Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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hauritz

Well-Known Member
Whatever the language, the PLAN has more high end ships today compared to the past of much better quality across the full range of vessels, blue water fleets aspire. Back this with robust political language and money spent to seek this end and you can see a momentum that currently does not have an end.

Regards S
Yep ... biggest shipbuilding industry in the world as well.

There are many reasons why Australia need to be concerned with China. They are not only building ships ... they are building them quickly.

Look at their latest carrier. Laid down in 2013, completed this year and could be in service next year. That is a 70,000 ton carrier up and running in 5 or 6 years and the first carrier they have built from scratch. They also seem to be commissioning their destroyers and frigates at a rate of around 5 ships a year. Compare this to Australia's plan to build 9 frigates over the next 25 years.

Numerically they already out number the USN by nearly two to one and they are rapidly closing the technological gap as well.

The west has many reasons to be concerned with China's growing military strength.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
The West might the capacity to build more ships faster (not sure) but unlike China, the money isn't there unless the electorates in the West wake up. Same applies for defence R&D which China is starting to pull ahead.
 

Meriv90

Active Member
Yep ... biggest shipbuilding industry in the world as well.

There are many reasons why Australia need to be concerned with China. They are not only building ships ... they are building them quickly.

Look at their latest carrier. Laid down in 2013, completed this year and could be in service next year. That is a 70,000 ton carrier up and running in 5 or 6 years and the first carrier they have built from scratch. They also seem to be commissioning their destroyers and frigates at a rate of around 5 ships a year. Compare this to Australia's plan to build 9 frigates over the next 25 years.

Numerically they already out number the USN by nearly two to one and they are rapidly closing the technological gap as well.

The west has many reasons to be concerned with China's growing military strength.
Couldn't agree more. I will add something else, you are all seeing the consequence and not a cause.

Here it is.



As you can see their opportunity window before they have their Silver Tsunami is 2030/5 and this is really bad because the SEA5000 (if i remember correctly) will enter in service around the same period. This means that the Type26 (as the other SEA5000 options) can't be considered in the PLAN menace because by the time the class will be complete and in service it will be late :(.

Here another image.



So I would not only recognize the existence of the threat but I would also consider a specific time window to it 2025-2035.
 
Last edited:

pussertas

Active Member
Taylor Bros Marine Signs OPV Contract

(Source: Australian Department of Defence; issued July 18, 2018)

In a win for Tasmanian defence industry, Taylor Bros Marine has today announced the signing of a major contract with Luerssen Australia.

Taylor Bros will be involved in the design, production and installation of the accommodation spaces on Australia’s 12 Offshore Patrol Vessels.

“I’m pleased Luerssen Australia has brought Taylor Bros Marine on board for the 12 vessels,” Minister Pyne said.

“This marks the ongoing involvement of Taylor Bros in Australia’s continuous naval shipbuilding enterprise which has seen the company work on projects such as the LHD Amphibious Assault Ships and Air Warfare Destroyers.”

“This latest announcement provides Taylor Bros employee’s ongoing security and allows the company to retain its expertise in naval outfitting.”

The company currently employs 90 personnel with around 60 per cent of its work Defence related.


GOOD OLD TASSIE
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
I would be very worried about China when their demographic crisis hits. But will they act before or after? I would assume before, which gives it a very narrow window. Sometime before 2030.

Population to peak in 2025 - China - Chinadaily.com.cn

It is going to be hard to maintain external military power when your economy toilets itself, grow is negative, you have a millions less workers and tax payers every year and your citizens are unhappy and dealing with a crisis that affects them and their family. They will be cutting budgets. It will also be when the only children take control. China may even become ungovernable.
 

Meriv90

Active Member
That is what scares me, or they have priorities wrong and are popping out destroyers that will be useless after only 15 years or
-They are paranoid we make a move when they will be hit by the demographic curve
-They want to make a move before the demographic hit.

All 3 options are really dangerous and scary.
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
So I would not only recognize the existence of the threat but I would also consider a specific time window to it 2025-2035.
But what does this mean for Australian defence posture?

Are we saying that this represents a DOA threat?

