St. John's to Victoria is 7100 KMs, with a ferry ride at each end , so probably a realistic 9-10 days of steady driving from coast to coast. The furthest I've driven is from Ottawa to Slave Lake Alberta (north of Edmonton), and that took 4 days. That drive is about 3600 KMs. The North-South times are, as @John Fedup indicated, difficult to quantify. Just identifying a start point in the Arctic is difficult (Arctic Archipelago | The Canadian Encyclopedia). In any case, @ngatimozart's point is well taken - it would probably be a 5000KM transit from either Halifax or Esquimalt just to get to the start of a patrol area in the Arctic.
Royal Canadian Navy Discussions and updates
- Thread starter stephen weist
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Though relatively short legged, the RCN has run the Victorias on some quite long extended patrols. This is a good article describing one of those patrols, which took place in the Pacific, and included some intelligence work against North Korea: https://www.cbc.ca/news/thenational...dian-submarine-prowling-the-pacific-1.4512960
Thanks, really appreciate your efforts in this thread to discuss Canadian submarines and their replacement.
I think the range of the largest variant, Oceanic ER, is greater than 70 days , if SAAB marketing can be believed: Submarines | Leading naval technology | Saab
My pleasure.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
The 5000 KM transit to the Arctic patrol area was just as important as the under ice issue that made the unobtainable nuclear option so attractive to the RCN.
Not disagreeing but there is a difference between range and endurance which needs to be considered.
oldsig
See the above video seminar by Saab.
This is very different when talking about submerged endurance (with a zero IR). The issue for fussy users like the Singapore Navy, is the need to hide even at night with a zero or very low indiscretion ratio — due to the presence of capable opponents (who are using satellites and MPAs to track Singapore boats from the moment they leave Changi Naval base) and our need to always play an away game in the backyard of another country’s territorial waters. Every departure is an evasion and escape in the world’s busiest waterway.
Singapore provides a sea radar picture of the Singapore Straits to the Indonesians. From time to time, the Singapore Navy‘s specialised marine craft and submarines need to disappear from radar picture entirely during transit (and still avoid being hit by a commercial ship). Even our littoral mission vessels (which perform routine patrols) have some LO management, at base level and this radar signature can be modified (in a short while), along with AIS changes, to confuse our enemies by merging with commercial traffic.
If the Canadian Navy is willing to tolerate or mitigate against a higher indiscretion ratio (IR), especially at night, a long transit range of 5,000km is simply a function of diesel fuel and food carried onboard or a meet up with a submarine tender. The Australians need the ability to hide with a low IR even during a long transit to their mission area. The Collins class submarines were certainly tracking Indonesian submarines during Operation Stabilise to deter intervention.
This is very different when talking about submerged endurance (with a zero IR). The issue for fussy users like the Singapore Navy, is the need to hide even at night with a zero or very low indiscretion ratio — due to the presence of capable opponents (who are using satellites and MPAs to track Singapore boats from the moment they leave Changi Naval base) and our need to always play an away game in the backyard of another country’s territorial waters. Every departure is an evasion and escape in the world’s busiest waterway.
Singapore provides a sea radar picture of the Singapore Straits to the Indonesians. From time to time, the Singapore Navy‘s specialised marine craft and submarines need to disappear from radar picture entirely during transit (and still avoid being hit by a commercial ship). Even our littoral mission vessels (which perform routine patrols) have some LO management, at base level and this radar signature can be modified (in a short while), along with AIS changes, to confuse our enemies by merging with commercial traffic.
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True. Meant to say "endurance". Thanks for catching that. The endurance of the Victorias is apparently 8 weeks, or 56 days (Victoria-Class Capability | Fleet & Units | Royal Canadian Navy). I would assume that the RCN would be looking for a sub with more than this, though I have not seen anything resembling a SOR, so how much more is anyone's guess. There have been some pundits writing for Canadian defence periodicals such as Canadian Naval Review and CDR who have suggested it should be 80 days, which seems sensible. However, until an official replacement program is started, we simply won't know what the RCN wants. And, given the secretive nature of our last few procurements, we might not even know then...
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
There is a considerable timeframe for the RCN to see what designs emerge but certainly Australia’s Attack class should be a top contender. I think the rapid advances in missile technology may result in many navies reconsidering the ratio of surface combatants to submarines unless missile defence technology keeps advancing significantly as well.
Pretty funny. At around 37:24, the speaker, when discussing future sales, refers to opportunities in North North America. I've never heard Canada referred to that way before.
It does suggest though that the A26 is at the very least being actively marketed to Canada. If the RCN is interested is another matter, but I would think this design would be in the running.I don't pretend to be an expert on RCN submarine operations, but it would seem logical to assume Singaporean submarines operate in a more complex environment than do ours. So, where your guys are used to operating in this zero IR environment, I would suggest that RCN subs do not face the same constraints, given the vastness of the waters in which they operate. Knowing this (and thanks for the education, btw), I certainly have a newfound respect for RSN submariners!
