And some very stringent separations between the 2 as well, was widely reported in public that France are to have no access whatsoever to the CMS or any related systems or sub systems, all black curtain stuff !
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Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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Git_Kraken
Active Member
Fair. On re-read I overstated my case. But I think you get what I was driving at.
I've worked in ship procurement over the years. The company will try to set itself up as best as possible. If that means ignoring/rewriting requirements to get the most profit or impinge on the schedule they will. If they can relabel any engineering work (aka reiterative design) as change they will (means they get more $$$). Any delays will be blamed on the customer (Australia) if possible (you changed this, this government-supplied info/material wasn't on time etc...) so they can still get paid or don't lose money through penalties. Claim requirements were conflicting to cover off bad engineering/design processes. Or choosing an obviously inferior solution because it meets the requirements but won't actually meet operational needs, forcing the customer to dictate the solution (costing more $$).
Riding herd on them is a constant battle.
I see naval group has hired Simon Crean.. To help fix their image?
Maybe manage Labors attack?
Maybe manage Labors attack?
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Simon Crean? God help us, God help the Attack class program.
He’s got to be the most boring former politician in the world.
Almost as boring as Eric Olthwaite:
Cheers,
PS, the funny part is that Eric’s father pretends to be French!!!
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Git_Kraken
Active Member
As my hockey coach once told me, boring is good. It means we're controlling the game.
I am not entirely sure what the Naval Group think Crean will offer. He is out of politics and is currently the Chair of the live export council. He did not have a great deal to do with the Collins Class (That was Beasley’s baby) nor has he really been involved in defence.
I am not sure how this will ‘repair’ the Naval Groups image unless they are betting on a change of government. I don’t see using him to strategise any external pressure on the government is going to win them any favours if this is the intent.
If anybody has any insight as to why he was selected I would be quite interested.
I am not sure how this will ‘repair’ the Naval Groups image unless they are betting on a change of government. I don’t see using him to strategise any external pressure on the government is going to win them any favours if this is the intent.
If anybody has any insight as to why he was selected I would be quite interested.
Inverno
New Member
Hopefully this will work out positively for Australia, which ever way it takes. The influence of politics on shaping instruments for national defense regularly gives me the creeps. Here's a (rather lengthy) tract on the procurement process from an U.S. ex-sonarman on YouTube. Maybe it has some entertaining value.Plan A - Build attack subs with naval group
Plan B - Build attack subs with naval group with a very tense relationship with lots of pushing and shoving
Plan C - take work done and paid for so far, go to the Americans to help finish, go back to the French and build attack class
Plan D - take the work done and paid for so far, go to the Americans build without the French involved at all.
Plan E - Build more enhanced Collins - Would only happen if the design had terminal issues that were irresolvable.
We have been here before.
F-111, Collins, F-35, E7 wedgetail, pretty much every big military program. Not just Australia, every bloody country that tries and ambitious program. Not just defence. Harbor bridge and the Opera house had their fair share of dramas as well.
Submarines are important. Failure is not an option. Double your efforts.
"Fleecing the Future Submarine Program" by Sub Brief
I am aware that a lot of people here seem to think that there is no Plan B, and to some extent that includes myself. However I think the reality is that there does need to be a Plan B. You can't really operate from a position of strength and apply pressure to a contractor if they know that you are only bluffing. The French know this and I expect them to continue being recalcitrant.
Unfortunately any Plan B will result in either further delays or accepting a less capable system.
Unfortunately any Plan B will result in either further delays or accepting a less capable system.
If you read back through the thread to when this was discussed 2 or 3 years ago you will find the answer to your question there. It's better that you do some basic research than everyone relitigating the whole saga again.
This applies to German, Dutch, and Swedish submarines. Why? Because none meet the requirements of the Royal Australian Navy and the Commonwealth of Australia who happen to be the ones paying the bills. There is a significant amount that happens behind closed doors that is not in the public domain and this submarine acquisition is highly politicised by certain pollies, groups and media with ulterior motives. Hence what does make it to the public domain outside of official channels should be regarded with caution because of people grinding axes.
