Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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I don't think that's a particularly relevant comparison. With very few exceptions, any 50 year old in the Army would have progressed to a rank where they would no longer be part of the field force, and would be conducting duties no more arduous than in the other services.
After all, despite the increasing numbers of senior officers and warrant officers, the actual command structure hasn't become bloated. Even the growth in proper S/G1-7 staff jobs has been limited. All the growth is in random paper shuffling areas irrelevant to the front line.
The funny thing is, in the Army at least, there is a far larger number of useless WOs than there are officers. The Army is currently about 300 WO1s over establishment. At least a ceiling-rank Major or LTCOL has the education and training to still be useful in some capacity. The vast majority of WOs, on the other hand, have very little utility outside of the regimental stream.
That’s the point I was trying to make. You can’t make an extra infantry battalion out of all those surplus RAInf WO2s, WO1s and Majors in the Army. But the Navy can and does send their older and senior sailors back to sea in technical appointments they might have held 10-20 years ago.
Not just technical sailors, if it wasn't for the 50+ sailors and officers there wouldn't be many PBs going to sea at all. With the RAN as well senior BMs can hold bridge watch keeping certificates from the Navy Jobs site:
Officer of the Watch (OOW) on Armidale Class Patrol Boats (ACPB) by obtaining your Limited Navigation Watch keeping Certificate (LNWC). Petty Officer Boatswains have the ability to increase skill levels by obtaining a Navigation Watch keeping Certificate (NWC).
Age, far from being an impediment can actually be an advantage in the RAN. As for the RAAF I know less of the ages and opportunities but looking at the number of grey haired pilots and techos in civil aviation I cant see any reason why it would be a problem.
Basically the higher tech the ADF becomes the more opportunities there will be for older competent personnel. UAVs, UGVs etc. why not use a competent 50+ to drive the thing rather than an inexperienced kid, considering the decisions that have to be made with armed options maturity would be an advantage.
Part of the reason people keep getting promoted is to increase their pay rates, why not instead opt for specialists along the lines of Army SSOs but pay them according to there experience and competency rather than rank?
Looking at the aircraft carrier programs and aspirations we are seeing throughout the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean regions I cant help but wonder if Australia may end up being the only major economy / nation in the greater region without aircraft carriers by 2050.
Quite ironic as from 1948 until 1961 (when India commissioned INS Vikrant) the RAN was the only navy in the greater region to have a carrier and from then until the retirement of HMAS Melbourne in 1983 one of only two nations. Now there seems to be an ideological block in our political, government, military classes, as well as in many parts of the Australian community that a carrier capability is unaffordable, unsustainable and unnecessary.
Purely personal opinion here but the lack of carrier airpower has forced Australia to put up with capability gaps as well as spending huge sums of money on other less effective, less versatile capabilities to make up for the lack of carriers. i.e. the cost of the Seahawk helicopters, the associated modifications to the first three FFGs and the local build of an additional two FFGs was higher than the cost of building a new carrier, in fact was likely close to the cost of a new carrier and Harriers / Sea Harriers or even the build of two simpler helicopter carriers to operate the existing Sea King and Wessex helicopters. Throw in the cost of the two LPHs and the picture becomes even clearer, maybe a third hull could have been afforded. Would we have needed AWDs if we had AV-8B+ or Sea Harrier F/A-2 and a helo based AEW? Would a cheaper GP DDG design have sufficed, or even modernised Kidd Class DDGs? Could we then have invested more in OPVs or corvettes instead of PBs and patrol frigates?
I wonder what it would take to change the prevailing anti-carrier mind set, what would need to happen to review the inherent flexibility and capability these platforms provide?
I live in hope but expect to be forever disappointed.
Quite ironic as from 1948 until 1961 (when India commissioned INS Vikrant) the RAN was the only navy in the greater region to have a carrier and from then until the retirement of HMAS Melbourne in 1983 one of only two nations. Now there seems to be an ideological block in our political, government, military classes, as well as in many parts of the Australian community that a carrier capability is unaffordable, unsustainable and unnecessary.
Purely personal opinion here but the lack of carrier airpower has forced Australia to put up with capability gaps as well as spending huge sums of money on other less effective, less versatile capabilities to make up for the lack of carriers. i.e. the cost of the Seahawk helicopters, the associated modifications to the first three FFGs and the local build of an additional two FFGs was higher than the cost of building a new carrier, in fact was likely close to the cost of a new carrier and Harriers / Sea Harriers or even the build of two simpler helicopter carriers to operate the existing Sea King and Wessex helicopters. Throw in the cost of the two LPHs and the picture becomes even clearer, maybe a third hull could have been afforded. Would we have needed AWDs if we had AV-8B+ or Sea Harrier F/A-2 and a helo based AEW? Would a cheaper GP DDG design have sufficed, or even modernised Kidd Class DDGs? Could we then have invested more in OPVs or corvettes instead of PBs and patrol frigates?