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I would be less apt to describe the Singaporean submarine environment as "more complex" and more apt to just state that it is a different environment.
I say this because while the waters around Singapore are warmer, littoral, and amongst the most heavily trafficked, all of which makes it difficult for Singapore to have a sub depart unnoticed, those conditions also make it much more difficult to a "Red Force" sub to close and loiter/lurk in or near Singapore's waters.
OTOH with Canada, while it can be easier to arrange ingress/egress times and routes for RCN subs, the conditions which permit this also make it easier for non-Canadian subs to approach Canadian ports...
Another interesting article, originally published in the June 2018 edition of Warships International Fleet Review: Canadian submarine force demonstrates global reach
The last paragraph suggests up to 12 ships, which is what the Canadian Senate had recommended, and that the following firms were the most likely candidates to supply those vessels: Saab Kockums of Sweden, Naval Group (ex-DCNS) of France, Navantia of Spain, Fincantieri of Italy or ThyssenKrupp Marine of Germany. This is the first time I have seen either Navantia or Fincantieri mentioned.
Do I think we'll get 12? Nope. But it does jibe with what the Senate recommended, which was two subs available for patrol on each coast, including the Arctic (6), and an additional 2 subs available for international taskings - a total of 8 subs at high-readiness, available for operations at all times. To support this, given maintenance cycles and workups, I think 12 would be the minimum, so that number does seem logical. The only way this could happen, in my humble opinion, is if we gave up a number of T26s. This is actually what happened with the current subs. We cancelled the third batch of CPFs (Halifax class) to free up the money for the Upholders. Assuming we were going to buy 6 anyway, losing 3-4 T26s to gain an additional 6 subs does actually seem like a fair trade.
This paper is also interesting, and discusses the cost of a more modest procurement of 6 subs of a MOTS design. It also talks about some of the political and social impediments this program will need to overcome in order to move forward: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/305/summers.pdf
The last paragraph suggests up to 12 ships, which is what the Canadian Senate had recommended, and that the following firms were the most likely candidates to supply those vessels: Saab Kockums of Sweden, Naval Group (ex-DCNS) of France, Navantia of Spain, Fincantieri of Italy or ThyssenKrupp Marine of Germany. This is the first time I have seen either Navantia or Fincantieri mentioned.
Do I think we'll get 12? Nope. But it does jibe with what the Senate recommended, which was two subs available for patrol on each coast, including the Arctic (6), and an additional 2 subs available for international taskings - a total of 8 subs at high-readiness, available for operations at all times. To support this, given maintenance cycles and workups, I think 12 would be the minimum, so that number does seem logical. The only way this could happen, in my humble opinion, is if we gave up a number of T26s. This is actually what happened with the current subs. We cancelled the third batch of CPFs (Halifax class) to free up the money for the Upholders. Assuming we were going to buy 6 anyway, losing 3-4 T26s to gain an additional 6 subs does actually seem like a fair trade.
This paper is also interesting, and discusses the cost of a more modest procurement of 6 subs of a MOTS design. It also talks about some of the political and social impediments this program will need to overcome in order to move forward: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/305/summers.pdf
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Thanks @John Fedup and @Calculus for your education of a Kiwi on Canadian geographic distances. A bit larger than I thought.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I can state with near-absolute certainty that Canada will not, barring the outbreak of another conventional World War, ever have a sub fleet as you describe above.
I have mentioned previously in posts in other threads the Rule of Threes, i.e. to have a single asset (ship, aircraft, etc.) available or on a deployment, a total of three are required to permit training, maintenance cycles, and pre-/post-deployment operations. With subs the situation is similar but a little different, as it is a Rule of Fours for submarines, i.e. for every sub either on or ready for deployment, a total of four subs are required again to meet training and maintenance cycles, and pre-/post-deployment operations. Therefore, in order for Canada to have eight subs either ready for deployment or on deployments all at the same time, the RCN would need ~32 subs in the fleet. Realistically a 12 sub fleet would be able to have ~3 subs available at any given time, with the potential for surging 1-3 more depending on what the situation is and when it occurred.
@Todjaeger,
Sorry for the off-topic reply but I wanted to provide some details you may not be aware of. Your input is valued but I want to clarify some details relating to submarine operations around the relatively shallow waters around Singapore — so please bear with the additional info provided, for your consideration.
2. There has been so many near misses for foreign submarines in Singapore / Indonesian waters that in 2017 Singapore Navy started to provide a dedicated portal for submarine safety information (SSIP) with real time information with real-time tracking of deep draft commercial vessels and hazards to prevent underwater accidents. These include seismic activities, and real-time movement of deep-sea oil rigs and very large crude carriers.
