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Joe Black

Active Member
Can we trust DCNS

Our French submarine builder in massive leak scandal

Cameron Stewart
Associate Editor
Melbourne

The French company that won the bid to design Australia’s new $50 billion submarine fleet has suffered a massive leak of secret documents, raising fears about the future security of top-secret data on the navy’s future fleet.

The stunning leak, which runs to 22,400 pages and has been seen by The Australian, details the *entire secret combat capability of the six Scorpene-class submarines that French shipbuilder DCNS has designed for the Indian Navy.

A variant of the same French-designed Scorpene is also used by the navies of Malaysia, Chile and, from 2018, Brazil, so news of the Edward Snowden-sized leak — *revealed today — will trigger alarm at the highest level in these countries. Marked “Restricted Scorpene India”, the DCNS documents *detail the most sensitive combat capabilities of India’s new $US3 bn ($3.9bn) submarine fleet and would provide an *intelligence bonanza if obtained by India’s strategic rivals, such as Pakistan or China.
The leak will spark grave concern in Australia and especially in the US where senior navy officials have privately expressed fears about the security of top-secret data entrusted to France.

In April DCNS, which is two-thirds owned by the French government, won the hotly contested bid over Germany and Japan to design 12 new submarines for Australia. Its proposed submarine for Australia — the yet-to-be-built Shortfin Barracuda — was chosen ahead of its rivals because it was considered to be the quietest in the water, making it perfectly suited to intelligence-gathering operations against China and others in the *region.
Any stealth advantage for the navy’s new submarines would be gravely compromised if data on its planned combat and performance capabilities was leaked in the same manner as the data from the *Scorpene. The leaked DCNS data details the secret stealth capabilities of the six new Indian submarines, including what frequencies they gather intelligence at, what levels of noise they make at various speeds and their diving depths, range and endurance — all sensitive information that is highly classified. The data tells the submarine crew where on the boat they can speak safely to avoid *detection by the enemy. It also discloses magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data as well as the specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and the combat system.

It details the speed and conditions needed for using the periscope, the noise specifications of the propeller and the radiated noise levels that occur when the submarine surfaces.

The data seen by The Australian includes 4457 pages on the submarine’s underwater sensors, 4209 pages on its above-water sensors, 4301 pages on its combat management system, 493 pages on its torpedo launch system and specifications, 6841 pages on the sub’s communications system and 2138 on its navigation systems.
The Australian has chosen to redact sensitive information from the documents.

Sea trials for the first of India’s six Scorpene submarines began in May. The project is running four years behind schedule.

The Indian Navy has boasted that its Scorpene submarines have superior stealth features, which give them a major advantage against other submarines.

The US will be alarmed by the leak of the DCNS data because Australia hopes to install an American combat system — with the latest US stealth technology — in the French Shortfin Barracuda.
If Washington does not feel confident that its “crown jewels’’ of stealth technology can be protected, it may decline to give Australia its state-of-the-art combat system.

DCNS yesterday sought to *reassure Australians that the leak of the data on the Indian Scorpene submarine would not happen with its proposed submarine for Australia. The company also implied — but did not say directly — that the leak might have occurred at India’s end, rather than from France. “Uncontrolled technical data is not possible in the Australian *arrangements,” the company said. “Multiple and independent controls exist within DCNS to prevent unauthorised access to data and all data movements are encrypted and recorded. In the case of India, where a DCNS design is built by a local company, DCNS is the provider and not the controller of technical data.

“In the case of Australia, and unlike India, DCNS is both the provider and in-country controller of technical data for the full chain of transmission and usage over the life of the submarines.”

However, The Australian has been told that the data on the Scorpene was written in France for India in 2011 and is suspected of being removed from France in that same year by a former French Navy officer who was at that time a DCNS subcontractor.

The data is then believed to have been taken to a company in Southeast Asia, possibly to assist in a commercial venture for a *regional navy.
It was subsequently passed by a third party to a second company in the region before being sent on a data disk by regular mail to a company in Australia. It is unclear how widely the data has been shared in Asia or whether it has been obtained by foreign *intelligence agencies.
The data seen by The Australian also includes separate confidential DCNS files on plans to sell French frigates to Chile and the French sale of the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship carrier to Russia. These DCNS projects have no link to India, which adds weight to the probability that the data files were removed from DCNS in France.

