Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[hauritz]

When I wrote this what I should have said is; And at this stage everything we are doing to try and make it more attractive and increase that percentage of the population wanting to serve AND CONTINUE SERVING PAST THEIR INITIAL MINIMUM PERIOD OF SERVICE is not enough. Because there is our problem, we have what DCN calls "a hollowness in our ranks" at the LS/PO and LEUT/LCDR level that has existed for decades.

I used to work in HR and I can tell you that recruitment is easy ... but retention is hard.

I imagine the Navy must find it very hard hanging onto recruits once they are trained up and that enlistment period expires.

Perhaps someone can enlighten me on what is required if someone wishes to re-enlist. Is there a fixed re-enlistment period or can you re-enlist for an agreed period of time?

Is there an option for simply re-enlisting without agreeing to a particular period of service?

 

[Redlands18]

As far as I know general enlistment in the ADF is still Open Ended* has been since the mid 80s. Which means you have enlisted permantly and when you wish to leave you put in 6 months notice but only after you have completed 3 years 6 months(4 year’s total service).
Those with return of Service obligations excepted*

I used to work in HR and I can tell you that recruitment is easy ... but retention is hard.

I imagine the Navy must find it very hard hanging onto recruits once they are trained up and that enlistment period expires.

Perhaps someone can enlighten me on what is required if someone wishes to re-enlist. Is there a fixed re-enlistment period or can you re-enlist for an agreed period of time?

Is there an option for simply re-enlisting without agreeing to a particular period of service?

 

[seaspear]

I was wondering if it was possible that shore based duties and training could be devised so that crews returning from overseas operations were able to have a better connection to family and thus keeping them in the service longer

 

[JBRobbo]

Considering that our manpower pool is likely to remain somewhat constant and a limiting factor in acquiring more vessels, perhaps reducing the Hunter class build from nine to six and using the 540+ crew envisioned for those three vessels to crew a fleet of smaller combatants like Saab's stealthy steel/composite next generation corvette/FlexPatrol-98 would be a better solution. With each requiring a complement of just 80, this would enable three additional surface combatants (15) in the water with a new class of six multirole patrol corvettes that would fill a niche between the Arafura class OPV's and Hunter class FFG's- being able to support up to 10x containerized mission modules with a large mission bay and stern ramp similar to the OPV's for mine countermeasures, survey, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief etc. whilst at the same time possessing near identical warfighting capabilities as the AMCAP upgraded ANZAC class FFH. The design also seems well suited to our geographic requirements with a range of 5,000nmi+ @ 15kts as opposed to similar concepts like the littoral combat ships whilst its carbon-fibre superstructure would go a long way in reducing the top-weight issues found in small combatants such as the ANZAC's. Just a thought.


The next generation Corvette | Multi-mission advantage | Saab
https://saabgroup.com/globalassets/...ad-2017/saabnavalsolutions_brief_laad_eng.pdf

 

[Todjaeger]

Considering that our manpower pool is likely to remain somewhat constant and a limiting factor in acquiring more vessels, perhaps reducing the Hunter class build from nine to six and using the 540+ crew envisioned for those three vessels to crew a fleet of smaller combatants like Saab's stealthy steel/composite next generation corvette/FlexPatrol-98 would be a better solution. With each requiring a complement of just 80, this would enable three additional surface combatants (15) in the water with a new class of six multirole patrol corvettes that would fill a niche between the Arafura class OPV's and Hunter class FFG's- being able to support up to 10x containerized mission modules with a large mission bay and stern ramp similar to the OPV's for mine countermeasures, survey, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief etc. whilst at the same time possessing near identical warfighting capabilities as the AMCAP upgraded ANZAC class FFH. The design also seems well suited to our geographic requirements with a range of 5,000nmi+ @ 15kts as opposed to similar concepts like the littoral combat ships whilst its carbon-fibre superstructure would go a long way in reducing the top-weight issues found in small combatants such as the ANZAC's. Just a thought.