I wonder what it would take to change the prevailing anti-carrier mind set, what would need to happen to review the inherent flexibility and capability these platforms provide?
I live in hope but expect to be forever disappointed.
King Wally
Active Member
In my humble personal opinion I think there still exists a chance in the years to come. After the LHD's hit open water and for example start cross training with the USMC, including their F35-B's I think we could start to see a national conversation start again.
Around the period of time in the 2020's when the RAAF look to replace our 24 Super Hornets with F35A's I would surely think that you could stop and debate the logic of instead picking up a squadron of F35-B's and perhaps a light STOVL carrier. The LHD's could provide a great training prop to build up readiness for such a move too. In the back of my mind however I just wonder if the future sub project may suck the life out of the defence budget at that point in time?
Around the period of time in the 2020's when the RAAF look to replace our 24 Super Hornets with F35A's I would surely think that you could stop and debate the logic of instead picking up a squadron of F35-B's and perhaps a light STOVL carrier. The LHD's could provide a great training prop to build up readiness for such a move too. In the back of my mind however I just wonder if the future sub project may suck the life out of the defence budget at that point in time?
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Like you I live in hope and know I'm going to be forever disappointed too!
What would it take to change the mind set? Maybe if our northern neighbour (who isn't so happy with us at the moment) eventually built up a credible navy and carrier force, even then I still wouldn't hold my breath.
It's funny you bring up the subject, the other day I was having a look through my old Warships of Australia book and I was reading the chapters about the formation of the RAN not much more than 100 years ago.
It was interesting to read about the various proposals for the composition of the fleet before finally settling on the numbers and types of ships that would become the RAN.
It got me thinking (yes I know, it's dangerous to think), if the new nation of Australia was starting off today, as it was then, to build a navy from scratch, what would the composition be?
Back then with a population of 4 million, included in the fleet were Destroyers, Submarines, Cruisers and of course a capital ship, the Battlecruiser HMAS Australia.
I suppose there are endless views on what would be appropriate fleet composition today, but I'd certainly have a few 'capital ships', eg, aircraft carriers in my fleet!!
the road runner
Active Member
Defence Minister says....
"So you want a Light Air Craft Carrier and F-35B for Air Defence and Strike for the fleet ? We just bought you Air Warfare Destroyers and will give you a strike missile on the future Subs we are purchasing plus we went the extra mile and even gave you the F-35A and A330 MRTT, you guys are getting a bit greedy ....."
"So you want a Light Air Craft Carrier and F-35B for Air Defence and Strike for the fleet ? We just bought you Air Warfare Destroyers and will give you a strike missile on the future Subs we are purchasing plus we went the extra mile and even gave you the F-35A and A330 MRTT, you guys are getting a bit greedy ....."
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They are trying to phase out CPO Bosuns being boardos on ACPB. I know many CO's prefer the XO and Navigator to be 2 different people so XO becomes Boarding Officer. This allows Nav to be used for statements and drive the boat during boardings in close range to the vessel being boarded. The time frame was for officers to be Boardos on all ACPB by end of next year(once current postings are up for most) but noting how hard it is to get officers posted to Darwin, and how overborne the BM catagory is, the general belief is they will still have CPO as Boardos. The buffer, Coxswain and 1 LSBM are required to be OOW and get their LNWC. Generally this pushes their watches to 1 in 5 before they get Phase 3 Trainees qualified.
Im very supportive of cleaning out some of the older generation of all rates in the RAN. With the changes in ships coming and different capabilities, we could clear out many Senior Sailors in the MT, ET, NPC, BM and Supply(come at me pusser!
). The changes in much of the types of engines brings about new techincal challenges and new training and qualification requirements. With Aegis on AWD this means training more 30-40 yr old Petty Officers in the US would allow more useful time to work with this capability then sending a 50 year old chief(as some have already done). It is becoming quite frustrating for people at LS and PO to get promoted and get a posting in a new locality as some chiefs have a death grip on a position and dont let go until retire or die, and these people dont always go back to sea once they've found a good shore billet. Many POs have been unable to get career progression and are simply quitting as they can more options with outside of Navy, including customs who are more then happy to take many well experienced ACPB POs.
And my response is, if we had a carrier or two (or even three) we wouldn't need strike missiles on our future subs, or in fact as many future subs, the AWD could have been a cheaper less capable but potentially more versatile design and with the ability to get a dozen or more F-35Bs where we wanted, when we wanted, we wouldn't need as many F-35As or A330 MRTTs. With carriers would could cut back on requirements for the ANZAC replacements and go for a mix of corvettes and OPVs to replace them and the ACPBs.