DCNS Australia this month signed a deed of agreement with the Defence Department, *paving the way for talks over the contract which will guide the design phase of the new *submarines. The government plans to build 12 submarines in Adelaide to replace the six-boat Collins-class fleet from the early 2030s. The Shortfin Barracuda will be a slightly shorter, conventionally powered version of France’s new fleet of Barracuda-class nuclear submarines.

Restricted data
The secret information the leaked documents reveal:
• The stealth capabilities of the six new Indian Scorpene submarines
• The frequencies at which the subs gather intelligence
• The levels of noise the subs make at various speeds
• Diving depths, range and endurance
• Magnetic, electromagnetic and infra-red data
• Specifications of the submarine’s torpedo launch system and the combat system
• Speed and conditions needed for using the periscope
• Propeller’s noise specifications
• Radiated noise levels when the submarine surfaces
View the leaked documents below. If you are using a mobile device, you can view the extracts on the desktop version of theaustralian.com.au

Our French submarine builder in massive leak scandal|The Australian
(Right mouse click and open with "New Private Window" or Incognito Window)
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Frankly I don't know what to believe about the numerous leak stories about this and the even more numerous F-35 leaks. The frequency is increasing my skeptisim about these leaks, hopefully I am right!
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
That is a pretty big leak.
That's not transcripts of conversations etc. that might be basically all the useful intel the manufacturer has on that project.

You wonder how much would Dcns have to drop the ball for Australia to start to look else where.
 

t68

Well-Known Member
That is a pretty big leak.
That's not transcripts of conversations etc. that might be basically all the useful intel the manufacturer has on that project.

You wonder how much would Dcns have to drop the ball for Australia to start to look else where.
Makes you wonder, if it was a show stopper wonder of the Japanese would really want to play ball again,


Edit

It appears the PM is down playing it.
http://www.news.com.au/national/sou...k/news-story/fef2f03e73776698410925ab2e987105
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Makes you wonder, if it was a show stopper wonder of the Japanese would really want to play ball again,
Noting the documents were

is suspected of being removed from France in that same year by a former French Navy officer who was at that time a DCNS subcontractor
.... suggests inappropriate or illegal action by an individual (essentially industrial espionage noting he wanted to use the information for other purposes). The same issues relate to a lot of projects, including US projects, where individuals attempt to use or steal information for personal or 'national' purposes.

This does not necessarily suggest that Australian information will be flippantly managed. How DCNS deal with security as a result of this theft is really the issue. I would not be rushing to conclusions that this is a show stopper.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Agreed on not rushing to conclusions, So far it is all just media hype and they are expert's at delivering only partial fact's out of context so should be careful on anything they say.

That said I'd imagine the level of security will be far greater for the Australian Submarines as we are getting tech from there nuclear submarines, This isn't you'r average conventional submarine that they will try and sell to just anyone.

From my understanding from the get go we have had extremely high level of security procedures put in place including not having any of the plans on net worked computers thus greatly limiting the chance of just anyone pinching the designs.

Regards, vonnoobie.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
All I have to say is compare the public domain stats of the Scorpion to the Shortfin and then consider how different the two designs are going to have to be to each other. Recall also that the Spanish S-80A is a derivative of the Scorpene JV but was different enough to result in serious weight miscalculations that delayed the project for up to two years.

I wouldn't panic too much as the RANs replacement subs will be very different to the Indian ones. If anything this could be used to justify having Australians in key roles and managing the contractors rather than DCNS serving as prime.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
This does not necessarily suggest that Australian information will be flippantly managed. How DCNS deal with security as a result of this theft is really the issue. I would not be rushing to conclusions that this is a show stopper.
I don't think this is a show stopper, yet. It won't contain anything useful about the Barracuda and the short fin Barracuda.

But its raising a pretty big concerning question. I do wonder what would have happened if this had gotten out during the tender process. What would happen if it was the Barracuda information instead of the Scorpene?

Given it had already occurred before the tender process, I wouldn't imagine it was impossible that other people/nations knew about this particular issue.