If so, then the subs we have will be the critical strategic asset and the numbers largely fixed. Would the focus then be on making sure the subs are defended when they are at HMAS Stirling (AEGIS ashore, secondary defence against cruise missiles), and a way of establishing sea control so that they can get to sea (surface fleet & P-8s)

Otherwise it would be a larger harder army + multipliers to make sure any invader needs to bring more stuff and a larger airforce to make it harder to get it here.

When you write it like that the threat just doesn't make sense - what is the real threat here from the demographics you mention etc?

Regards,

Massive
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Demographics could be an issue that initiates a crisis. A military conflict would certainly divert their citizens attention away from the looming social and likely economic pressures resulting from an aging and less productive population that will set in by 2030-5. Add in other global stuff like over population and climate change, a definite brew of trouble. There is a slim chance that a new less corrupt and progressive generation of leaders might avert this but not holding my breath on that outcome.
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
Demographics could be an issue that initiates a crisis.
But what are the defence implications for this for Australia and hence the RAN?

My sense is that there is not a lot can be done for the RAN in the timeframe unless you accelerate the Shortfin program.

Increasing P-8 and F-35 numbers and their armaments would seem a more likely response. HIMARS and ballistic SSMs could also be part of this.

Thoughts?

Regards,

Massive
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I've bought these two posts over from the USN thread because they are very pertinent to the discussion here.

ASSAIL, post: 339112
There has been recent discussion about the Chinese naval buildup on the RAN thread which has prompted me to refer to an essay in the June edition of proceedings. It’s written by Professor James Holmes the inaugural holder of the JC Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College.
The following is my amateur attempt to précis his essay and I aplolagise for not have access to a link.

His essay explores the context in which China is amassing sea power and this should help US military leaders comprehend their maritime strategy along with the forces and methods the PLA N and affiliated joint forces are deploying to fulfill their operational and strategic goals. Sea power is no longer a matter for fleets alone, air forces and strategic rocket forces can increasingly reach far out to sea and the guided missile and precision guidance age has hastened the onset of land based sea power.
The PLA has harvested all available elements of maritime might to mount forward defences of Chinese shores.

The PLA has drawn on Mao and four other maritime scholars to deliver their strategic goals.
MAO his well known tenet of “ active defence” has been rebranded as “offshore waters defence”
It makes little sense to place the homeland and adjoining waters in jeopardy for the sake of secondary enterprises in faraway seas but if the PLA could defend the homeland and Pacific interests with land based weapons, diesel submarines and fast attack craft they could spare a sizeable fleet to venture beyond Chinas geographical environs and they could enforce open seas protection without risk at home.

Therefor if the US and her allies can compete effectively in the Western Pacific they can draw Chinese forces homeward to guard China proper and relieve Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and other areas of importance.
The US should subsequently focus on the East Asia area and apply all seaborne energies and resources there.

THE OFFSHORE CRUMPLE ZONE
Chinese anti access logic operates like a car crumple zone, some areas are sacrifices in sequence to protect the passengers.
Security for the near seas and mainland is what they treasure most further, they know they can’t erect a defensive perimeter that blocks out the US fleet altogether. What they can do is impose a high if not unbearable cost on the US fleet and their reinforcements surging westward to supplement the forward deployed forces.

In this they take inspiration from Carl Von Clausewitz who teaches that there are three ways to prevail in war, simply, one can smash, one can overawe and one can bankrupt a foe.
Therefore if China can dishearten her adversaries or drive the price so high that the US is unwilling to pay China can win without committing to a major fleet engagement.

Again Mao’s “active defence”. Forces will not try to protect a fixed outer perimeter, they will stage a fighting retreat while launching piecemeal attacks to cut the US fleet down to size in preparation somewhere in the crumple zone.
If Chinese anti access defences grow powerful enough to impose unacceptable costs on the US fleet they ,AU be even able to hold their battle fleet in reserve - why risk your fleet when you can fulfill your goals by sending expendable platforms out to the near seas to dispense punishment. This is a strategy that both Mao and Clausewitz would endorse.

MAHAN AND THE FORTRESS
The next faces of Chinese sea power are those of MAHAN and AUBE
These two foresaw maritime tactics that are only now coming into their own with the advent of long range precision guided weapons.
Mahan wrote decrying the Russian tactics of keeping the fleet in harbour under the protection of the fort guns during the Russo Japanese war of 1904-5. The protection of land based guns was erroneous as it limited fighting ships radius of action and bred timidity in commanders.
But what if the Port Arthur guns boasted both the range and accuracy of today, the Russian tactics would have been justified, they were facing a far superior Japanese fleet, the result would have been far different.
No longer is the ‘Fortress Fleet’ strategy wrong, it’s an obvious choice for China.