The next generation Corvette | Multi-mission advantage | Saab
https://saabgroup.com/globalassets/...ad-2017/saabnavalsolutions_brief_laad_eng.pdf

Gawd I hope not!

If the Hunter-class was reduced from nine vessels to six vessels, that would mean the RAN would only have a pair of Hunter-class "frigates" consistently available for or already on operations, plus a single Hobart-class DDG. If a crisis were to break out somewhere that the ADF had to respond to, and vessels requiring escorts (like the LHD's and/or the LSD), only having a max of three consistently available major warships would be a problem.

When I checked the info on the FlexPatrol-98, it is referring to a 100 m LOA, 2,400 ton vessel, which due to space, weight/displacement availability and crew issues would likely have less capability than an upgraded ANZAC-class FFH. Of vessel of that size and displacement would likely be workable for Australia as a blue water OPV, but not a combatant.

Part of the reason why the Hunter-class is going to be so large and require the projected number of crew is because of the desired quantity and quality of capabilities. By way of example, if long-ranged area air defence is a required capability, then in turn requires sensors to detect, track and engage targets, a combat data system capable of handling all the information, and a long-ranged weapon system like SM-2/3/6 or similar. In order to fit all that, plus the power generation capability to cover the electrical loads for the electronics, and enough of the long-ranged missiles to be useful, a certain minimum amount of both space and displacement is required.

Going in the direction of patrol corvettes would actually be going away from where Australia is currently going, and away from where Australia needs to go. Speaking in generalities, a corvette (FSG) can provide capabilities similar to what an FFG or DDG is capable of but to a lesser degree and from a smaller, shorter-legged package. If a DDG can fit area air defence missiles with a max engagement range out to 120+ km, a corvette might only be able to fit smaller missiles with a max engagement range of 50 km, and so on.

If the FlexPatrol-98 had been selected as the base for the Arafura-class that could have worked. As a replacement for some of the planned Hunter-class FFG's, no. If RAN operations were carried out more focused in a littoral maritime environment like Malaysia, Indonesia, or the Phillipines, then a smaller vessel than the planned DDG's and FFG's might work. Given that Australia's maritime area of interest is much more expansive than just the northern approaches, blue water vessels which can bring the breadth of capabilities the RAN might require are needed.

 

[JBRobbo]

Gawd I hope not!

If the Hunter-class was reduced from nine vessels to six vessels, that would mean the RAN would only have a pair of Hunter-class "frigates" consistently available for or already on operations, plus a single Hobart-class DDG. If a crisis were to break out somewhere that the ADF had to respond to, and vessels requiring escorts (like the LHD's and/or the LSD), only having a max of three consistently available major warships would be a problem.

When I checked the info on the FlexPatrol-98, it is referring to a 100 m LOA, 2,400 ton vessel, which due to space, weight/displacement availability and crew issues would likely have less capability than an upgraded ANZAC-class FFH. Of vessel of that size and displacement would likely be workable for Australia as a blue water OPV, but not a combatant.

Part of the reason why the Hunter-class is going to be so large and require the projected number of crew is because of the desired quantity and quality of capabilities. By way of example, if long-ranged area air defence is a required capability, then in turn requires sensors to detect, track and engage targets, a combat data system capable of handling all the information, and a long-ranged weapon system like SM-2/3/6 or similar. In order to fit all that, plus the power generation capability to cover the electrical loads for the electronics, and enough of the long-ranged missiles to be useful, a certain minimum amount of both space and displacement is required.

Going in the direction of patrol corvettes would actually be going away from where Australia is currently going, and away from where Australia needs to go. Speaking in generalities, a corvette (FSG) can provide capabilities similar to what an FFG or DDG is capable of but to a lesser degree and from a smaller, shorter-legged package. If a DDG can fit area air defence missiles with a max engagement range out to 120+ km, a corvette might only be able to fit smaller missiles with a max engagement range of 50 km, and so on.

