Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Australian navy must go for f35 for its navy
Would you like to tell us why you think we need Naval F-35s. We do not have suitable Ships for conducting F-35 combat operations off. At best the LHDs could be used for Trg and ferrying F-35Bs but could not sustain operations over any length of period due to a lack of Aviation Fuel bunkarage and magazine capacity.

PS : Mate the Mods are very tough one one liners.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Steel is cheap and air is free, combine this with the facts that the capabilities of the F-35 are so transformational, that we are fitting more and more of our ships (including amphibs and the new tankers) with the same core combat system that could potentially be expanded to deliver ASMD levels of capability or better, and we are in a deteriorating strategic situation, the question has to be asked why we are not at least assessing the capability even a small number of F-35B will bring to the ADF.

I have long believed the flexibility, even without STO/VL or AEW, that a small helicopter carrier, Through Deck Cruiser, Escort Cruiser, DDH, could bring to the ADF would make the acquisition worthwhile. A small build of three such ships in place of the same number of frigates, to support operations locally and globally would be a no-brainer. The only issue was when the fleet was looking to shrink to only three DDGs, possibly only six underwhelming ANZAC replacements and a mix of semi commercial patrol boats and support craft there was no way we could justify the further reduction in combatant numbers such a move would require as there were already going to be insufficient ocean going combatants to meet operational requirements.

Flash back to the mid 90s, when there were to be 14-17 major combatants, or forward to the near future with 12 majors and 12 OPVs with the very real potential to be upgraded to corvettes and three 20-30,000 ton (or even 10-20,000ton), flat decks, with frigate propulsion and combat system, could actually be viable in place of three of the frigates. Just order the final batch of F-35 as B models, procure a modular AEW system to fit our MHR-90 (or maybe MH-60S) fleet, specify three or more of the OPVs with modular enhanced capabilities and equipment to permit their deployment on UN etc. ops and the ADF has an affordable, deployable, carrier capability that is a massive force multiplier. With the F-35B and carriers in service it becomes easy to deploy the B's on the LHDs as well.
 

hairyman

Active Member
My previous thread is being ignored, so I will go again. I would suggest a purchase of a Izumo class ship from Japan with a ski jump deck, would be ideal. Similar weight to our Canberra class, but with a longer flight deck. Maybe we would not be limited to VTOL planes.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
More important is to decide what to fly it off. At this timeI would go Japanese, their "destroyer" Izumo,. but with the same ski jump deck as our LSD:s.
Pointless discussion as we have already ruled out the F-35's for the RAN or any F-35's being operated off of RAN asset's in any capacity.

We only have x amount of personnel to perform a task on a scale that would scare most. Operating in a far larger area with limited asset's reduces any ability for us to acquire niche assets such as carriers and F-35B/C's.

In any case this has already been decided on by those in charge and has already been debated to death here with I believe the general consensus being it would take away resources more valuable used else where.
 

hairyman

Active Member
Point taken Vonnoobie. But if ever the RAN and or defence decided a carrier might be handy for the RAN, then rather than potter around with our LHD's, purchasing a Azumo with Ski Jump from the Japanese might be the way to go.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
More important is to decide what to fly it off. At this timeI would go Japanese, their "destroyer" Izumo,. but with the same ski jump deck as our LSD:s.
Point taken Vonnoobie. But if ever the RAN and or defence decided a carrier might be handy for the RAN, then rather than potter around with our LHD's, purchasing a Azumo with Ski Jump from the Japanese might be the way to go.
A ship the size of Izumo doesn't actually need a ski jump though I wouldn't necessarily preclude one. The Japanese designs would be a good fit IMO, especially the smaller Hyuga which embodies the ASW and Command capabilities that would be most useful to the RAN, together with their greater self defence capability. Izumo is more a carrier with a secondary LPH role, impressive and capable but considering the existence of the Canberra's, probably not necessary.
 

