Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[alexsa]

The Collins class got so much bad press that I feel that it became politically untenable to consider developing it any further. Such a pity really. All the work that was put in and all of the lessons learnt seem to have been tossed aside just because of the lack of the political will to continue developing the class.

We need to remember what we will get with the future submarine if it comes off. And that is a hull that can take a wide appature array, very very long legs wth a high transit speed and the US combat system combined with the best features of the Collins. The Collins have not been hard worked as far as I can tell (Volk would be best placed to advise) and they are not being allowed to stagnate pending their replacement. As of June two of the boats are in the process of getting a significant sonar upgrade whihc will flow onto the rest of the fleet.

In so far as waht SAAB can offer, again their current product falls well short of what Australia are looking for. The biggest A26 being 3000 tonnes is quoted as having a range of 10000nm .... at 10 knots while the future submarine is looking at 14000nm at speed over 14knots (depending on which sourse your read) or 18000nm at 10 knots ..... and will not rely on AIP to achieve this. Similarly the endurance is 50 days (for the biggest version) compared to 80 days.

For a remote country like Australia ..... range and speed is everything.

 

[ASSAIL]

Check out this awesome Saab/Kockum video on their A26 submarine build.

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=2092623494399597

I do wonder ASC and Saab could continue to collaborate in maintaining the Collins class, if the ASC would be able to continue learning from Saab.

Or, SAAB learning from ASC.
Kockums didn’t exactly cover themselves in glory with their construction efforts on the bow sections they built for Collins, most of their shoddy welding had to be redone.
Collins has undergone and evolution in capability and design since Kockums involvement and let’s not forget Saab don’t have a workforce with current experience due to the hiatus in Swedish sub construction and disruptions from the corporate gyrations with HDW and Saab.
The development of the ASC sustainment practice and innovation is world class and should never be underestimated and although sustainment and build are two very different skill sets there’s enough commonality to suggest the transition to building the SEA 1000 will be a lot smoother and less traumatic than Collins and probably, my opinion, be easier than the Swedes into the A26.

 

[Volkodav]

Or, SAAB learning from ASC.
Kockums didn’t exactly cover themselves in glory with their construction efforts on the bow sections they built for Collins, most of their shoddy welding had to be redone.
Collins has undergone and evolution in capability and design since Kockums involvement and let’s not forget Saab don’t have a workforce with current experience due to the hiatus in Swedish sub construction and disruptions from the corporate gyrations with HDW and Saab.
The development of the ASC sustainment practice and innovation is world class and should never be underestimated and although sustainment and build are two very different skill sets there’s enough commonality to suggest the transition to building the SEA 1000 will be a lot smoother and less traumatic than Collins and probably, my opinion, be easier than the Swedes into the A26.

My LinkedIn shows the number of Collins class people who moved from Deep Blue Tech, ASCs R&D/new projects subsidiary, to Saab and the Viking project.

Basically prior to the build in Japan idea Australia was looking at a local design. Once it was decided we were going offshore the government owned ASC shut down Deep BlueTech and its talent either returned to Collins Class sustainment or left all together, many of the Swede's on the team going back to work on Viking, having maintained their skills in Australia.

The has been a fair bit of mobility with SEA1000 now recruiting individuals to train to undertake roles that the encumbants have retired or moved on from, without replacement, because of the assumption the skills weren't needed anymore.

This is the reality of a politically induced blackhole and why it takes so long and costs so much to rectify. Even if people like me returned to the fold we would still need months, if not a couple of years to get back up to speed. When you look at the talent that DBT had just five/six years ago verses now it's enough to make you cry.

 

[Stampede]

Check out this awesome Saab/Kockum video on their A26 submarine build.

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=2092623494399597

I do wonder ASC and Saab could continue to collaborate in maintaining the Collins class, if the ASC would be able to continue learning from Saab.