5. The free portal, touted as the world’s first, is housed at the RSN’s Information Fusion Centre at Changi Naval Base, and builds on the existing database at the centre. In June 2009, a Chinese submarine accidentally snagged an underwater sonar array being towed by USS John S. McCain. Not all sub drivers are equally competent and we really don’t want them to die trying to observe ship movements in our waters.
6. Singapore also provides a regional submarine rescue service to multiple navies — can’t be bothered to dig up the long list of agreements with foreign navies today. DSTA has an article on sub rescue, here and have since 2015, established Joint Standard Operating Procedures for sub rescue, with other navies, like the US Navy.
7. Given that there are over 200 submarines operating in the region, Singapore is doing all it can to avoid a repeat of the Kursk incident (that occurred in August 2000, where all 118 personnel on board were killed), in the South China Sea. We also grieve with KRI Cakra in relation to the unfortunate deaths of two sailors in an submarine egress exercise in 2012 (see: Indonesian Navy to probe death of two sailors in submarine exercise).
Sorry for the off-topic reply but I wanted to provide some details you may not be aware of. Your input is valued but I want to clarify some details relating to submarine operations around the relatively shallow waters around Singapore — so please bear with the additional info provided, for your consideration.
1. At the very least, you would have to say that operating a ship or a boat in the Singapore Straits would constitute as steaming in a complex environment. In August 2017, the USS John S McCain was overtaking the Liberian-flagged tanker Alnic MC while both vessels were transiting the westbound lane in the Middle Channel passage of the Singapore Strait Traffic Separation Scheme, when a collision occurred. See: NTSB Accident Report on Fatal 2017 USS John McCain Collision off Singapore - USNI News
2. There has been so many near misses for foreign submarines in Singapore / Indonesian waters that in 2017 Singapore Navy started to provide a dedicated portal for submarine safety information (SSIP) with real time information with real-time tracking of deep draft commercial vessels and hazards to prevent underwater accidents. These include seismic activities, and real-time movement of deep-sea oil rigs and very large crude carriers.
3. Agreed. It just takes skill and coordination or having a good deception plan for any submarine operator who calls on Changi. US Navy and Australian Navy submarines do regularly call on Singapore as a port, with the SSIP designed to reduce stress for sub drivers in Singapore / Indonesian waters. These waters are also full of contact noise — it is really not easy to safely sail given the presence of deep draft vessels.
4. That is not true, from our observation — numerous countries, both friendly and hostile, lurk in our waters as part of their mission. The Singapore Navy has multiple unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) in the water, during our naval exercises in the South China Sea and we know that often multiple foreign submarines are tracking our ships and each other during these times. It is just risky and that prompted the creation of SSIP. Colonel David Foo, Commanding Officer of the Submarine Squadron said, “The portal will help submarines navigate amid unmanned underwater vehicles and warship exercises out at sea.”
5. The free portal, touted as the world’s first, is housed at the RSN’s Information Fusion Centre at Changi Naval Base, and builds on the existing database at the centre. In June 2009, a Chinese submarine accidentally snagged an underwater sonar array being towed by USS John S. McCain. Not all sub drivers are equally competent and we really don’t want them to die trying to observe ship movements in our waters.
6. Singapore also provides a regional submarine rescue service to multiple navies — can’t be bothered to dig up the long list of agreements with foreign navies today. DSTA has an article on sub rescue, here and have since 2015, established Joint Standard Operating Procedures for sub rescue, with other navies, like the US Navy.
7. Given that there are over 200 submarines operating in the region, Singapore is doing all it can to avoid a repeat of the Kursk incident (that occurred in August 2000, where all 118 personnel on board were killed), in the South China Sea. We also grieve with KRI Cakra in relation to the unfortunate deaths of two sailors in an submarine egress exercise in 2012 (see: Indonesian Navy to probe death of two sailors in submarine exercise).
8. True, from a certain point of view. Conversely, Singapore submarines just use the traffic noise to hide from "Red Force" sub and observe their activities.
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Canadians took note — MINDEF also confirmed that the pioneering crew, which will be in service as RSS Invincible once commissioned, has commenced training in parallel to these sea trials.
Thanks for the links. If Canada decides on 6 MOTS SSK submarines, you certainly can’t accuse the country of too much ambition.
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Ten years from now we have have an environment where surface combatants are much more vulnerable so trimming 3-5 T-26s for extra subs could make sense. If the geopolitical situation doesn’t deteriorate too much and missile technology doesn’t progress as much as I fear it will then trimming the T-26 build probably only result in a more expensive unit cost.
I believe Spain builds a German design but am not sure about Italy. Can’t see much point in Canada buying from either. Might as well stick with the builder which did the design, especially if some Canadian modifications are required.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Have to agree, the maximum number might be 12 thus allowing a sub each for the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific. Realistically the Arctic sub won’t be in the Arctic for much more than 3-4 months (until the ice cap disappears) so it would be available for international duty.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
A good size globe will give a much better perspective on distance, especially compared to 2D maps with a northern hemisphere orientation.