Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Todjaeger]

You forgot South Korea's Red Shark.

Everyone is talking about range, but that's not the main strength of such systems, it's speed. They put a weapon on target faster than any other delivery method.

But only when that target is within range of the system. A warship would find ASROC worth SFA in an engagement with a hostile if that hostile sub fires an AShM from 50+ km away. By the same token, a hostile sub that is being engaged by an embarked naval helicopter 60 km ahead of the escort ship would not be at all threatened by VLS cells filled with ASROC-VL.

I also am honestly skeptical that something like ASROC-VL could deliver a LWT onto a potential sub faster than an overhead ASW helicopter could drop a depth bomb and/or LWT of it's own. That same ASW helicopter would also have the potential advantage of being able to detect the sub farther ahead of or behind the escort ship and/or task force, so that the escorts and shipping is largely kept out of harms way.

 

[Boatteacher]

And the alternative the County Class only had an average life Span in the RN of approx 18 years. Late 60s I dare say that there would still be some Old Salts who tended to think of the RAN as part of the RN and be totally against anything not British.

I'm going to stick my neck out here and comment that I thought the problem with the Counties was that they were built entirely around a (very large) missile system that essentially became obsolete, rather than any build quality issue.

To that extent, I thought history showed Australia made the right choice with the CFA because we went with the right system.

No doubt others will have a more knowledgeable view.

 

[MickB]

But only when that target is within range of the system. A warship would find ASROC worth SFA in an engagement with a hostile if that hostile sub fires an AShM from 50+ km away. By the same token, a hostile sub that is being engaged by an embarked naval helicopter 60 km ahead of the escort ship would not be at all threatened by VLS cells filled with ASROC-VL.

I also am honestly skeptical that something like ASROC-VL could deliver a LWT onto a potential sub faster than an overhead ASW helicopter could drop a depth bomb and/or LWT of it's own. That same ASW helicopter would also have the potential advantage of being able to detect the sub farther ahead of or behind the escort ship and/or task force, so that the escorts and shipping is largely kept out of harms way.

I understand that with limited budgets you have to weight the probabilities of an event occuring and spend accordingly, so ASROC may be a low priority.

Your example has the helo directly overhead of the contact. What if you have the helo 60km north investigating a contact. (perhaps a UUV operating as a decoy)
And then the real threat is discovered 20km to the south, which will get there first ASROC or the helo.

I have also thought that the ASROC or a modern version of the Ikara could be used in combination with a UAV equipped with dipping sonor.

 

[seaspear]

There is no argument that a submarine can outrange a ship with launches of either heavy weight torpedo or missile ,but its certainty of a successful attack is likely to depend on the attacked ships self defences in those regards and perhaps the time available to deploy those measures .
I would not argue against husbanding the loadout of a ship resources to meet those various threats ,but if the argument that you cannot allocate say an Asroc style loadout because you have limited amount of launching tubes suggests that more VLS should have been considered.
I would agree that airborne assets like the helicopter would provide an outer long range screen but providing a helicopter screen 24/7 at a distance from the ships its protecting would require several each which would be down for a maintenance period after

 

[spoz]

If the rest of the ASW screen for a task force is working properly, then a hostile sub should have been engaged well before the escort could utilize ASROC. With that in mind, I would much rather have a RAN vessel fill one of their limited in number VLS cells with either an air defence or strike missile loadout as they would present a greater range of employment.

I fear you may be making unjustified assessments of the efficacy of surface and air ASW detection capabilities. While dippers are not a submariner's best friend, and nor is another submarine, they will with some confidence attempt to approach targets relying on other air and surface protection. There's always the possibility of detection of course, but it is by no means a certainty. It's not about how good the kit those other platforms have alone; it is the nature of the environment in which the submarine operates and its effect on sensors that is the issue.

