Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[ngatimozart]

You don't send constabulary coast guards vessels to a major exercise whereby they sail with major warships and practice defending against simulated attack by enemy jets. Some level of self-defence capability would be nice.

Have a look at the Singaporean navy, they are starting to equip their patrol vessels (their new Independence class LMV) with Mica VLS system.

I am not proposing turning the OPV into an OCV, but it would be nice to have the OPV to be fitted for some additional capabilities when needed, in the sense of mission modules or in the traditional "fitted for but not with" way.

I don't see anything that the ACPBs are doing anything war like. Yes they are on an exercise but that doesn't mean that they are going to do any combat ops. It's good training for the crews to participate in such exercises because they won't be on ACPBs for their whole career.

 

[gf0012-aust]

You don't send constabulary coast guards vessels to a major exercise whereby they sail with major warships and practice defending against simulated attack by enemy jets. Some level of self-defence capability would be nice.

not that extraordinary to have coastal management/OPV's mixed into major fleet events

eg USCG have had a cutter attached to STANAVFORLANT for more than 10 years - and they are not a major surface combatant by any means. The French have also done the same in the PACRIM

they're in there for training reqs as its not unforseen that green/grey need to co-operate with blue and vice versa

that doesn't translate to them being used for tier 1 work

 

[Joe Black]

eg USCG have had a cutter attached to STANAVFORLANT for more than 10 years - and they are not a major surface combatant by any means. The French have also done the same in the PACRIM

they're in there for training reqs as its not unforseen that green/grey need to co-operate with blue and vice versa

that doesn't translate to them being used for tier 1 work

Yes I know, but USCG cutters are big ships (typically over 100m). They have either a 76mm or a 57mm gun onboard (the old Hamiltons even have a Phalanx onboard).

The French Navy's FS Prairial that attended the latest RIMPAC exercise is a Floreal-class frigate, I am not aware that they previously send any of their coast guard vessels to Rimpac.

Nevertheless, I am not proposing making the Sea 1180 OPV into a tier 1 vessel, but if the OPV would be used more than just constabulary work, perhaps a nice medium calibre gun, and a CIWS could be the answer, plus the ability to start plugging in mission modules in standard ISO containers.

I like idea of the the Damen OPV2 armed with a 76mm or a 35mm Millennium as the main gun, plus a pair of standard Typhoons / mk 38 and Mk36 SRBOC on one each side. Give the OPV a low-cost air-surface search radar like the Sea Giraffe, and could be it.

Just some thoughts only - really.

 

[ADMk2]

It surprises me that there doesn't seem to be much development work on STOVL UAVs that could operate off flatops without cats.

I can see a lot of navies that would be interested in that technology.

Apart from the MQ-8 Firescout types with full VTOL you mean? Or more like a fixed wing UAV that can operate like an F-35B?

I think cost would be a major factor here...

 

[Bluey 006]

Apart from the MQ-8 Firescout types with full VTOL you mean? Or more like a fixed wing UAV that can operate like an F-35B?

I think cost would be a major factor here...

VTOL Advanced Reconnaissance Insertion Organic Unmanned System (VARIOUS)

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/various.html

This concept appeared some years ago and it is likely things are progressing behind closed doors as much of it is based off the lessons learned in F-35 program. The thing is though, it is unlikely LockMart would want to have it compete (for orders) with the F-35B while the F-35B is still learning to walk.

 

[vonnoobie]

Recently in a conversation on another site a comment was made that an analysis for the replacement for the Kanimbla's came to favor 4 x LPD's however manning restraints led to the 2 LHD's. Is there any truth to this? Better yet does any one have any sources that led to the governments decision (ie: requirements, constraints etc)?

Has just peaked my interest a little.

Cheers

 

[gf0012-aust]

Recently in a conversation on another site a comment was made that an analysis for the replacement for the Kanimbla's came to favor 4 x LPD's however manning restraints led to the 2 LHD's. Is there any truth to this? Better yet does any one have any sources that led to the governments decision (ie: requirements, constraints etc)?

Has just peaked my interest a little.

Cheers

I have a doubt. I was tied into some of the earlier developments and never ever heard of any modelling around 4 platforms

bill and ben were snap decisions based around armies wrap up input into the mistakes of ET

the decisions were never about capacity but about sympathetic and coherent capability where all expeditionary platforms could transfer material with a minimum of grief

ET almost came undone due to logistics and thats what drove the decisions

manning 4 x LPD's would have been nigh on impossible due to manning constraints and restrictions in the politics of the decade around the decisions

 

[Goknub]

The recommendation for 4 x LPD over 2 x LHD came from an ASPI report back in 2004. Capability of First Resort? Australia’s Future Amphibious
It was mentioned/rejected in a Govt report. Google "Chapter 3. Australia’s Future Amphibious Requirement"

Now if only the replacement heavy landing craft were a higher priority. They didn't even get a mention in the naval shipbuilding plan as far as I could find. The Army still doesn't give amphibious operations the priority it needs considering every conflict we have been involved in has been overseas.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The recommendation for 4 x LPD over 2 x LHD came from an ASPI report back in 2004. Capability of First Resort? Australia’s Future Amphibious
It was mentioned/rejected in a Govt report. Google "Chapter 3. Australia’s Future Amphibious Requirement"

yep, ASPI - so not driven by navy reqs and reviews

 

[Raven22]

The Army still doesn't give amphibious operations the priority it needs considering every conflict we have been involved in has been overseas.