Oberon

Member
Point taken Vonnoobie. But if ever the RAN and or defence decided a carrier might be handy for the RAN, then rather than potter around with our LHD's, purchasing a Azumo with Ski Jump from the Japanese might be the way to go.
Being "handy" is insufficient reason to devote the sort of capital spend a carrier, plus aircraft like the F-35B, would involve. This was considered back in the early eighties when the Melbourne was retired without replacement. The government of the day instead decided on air to air refuelling and bare base airfields in the north as part of their Defence of Australia posture. A RAN aircraft carrier type vessel would cause considerable concern amongst our northern neighbours and is not a decision to be taken lightly. Indeed, I don't think any government in the past three or four decades as given it any serious thought.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Pointless discussion as we have already ruled out the F-35's for the RAN or any F-35's being operated off of RAN asset's in any capacity.

In any case this has already been decided on by those in charge and has already been debated to death here with I believe the general consensus being it would take away resources more valuable used else
Just because they have been ruled out operating of the LHD in the short term, does not rule out the capabilty long term for land use, I'd also hazard a guess that it would have been pointed out to PM Abbott at the time that it's going to take many years for the ADF to become proficient in Amphibous Warfare without complicating the mattter with additional capabilty.



In a little-noticed address to an ASPI meeting in July, the head of the RAAF, Air Marshal Leo Davies, listed the candidates for Australia’s next combat-aircraft program as Super Hornets, F-35As and F-35Bs.

Davies did not explain the merits of the third, quite surprising option, the F-35B. But an obvious possibility is that Australia has begun to wonder about the survivability of its northern airbases in the face of attack by Chinese cruise and ballistic missiles.
Report Raises Chance Of More Australian F/A-18 Super Hornets

Oct 21, 2016

Bradley Perrett | Aviation Week & Space Technology
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Well I think 2017 we will need to make some more decisions about our amphibious capability.

  • Can we realistically surge 2xLHD 1x LPD? For an ARG? is this the sort of capability Australia can sustain long term?
  • Should we replace the LPD with a more capable ship, or multiple less capable ships?
  • What are we doing about our heavy landing craft
  • What are we doing with our LCM's. Should we be considering LCAC? Can we operate that from our LHD's.
  • Are our helicopters suitable for amphibious operations or should we be looking at MV-22's?
  • Is an organic fixed wing capability something we should leave the door open to in the future? Not explicitly get F-35B's but be able to acquire them or similar capability in the future.

My preference is for another LHD, but bigger or reconfigured. Able to do amphibious, fixed wing, LCAC, MV-22. Something like a JC1, but with a 10-20m plug and in the original JC1 configuration or with larger JP5 bunkerage and aviation focus but with an ~800-1000 troop in Australian configuration.

That way you enhance the amphibious capability. 1400 on each of the Canberra's and 800 on the larger Canberra+ would give us 3,600+ 100-110% the USMC ARG capability instead of the <90% we are aiming for. Or you could shift for a more air focused role. But all the air assets could take off and land on any of the LHD's.

Plus you could then support MV-22's, LCAC, F-35 without trying to reconfigure the LHD's. But with the same LHD systems to reduced logistics, training etc. The LCM-1e still get used, but heavy stuff can operate off the Canberra+ LCAC (or carried in the Canberra+ but can shift off the existing Canberra's). Crewing comes from Choules (and some). Choules then get offered to someone in the region. Malaysia, Singapore, NZ would be ideal (and all ex-british colonies).

I'm not sure a dedicated carrier is the way to go, and it might shift the RAN, RAAF, and army in a non positive way. Particularly if it means throwing away the whole amphibious concept we have been trying to build.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Well I think 2017 we will need to make some more decisions about our amphibious capability.
Agree, I think they have to make a move on a complimentary assets in the short term replacement LCH has to be dealt with sooner rather than later.



Can we realistically surge 2xLHD 1x LPD? For an ARG? is this the sort of capability Australia can sustain long term?
It was pointed out on here some time ago that the ARG is a one shot bullet, I don't think we have to ba able to rotate the capabilty but sustain the deployment once it's lodged and that's comes down to cheaper sealift shipping and stratigic airlift.