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Regardless of being ‘highly rated’ or not, none of the rejected short listed submarines, or those that didn’t make the short list, were anywhere near the ‘size’ the RAN reportedly required, eg, endurance, power generation, etc.
They all had to be significantly enlarged and/or stretched, including the Japanese boat.
On the other hand the French boat, despite being an SSN, is of a size that will not require being stretched or enlarged, from what has been published/reported, the Attack class will share the same hull diameter, but likely be a few metres shorter.
At the end of the day, all designs have to be modified, there is no magic bullet, no magic solution.
There is of course endless speculation.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I would imagine that the development of an Australian version of one of the Japanese subs would be more like a Plan C or Plan D-type option. While the Japanese subs are very good, they are designed for Japanese CONOPS and conditions, when the RAN's CONOPS and conditions are rather different. More to the point, there are no MOTS conventional sub designs which actually fit Oz requirements apart from the Collins-class. All of the designs were either new, or modifications of existing designs to increase size, displacement, and power generation/storage, etc.
Something which could be potentially 'interesting' if Naval Group should become too difficult, would be to invite General Dynamics Electric Boat to participate and aide in the design of a conventionally-powered sub to be built in Australia. This could get GD an Australian subsidiary that is back in the conventional sub-building game, and provide an avenue where the US could source conventional subs for friendly/allied nations via Australia. IIRC at one point the US was considering a request for newer conventional subs from Taiwan, but the US had no domestic yard with any recent design or build experience with conventionals.
As an added "bonus" should relations between Oz and certain nations, the export potential of arms to an island could become more politically palatable...
How the submarine thing plays out I don't know.
Speculating only, but maybe the real issue is TIME.
It could be that Naval group and the Attack Class are running a bit late ( or Not ) but this would not be unexpected in such a large and complex project.
In a more benign world this would not have being such a concern.
It appears that the rapid military rise of China accompanied by a lot of robust rhetoric has changed the threat envelope.
Timing is probably the issue for our submarine capability.
The Attack class wont realistically provide capacity till the early to mid thirty's and the Collins Class are running out of life.
Their expected major life extension will be challenging and potentially problematic.
Not what you want when regardless of submarine Class you just want available sub numbers in the water ready to go.
Particularly in the mid 20's to mid 30's time frame.
Is there really no plan B but for making plan A work?
Can't say
Potentially we are in between a rock and a hard place.
Attack Class probably cannot be bought forward in timetable and The Collins Class is only a fleet of 6 with a significant percentage of them to be removed to undertake a major refit.
Active numbers could prove a problem
Talk of a purchase of a German or other class of small submarine is worthy if the threat scenario cannot be met by our submarine fleets existing and intended availability rates going forward.
Submarine numbers in the water set to go is what is important.
Maybe the comparison is not comparing these smaller fleet submarines to either a Collins and Attack but rather look what our submarine capacity would look like both with and without such a complimentary capability in the challenging decade to come?
So how quick could an off the shelf German/ Dutch/ Korean/ sub be built with American weapons and systems?
Is it realistic and would it be quicker than the alternative?
Challenges all round and yes, we know the history lesson and should of started SEA 1000 yonks' ago.
But then again I don't know how the submarine thing will play out
Regards S
PS - Singapore's German built Invincible Class, Type 218SG could prove interesting.
Currently in production with a good rate of build.
Speculating only, but maybe the real issue is TIME.
It could be that Naval group and the Attack Class are running a bit late ( or Not ) but this would not be unexpected in such a large and complex project.
In a more benign world this would not have being such a concern.
It appears that the rapid military rise of China accompanied by a lot of robust rhetoric has changed the threat envelope.
Timing is probably the issue for our submarine capability.
The Attack class wont realistically provide capacity till the early to mid thirty's and the Collins Class are running out of life.
Their expected major life extension will be challenging and potentially problematic.
Not what you want when regardless of submarine Class you just want available sub numbers in the water ready to go.
Particularly in the mid 20's to mid 30's time frame.
Is there really no plan B but for making plan A work?
Can't say
Potentially we are in between a rock and a hard place.