How is it the Army's fault that the Navy didn't replace the LCHs? That makes zero sense. You might as well blame the Navy because the RAAF took so long to replace the Caribou.

I think the Army is doing more than you know for the amphibious capability. If the Navy could keep ships serviceable, the whole program would be a lot further along than it is.

 

[rjtjrt]

..........

bill and ben were snap decisions based around armies wrap up input into the mistakes of ET

the decisions were never about capacity but about sympathetic and coherent capability where all expeditionary platforms could transfer material with a minimum of grief

ET almost came undone due to logistics and thats what drove the decisions

........

I recall Kanimbla/Manoora were in Australia at time of East Timor 1999. They were not yet operational, as I remember, due delays.

 

[t68]

I recall Kanimbla/Manoora were in Australia at time of East Timor 1999. They were not yet operational, as I remember, due delays.

From memory they were still undergoing conversion at the time, and GF could confirm from memory they had long lead time to may what may happen hence the fast ferry HMAS Jervis Bay

 

[Redlands18]

D-Day for Talisman Sabre
Taliking of Amphibs Australia conducted it's largest Amphibious operation since WW2 today as part of Exercise Talisman Sabre.

 

[gf0012-aust]

From memory they were still undergoing conversion at the time, and GF could confirm from memory they had long lead time to may what may happen hence the fast ferry HMAS Jervis Bay

OPERATION STABILISE (INTERFET1999-200) (wiki)

Of the 22 nations involved in INTERFET, 10 provided naval assets. Australia was the single largest provider, with 14 ships deployed with INTERFET between 19 September 1999 and 23 February 2000: the frigates Adelaide, Anzac, Darwin, Sydney, Newcastle, and Melbourne; the landing ship Tobruk, the landing craft Balikpapan, Brunei, Labuan, Tarakan, and Betano; the fast transport Jervis Bay; and the replenishment vessel Success. The United States contributed seven ships: the cruiser Mobile Bay; the amphibious assault ships Belleau Wood, Peleliu, and Juneau; and the replenishment ships Kilauea, San Jose, and Tippecanoe. France supplied four vessels: the frigates Vendémiaire and Prairial plus the landing ships Siroco and Jacques Cartier. Singapore contributed the amphibious landing ships Excellence, Intrepid, and Perseverance. New Zealand deployed the frigates Te Kaha and Canterbury and the replenishment ship Endeavour. Other naval vessels deployed during the operation included the Canadian replenishment ship Protecteur, the Italian amphibious assault ship San Giusto, the Portuguese frigate Vasco da Gama, the Thai landing ship Surin, and the British destroyer Glasgow.[19]

Bill and Ben were OP ASTUTE 2006

 

[vonnoobie]

Looking into it the upto 4 x LPD's didnt actually come from ASPI but actually from the Army.

The Army's view at the time was that there where a number of smaller (12,000t range) LPD's that carried the same amount of landing craft as the larger LHD's and there personnel need was to be able to land as many vehicles etc as quickly as possible, Something that they viewed 3 - 4 LPD's would be able to do better then 2 x LHD's.

 

[gf0012-aust]

worth reading

[FONT=tahoma, sans-serif]You Cannot Surge Trust: Combined Naval Operations of the Royal Australian Navy, Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, and United States Navy, 1991–2003 [/FONT]

[FONT=tahoma, sans-serif]Operation Stabilise: U.S. Joint Force Operations In East Timor CSC 2001 Subject Area Operations
[/FONT]

 

[Goknub]

How is it the Army's fault that the Navy didn't replace the LCHs?

The RAN is focused on its warfighting capabilities, the LCH replacements are not a priority for them. Amphibious assets barely got a mention in the grand shipbuilding plan so if Army wants amphibious ops to be a core capability they need to fight for the assets they need regardless of which Service drives them. These Joint capabilites is one area the new ADFHQ could really contribute to.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The RAN is focused on its warfighting capabilities, the LCH replacements are not a priority for them. Amphibious assets barely got a mention in the grand shipbuilding plan so if Army wants amphibious ops to be a core capability they need to fight for the assets they need regardless of which Service drives them. These Joint capabilites is one area the new ADFHQ could really contribute to.

the LPD's were successful as they were enthusiastically picked up at a joint level by all the service 3 stars

 

[hauritz]

the LPD's were successful as they were enthusiastically picked up at a joint level by all the service 3 stars

It is interesting to think how the requirements for joint projects such as the acquisition of the LHDs must be determined.

I imagine the army putting forward a case for some sort of amphibious capability while the navy would be concerned about money being taken away from projects that they are interested in. The airforce would probably oppose fixed wing elements being operated from these vessels as it could impact on their own plans.

It must make for some very interesting meetings.

 

[gf0012-aust]

It is interesting to think how the requirements for joint projects such as the acquisition of the LHDs must be determined.

I imagine the army putting forward a case for some sort of amphibious capability while the navy would be concerned about money being taken away from projects that they are interested in. The airforce would probably oppose fixed wing elements being operated from these vessels as it could impact on their own plans.

It must make for some very interesting meetings.

I've been to some of the JP2048 meetings in the early days where army were excoriated over their lack of battlespace comms integration

"wincing moments" if you wore green in those days