My preference is for another LHD, but bigger or reconfigured. Able to do amphibious, fixed wing, LCAC, MV-22. Something like a JC1, but with a 10-20m plug and in the original JC1 configuration or with larger JP5 bunkerage and aviation focus but with an ~800-1000 troop in Australian configuration.

I'm not sure a dedicated carrier is the way to go, and it might shift the RAN, RAAF, and army in a non positive way. Particularly if it means throwing away the whole amphibious concept we have been trying to build.

I think that would be good if the ARG only needed 2x LHD to make up the ARG, but I would support a carrier with a secondary Amphious Assault role in a similer way to Cavour and modified Prince of Wales, our one shot bullet is going to need the protection from threats from the air, surface and subsurface at its core role so it should be filled with fixed wing for CAP over the task force as well as have multiple AEW and ASW aircraft.

Come the mid 20's I personally think we need more than one Choules replacement that can serve in different roles when needed, it should be able to be used in the strategic role of moving large amounted of stores also bulk liquids and the move into the Amphibious Assualt role for a Battlion, a hanger for 6x MRH or 2x Chinooks. If you haven't guessed it am talking about a modified HNLMS Karel Doorman, I think our Amphibous Warfare shipping should consist of,

2x Canberra LHD
1x ASW/Strike carrier
2x Karel Doorman LPD (modified)
8x LCH replacement (oceanic capable)
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
there needs to be a reality check on the force planning already in play and the resources, manning and budget constraints

the phatships are more than just seagoing trucks - and for any consideration to get a fixed wing fighter fleet air arm you would have to demonstrably hack into the rest of the services and force planning for the next 20 years

thats just not going to happen

there's a reason why we are getting praise from other militaries on a structured and coherent force development - we haven't been distracted and all force development is around an existing model that is the envy of a lot of other forces, despite how small it may appear when compared to militaries with a far bigger clout

there is a strong focus to banish the good idea faeries because its unhelpful
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I'm not sure a dedicated carrier is the way to go, and it might shift the RAN, RAAF, and army in a non positive way. Particularly if it means throwing away the whole amphibious concept we have been trying to build.
No need to throw away the amphibious concept to have a number of small carriers. The carriers would be complementary to the existing force structure, replacing three of nine high end frigates with something like a Japanese DDH. It would still have the same combat system as the frigates, possibly the same self defence and even local area defence capability, plus it would also have the ability to surge our existing and planned helicopter forces in anti submarine and littoral operations.

With the acquisition of AEW and mine warfare modules for MRH90 or possible MH-60S, we would gain an expeditionary capability we currently lack. Same with a future acquisition of F-35B, the ships don't need them to be useful but add them to the mix and we are talking transformational capability increase.

I can't see an AWD or LHD being deployed to even a low threat zone alone, i would imagine the minimum would be an AWD paired with a frigate, while an LHD would likely justify an AWD, a frigate or two and possibly an mcm, hydrographic, or even ASW/Anti Swarm Boat configured OPV. With an ARG we would send everything, including the kitchen sink to escort it. In such senarios it doesn't really matter that three of the potential escorts are massively more capable and flexible DDHs instead of frigates that may or may not carry cruise missiles.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
Is the capability provided by the LCH really that badly missed by the navy?

The LCM would seem to cover ship-to-shore operations.

I might be missing something ... but it seems to me that an LCH wouldn't really greatly increase the amphibious capability the navy already possesses. Other roles such as Humanitarian Aid would probably be better left to the navy's new OPVs.

The reason the LCH replacement is missing from the white paper may be that it wasn't considered to be a priority.
 

hairyman

Active Member
Volkodav, when you say a Japanese DDH, do you mean the 27'000 ton Azumo that I suggested, or the 19'000 ton Hyuga, the smaller and older of the two?
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
No need to throw away the amphibious concept to have a number of small carriers. The carriers would be complementary to the existing force structure, replacing three of nine high end frigates with something like a Japanese DDH. It would still have the same combat system as the frigates, possibly the same self defence and even local area defence capability, plus it would also have the ability to surge our existing and planned helicopter forces in anti submarine and littoral operations.