Attack Class probably cannot be bought forward in timetable and The Collins Class is only a fleet of 6 with a significant percentage of them to be removed to undertake a major refit.
Active numbers could prove a problem
Talk of a purchase of a German or other class of small submarine is worthy if the threat scenario cannot be met by our submarine fleets existing and intended availability rates going forward.
Submarine numbers in the water set to go is what is important.
Maybe the comparison is not comparing these smaller fleet submarines to either a Collins and Attack but rather look what our submarine capacity would look like both with and without such a complimentary capability in the challenging decade to come?
So how quick could an off the shelf German/ Dutch/ Korean/ sub be built with American weapons and systems?
Is it realistic and would it be quicker than the alternative?
Challenges all round and yes, we know the history lesson and should of started SEA 1000 yonks' ago.
But then again I don't know how the submarine thing will play out
Regards S
PS - Singapore's German built Invincible Class, Type 218SG could prove interesting.
Currently in production with a good rate of build.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Realistically, TIME would also be an issue for Australia ordering any subs other than those already built. Take Singapore's Invincible-class/Type 218. That project had the initial order (for two) placed back in 2013 with the lead sub launched in 2019 and undergoing sea trials with delivery expected some time this year IIRC.
Typically the contracting phase for a military acquisition can take two years or more. For a platform as complex as a sub, especially one that needed changes made to accommodate Australian and/or US kit, I could easily see that taking even longer. All of this would need to be resolved before construction could commence. Also worth noting is that an established shipyard and workforce would need to be available. In the hypothetical scenario where Australia did decide to order some Type 218 subs from TKMS, the Kiel yard might have capacity to fulfill such an order, with delivery falling some time after the 2024 handover of the additional Invincible-class subs Singapore ordered in 2017. Now to this into some perspective, Singapore added onto the initial order placed in 2013, so the sub programme had already been underway (
) for four years, and the anticipated delivery for the 'extra' subs was/is ~seven years after they were ordered. That introduces the potential for deliveries to Australia to not be able to occur until ~2028, and that is if Australia ordered Type 218 subs that are configured exactly the same as those currently under construction for Singapore.Aside from the enormous costs that would be associated with ordering an interim sub fleet, there would also be problems getting the number of trained submariners needed to operate all the subs planned for the RAN, plus for the interim order. I certainly cannot see it being managed within the next five years, there is just insufficient time.
Thanks for the replyRealistically, TIME would also be an issue for Australia ordering any subs other than those already built. Take Singapore's Invincible-class/Type 218. That project had the initial order (for two) placed back in 2013 with the lead sub launched in 2019 and undergoing sea trials with delivery expected some time this year IIRC.
Typically the contracting phase for a military acquisition can take two years or more. For a platform as complex as a sub, especially one that needed changes made to accommodate Australian and/or US kit, I could easily see that taking even longer. All of this would need to be resolved before construction could commence. Also worth noting is that an established shipyard and workforce would need to be available. In the hypothetical scenario where Australia did decide to order some Type 218 subs from TKMS, the Kiel yard might have capacity to fulfill such an order, with delivery falling some time after the 2024 handover of the additional Invincible-class subs Singapore ordered in 2017. Now to this into some perspective, Singapore added onto the initial order placed in 2013, so the sub programme had already been underway (
Aside from the enormous costs that would be associated with ordering an interim sub fleet, there would also be problems getting the number of trained submariners needed to operate all the subs planned for the RAN, plus for the interim order. I certainly cannot see it being managed within the next five years, there is just insufficient time.
I concur with the concerns re time and the complexity to the challenge.
Trying to find the balance between fantasy fleets and the realistic challenge we may ( may not ) face with submarine availability later this decade is a mix of speculation and guarded prudence.
Collins and Attack may not be the answer.
Two coastal subs built over seas may prove a reluctant but necessary solution.
Entering service in 2028 they will give the RAN greater submarine numbers for active service in a crucial window of transition from one Class to the other.
Singapore's Type 218 has a relatively small crew which would be advantageous short term.