If the FlexPatrol-98 had been selected as the base for the Arafura-class that could have worked. As a replacement for some of the planned Hunter-class FFG's, no. If RAN operations were carried out more focused in a littoral maritime environment like Malaysia, Indonesia, or the Phillipines, then a smaller vessel than the planned DDG's and FFG's might work. Given that Australia's maritime area of interest is much more expansive than just the northern approaches, blue water vessels which can bring the breadth of capabilities the RAN might require are needed.

Obviously I am aware that the Hunter class are vastly more capable and more or less agree with everything you just said, however there is no reason that this design could not escort a Canberra LHD as part of a task group as the smaller Arafura class have been earmarked to do so for rapid environmental assessment prior to beach landings. I was merely speculating a theoretical alternative to increase hull numbers to promote discussion. Sure you may only have three high-end surface combatants available at any one time as opposed to four, but this would be offset by having an additional two available mid-level combatants that with 9LV, CEAFAR and 32-64 ESSM still provide excellent short-to-medium range AAW.

 

[Todjaeger]

Obviously I am aware that the Hunter class are vastly more capable and more or less agree with everything you just said, however there is no reason that this design could not escort a Canberra LHD as part of a task group as the smaller Arafura class have been earmarked to do so for rapid environmental assessment prior to beach landings. I was merely speculating a theoretical alternative to increase hull numbers to promote discussion. Sure you may only have three high-end surface combatants available at any one time as opposed to four, but this would be offset by having an additional two available mid-level combatants that with 9LV, CEAFAR and 32-64 ESSM still provide excellent short-to-medium range AAW.

Firstly, the three major warships at any one time would be potentially across the entirety of the RAN. This includes any major RAN warships that are already deployed on operations or international goodwill/showing the flag-type missions. With that in mind, a reduction of major fleet units from a planned 12 to 9 is asking for future problems to emerge. Consider for example, a crisis of some sort where the ADF needs to land troops and sends one of the LHD's, escorted by a Hobart-class DDG for area air defence and a Hunter-class FFG for additional air defence plus ASW. If there is only one other Hunter-class FFG available for service due to maintenance and training cycles, but it is already deployed on an anti-piracy operation off eastern Africa, then if one of the AOR's needed to be escorted to where the RAN task force is operating, the proposed corvette IMO would be insufficient to cover the spectrum of potential threats. Even a pair of them I suspect would not provide the same breadth and degree of capability that a single Hunter-class would.

Keep in mind the very real limitations that would be imposed on a vessel with a little more than half the displacement of an ANZAC-class FFH (2,400 tons vs. 4,000 tons full load), that is about 15 m longer than one of the OPV's, but 18 m shorter than an FFH, and with half the crew of an FFH. Especially if the vessel is supposed to be sturdy enough to handle some of the blue water operations the RAN might be called upon to perform, and have sufficient bunkerage to transit 5,000 n miles @15 kts. Until there is an actual example under construction, and mission modules which have been successfully produced, I will remain quite skeptical about both the available load out and how effective a vessel not much larger than an OPV would actually be as a warship.

Something else to consider is that to achieve 32-64 ESSM, one would need 8-16 Mk 41 VLS cells, or 16-32 Mk 56 VLS cells. Either would likely be a stretch for such a small vessel, and absent more information it would be an open question on whether or not the craft would have any other capabilities of note at the same time. A Hunter-class FFG is intended to be able to perform area air defence, ASuW and ASW roles as needed on a deployment or operation, without requiring a change in configuration.

Again, the Flex Patrol 98 concept might have provided a more combat capable vessel than the Arafura-class OPV will be, would also be a poor substitute for some of the currently planned Hunter-class FFG's.