 

[spoz]

Basically, yes - but their COSAG system wasn't the simplest to keep operating and their helicopter arrangements were unwieldy. Plus, they were sort of designed as one of their roles to replace cruisers in the "empire trade protection/show the flag" role so they came equipped with teak decks and very comfortable (senior) officer accommodation and large ships' companies, and as a result they were not cheap to operate. Refitting them with a more modern missile system (which was studied) would have been very expensive; while at the time it was being considered the RN was contracting and seeking to standardise on Sea Dart as their longer range AAW missile (Seaslug being effectively obsolescent). However, as the Chileans showed, if you were willing to invest in major refitting they could have much longer service lives than the RN got out of them; so far as I know their build quality was VG. While I never served in one, I know a number of people who did, and they seem to have enjoyed the experience.

OTH, I don't think there is any doubt at all that the RAN made the right decision going down the CFA route; a much more competent weapons system and efficient use of resources in ships that lasted very well indeed.

 

[hairyman]

As I posted ten posts above, with a modernised ikara. There would be no point in producing a 1990 model Ikara today. I am sure our technical people would be quite capable of designing an Ikara that would out perform the American Asroc for example.

 

[Todjaeger]

I understand that with limited budgets you have to weight the probabilities of an event occuring and spend accordingly, so ASROC may be a low priority.

Your example has the helo directly overhead of the contact. What if you have the helo 60km north investigating a contact. (perhaps a UUV operating as a decoy)
And then the real threat is discovered 20km to the south, which will get there first ASROC or the helo.

I have also thought that the ASROC or a modern version of the Ikara could be used in combination with a UAV equipped with dipping sonor.

There is a major factor which is either being overlooked or ignored in the above scenario, and that is that ASW is a layered approach. If an ASW is investigating a possible contact 60 km away to the north, that would usually be considered in the middle layer, where most contacts would be persecuted when possible. If a threat was then detected 20 km to the south, that threat managed to evade detection until it was within the inner most ASW layer, and well within the effective engagement ranges of a number of sub-launched weapons.

To carry out ASW operations effectively, it would require multiple assets working together centered around and protecting either a key area like a port or choke point, or a task force. With that in mind, the direction is less important than how close a sub can get to what is being protected.

I fear you may be making unjustified assessments of the efficacy of surface and air ASW detection capabilities. While dippers are not a submariner's best friend, and nor is another submarine, they will with some confidence attempt to approach targets relying on other air and surface protection. There's always the possibility of detection of course, but it is by no means a certainty. It's not about how good the kit those other platforms have alone; it is the nature of the environment in which the submarine operates and its effect on sensors that is the issue.

Not really, but on re-reading I can see in the most recent set of posts I did not make something clear. The most effective ASW platform is another sub, and a good sub, with a well trained crew, can often evade, elude, and otherwise control their engagement with 'targets' as surface vessels as sometimes referred to as.

From an ASW ops standpoint, if a hostile submarine has managed to close to within that third/inner most layer, where the surface vessels are, then the ASW force has already effectively lost the engagement. A system like ASROC-VL is still only useful within that inner most layer and the max effective range is still something like 20+ km short of the effective range of a number of sub-launched weapons. The reason why ASW ops want to have neutralized hostile subs by that 2nd or middle layer or before, is to prevent the hostile subs from being able to engage surface vessels.

To provide a little bit of context, an ASROC/Mk 46 combination would have a max effective range of ~33 km, which is about a two minute flight for a sub-launched AShM like a UGM-84 Harpoon., and well short of the 100+ km max range for Harpoon. It is also several km's short of the effective range for a Mk 48 ADCAP heavyweight torpedoe on a high speed run. Given how difficult it can be to detect a well-running boat with an experienced crew, the first indication a surface escort might have that a hostile sub has penetrated the outer ASW screens might be when the sub launches missiles and/or heavyweight torpedoes. With that in mind, a two minute window to detect a sub-launched AShM, track the AShM back to it's point of origin, detect the launching submarine, generate a targeting solution and then launch an autonomous counterattack using an ASROC with a homing LWT, might be a bit too tight. This also raises the notion of what might be a better value, a VLS cell which might possibly be used to launch a relatively short-ranged counterattack, or using the VLS cell to carry/launch something which would defend the surface vessel or another ship.