Nocookies | The Australian
The company says that with the Australian project DCNS is responsible for safeguarding sensitive information both in France and in Australia, whereas in India it was merely “the provider and not the controller of technical data”.
Why does that literally send off red flashing alarms in my head. Saying DCNS is in charge of security after this leak does not seem to be pouring cold water on this particular issue, as it would seem that a DCNS employee or ex-employee is central to this issue.

The fact that they not only had information on subs, but Russian mistrals and other projects, and then those documents found their way to a news paper (as well as lots of others) is not a good sign. Security must be pretty lax. You would hope to isolate projects (and even down to parts of projects) pretty comprehensively.

I am curious why this leak has occurred at its current timing by an Australian company to a news paper.

Makes you wonder when the CIA rejected a deal to make France part of the five eyes what the US knows about French security.

The leak of who won the Australian submarine contract was not a great start to the project either.
 

Joe Black

Active Member
I don't think this is a show stopper, yet. It won't contain anything useful about the Barracuda and the short fin Barracuda.
If I were Indian I would be pissed. Yea the information might not necessary give too much useful information on Barracuda, but you do have to wonder how our Shortfin's technical info would be provided if DCNS happens to have another episode of disgruntled/opportunistic ex-employees or contractors.

China is laughing right now I would imagine.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Which end did that originate from AU or FR?
Exactly. This seems to be a very important question now.

China is laughing right now I would imagine.
I don't know if its laughing, but they will be watching very closely. The fact The Australian had pretty good understanding of the provenance of this information is also very interesting. Its not often a leak comes with a full paper trail from where.

We know the Chinese were hitting TKMS pretty hard during the bidding process. The Japanese were very out spoken about security and were worried about even dealing with Australia. The french really didn't say anything, except they can be trusted and that the rumours about them not being trustworthy are not true and that the Americans said they would probably work with them.

Which makes me concerned that DCNS didn't even know someone had walked out their door with the information would seem to indicate pretty lax controls. How a single user can go through and access every file on a project and span multiple projects is worrying. Obviously any attempt to lock it down after it got out was a complete failure (I assume they didn't even know about it until it was published). The original motive for taking the information (competitive advantage) is also worrying as is the amount of copying between parties in the industry, that still would have worked for/along with DCNS.

Very worrying news for DCNS. DCNS has certainly had its problems. I wouldn't imagine it would be too hard to find ex-DCNS employees from the Barracuda program, they basically re-staffed the place ~ 12 months ago because it was running so far behind.
 

Joe Black

Active Member
Exactly. This seems to be a very important question
Which makes me concerned that DCNS didn't even know someone had walked out their door with the information would seem to indicate pretty lax controls. How a single user can go through and access every file on a project and span multiple projects is worrying. Obviously any attempt to lock it down after it got out was a complete failure (I assume they didn't even know about it until it was published). The original motive for taking the information (competitive advantage) is also worrying as is the amount of copying between parties in the industry, that still would have worked for/along with DCNS.

Very worrying news for DCNS. DCNS has certainly had its problems. I wouldn't imagine it would be too hard to find ex-DCNS employees from the Barracuda program, they basically re-staffed the place ~ 12 months ago because it was running so far behind.

India is now really concern. I wonder if the impact is so huge that they will stop further builds and expediate with a new design (Project-75 I or i) to replace their Kilos.

Govt probes damage caused by Scorpene submarine data leak - Times of India
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I don't think this is a show stopper, yet. It won't contain anything useful about the Barracuda and the short fin Barracuda.

But its raising a pretty big concerning question. I do wonder what would have happened if this had gotten out during the tender process. What would happen if it was the Barracuda information instead of the Scorpene?

Given it had already occurred before the tender process, I wouldn't imagine it was impossible that other people/nations knew about this particular issue.

Nocookies | The Australian


Why does that literally send off red flashing alarms in my head. Saying DCNS is in charge of security after this leak does not seem to be pouring cold water on this particular issue, as it would seem that a DCNS employee or ex-employee is central to this issue.

The fact that they not only had information on subs, but Russian mistrals and other projects, and then those documents found their way to a news paper (as well as lots of others) is not a good sign. Security must be pretty lax. You would hope to isolate projects (and even down to parts of projects) pretty comprehensively.