 

[JBRobbo]

Firstly, the three major warships at any one time would be potentially across the entirety of the RAN. This includes any major RAN warships that are already deployed on operations or international goodwill/showing the flag-type missions. With that in mind, a reduction of major fleet units from a planned 12 to 9 is asking for future problems to emerge. Consider for example, a crisis of some sort where the ADF needs to land troops and sends one of the LHD's, escorted by a Hobart-class DDG for area air defence and a Hunter-class FFG for additional air defence plus ASW. If there is only one other Hunter-class FFG available for service due to maintenance and training cycles, but it is already deployed on an anti-piracy operation off eastern Africa, then if one of the AOR's needed to be escorted to where the RAN task force is operating, the proposed corvette IMO would be insufficient to cover the spectrum of potential threats. Even a pair of them I suspect would not provide the same breadth and degree of capability that a single Hunter-class would.

Keep in mind the very real limitations that would be imposed on a vessel with a little more than half the displacement of an ANZAC-class FFH (2,400 tons vs. 4,000 tons full load), that is about 15 m longer than one of the OPV's, but 18 m shorter than an FFH, and with half the crew of an FFH. Especially if the vessel is supposed to be sturdy enough to handle some of the blue water operations the RAN might be called upon to perform, and have sufficient bunkerage to transit 5,000 n miles @15 kts. Until there is an actual example under construction, and mission modules which have been successfully produced, I will remain quite skeptical about both the available load out and how effective a vessel not much larger than an OPV would actually be as a warship.

Something else to consider is that to achieve 32-64 ESSM, one would need 8-16 Mk 41 VLS cells, or 16-32 Mk 56 VLS cells. Either would likely be a stretch for such a small vessel, and absent more information it would be an open question on whether or not the craft would have any other capabilities of note at the same time. A Hunter-class FFG is intended to be able to perform area air defence, ASuW and ASW roles as needed on a deployment or operation, without requiring a change in configuration.

Again, the Flex Patrol 98 concept might have provided a more combat capable vessel than the Arafura-class OPV will be, would also be a poor substitute for some of the currently planned Hunter-class FFG's.

Fair points. All information and diagrams only reference 'vertically launched' air defence missiles with no mention of Mk41, it may very well be limited to something like Umkhonto, Seaceptor or Mk56 w/ ESSM at the most, but on the same token the now cancelled 95m/2,050t Polish 'Gawron' class design based on the MEKO A-100 featured an 8-cell Mk41 VLS so theoretically it shouldn't be an issue, at least in self-defence or tactical length. The forthcoming 90m/2,000t Israeli Sa'ar-6, also based on the MEKO A-100, is likewise very heavily armed for a vessel its size. Considering that the original plan for SEA 1180 was for 20 vessels, a class of eight Flex Patrol 98's to meet the originally envisioned numbers sure would seem to fill a lot of gaps but then we're back again where we started in regards to manpower deficiencies, not to mention how we are to pay for it.

 

[seaspear]

Just out of curiosity has the Navy ever asked of the personnel leaving the service why and what it would take for them to reconsider ?

 

[hairyman]

Why is this an issue?

The armed forces took the numbers they needed from the pool of applicants.

If they were funded for more people they would have taken more applicants.

Regards,

Massive[/QU


That is the answer is'nt it, if they were funded for more people. I am of the impression that our Navy is undermanned, as so many posters on here have raised this issue as to why we man all our subs etc. If we need more people we should get more people. I know our government doesnt like to spend money, no matter who is in power, but we are supposed to be lifting our spending, so extra personnel if required should not be a problem.

 

[John Fedup]

I think the RAN will be able to continue to recruit RCN personnel for the foreseeable future until our CSCs arrive. By the late 2020s, a pool of Canadian submariners will be looking at the RAN as the chances of a Victoria class replacement are not good. Given the UK’s Brexit situation the RN could see cuts resulting in RN personnel seeking the sunshine navy. Reduced training costs will be bonus as well.

 

[spoz]

Just out of curiosity has the Navy ever asked of the personnel leaving the service why and what it would take for them to reconsider ?