 

[MickB]

There is a major factor which is either being overlooked or ignored in the above scenario, and that is that ASW is a layered approach. If an ASW is investigating a possible contact 60 km away to the north, that would usually be considered in the middle layer, where most contacts would be persecuted when possible. If a threat was then detected 20 km to the south, that threat managed to evade detection until it was within the inner most ASW layer, and well within the effective engagement ranges of a number of sub-launched weapons.

To carry out ASW operations effectively, it would require multiple assets working together centered around and protecting either a key area like a port or choke point, or a task force. With that in mind, the direction is less important than how close a sub can get to what is being protected.



Not really, but on re-reading I can see in the most recent set of posts I did not make something clear. The most effective ASW platform is another sub, and a good sub, with a well trained crew, can often evade, elude, and otherwise control their engagement with 'targets' as surface vessels as sometimes referred to as.

From an ASW ops standpoint, if a hostile submarine has managed to close to within that third/inner most layer, where the surface vessels are, then the ASW force has already effectively lost the engagement. A system like ASROC-VL is still only useful within that inner most layer and the max effective range is still something like 20+ km short of the effective range of a number of sub-launched weapons. The reason why ASW ops want to have neutralized hostile subs by that 2nd or middle layer or before, is to prevent the hostile subs from being able to engage surface vessels.

To provide a little bit of context, an ASROC/Mk 46 combination would have a max effective range of ~33 km, which is about a two minute flight for a sub-launched AShM like a UGM-84 Harpoon., and well short of the 100+ km max range for Harpoon. It is also several km's short of the effective range for a Mk 48 ADCAP heavyweight torpedoe on a high speed run. Given how difficult it can be to detect a well-running boat with an experienced crew, the first indication a surface escort might have that a hostile sub has penetrated the outer ASW screens might be when the sub launches missiles and/or heavyweight torpedoes. With that in mind, a two minute window to detect a sub-launched AShM, track the AShM back to it's point of origin, detect the launching submarine, generate a targeting solution and then launch an autonomous counterattack using an ASROC with a homing LWT, might be a bit too tight. This also raises the notion of what might be a better value, a VLS cell which might possibly be used to launch a relatively short-ranged counterattack, or using the VLS cell to carry/launch something which would defend the surface vessel or another ship.

Totally agree with everything you said, if and its a big if, every time a ship puts to sea if is part of a task force.
The Hunters will be equipped with one Helo and perhaps one UAV. Operating alone or even in tandom how do you get a 24/7 triple layer defence.
With many tasks and a limited navy how do you send a full task force to every situation.
One of the great benifits of submarines is it make the opposition disperse its fleet searching for it. The same would apply to the RAN.

 

[beegee]

In the grand scheme of things, an extra ~20 km for a ship-launched LWT is of somewhat limited value in many (perhaps even most) circumstances.

Then why are so many countries fielding such systems? Mate, the navies that operate these systems know a hell of a lot more about ASW than you or I, if the system had little or no value they wouldn't be wasting precious ship weight and space on it.

 

[alexsa]

There is a major factor which is either being overlooked or ignored in the above scenario, and that is that ASW is a layered approach. If an ASW is investigating a possible contact 60 km away to the north, that would usually be considered in the middle layer, where most contacts would be persecuted when possible. If a threat was then detected 20 km to the south, that threat managed to evade detection until it was within the inner most ASW layer, and well within the effective engagement ranges of a number of sub-launched weapons.

To carry out ASW operations effectively, it would require multiple assets working together centered around and protecting either a key area like a port or choke point, or a task force. With that in mind, the direction is less important than how close a sub can get to what is being protected.



Not really, but on re-reading I can see in the most recent set of posts I did not make something clear. The most effective ASW platform is another sub, and a good sub, with a well trained crew, can often evade, elude, and otherwise control their engagement with 'targets' as surface vessels as sometimes referred to as.

