Not necessarily so. Buying 12 submarines is not the same as intending to operate 12 submarines simultaneously. If you consider the intention of starting a continuous build line it could equally mean an intention to build up to a fleet of nine, then retire one for one as the last few come on line. That would remove the least modern and introduce the most modern of that class while preparation and design is done for the replacement class. Then, if the replacement is delayed it reduces the risk that the navy gets stuck trying to support creaking hulls.
Not my idea by the way. This was suggested by someone in Defence around the time that the fleet of twelve was first mooted. And I've read it repeated here.
oldsig
From what I recall, the original plan for the 12 sub force was to build the subs in three blocks of four, with a goal of having a total sub force of eight in service. The first two would be built and commissioned and as the third sub was getting commissioned, one of the
Collins-class SSG's would be decommissioned, with the numbers rolling along from there. Then as boat nine gets commissioned, one of the initial SEA 1000 production block subs would be decommissioned, with the numbers again rolling from there.
As for the difficulties the RAN had in crewing the six
Collins-class SSG's, there were a number of reasons for that. Some due to external circumstances like the mining boom, where the mining industry was looking for people with certain skills and trades and was willing to pay to attract and keep them. Unfortunately the desired skills and talents were also relevant to the submarine service, so the RAN was having to compete with the mining industry to retain experienced personnel with the skills needed to serve aboard subs and the RAN just did not have the budget to match the pay and signing bonuses the mining industry could offer.
Another area which was essentially self-inflicted was having all the subs based at FBW which meant any sub crew member not from Perth or WA would be looking at either relocating their families or else face long periods of separation. Having some subs based at FBE should help relieve that to a degree.
Another area which was again essentially self-inflicted (by gov't I believe) was the maintenance and docking schedule that gov't authorized the RAN and ASC to conduct. By reducing the scale of some of the upgrades and maintenance to reduce cost and perceived risk the reliability and availability of the subs suffered. Add to that the desire of gov't to reduce some of the operating costs by having subs tied up alongside, then the sub crews can no longer deploy out to sea and needed skills start to wither, and/or service members who joined up to go to sea start looking at alternate careers (like mining) that pay better if they are going to be stuck ashore.
Lastly, there is the fact that the
Collins-class sub fleet is only six vessels, requiring a total of 60 officers and 228 sailors. With such a small pool of crew, it becomes hard to maintain the sort of critical mass, especially when subs are undergoing long-term maintenance or tied up alongside and not going out to sea. Had the options for the two extra subs been exercised and then the maintenance and docking cycles been done as planned, then I suspect the RAN would not have had such difficulty getting subs out to sea.