With the acquisition of AEW and mine warfare modules for MRH90 or possible MH-60S, we would gain an expeditionary capability we currently lack. Same with a future acquisition of F-35B, the ships don't need them to be useful but add them to the mix and we are talking transformational capability increase.

I can't see an AWD or LHD being deployed to even a low threat zone alone, i would imagine the minimum would be an AWD paired with a frigate, while an LHD would likely justify an AWD, a frigate or two and possibly an mcm, hydrographic, or even ASW/Anti Swarm Boat configured OPV. With an ARG we would send everything, including the kitchen sink to escort it. In such senarios it doesn't really matter that three of the potential escorts are massively more capable and flexible DDHs instead of frigates that may or may not carry cruise missiles.
When you say replace 3 of the FFG's with a DDH are you talking a 1 for 1 swap or a 3 for 1 swap?

In either event we could very well be worse off.

A. If replacing 1 for 1 even if the DDH's may be more capable (I dealt this, but just my opinion) they are also far more crew intensive requiring 2 - 3 times as many personnel as our planned FFG's, Sadly sailors dont grow on trees.

B. If replacing 3 for 1 then we are set personnel wise but we would then run into the issue of while having 1 very capable asset we would have that 1 asset required to voer the downtime, and operational needs of those 3 planned assets effectively spreading the force very thin if not out right giving up on a number of operations.

That also doesnt take into account the issue with continuous shipbuilding, DDH's wont exactly slip into the same production line as AWD's and FFG's meaning either longer build times for those units (reduced efficiencies = higher costs) or a period of non production for surface combatants (requiring retraining of extra workers next time a build cycle comes around = higher costs).

They are nice big shiney ships but with the size of the area we operate I don't see decreasing the number of available hull's as being a benefit regardless of how good the replacement asset is nor do I see the benfit in diverting such a large amount of resources (personnel, cash and time) to acquire what would effectively be a niche asset to us.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Is the capability provided by the LCH really that badly missed by the navy?

The LCM would seem to cover ship-to-shore operations.

I might be missing something ... but it seems to me that an LCH wouldn't really greatly increase the amphibious capability the navy already possesses. Other roles such as Humanitarian Aid would probably be better left to the navy's new OPVs.

The reason the LCH replacement is missing from the white paper may be that it wasn't considered to be a priority.
You are probably correct on the LCH not being a priority though not so sure the OPV's would be able to fill in for them. OPV's would still require some form of port access while LCH's could land straight on the beach.

A few benifits of the LCH's depending on what was chosen is that

- they can go far greater distances for longer periods independantly then the LCM's.
- They fill in low operational requirements quite nicely (ie: Only needing to deliver x amount of resources but that Choules or Canberra's would be over kill for)
- For marginal cost both financially and personnel wise they provide a good force multiplier.

With everything else going on especially an umber of programs on a very tight schedule the LCH is not that big a deal but when/if it comes back into use it will be a valuable one.
 

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I might be missing something ... but it seems to me that an LCH wouldn't really greatly increase the amphibious capability the navy already possesses. Other roles such as Humanitarian Aid would probably be better left to the navy's new OPVs.
.
Proportionality. The old LCHs were appropriate for soft diplomacy among our island friends in a way a LHD could not be. If we just want to provide neighbourly assistance with all the close ties that can engender, an LCH with a small engineer detachment and equipment can build a lot of bridges (literally and figuratively) without tying up a major and potentially intimidatory fleet unit.

oldsig
 

t68

Well-Known Member
Is the capability provided by the LCH really that badly missed by the navy?
Not sure if they are badly missed but it's good comand training for junior officers and lower ranks.

