The latest ANAO audit provides some "interesting" though obviously well known data that I feel is rather applicable to this point.
21 projects are reviewed. 12 projects have schedule delays, 8 are on schedule and 1 is ahead of schedule.
Of those 12 schedule delayed projects, 5 are also significantly "above" budget.
None of the 9 at or ahead of schedule projects (IIRC) are above budget.
Each of the on or ahead (and under budget) projects are MOTS acquisitions.
EVERY over schedule and over budget projects are "Australianised MOTS" or "developmental" projects.
Doesn't speak well of Defence Industry (Australian or otherwise). Doesn't speak well of Defence when "scope creep" is largely to blame for schedule delays either, but then "scope creep" couldn't occur if Defence Industry didn't agree to the contract change proposals allowing it to enter into the projects...
To me, the introduction to service of the capability Australia needs to defend herself should be the number 1 priority. Domestic defence Industry investment should NOT be a priority for Government in preference to the delivery of useable capability and developmental projects, especially whilst defence industry is demonstrably unable to deliver on schedule and under budget on existing projects. If work performance improves, the scope and potential profit should improve likewise...
These points are a heresy no doubt, but I fail to understand WHY such a situation continues again and again.
The replacement of SPG-62 with CEAMOUNT etc seems to me to be a case in point. SPG-62 will provide GOOD capability. An EXCELLENT capability in fact. One that the USN is using as it's frontline capability. CEAMOUNT remains developmental. Therefore UNTIL it demonstrates a sound
operational capability (as opposed to theoretical development) it should be the province of industry to "prove" it. Defence should concern itself with introducing it's planned capability into service and achieve "professional mastery" of the capability before scope creep or capability upgrade is even considered.
I understand the "cutting edge of technology" issue very well, but defence so often repeats that PEOPLE are the true determinate of capability NOT the platform itself, that it beggars belief that IF this mantra is actually believed then WHY should the platform in the capability acquisition phase, be changed around or re-configured so much during it's introduction to service that the change itself actually and directly impedes the introduction to service...
It's bureaucracy gone mad. Personally I'd rather see ALL current proposals for weapons platforms upgrades/replacements completely halted UNTIL current acquisitions actually give us a useable capability and ALL current project management resources are devoted to delivering the capabilities we already have planned.
Project Overlander is a case in point. Scope creep and operational realities (ie: Army is finally realising that non-protected vehicles can't operate in a modern battlespace littered with IED's, mines and light/heavy anti-armour weapons and are in fact only useful for peacetime training activities NOT operations) have completely stuffed that program, leading to unbelivable schedule delays to what will, at the end of the day, provide ADF with new light and medium utility vehicles, hardly the most technically complex project.
God only knows what someone actually firing modern anti-ship missiles at the ANZAC Class or AWD's would actually do to those platforms...