From an ASW ops standpoint, if a hostile submarine has managed to close to within that third/inner most layer, where the surface vessels are, then the ASW force has already effectively lost the engagement. A system like ASROC-VL is still only useful within that inner most layer and the max effective range is still something like 20+ km short of the effective range of a number of sub-launched weapons. The reason why ASW ops want to have neutralized hostile subs by that 2nd or middle layer or before, is to prevent the hostile subs from being able to engage surface vessels.

To provide a little bit of context, an ASROC/Mk 46 combination would have a max effective range of ~33 km, which is about a two minute flight for a sub-launched AShM like a UGM-84 Harpoon., and well short of the 100+ km max range for Harpoon. It is also several km's short of the effective range for a Mk 48 ADCAP heavyweight torpedoe on a high speed run. Given how difficult it can be to detect a well-running boat with an experienced crew, the first indication a surface escort might have that a hostile sub has penetrated the outer ASW screens might be when the sub launches missiles and/or heavyweight torpedoes. With that in mind, a two minute window to detect a sub-launched AShM, track the AShM back to it's point of origin, detect the launching submarine, generate a targeting solution and then launch an autonomous counterattack using an ASROC with a homing LWT, might be a bit too tight. This also raises the notion of what might be a better value, a VLS cell which might possibly be used to launch a relatively short-ranged counterattack, or using the VLS cell to carry/launch something which would defend the surface vessel or another ship.

I do agree with your comments but would note one thing about the reach of submarine weapons .... the submarine must know the vessel is there in order to deploy them. Contemporaty and emerging ASW vessels such as the T26 may be a challenge (I say may be as we really do not have a read on its capability in the public domain) in this regard ... particularly if it is configured for ASW operations and is minimising emmissions. While submarine emmissions have been dramatically reduced over the last two decades (the Collins Class being a bit of a star in this area) so have the emissions from 'some' platforms meaning a vessel ourside visual range may actually be challenging to find (noting this is beyond LWT range as well) particularly if employs remotely operated vessel with tails to add another dispersed layer to its own rotary assets and any MPA assets that may be deployed. Such remotely operated vessels are in development in the Australian context and such a combination may actually benefit from a long range ASW weapon.

Of course a taskforce is generally going to generate a racket that will act as a submarine magnet .... but in such cases an Attack Submarine (conventional or otherwise) will (should) be part of the mix.

Having been in an O Boat bounced by a T22 batch 2 (and its aviation assets) I am not in a rush to write of contemporary ASW vessels.

 

[beegee]

...but would note one thing about the reach of submarine weapons .... the submarine must know the vessel is there in order to deploy them.

Yeah, and even more than that, it needs to identify the specific high value target it's trying to hit (carrier/transports/amphibs/etc).

 

[ngatimozart]

Some posters on here are discussing certain aspects of ASW warfare with no knowledge of it. They look at what is publicly stated about weapons systems and then make profound statements based upon limited material. At it's best ASW is a mysterious arcane dark art practised by wizards and witches. Very little is publicly available about ASW warfare and rightly so, however there are some practitioners of its dark arts on the forum here and one has an international reputation for his expertise. Another one has been replying to the various posts in the last day or so on this thread and he is a blue tag - DEF PRO who probably has forgotten more about it than most of its practitioners know. So when a DEF PRO comments upon a particular topic and it is obvious that they are speaking with some expertise, take note and learn something, instead of trying to drown them out with your obvious lack of knowledge. Obvious they cannot go into specifics, but they can talk in generalities where possible.

 

[Todjaeger]

Then why are so many countries fielding such systems? Mate, the navies that operate these systems know a hell of a lot more about ASW than you or I, if the system had little or no value they wouldn't be wasting precious ship weight and space on it.

Re-read what I posted. Specifically where I mentioned that "In the grand scheme of things, an extra ~20 km for a ship-launched LWT is of somewhat limited value in many (perhaps even most) circumstances."

