Defence sustains friendly fire over torpedo
".........
In polite terms, the Auditor-General says as much in a report on the program to install the MU90 anti-submarine torpedo on naval vessels and aircraft.
Approved more than 12 years ago, the program "is yet to deliver an operational capability".
From the start, this new tool for shooting enemy subs was far more explosive for those trying to buy it than the foreign navies it was supposed to frighten.
Defence and the Howard government thought they were buying a proven torpedo. They "believed the MU90 to be an off the shelf acquisition . . . already in service with the other navies. This was not the case" says the Auditor-General.
How do you get that wrong? Who knows, but the Auditor-General notes "it took several years . . . to identify this".
"Planning and management was inadequate," the report says. There was "an underestimation of . . . risk".
Risk became an even more critical issue in August 2005 when Defence asked the government to approve the project's third phase.
Consider the equation that confronted John Howard's cabinet. The cost of stage three alone: $264 million. The progress to date: ". . . no torpedoes had been delivered under Phase two, and the integration of the torpedo onto the (frigates and naval aircraft) had made limited or no progress."
So what did they do? They doubled up.
According to the Auditor-General, when the government committed $264 million to the project's third phase in August 2005, Defence already felt it was "in a such a weak negotiating position (with those selling the technology) . . . it was necessary to use (the) commitment to Phase three work as leverage to improve Defence's poor overall contractual position".
Andrew Davies, the director of operations and capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, has another name for it — "the sunk cost fallacy".
"I don't think anyone wants to be the person who stands up and says, 'Look we've spent this amount of money and this many years, but we should stop this now,' " Davies says.
"They tend to limp on and limp on and limp on and nobody wants to cut their losses."
It's not a bad description of a small-time gambler, ratcheting up their bets and ignoring the risks.
Twelve years on, the Auditor finds almost $400 million of taxpayers' money has been sunk into the anti-submarine missile program.
Even when the $665 million budgeted cost is finally spent our Navy will not have "the capability originally sought by the ADF, with uncertainty surrounding what will be delivered"......"
OK this is one person's version.
I remember reading about some test firings
(
Defence News 2008 - Department of Defence)
Anyone know if it is truly as bad as the article makes out?
Not a good week for the ADF, what with the MRH groundings (4 weeks ago) too.
Someone had earlier alluded to the fact that the spit had hit the fan.
rb