I am curious why this leak has occurred at its current timing by an Australian company to a news paper.

Makes you wonder when the CIA rejected a deal to make France part of the five eyes what the US knows about French security.

The leak of who won the Australian submarine contract was not a great start to the project either.
Let's put this in perspective based on what we know.... Noting the report indicated the document was marked "restricted" and clearly was not a document subject to significant controls (as it would have been noticed as missing if it were) then it appears suggesting this was "most sensitive" may be a press overplay as opposed to the information being 'secret' or 'particularly sensitive'. The term 'restricted' in previous Australian use was the lowest classification of documents.

By way if example .... In the current system the term protected is the lowest classification

The PROTECTED security classification should be used when the compromise of the confidentiality of information could be expected to cause damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.

Not exactly the same critical impact (or controls) as Confidential, Secret and Top Secret where the damage and controls steadily increase. In fact Annex A of the guidance on this (see below) indicates that PROTECTED needs some degree of protection. Not exactly suggesting this is 'most sensitive. By the way documents that reveal cabinet papers should be PROTECTED and these appear to leak from the government process like rain.

https://www.protectivesecurity.gov....ianGovernmentSecurityClassificationSystem.pdf

So once again I suggest this may not have been as bad as suggested and I don't think it should be overplayed despite the press attempt to beat this up. I am sure the facts will play out in time.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Bit off topic in regards to India,
But what rights do they have over this, can India sue for damages which it has caused to the sub program?
it all gets down to the classified parts of the contract that deal with IP management.

couple of issues here, it would appear that the leak is internal and from the DCNS end - French reports blaming the indians will have flow on effect - and I would imagine that there could be peripheral flow on for other french gear under consideration despite them not having any contractual relationships - eg Rafale negotiations would come under negotiation pressure by association

if DCNS has not complied with unknown (ie public domain) contractual management considerations re protection of the IP, then I would imagine that life for DCNS will be very much more difficult. If it can be established that there is State material thats been exposed and which was held under DCNS comms, then it becomes even uglier, exposing their own tech material is bad enough, bleeding material that may hilight IndNav CONOPs (subs, skimmers, ASW, C2,3,4 and ISR artifacts) would be worse

Not enough exposed to the public domain for any real analysis to be made

it will be of even greater interest for other Scorpene users, there will be some shallow egg on face for public commentators in Oz who were also pushing for a canned buy of the Scorpene....
 
Last edited:

Joe Black

Active Member
it all gets down to the classified parts of the contract that deal with IP management.

couple of issues here, it would appear that the leak is internal and from the DCNS end - French reports blaming the indians will have flow on effect - and I would imagine that there could be peripheral flow on for other french gear under consideration despite them not having any contractual relationships - eg Rafale negotiations would come under negotiation pressure by association
.
Details of how the leaks happened and how The Australian got a copy of it. Reads more like a Tom Clancy's story:

It's in the mail: how submarine secrets surfaced in Australia
https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&...YJ2D2bHR_BxeOS86P954gA&bvm=bv.131286987,d.dGo
(Right mouse click and open it in Private/Incognito window)
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Details of how the leaks happened and how The Australian got a copy of it. Reads more like a Tom Clancy's story:

It's in the mail: how submarine secrets surfaced in Australia
https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&...YJ2D2bHR_BxeOS86P954gA&bvm=bv.131286987,d.dGo
(Right mouse click and open it in Private/Incognito window)
Actually I have read stories on it with apperantly the initial Journo involved saying that the story had a lot of holes, yet apperantly still good enough to be read as gospel o.0.

Journalism does not live up to any standards these days, Even if something sounds out of place they will still go and print it.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
If Cameron Stuart had any morals he would have contacted the Ind Mil Attache before contacting DCNS - and he definitely should not have egged the material as much as he has

It creates some nightmares for all 4 countries irrespective of what the talking heads say

any material thats been compromised for so long (since 2013) is well on the way to being reference material by other INT services that would have far greater ability and resources than a media hack
 

Joe Black

Active Member
If Cameron Stuart had any morals he would have contacted the Ind Mil Attache before contacting DCNS - and he definitely should not have egged the material as much as he has
Why would he? He needs to sell papers. He would probably be fired by The Australian had he done the right thing.
 
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