Please explain to me the value of ASROC-VL in an area air defence role, or anti-shipping/ASuW, or strike/land attack, etc. I ask for this explanation because a RAN VLS cell loaded with a ASROC-VL missile would be unable to be loaded with ESSM or SM-2/6 missiles for air defence, or some type of LACM like a TacTom or LRASM in the future. Given the limited number of VLS cells across the whole of the RAN, as well as the limited quantities of warstocks and cost to purchase large quantities of a broad selection of missiles, real choices have to be made about what would be more useful across a range of circumstances.

There are a few other navies which either use ASROC, ASROC-VL, or a comparable system, but it seems as though most other navies do not field something like ASROC, including a few nations that had in the past either used ASROC, Ikara, or something similar. That reinforces the notion I have that a capability like ASROC or ASROC-VL would be accurately described as a specialty capability, one that is useful in the correct circumstances but not something with broad utility. It therefore follows that such a capability would be pursued by navies that are large enough to afford certain specialties, and/or a navy's threat matrix has the correct circumstances more common than other potential naval threats.

Yeah, and even more than that, it needs to identify the specific high value target it's trying to hit (carrier/transports/amphibs/etc).

The above is true if, and only if, there is a specific high value target which a submarine has been tasked with attacking. If not, then any detected surface vessel in the area of a task force would be a potential target for a hostile sub. The mere knowledge that a hostile sub was present in a given area would impact how surface warships operated, including potential high value targets. During the Falklands War the Argentine Navy essentially remained at their bases following the sinking of an Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano by a RN SSN. I would imagine that any task force commander would carefully consider where and how the task force vessels are deployed if they start getting sniped at by one or more hostile subs. That consideration would likely become even more careful if that sniping succeeds in causing damage to or loss of task force vessels, regardless of whether or not the loss was of a 'high value' vessel or not.

 

[pussertas]

(Source: Australian Minister for Defence; issued March 06, 2019)

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) will receive a new sovereign air transportable Submarine Rescue Service capability under a contract with Phoenix International (Australia).

The service will be based in Western Australia and support both the Collins Class submarine force and the Attack Class submarines for the next 25 plus years.

“The new system is being designed and built specifically to support the capability requirements of the Navy and will be both air and road transportable, capable of being deployed on a range of vessels.”

“The 2016 Defence White Paper clearly outlines the importance of supporting the new submarines with an upgraded submarine rescue system.”

“The flexibility this capability will bring means it can be rapidly deployed in support of a distressed submarine anywhere in Australia’s area of operation.”

The acquisition phase of the project is valued at $255 million with Australian Industry Content at approximately 80 per cent, creating more than 55 jobs.


The submarine rescue system will be accepted into operational service in 2022 and will be one of only four air transportable systems in the world. While the primary mission is to deliver a rescue capability for Australia’s submarine fleet, the system will also be capable of supporting other submarine operating nations in distress through the use of the NATO standard escape hatch.

About B, Time.

 

[seaspear]

I thought this article is of interest because of artificial intelligence covered by launched submarine and the discussion of course on asw, that France the architect of the future Attack class submarine has done some work on this we could even speculate that it maybe a consideration for the R.A.N vessel
Have Submarine-Launched Anti-Aircraft Missiles Finally Come Of Age?

 

[aussienscale]

(Source: Australian Minister for Defence; issued March 06, 2019)

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) will receive a new sovereign air transportable Submarine Rescue Service capability under a contract with Phoenix International (Australia).

The service will be based in Western Australia and support both the Collins Class submarine force and the Attack Class submarines for the next 25 plus years.

“The new system is being designed and built specifically to support the capability requirements of the Navy and will be both air and road transportable, capable of being deployed on a range of vessels.”

“The 2016 Defence White Paper clearly outlines the importance of supporting the new submarines with an upgraded submarine rescue system.”

“The flexibility this capability will bring means it can be rapidly deployed in support of a distressed submarine anywhere in Australia’s area of operation.”