Customs are desperately short of engineers so that makes sense. On the ACPBs the Hull PO billet is quite interesting, it lets the PBs push out more Charge Qualified CPO MTs than any other FEG, if it keeps up I can see career orientated POs pushing to get up north.They are trying to phase out CPO Bosuns being boardos on ACPB. I know many CO's prefer the XO and Navigator to be 2 different people so XO becomes Boarding Officer. This allows Nav to be used for statements and drive the boat during boardings in close range to the vessel being boarded. The time frame was for officers to be Boardos on all ACPB by end of next year(once current postings are up for most) but noting how hard it is to get officers posted to Darwin, and how overborne the BM catagory is, the general belief is they will still have CPO as Boardos. The buffer, Coxswain and 1 LSBM are required to be OOW and get their LNWC. Generally this pushes their watches to 1 in 5 before they get Phase 3 Trainees qualified.
Im very supportive of cleaning out some of the older generation of all rates in the RAN. With the changes in ships coming and different capabilities, we could clear out many Senior Sailors in the MT, ET, NPC, BM and Supply(come at me pusser!
It is becoming quite frustrating for people at LS and PO to get promoted and get a posting in a new locality as some chiefs have a death grip on a position and dont let go until retire or die, and these people dont always go back to sea once they've found a good shore billet. Many POs have been unable to get career progression and are simply quitting as they can more options with outside of Navy, including customs who are more then happy to take many well experienced ACPB POs.
I notice a few Buffers and Boardos go onto officer training, hence some of the quite grey haired COs and XOs on PBs at the moment.
If the RAN were really smart though they would make sure they got more junior officers out on PBs for a few years to learn the ropes. If they went for a larger OPV type platform then no issue at all, they could justify a commissioned Boardo and a CPO as well as an MEO instead of a Charge and maybe a billet for a CPO ET.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Whilst I understand the point you are making, do we have to sacrifice one for the other or can we have our cake and eat it too?
Assuming somewhere in the future the Governments attitude to reintroducing carriers and fast jets to the RAN changed, (yes we can dream), would it be necessary to cut those other capabilities to obtain a carrier capability?
If defence spending does get to 2% of GDP, and stays there as the current Government is promising to do, would that extra funding allow for a wider range of capabilities such as carriers?
Doing rough maths, if the current level of spending went up to 2% that would add another $5 Billion in one year alone in today's dollars and as the population and economy grows, going to and maintaining 2% would add significantly to the Defence budget.
With a sustained 2% I would imagine a lot of extra capability could be added, be interesting to know what a carrier fleet with aircraft, would reasonably cost up front and what would be the ongoing cost to sustain it.
the road runner
Active Member
There seems to be 2 view's about the Navy Australia should have.
What’s the best kind of Navy for us? | The Strategist
Hugh White favours smaller ships is greater numbers ,with a large submarine force and maritime strike aircraft for a sea denial tactic.
James Goldrick seems to be of the impression we should have a small navy of big ships for a sea control tactic
The USA dose sea control well but has a much larger budget to spend of capital ships ,platforms and has the crew to man these ships.
As for Australia with a much smaller population,budget and large operations area ,i am of the point of view that maybe we should be looking at a sea denial tactic(Happy to be proven wrong)?
Regards
The sea denial approach is only useful for defending the continent of Australia from invasion. It is of little use to defend the maritime lines of communication by which trade enters and leaves Australia or contributing to mutal defence in the region (South East Asia) or around the world. In historical terms the sea denial navy would have been useful from March 1942 to November 1942. At all other times in Australian history the expeditionary navy would have been far more useful. There is also a good argument to make that an expeditionary navy would actually be better at defending the continent of Australia from invasion than the sea denial navy.
The whole point of the Hugh White, Paul Dibb, aka Defence of Australia, viewpoint is to structure the ADF so it is incapable of expeditionary operations. This harks back to political opposition to the VietNam War and the Hawke Government’s opportunism in the 1980s to try and sit out the end of the Cold War. Using defence policy to force the government of the day into a political bind is far from appropriate in my opinion and opportunistically sitting out the crises of the world has proven to date a hopeless wish for Australia. As an advanced democratic nation and one dependent on global trade for our wealth we are forced to be a player in the security affairs of the world. Anything else is naïve and wishful thinking.
