I think you also have to consider our NATO and NORAD commitments when making these statements. Interoperability with our allies must be a key consideration when making this decision. Canada cannot defend itself by itself, we rely on our allies. In exchange for this, our allies rely on us. If we end up in a first world conflict, we will not be in Canada fighting, we will be somewhere else supporting someone else, and they will likely be using the F35. Now because we are the odd man out, we need to bring our own spares, our own maintenance crews, our own etc etc etc. On top of that, we could be facing peer on peer.
The truth is nobody knows what the next conflict will be, nobody predicted the Crimea fiasco or Georgia. To assume we will never be in a peer to peer situation is pretty naive I think.
Another consideration which needs to be kept in mind, and it does often appear that politicians, those officials who control the cheque book, and optimistic idealists who wear rose-tinted glasses, all seem to consistently fail to consider what the future can bring, which has led to history repeating itself. Repeatedly, unfortunately.
Just like it typically does not go well fighting today's wars using yesterday's weapons and kit, so too it will be similarly difficult fighting tomorrow's wars using the weapons and kit of today. If that was not a military/naval truism, then the weaponry and kit of today would be little different to that used in 1914, or even that in service before the American Civil War in 1861. Both conflicts led to the very rapid development and integration of new weaponry and capabilities unseen in prior conflicts, as well as the strategies and tactics to make use of such new capabilities.
If one sets the capability requirements for the RCAF fighter force as 'only' interception and identification of unknown and largely civilian aircraft, or shadow/escort flights of foreign long-ranged aircraft near Canadian airspace/territory, or CAS/ground-attack missions vs. irregular forces, then that is an enormous failure in planning, as it ignores both the potential for other scenarios which do exist to occur, and how badly impacted Canada as well as Canadian forces an allies could be impacted. Such a failure in planning is also planning to fail.