The acquisition phase of the project is valued at $255 million with Australian Industry Content at approximately 80 per cent, creating more than 55 jobs.


The submarine rescue system will be accepted into operational service in 2022 and will be one of only four air transportable systems in the world. While the primary mission is to deliver a rescue capability for Australia’s submarine fleet, the system will also be capable of supporting other submarine operating nations in distress through the use of the NATO standard escape hatch.

About B, Time.

Good news indeed, the below press release from Phoenix International gives a little more detail with a lot of work to be done in WA at Henderson and by Civmec, some in Vic and NSW too

PHOENIX INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD AWARDED CONTRACT FOR SUBMARINE RESCUE SERVICES FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE – Phoenix International

Cheers

 

[alexsa]

Yeah, and even more than that, it needs to identify the specific high value target it's trying to hit (carrier/transports/amphibs/etc).

Modern submarine sensors and analysis systems have great capcity to identify a particular vessel and they won't get lost in the back scatter of noise. The purpsoe of the layered approach is to kill of suppress the opposition. Suppression (or avoidance) is a good outcome as a stern chase by an SSG (and even and SSN's) is going to improve the probability of detection wiht the submarine at speed. My case was there 'may' be a case for a long range ASW weapon in layered situation but it would be great if it had longer legs.

Happy to be howled down but VLS weapons 'may' also have a use in littorial or archipelagic waters where the shallow waters and presence of islands and shouls may reduce some of the submarines advatages and increase the risk of detention (again looking at history where a powerful LF sonar in shallow water proved to be a problem . However, I would envisage in such cases such a weapon would support the aircraft (organic or otherwise)

I thought this article is of interest because of artificial intelligence covered by launched submarine and the discussion of course on asw, that France the architect of the future Attack class submarine has done some work on this we could even speculate that it maybe a consideration for the R.A.N vessel
Have Submarine-Launched Anti-Aircraft Missiles Finally Come Of Age?

I do note the comment on the flamming geyser of water being a bit of a give away when firing a within visual range missile ..... with Harpoon you generally try to launch far enough away that is not immediately obvious where you are. If you fire a heat seeker and the helo self defence systems defeat it (and/or ther is more than one helo or aviation asset) you gould be in a spot of bother.

 

[alexsa]

Yeah, and even more than that, it needs to identify the specific high value target it's trying to hit (carrier/transports/amphibs/etc).

Actaully this is not a huge issue with modern sensors and acoucstic analysis systems. I don't see this being a factor really. The HVU will draw hostile submarines and the layered approach (ships, tails, aircraft and blue submarines) is necessary to defeat or supress them.

 

[alexsa]

And the alternative the County Class only had an average life Span in the RN of approx 18 years. Late 60s I dare say that there would still be some Old Salts who tended to think of the RAN as part of the RN and be totally against anything not British.

If they had built the modified Counties they were considering they may have lasted longer. The aim was to fit GWS13 with Tarter missles (moving to SM1 I expect) and associated US radars. Bigger ship, same missile system and an aviation capability have been useful.

I understand (and I am happy to be corrected) the UK refused to modify the design .... so CFA it was,

PS - that font of knowledge Wikipedia covers this (not sure to what lenght I trust Wikipedia)
County-class destroyer - Wikipedia

In 1960, because US-designed missiles were seen at the time to be superior to the Seaslug, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) proposed a County class armed with the US Tartar missile and two additional modifications: hangar space for three Wessex helicopters and a steam propulsion system, rather than the combined steam and gas system used in the County class. However, the RAN instead decided to proceed with the Perth class (a modified version of the US Charles F. Adams class). Two different reasons have been put forward for the Australian decision: according to an Australian history, British authorities would not allow a steam-propelled variant of the County,[36] whereas, according to a British account, the re-design required to accommodate the Tartar missile would have taken longer than the RAN deemed to be acceptable

Sorry we are way OT so I will leave it at that.