It's a nice presentation and originally I would have liked them to have been one on the contenders.
However there must of being a reason they didn't make the top three SEA 1000 contenders.
I'm sure Saab/Kockums were disappointed and have reflected on said decision.
Maybe they and the Commonwealth would both of done things differently second time round.
We will never Know.

Moving forward I hope for a successful and timely submarine build with the French.
Fingers crossed.


Regards S

 

[ASSAIL]

It's a nice presentation and originally I would have liked them to have been one on the contenders.
However there must of being a reason they didn't make the top three SEA 1000 contenders.
I'm sure Saab/Kockums were disappointed and have reflected on said decision.
Maybe they and the Commonwealth would both of done things differently second time round.
We will never Know.

Moving forward I hope for a successful and timely submarine build with the French.
Fingers crossed.


Regards S

Let’s focus on the theme of that presentation - the A26 is a submarine for “littoral” operations.
Say no more.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Reading between the lines the reason the US was so keen on the Aust Japan tie up may have been to improve the quality of Japan's much more substantial submarine fleet. My understanding is the Japanese metallurgy is world class but many other design features of their boats were evolutionary in nature and inferior to the technically older Collins design.

What is often lost in the politics and headlines surrounding the Collins Class is that they were bleeding edge, completely new and in some ways so far ahead of their time that certain features were unworkable and had to be downgraded from the original requirements, i.e. the original combat system. They were more advanced than anything the Swede's had ever built and actually trailblazers for the following kockums designs. The Japanese boats are the result of the continual evolution of a design derived from the US Barbel class, so while very advanced in some ways, they are evolved from a US 1950s SSK concept.

Japan and Australia have different priorities and different needs from a sub, and have no doubt funded research in different priorities. Working together on subs, doesn't have to mean a one way communicate from Japan to Australia. Ideally we would put the money where it is best, and we become world best at specific tech that is relevant to us that we could share across allies so we don't just spend tens of billions reinventing the wheel.

Collins are capable boats and for what we want, I am not sure the Japanese proposal would have gotten us a significant better platform. Particularly going into the future. Any new needs and capabilities would have to be slowly evolved into the platform. Japanese aren't really that interested in inserting special forces, land strike, long range transits, surface surveillance etc. They are designed to basically face off against China and its capabilities in the immediate area using certain tactics and advantages. In that role they are very good, but they are pretty specialized.

I totally agree with Alex, if the program is successful, what we will have will really be unique. Could be a game changer. Certainly very high end.

 

[Volkodav]

Japan and Australia have different priorities and different needs from a sub, and have no doubt funded research in different priorities. Working together on subs, doesn't have to mean a one way communicate from Japan to Australia. Ideally we would put the money where it is best, and we become world best at specific tech that is relevant to us that we could share across allies so we don't just spend tens of billions reinventing the wheel.

Collins are capable boats and for what we want, I am not sure the Japanese proposal would have gotten us a significant better platform. Particularly going into the future. Any new needs and capabilities would have to be slowly evolved into the platform. Japanese aren't really that interested in inserting special forces, land strike, long range transits, surface surveillance etc. They are designed to basically face off against China and its capabilities in the immediate area using certain tactics and advantages. In that role they are very good, but they are pretty specialized.

I totally agree with Alex, if the program is successful, what we will have will really be unique. Could be a game changer. Certainly very high end.

The Japanese weren't interested in....... when the JMSDFs role was sanitising the waters around Japan to permit US CBGs to operate with impunity.

Things have changed, Japan now has marines, amphibious ships, is investing in force projection and strike capabilities. The now want and need longer ranged boats able to take the war to an agress or rather than providing a bastion for their allies to strike from.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Definately, China is different.

The threat has Changed. China today and more importantly China of 2030 isn't the same China of the 1990's. You can't keep China in a box, and that is very much what Japan would like to do, keep them in a box. It explains some of the actions China takes in the SCS. It also underlines some key Japan US relations and Japanese concerns about the future.

China has expeditionary capability and a global outlook. Japanese subs aren't really designed to project power in the Indian ocean or further afield.