We are after all intending to enlarge our fleet numbers, so reluctantly we may just have to endeavor to do it earlier, not later.
In a different world, the JSF would have been early to production and we would of not needed the Super Hornets.
( Never actually thought that one would be on time but still not disappointed with the SH buy. Something to think about for our submarine capability).
Sometimes we need to be open to tack a different way.
Again I don't know the reality of SEA 1000.
In fact in the public domain most don't.
Preferably all success to the Attack Class with no need any of these other options or conversations.
I just don't know
Certainly the government may need to keep the public on side with this program.
In a election year its a subject that you don't want to become political.
Regards S
The timing issue, and other things, were discussed around post 29537. No alternate option, except possibly an Attack build in France, would deliver submarines significantly before the current build plan. If you wanted them faster, then increase the drumbeat from 2 years to 18 months which would probably be achievable.
The Collins could be extended “as is” by a Full Cycle Docking; if you want to keep them at the cutting edge you have to do an upgrade. But that has been what has been done during FCDs for years to keep them current. That would give you another ten years of each boat put through the process.
The Collins could be extended “as is” by a Full Cycle Docking; if you want to keep them at the cutting edge you have to do an upgrade. But that has been what has been done during FCDs for years to keep them current. That would give you another ten years of each boat put through the process.
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t68
Well-Known Member
From memory isn’t that why we went down the rabbit hole in the 1st place. If I recall correctly it was because the Rudd/Gillard governments raided the kitty from defence when we had the opportunity to go for a complete clean design, I seem to recall GFAust saying something long those lines
Are you saying we could have still done that during the selection stage with the various nations whom participate in the initial stages leading up to the winning French bid
Mark_Evans
Member
And the US Virginia class as an option has been dragged back into the conversation by Tom Lewis at Naval Institute. Even suggesting asking the US if we can build them ourselves.
Sorry been inactive for a while but going to Virginia class is one heck of a size increase despite how much I like the sub.
Please tell me this is dream fleet thinking again on Tom Lewis's part.
navalinstitute.com.au
Sorry been inactive for a while but going to Virginia class is one heck of a size increase despite how much I like the sub.
Please tell me this is dream fleet thinking again on Tom Lewis's part.
Virginia-class nuclear subs a better option | The Australian Naval Institute
navalinstitute.com.au
t68
Well-Known Member
And the US Virginia class as an option has been dragged back into the conversation by Tom Lewis at Naval Institute. Even suggesting asking the US if we can build them ourselves.
Sorry been inactive for a while but going to Virginia class is one heck of a size increase despite how much I like the sub.
Please tell me this is dream fleet thinking again on Tom Lewis's part.
Virginia-class nuclear subs a better option | The Australian Naval Institute
This has been brought up before, everyone recognise that the RAN conops nuclear would be the logical way to go, but to get to that position in reality would mean an increase in burden long in training for just the propulsion and a much larger domestic nuclear energy sector and let alone after the submarines have been paid off with the reactor cores
I read it and then wondered if he'd been near them funny mushrooms. There are too many hoops to jump through and the first one is the matter of whether or not the US will in fact authorise an export of such a sensitive platform. It appusears that some Aussies take it for granted that the US will sell them anything in the US defence armoury. That is not the case and is an arrogant assumption.And the US Virginia class as an option has been dragged back into the conversation by Tom Lewis at Naval Institute. Even suggesting asking the US if we can build them ourselves.
Sorry been inactive for a while but going to Virginia class is one heck of a size increase despite how much I like the sub.
Please tell me this is dream fleet thinking again on Tom Lewis's part.
Virginia-class nuclear subs a better option | The Australian Naval Institute
The rest has already been thrashed to death within this thread ad nauseum and people should go look back through the thread at previous discussions about this.
I wouldn't go so far as to say that. It's somewhat misleading to claim that because RAN sub CONOPS aren't necessarily in the public domain and SSKs are able to undertake some sneaky thinks that SSNs can't because they are generally quieter when running electrically and hence more sneaky.
That's the expense that keeps on racking up very long after the subs have been decommissioned and scrapped. Don't have the same problem with the SSK.
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