Yes, every person advising of an intention to leave the RAN is interviewed and also asked to fill out a questionnaire (which is voluntary). A large number of intelligent personnel have been working this problem for many years and a wide variety of measures have been tried; the conversation here so far has canvassed some of the more obvious ones. A number of them have been standard practice for years - sea shore rosters, targeted incentive schemes of various sorts etc.

 

[ASSAIL]

Yes, every person advising of an intention to leave the RAN is interviewed and also asked to fill out a questionnaire (which is voluntary). A large number of intelligent personnel have been working this problem for many years and a wide variety of measures have been tried; the conversation here so far has canvassed some of the more obvious ones. A number of them have been standard practice for years - sea shore rosters, targeted incentive schemes of various sorts etc.

There’s also the effort to entice leavers back into the Navy.
I’m not sure how successful that has been. This didn’t exist when I left the service so maybe a member with more recent knowledge could comment.

Rejoin Case Management Team (RCMT) | Royal Australian Navy

 

[StingrayOZ]

Noonan addressed many of these issues directly in the last half of this video. Not with specifics, but it is clear it is a priority.

Adf has also re-introduced a gap year program, with only a 12 month commitment. I think this a good program, many recruits don't have family experience with the military any more.

It's no longer about warm bodies either. They need skills. We have an national education system which is really struggling in the STEM areas. Skills highly relevant for the ADF technical roles and roles in general.

Tapping into the next generation successful for ADF recruitment

The ADF international recruiters are ruthless. Australia has done very well picking up key internationals. But retention and international recruitment can have affect on current locals and currently serving members if its overtly generous.

Some of the other issues are things like the sub base only in WA. That will change. New platforms are coming online. New equipment across the ADF. Also recently look at the greater profile the ADF has with humanitarian and global security and partnerships, which tends to be more attractive to recruits.

 

[Todjaeger]

Fair points. All information and diagrams only reference 'vertically launched' air defence missiles with no mention of Mk41, it may very well be limited to something like Umkhonto, Seaceptor or Mk56 w/ ESSM at the most, but on the same token the now cancelled 95m/2,050t Polish 'Gawron' class design based on the MEKO A-100 featured an 8-cell Mk41 VLS so theoretically it shouldn't be an issue, at least in self-defence or tactical length. The forthcoming 90m/2,000t Israeli Sa'ar-6, also based on the MEKO A-100, is likewise very heavily armed for a vessel its size. Considering that the original plan for SEA 1180 was for 20 vessels, a class of eight Flex Patrol 98's to meet the originally envisioned numbers sure would seem to fill a lot of gaps but then we're back again where we started in regards to manpower deficiencies, not to mention how we are to pay for it.

I agree that there are some quite combat capable corvettes, Germany's K130 readily comes to mind as an example.

However, the idea originally proposed was for a class of six corvettes in place of three Hunter-class frigates, or a third of the planned frigates, or a quarter of the total number of major warships the RAN is planning on having.

Put another way, the proposal was to replace three blue water major warships, for a total tonnage of ~26,400 tonnes with six corvettes which are likely more suitable for littoral operations based off total size, displacement and armament, with a total tonnage of ~13,200 tonnes. Even if the corvettes were to deploy and operate in pairs, they would not realistically be able to provide the same level of capabilities that a single Hunter-class frigate would be expected to. The one advantage that the corvettes might have, is simply being able to have a greater number of hulls in the water. Each of those hulls would be a quarter of the displacement of a Hunter-class, which would dramatically impact what the corvette would be capable of doing.

There is a reason why the RAN and most other modern navies have demonstrated a trend towards replacing surface escorts with larger and more capable classes. The RAN is planning on operating a total of 12 major surface warships like it largely has for some time, but these will all be significantly larger and more capable than previous classes.

If the idea was instead to acquire some form of corvette either in addition to or perhaps in place of some of the Arafura-class OPV's, that would be one thing.