Japan has a lot of evolving to do across their forces. Australia is an ideal partner for a lot of reasons for them, in many areas.

 

[John Fedup]

Yet another article on SSN wrt Australia. This one is a little more realistic, Sea 1000 continues on as a SSK program and in the meantime decide if the follow-on generation of subs should be SSN based on the strategic situation signs during the next few years. If the answer is yes for SSNs then start planning the transition well before Sea 1000 is finished.

Should nuclear-powered submarines be part of Australia’s future? | The Strategist

 

[ASSAIL]

Yet another article on SSN wrt Australia. This one is a little more realistic, Sea 1000 continues on as a SSK program and in the meantime decide if the follow-on generation of subs should be SSN based on the strategic situation signs during the next few years. If the answer is yes for SSNs then start planning the transition well before Sea 1000 is finished.

Should nuclear-powered submarines be part of Australia’s future? | The Strategist

I have no cause to argue with the transition to Nucs, the whole timing of such a move will depend on the gradual acceptance by our people.
The Institute has long championed such a move. I was a one time neighbour of Peter Briggs and I’m aware of his views in the past and it does not surprise me that he has put this proposition.
Capability planners have to deal In the realm of the possible but they can advocate for the future and I believe that the selection of Barracuda was exactly that. It provides a future pathway to SSNs for the RAN and I believe that was a defining factor in its selection.
We could have gone for the alternatives but when the time for change to nucs arrives they gave no easy solution. The Barracuda type hull did.

 

[John Fedup]

Yes, I agree, the Barracuda or a future iteration of it was probably a factor in the French selection and France was the only player that could offer a SSK to SSN transition with Australia having an important role in the “now” and later in the “future” wrt to actual development and manufacturing.

 

[Redlands18]

Yes, I agree, the Barracuda or a future iteration of it was probably a factor in the French selection and France was the only player that could offer a SSK to SSN transition with Australia having an important role in the “now” and later in the “future” wrt to actual development and manufacturing.

One day maybe, but doubtfull we will see a HMAS Nautinaught(named after Nautilas & Dreadnought) in the life time of many posters on this Forum.

 

[hauritz]

One day maybe, but doubtfull we will see a HMAS Nautinaught(named after Nautilas & Dreadnought) in the life time of many posters on this Forum.

I will count myself lucky if I live long enough to see the first Shortfin Barracuda hit the water. As programs become more complex it seems to take longer to bring them to fruition. SEA 1000 technically started back in 2007. It took another 9 years to select the prefered design. It will then take another 6 or 7 years for construction to start with the first sub entering service in maybe the first half of the 2030s with the last of the class perhaps not entering service until the 2050s.

By that time I will be well into my late eighties.

 

[ASSAIL]

I will count myself lucky if I live long enough to see the first Shortfin Barracuda hit the water. As programs become more complex it seems to take longer to bring them to fruition. SEA 1000 technically started back in 2007. It took another 9 years to select the prefered design. It will then take another 6 or 7 years for construction to start with the first sub entering service in maybe the first half of the 2030s with the last of the class perhaps not entering service until the 2050s.

By that time I will be well into my late eighties.

Your timeline can be modified because berween 2007 and 2013 an idea was floated but nothing, zero was done, no substantive funding and no intent to do anything was apparent.

 

[Joe Black]

I will count myself lucky if I live long enough to see the first Shortfin Barracuda hit the water. As programs become more complex it seems to take longer to bring them to fruition. SEA 1000 technically started back in 2007. It took another 9 years to select the prefered design. It will then take another 6 or 7 years for construction to start with the first sub entering service in maybe the first half of the 2030s with the last of the class perhaps not entering service until the 2050s.

By that time I will be well into my late eighties.

