The BPE has several advantages even totally ignoring the F-35 skijump.
-It can carry more
-It can deck a chook with its blades removed
-It has better accomodation and room for more troops
The offical Navantia Canberra class bid website list a whole load more.
I think it looks sexier..
http://www.lhd.tenix.com/
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/SHIP_LHD_Navantia_lg.jpg
As its been pointed out, AEW would be a smart buy regardless (even with no LHD). The BPE is the more capable ship for Australia regardless of STOVL. So to operate F-35B's off it, we would just have to upgrade our F-35 order for ~12 units F-35B for ~$10 million a peice extra. With very little additional logistics and ongoing costs over a F-35A.
$120 million dollars to have stealth fixed wing airsupport for our navy at sea and land forces overseas. As well as able to be stationed at rough and ready airfields? Not to mention Australia would be one of the very few countries with TWO carriers. Thats ~$6 for every Australian, money well spent. You could get elected on that slogan.
Not to mention the pubicity win for the ADF, attracting people to work on its new carriers in army, navy and airforce. It would encorage them all to work more cohesively together. It would also maximise the effectiveness of the AWD's freeing some cells for SM-3 etc instead of land or shipping stike weapons and allowing them to be more flexable in the selection.
It would also make Australia the logical base for F-35 service contracts regionally. Bringing in money, creating jobs, building skill base.
Australia would step out to become a true blue water force, as well as a regional security power, more able to operate independant of US forces and US policy. Australia would find new political friends, with 2nd tier players looking for a strong friend.
It would be un-Australian to not get the BPE and the F-35B's to stick onto it.
Good post StingrayOZ and I agree with everything you have said. I've never quite been able to get over the abandonment of the fixed wing FAA.
The writing was probably on the wall for the FAA from the time it proved so successful during
Sydney's deployment to Korea. The RAAF always resented its existence, believing, probably correctly, that it took money away from the airforce.
As early as 1954 the government backed away from the original plans of operating two front line carriers.
Sydney had its modernization plans cancelled and was relegated first to training and then to troop transport roles,
after only six years service as a carrier. With encouragement from the RN, who advised that it would be unable to operate the next generation of British naval fighters,
Melbourne was given an ASW role by the government even though many in the RAN believed it would be more valuable as a light strike carrier. With this view in mind, contingency plans to operate Sea Furies alongside the Sea Venoms, in place of some or all of the Gannets, were kept in place for some time. The concept of acquiring American aircraft did not fit with the 'old school tie' RAN hierarchy of the time. In 1959, after
Melbourne had been in service for
only four years plans were made to abandon fixed wing flying in 1961 and operate her as an ASW helicopter carrier. Only the dedication of the FAA leadership and the turning of a few 'blind eyes', kept the existing Sea Venoms and Gannets in service until replacement aircraft were eventually acquired in the late 60s. Moves to acquire a faster and larger replacement for
Melbourne were rejected on the basis of cost or manpower requirements. The British carriers
Bulwark, Albion and
Centaur were all considered at various times beginning soon after
Melbourne entered service and from the mid 60s there were proposals to acquire a modified
Essex class carrier, together with 28 F4B Phantom IIs, 24 S2E Trackers and 8 E1B Tracer AEW aircraft. Had such a carrier been purchased it would have needed extensive modification to operate the F4 (which was not used on USN
Essex class carriers) but the fact it was considered is interesting. Subsequent proposals for a VSTOL carrier finally foundered with the cancellation of the
Invincible purchase in 1982 and fixed wing naval aviation was gone.
Not all of the FAA’s decline can be blamed on government or on RAAF jealousies. There was also an almost unbelievable ignorance of the capability of available naval aircraft by some very senior naval staff including at least one CNS. Often these staff relied totally on what they were told by their RN counterparts whereas their own naval pilots could have told them about aircraft like the A4 Skyhawk and its proven ability to operate from the CVLs years before it was finally acquired (it had been tested by the RCN on
Bonaventure). The RAN could have had the Skyhawk in service at least 5 or 6 years earlier than what finally eventuated.
Sources:
Flying Stations, A Story of Australian Naval Aviation, Australian Naval Aviation Museum, Allen and Unwin, 1998
The Royal Australian Navy, David Stevens, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005
IMO, it would be very risky from a political point of view to push for a naval F-35B squadron at this stage but a good starting point would be for the navy and army to push the RAAF to acquire a small number for a joint operations squadron. It would certainly be great to see the RAN regain the ability to operate advanced fighter aircraft at sea.
Cheers