In general terms, as one shrinks the size of a warship, the vessel tends to lose the properties which enable it to perform adequately in blue water operations. At the same time, the smaller sized vessels with lower displacement also have less "free" space and displacement available to use when fitting weapons, bunkerage, storage for victuals, etc. Again using the German K-130/Braunschweig-class FSG as example, a range of 2,500 n miles @ 15kts is mentioned, but also an endurance of seven days without a tender. To provide some context, that would just about enable a K-130 corvette to transit (@15 kts) from sail from Sydney to Darwin without stopping en route to refuel and resupply, while staying within ~300 km of the eastern Australian coastline. Now for Germany, having such a short endurance would not be much of an issue, since the major nearby waters are the North Sea and Baltic Sea, where a corvette could easily return to a German port to refuel and resupply. A similar situation exists for the majority of other nations which operate advanced corvettes, the corvettes operate largely in littoral waters and could return to port comparatively easily. The situation for a navy like the RAN is quite different however, since port facilities around the Australian coastline can be few and far between. If RAN vessels needed to operate off the shores of some S. Pacific island nation, those already long distances could grow even longer, and the limited port facilities limited even further. If one then adds in RAN vessels needing a reserve of fuel and stores to permit the vessel to be on station for several days or longer...

A vessel like an Arafura-class OPV could potentially manage this better despite being a bit smaller and with a lower displacement because the OPV would have so much less of that displacement taken up by weaponry and munitions, leaving more displacement available for fuel and stores.

 

[JBRobbo]

I agree that there are some quite combat capable corvettes, Germany's K130 readily comes to mind as an example.

However, the idea originally proposed was for a class of six corvettes in place of three Hunter-class frigates, or a third of the planned frigates, or a quarter of the total number of major warships the RAN is planning on having.

Put another way, the proposal was to replace three blue water major warships, for a total tonnage of ~26,400 tonnes with six corvettes which are likely more suitable for littoral operations based off total size, displacement and armament, with a total tonnage of ~13,200 tonnes. Even if the corvettes were to deploy and operate in pairs, they would not realistically be able to provide the same level of capabilities that a single Hunter-class frigate would be expected to. The one advantage that the corvettes might have, is simply being able to have a greater number of hulls in the water. Each of those hulls would be a quarter of the displacement of a Hunter-class, which would dramatically impact what the corvette would be capable of doing.

There is a reason why the RAN and most other modern navies have demonstrated a trend towards replacing surface escorts with larger and more capable classes. The RAN is planning on operating a total of 12 major surface warships like it largely has for some time, but these will all be significantly larger and more capable than previous classes.

If the idea was instead to acquire some form of corvette either in addition to or perhaps in place of some of the Arafura-class OPV's, that would be one thing.

In general terms, as one shrinks the size of a warship, the vessel tends to lose the properties which enable it to perform adequately in blue water operations. At the same time, the smaller sized vessels with lower displacement also have less "free" space and displacement available to use when fitting weapons, bunkerage, storage for victuals, etc. Again using the German K-130/Braunschweig-class FSG as example, a range of 2,500 n miles @ 15kts is mentioned, but also an endurance of seven days without a tender. To provide some context, that would just about enable a K-130 corvette to transit (@15 kts) from sail from Sydney to Darwin without stopping en route to refuel and resupply, while staying within ~300 km of the eastern Australian coastline. Now for Germany, having such a short endurance would not be much of an issue, since the major nearby waters are the North Sea and Baltic Sea, where a corvette could easily return to a German port to refuel and resupply. A similar situation exists for the majority of other nations which operate advanced corvettes, the corvettes operate largely in littoral waters and could return to port comparatively easily. The situation for a navy like the RAN is quite different however, since port facilities around the Australian coastline can be few and far between. If RAN vessels needed to operate off the shores of some S. Pacific island nation, those already long distances could grow even longer, and the limited port facilities limited even further. If one then adds in RAN vessels needing a reserve of fuel and stores to permit the vessel to be on station for several days or longer...

