be understated but should be obvious.
Having well trained, well armed and of sufficient numbers of fully equipped rapid response units to deal with all threats.
Having a clear policy regarding collateral damage and what is acceptable.
Having the Spy7 test unit located in Halifax provides improved situational awareness and increased response time to a large area. Including a test ExLS launcher with seaceptor would add a lot of credibility to the defense of Halifax and her Naval assets in port. Threats aren't just from small drones. One only has to look at the Twin Towers of NY to see the devastation that could happen.

With global tensions rising around the world it would seem to be prudent to be over prepared than under prepared.

Perhaps the Israelis with all of their real world experience could test our current system from an outsiders point of view showing us our weaknesses and ways of dealing with them. There's not much point in building Billion dollar Warships if you cant protect them in your own home port.

Also its probably a good time for everyone to break out their copy of Sun Zsu to help understand the mind of our enemy.
 
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