One does wonder if the Collins will really last that long. I think this investment will need to ensure that Australia will from now, establish a permanent continous build program, liken the Japanese sub program, except, our build cycle and drumbeat will be a bit more stretched. I do hope that the first Shortfin will hit the water not much later than 2030. They say it typically takes 10 years for a new class of sub. I hope we will then take a more evolutionary path rather than revolutionary path everytime RAN requests a new class of sub.

Taken a page from the USN, one could see how the Seawolf and Virginia class were evolved from Los Angeles class, likewise, the Japanese Soryu was an evolutionary design from Oyashio which in turn was from Harushio class.

 

[Tasman]

I will count myself lucky if I live long enough to see the first Shortfin Barracuda hit the water. As programs become more complex it seems to take longer to bring them to fruition. SEA 1000 technically started back in 2007. It took another 9 years to select the prefered design. It will then take another 6 or 7 years for construction to start with the first sub entering service in maybe the first half of the 2030s with the last of the class perhaps not entering service until the 2050s.

By that time I will be well into my late eighties.

You're lucky. By the mid 2030s I'll be in my nineties! By 2050 I'll be looking down and haunting any politician or bureaucrat who stuffs up the program!

Thank goodness we finally have a continuous build program in place for both submarines and surface vessels that seems to have bipartisan support. It will be a huge leap forward for Australia if it is successfully followed through. Let's hope that it is not scuttled down the track for political or economic reasons.

Tas

 

[Volkodav]

Your timeline can be modified because berween 2007 and 2013 an idea was floated but nothing, zero was done, no substantive funding and no intent to do anything was apparent.

Yes and no.

There was a vacuum in relation to direction from government under Gillard and Smith but the intent to acquire twelve boats was in the Rudd / Fitzgibbon whitepaper but stalled when Falkner became DM.

That said RAN were very aware of the requirement and with their support ASC established Deep Blue Tech to develop concepts for the replacement program. It was this work that enabled the then government to select the local design as their preferred way forward, with an evolved Collins (developed with Kockums as plan B and an evolved MOTS design from elsewhere as plan C. An evolved MOTS solution was seen as the worst option as it would basically repeat the painful early years of the Collins project.

 

[Volkodav]

One does wonder if the Collins will really last that long. I think this investment will need to ensure that Australia will from now, establish a permanent continous build program, liken the Japanese sub program, except, our build cycle and drumbeat will be a bit more stretched. I do hope that the first Shortfin will hit the water not much later than 2030. They say it typically takes 10 years for a new class of sub. I hope we will then take a more evolutionary path rather than revolutionary path everytime RAN requests a new class of sub.

Taken a page from the USN, one could see how the Seawolf and Virginia class were evolved from Los Angeles class, likewise, the Japanese Soryu was an evolutionary design from Oyashio which in turn was from Harushio class.

Seawolf was pretty much a clean sheet proposition designed to counter the best the soviets had to offer in the open ocean. The Virginia was a more flexible design, using bits and bobs from the Seawolf, but intended more for littoral operations. This can be seen by its smaller size, sizable lockout chamber and lower speed.

 

[ASSAIL]

Yes and no.

There was a vacuum in relation to direction from government under Gillard and Smith but the intent to acquire twelve boats was in the Rudd / Fitzgibbon whitepaper but stalled when Falkner became DM.

That said RAN were very aware of the requirement and with their support ASC established Deep Blue Tech to develop concepts for the replacement program. It was this work that enabled the then government to select the local design as their preferred way forward, with an evolved Collins (developed with Kockums as plan B and an evolved MOTS design from elsewhere as plan C. An evolved MOTS solution was seen as the worst option as it would basically repeat the painful early years of the Collins project.

Yes I agree but that was an ASC initiative, not properly funded IIRC
You have to give credit to them but eventually that dissolved and the team dispersed, what a waste.

 

[Volkodav]

Yes I agree but that was an ASC initiative, not properly funded IIRC
You have to give credit to them but eventually that dissolved and the team dispersed, what a waste.

It's a funny one, ASC is government owned and can't do anything much without dept. Finance direction.