The whole point of the Hugh White, Paul Dibb, aka Defence of Australia, viewpoint is to structure the ADF so it is incapable of expeditionary operations. This harks back to political opposition to the VietNam War and the Hawke Government’s opportunism in the 1980s to try and sit out the end of the Cold War. Using defence policy to force the government of the day into a political bind is far from appropriate in my opinion and opportunistically sitting out the crises of the world has proven to date a hopeless wish for Australia. As an advanced democratic nation and one dependent on global trade for our wealth we are forced to be a player in the security affairs of the world. Anything else is naïve and wishful thinking.
That discussion has been going for a while in The Strategist recently and has been quite interesting. Whilst I do agree with some aspects of the sea denial strategy, it does tie you to the continent and doesn't allow Australia to project power or adequately operate at some distance from the homeland. I will say the same about NZ too, because we are both island nations with large and long SLOCs. Also like the three other major english speaking nations (US, UK & Canada - all islands) all our wars, or interventions, in the past 100 years have involved expeditionary forces. One cannot ignore the history and neither do we have the luxury of being able to let an enemy dictate the terms to us by leaving them with the initiative.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
It will be interesting to see what possible change of direction the new Def Min may set for the Navy in the upcoming DWP.
One of his recent quotes when talking about the Navy and specifically Littoral Combat Ships was:
Obviously it is too early to tell yet, but apart from the AWD's and Patrol Boats, he also mentions 'light fast frigates'. When he says Light Fast Frigates, I assume he is possibly referring to LCS type ships?
Does that mean that OCV's are back on the table (evolving into larger LCS?) or does it mean the larger Future Frigates are at risk of not happening, or possibly a smaller fleet compared to the 8 Anzac class.
Again it's too early to tell, but reading into that quote, it possibly means that AWD's will be at the top end, Patrol Boats at the bottom end and a class of LCS/Light Frigates in the middle. Just have to wait till the new DWP is released.
And talking of the new DWP, I saw this article on the Defencenews website today:
Australian Defense Minister Seeks Better Relations With Industry | Defense News | defensenews.com
The paragraph I though interesting was (referring to the new DWP):
No guarantee of course, but it appears there may be a possibility that he is aiming to have the new DWP ready earlier, eg, in mid to late next year.
Whatever direction and choice of platform he is advised to take it must continue to give weight to the growing submarine threat in the Indo-Pacific.
Discussions around ASMD and Littoral small craft roll on ad nauseum and we get over excited about expeditionary capability but 170 submarines in our region within 10 years, many of them owned by marginal "friends" is a fact which cannot be ignored.
The Romeos and P-8's are a start but excellence in ASW sensors and weapons is paramount if the RAN wants to arrive at an operational area in one piece.
The ANZAC replacements need to be one for one not diluted to the oft mentioned 6 or even 4 units.
Lets hope he gets good military advice and not political horse$hit.
Shanesworld
Well-Known Member
When it comes to sub hunting, if you had to prioritise one tool over another what is the most effective elements in the sub hunt? Is it a hull mounted sonar, towed array, dropped sonar bouys, dipping sonar? how does this process work?
Is a Romeo the most effective hunting element a frigate offers?
I assumed it was Romeo but not sure.
A good ASW helicopter operating from a frigate with an acoustically sound hull equipped with a good towed sonar array is a formidable ASW asset. But more formidable than a Collins or AP-3C? I don't really know enough about the RAN to make that call IMO.
AFAIK MH-60R carries a dipping sonar + disposable sonobuoys (25 ejected from the LHS i think), AP-3C drops sonobuoys, Collins uses sonar, frigates themselves use a towed sonar array so it's not exactly being able to say 'this type of ASW sensor is inherently better' because it's more complex than that. But vis-a-vis a frigate, then the Romeo is certainly the most potent element of the ASW group of sensors.
AFAIK MH-60R carries a dipping sonar + disposable sonobuoys (25 ejected from the LHS i think), AP-3C drops sonobuoys, Collins uses sonar, frigates themselves use a towed sonar array so it's not exactly being able to say 'this type of ASW sensor is inherently better' because it's more complex than that. But vis-a-vis a frigate, then the Romeo is certainly the most potent element of the ASW group of sensors.
ASW solutions:
-lots of SSGs
-smaller number of SSN
-Light carriers with Merlin
-Towed array/VDS/Helo on frigate / destroyer
-P-8 and
-HALE, i.e. persistent surveillance against snorting subs
-sea floor sensor arrays
-intelligence gathering
Make sure what ever we get for any planned littoral capability can as a minimum use the ASW outfit being developed by the USN for their LCS. Don't give a proverbial about 40kt but anything over 25kt and enough size to take the USN kit ASW kit, including the Romeo, would be a very smart way to go, not for the ANZAC replacement but for the ACPB replacement.
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