The LCM would seem to cover ship-to-shore operations.
Ship to shore was only one aspect, Balikipapan undertook a 5000 plus nautical mile passage something the LCM-1E can't do

I might be missing something ... but it seems to me that an LCH wouldn't really greatly increase the amphibious capability the navy already possesses. Other roles such as Humanitarian Aid would probably be better left to the navy's new OPVs.
A lot of operations were in support of Pacfic nation with troop movement HADR and coastal patrols, good will vista they were a versatile asset



The reason the LCH replacement is missing from the white paper may be that it wasn't considered to be a priority.
Most likely a budgetary measure more than anything
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
the govts clear direction is that if you want any additional capability beyond white paper planning then your service must give up existing capability so as to not blow out future force planning costs, if your service can't give something up, then another service will have to

guess what the chances are of that happening
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Hairy man - Hyuga

Vonnoobie - three frigates sacrificed for three DDH / Light Carriers.

The AWDs will never deploy alone except for maybe flag showing, they, our most powerful surface combatants will always operate with other fleet or coalition / allied assets, that's how it works. Same with the new frigates, something would have to be very wrong for one of them to be operating alone, they will pretty much always be deployed with other Australian or friendly combatants.

So taking this into account, how is a fleet of three DDH, three DDG, and six FFG inferior and less flexible than one with three DDG and nine FFG? In particular when the DDH has the same combat system, sensors, and mostly the same weapons as the FFGs they are supplanting. How are they more difficult to build when they have the same systems from the same supplier's as the frigates? They are bigger but bigger is actually easier to build, in particular to outfit.

The blocks and superblocks would actually be the same size as those for a frigate, there would just be more of them. Actually, ask navantia what's quicker, easier and cheaper to build, a frigate or a carrier / LHD? Maybe ask Ingles and Kawasaki too, maybe Hyundai as well. So what if they take longer to build, it just spreads out the work more and actually helps maintain a continuous build that could be expanded to include the eventual LHD, LPD and AOR replacements.

The RAN plans to acquire Firescout type UCAVs and the ADF has requirements for additional helicopters to support special forces etc. and possibly helicopters or UAV/UCAV for the OPVs, all types that in a task force setting would be more efficiently operated and supported from a DDH / light carrier. In fact, lets assume each FFG is assigned one Romeo and one Firescout and the additional helo is assigned to the DDH, that means each of the two DDH in active service / deployed has the two Romeo's it would have had as a frigate, one from the DDH in refit or reserve and three from the frigates now operating Firescouts. Six Romeos on a DDH are far more effective than the same number dispersed through the taskforce or fleet, they are also easier and cheaper to maintain, in fact the DDH would become a force multiplier through being able to support/maintain the helicopters of the ships flights.

The three DDH, unlike the frigates the replace, would also be able to operate AEW, SAR (or CSAR) and MCM helicopters, when not if these capabilities are acquired. Tilt rotors will not be an issue either and should the ADF acquire F-35B, guess what? There is also the army's ARH force, be it upgraded Tigers or something else, they will be certified for operation from the LHDs so logically also the DDH but somehow can't imagine them being dispersed onto frigates and AWDs.

The DDH would also have superior situational awareness to the frigates the supplant as they would logically have the same combat system and sensors but they would be mounted higher and hence have a greater horizon. They would also have larger command spaces and more data coming in from their greater number of helicopters, UAVs and UCAVs, just imagine the picture they would have with AEW and F-35B. Then there is their ESSM and possibly even SM-6 from their MK-41 VLS, as well as CEC.

Far from a reduction in numbers they would maintain numbers and multiply capability using existing and planned ADF assets and capabilities more efficiently and effectively. Even the small increase in crew is not a problem as a significant number of them could be junior sailors and officers who are taking advantage of the training billets these ships would provide, building experience under competent supervision before going out into the fleet fully qualified and experienced in their field from their time on the DDH/CVL. The aviation side would be covered from the personnel who would normally deploy with the aircraft.
 
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