A vessel like an Arafura-class OPV could potentially manage this better despite being a bit smaller and with a lower displacement because the OPV would have so much less of that displacement taken up by weaponry and munitions, leaving more displacement available for fuel and stores.

Yes all true, but we're not talking about the 90m/1,840t K-130 Braunschweig with a range of 2,500nm, zero ASW capability and zero local area air defence capability. We're talking about a 100m/2,400t corvette with a practically identical weapon and sensor suite to an ANZAC frigate with the same range as a Hobart DDG and an endurance of at least 14 days, which could likely be further bolstered with increased cold storage facilities etc. as was done with the Hobart class. Of all the corvettes in the world it is clear why you would pick the Braunschweig class for comparison, because they're hardly comparable. Why not the Malaysian Kedah class based on the MEKO A-100 with a range of 6,000nm and an endurance of 21 days? Furthermore you have slightly fudged the numbers in several of your posts to seemingly further strengthen your argument. I never said my proposal was right or wrong, it was merely a theoretical proposition, which you are clearly strongly against for solid reasons which is perfectly fine. Yes it certainly doesn't have the space, weight or power reserves for future upgrades as the Hunter's do, but instead i can be in two places instead of one. Is it as acoustically quiet as a Hunter class? probably not depending on the propulsion setup, but it sure as hell presents a smaller radar signature. Does it have SM-2/SM-6? no, but is that crucial for every combatant anyway? Plenty of capable modern combatants in our region without long range AAW, i.e. Talwar, Sovremenny, Type 054A....you name it.

 

[ngatimozart]

Yes all true, but we're not talking about the 90m/1,840t K-130 Braunschweig with a range of 2,500nm, zero ASW capability and zero local area air defence capability. We're talking about a 100m/2,400t corvette with a practically identical weapon and sensor suite to an ANZAC frigate with the same range as a Hobart DDG and an endurance of at least 14 days, which could likely be further bolstered with increased cold storage facilities etc. as was done with the Hobart class. Of all the corvettes in the world it is clear why you would pick the Braunschweig class for comparison, because they're hardly comparable. Why not the Malaysian Kedah class based on the MEKO A-100 with a range of 6,000nm and an endurance of 21 days? Furthermore you have slightly fudged the numbers in several of your posts to seemingly further strengthen your argument. I never said my proposal was right or wrong, it was merely a theoretical proposition, which you are clearly strongly against for solid reasons which is perfectly fine. Yes it certainly doesn't have the space, weight or power reserves for future upgrades as the Hunter's do, but instead i can be in two places instead of one. Is it as acoustically quiet as a Hunter class? probably not depending on the propulsion setup, but it sure as hell presents a smaller radar signature. Does it have SM-2/SM-6? no, but is that crucial for every combatant anyway? Plenty of capable modern combatants in our region without long range AAW, i.e. Talwar, Sovremenny, Type 054A....you name it.

But a 2,500 tonne , 100 m corvette / OPV is not a FFG with the modern sensors, weapons and C3 / C4 capabilities that the COA require; that is the point. Secondly, is such a capability part of the RAN CONOPS which are determined by the COA? Thirdly, stuffing such a hull with the systems that you suggest will create major stability problems. The RAN ANZAC FFGs currently have stability issues with their current systems fitout. Fourthly, what you suggest would be a major degradation of RAN surface fleet capability and capacity.

If such a capability is desired by the COA, then it will be funded separately from the Hunter class and not at the expense of it. My own suggestion would be something closer to 100 - 120 m length and 3,000 - 3,200 tonnes displacement being more GP rather than being specific. You can getaway with say two 35 mm Millennium guns (1 fore & 1 aft) 6 x ExLS cells for ESSM (=24 ESSM), 8 x Mk 41 tactical length VLS, hangar for Romeo / RPAS, 2 x Mark 32 Surface Vessel Torpedo Tubes, Spike ATGM for FASC etc., and a mission bay for what ever else the RAN / ADF might deem necessary. The ExLS is quite light compared to the Mk-41 and it doesn't penetrate the deck so is agnostic as to placement.

 

[JBRobbo]

But a 2,500 tonne , 100 m corvette / OPV is not a FFG with the modern sensors, weapons and C3 / C4 capabilities that the COA require; that is the point. Secondly, is such a capability part of the RAN CONOPS which are determined by the COA? Thirdly, stuffing such a hull with the systems that you suggest will create major stability problems. The RAN ANZAC FFGs currently have stability issues with their current systems fitout. Fourthly, what you suggest would be a major degradation of RAN surface fleet capability and capacity.

If such a capability is desired by the COA, then it will be funded separately from the Hunter class and not at the expense of it. My own suggestion would be something closer to 100 - 120 m length and 3,000 - 3,200 tonnes displacement being more GP rather than being specific. You can getaway with say two 35 mm Millennium guns (1 fore & 1 aft) 6 x ExLS cells for ESSM (=24 ESSM), 8 x Mk 41 tactical length VLS, hangar for Romeo / RPAS, 2 x Mark 32 Surface Vessel Torpedo Tubes, Spike ATGM for FASC etc., and a mission bay for what ever else the RAN / ADF might deem necessary. The ExLS is quite light compared to the Mk-41 and it doesn't penetrate the deck so is agnostic as to placement.

I understand the points that Todjaeger has made and i've been through them before. Again i say it is a THEORETICAL proposition, there are plenty of former high ranking RAN members and ASPI papers that suggest an increase in hull numbers is not only desirable but necessary so i am hardly alone, this was just a proposal that might help alleviate said issues whilst remaining under our current manpower constraints, nothing more.

 

[Stampede]

But a 2,500 tonne , 100 m corvette / OPV is not a FFG with the modern sensors, weapons and C3 / C4 capabilities that the COA require; that is the point. Secondly, is such a capability part of the RAN CONOPS which are determined by the COA? Thirdly, stuffing such a hull with the systems that you suggest will create major stability problems. The RAN ANZAC FFGs currently have stability issues with their current systems fitout. Fourthly, what you suggest would be a major degradation of RAN surface fleet capability and capacity.

If such a capability is desired by the COA, then it will be funded separately from the Hunter class and not at the expense of it. My own suggestion would be something closer to 100 - 120 m length and 3,000 - 3,200 tonnes displacement being more GP rather than being specific. You can getaway with say two 35 mm Millennium guns (1 fore & 1 aft) 6 x ExLS cells for ESSM (=24 ESSM), 8 x Mk 41 tactical length VLS, hangar for Romeo / RPAS, 2 x Mark 32 Surface Vessel Torpedo Tubes, Spike ATGM for FASC etc., and a mission bay for what ever else the RAN / ADF might deem necessary. The ExLS is quite light compared to the Mk-41 and it doesn't penetrate the deck so is agnostic as to placement.

I can understand the appeal of a 2k to 3k tonne ship but their will still be trade off's in capability.
Maybe the question is what level of harms way do you send a ship. If it is to sail with a blue water fleet under the umbrella of the major fleet units it needs to be an asset not a liability to the fleet.
In a high end conflict then ngatimozarts suggestion is probably the minimum in size and load out.
The question still is it an asset or liability?
Others would be better qualified to answer and I would be interested in the feedback
If yes, then maybe reduce the OPV's to 9 and build 3 to 6 such GP frigates.
But please leave the major units as is for a total of twelve destroyers.
I'm mindful these GP Frigates will still be expensive ships
.

Regards S

 

[JBRobbo]

Look at the JMSDF? They only have four Kongo's, two Atago's and the future two Maya's equipped with SM-2. Even under my proposal we would still have more Aegis/SM-2 equipped ships than they do (with much less VLS obviously, but that wasn't my decision) and they are sure as hell closer to hostility than we are.