AUBE
The French Admiral promoted the “Jeune ecole” or young school 19th Century Naval strategy. It sought to counter the RNks ocean going hegemony, it sought to keep the RN away from French shores by harnessing asymmetric technology such as torpedoes, seagoing mines, patrol forces and submarines.
Aube’s strategies resonate today, technology has super empowered submarines and patrol craft reinforcing his “jeune ecole” strategies.
By merging jeune ecole and Fortress Fleet concepts you have a perfect solution for China’s defence.

FOOTLOOSE FLEET
Speaking at the 1908 Battleship Conference Pres. Teddy Roosevelt promoted coastal gunners and light forces as a means of guarding seaports.
This concept would free the battle fleet to roam the seas to search out and destroy a foe thus rendering the fleet “footloose”.
In this strategy both Moa and TR agree, a mass of PLA defences in the West Pacific would render the PLA fleet “footloose” and that is the goal of offshore waters defence.
If the home land is defenc
Dead by “fortress fleet” and “jeune ecole” platforms the bulk of the fleet is freed to mount a regular if not permanent presence in remote waters.

CHINA’S STRATEGIC IDEAS
All these concepts add up to a strategy that the US and her allies dare not take lightly. Chinese sea power is here to stay so what should the US do about it?
first understand the concepts impelling Chines maritime strategy, sound ideas from the past make sense in a modern world, Clausewitz, Mao, Mahan, AUBE and Roosevelt would instantly understand the strategies.
Second, fashion forces and counter strategies to punch through China’s crumple zone.
Third, study Chinese operating patterns. If they have faith in homeland defence and their crumple zone they will increasingly deploy further afield in greater numbers.
Hardware and methods need developing to pierce that zone.


ngatimozart, post: 339114
Link to the full article by James Holmes. I thoroughly recommend him as an author. IMHO he is very astute. The book of his that I thoroughly recommend is Red Star Over The Pacific.

Visualize Chinese Sea Power | U.S. Naval Institute
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
But what are the defence implications for this for Australia and hence the RAN?

My sense is that there is not a lot can be done for the RAN in the timeframe unless you accelerate the Shortfin program.

Increasing P-8 and F-35 numbers and their armaments would seem a more likely response. HIMARS and ballistic SSMs could also be part of this.

Thoughts?

Regards,

Massive
There was mention of deployable land based anti-ship missile in the white paper. I assume these will be based to whatever future Anti-ship missile system will be selected by the navy.

The navy seems to be locked into a long drawn out upgrade program that doesn't allow for a lot of flexibility. Given that the Shortfin and Hunter classes still require an enormous amount of work just to get into production I doubt you could do much to accelerate the programs at this stage.

The only options for the navy to expand its capabilities in the short term would be to arm its OPVs and ... I know this idea has been done to death ... upgrade the Canberras to carry fixed-wing fighters.

You can certainly expand the airforce more quickly than the navy. It will be interesting to see how quickly the airforce moves to replace the SuperHornets and when that happens you might see the F-35B option rehashed.
 

Takao

The Bunker Group
I've bought these two posts over from the USN thread because they are very pertinent to the discussion here.
ASSAIL, post: 339112
There has been recent discussion about the Chinese naval buildup on the RAN thread which has prompted me to refer to an essay in the June edition of proceedings. It’s written by Professor James Holmes the inaugural holder of the JC Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College.
The following is my amateur attempt to précis his essay and I aplolagise for not have access to a link.
His essay explores the context in which China is amassing sea power and this should help US military leaders comprehend their maritime strategy along with the forces and methods the PLA N and affiliated joint forces are deploying to fulfill their operational and strategic goals. Sea power is no longer a matter for fleets alone, air forces and strategic rocket forces can increasingly reach far out to sea and the guided missile and precision guidance age has hastened the onset of land based sea power.
The PLA has harvested all available elements of maritime might to mount forward defences of Chinese shores.
The PLA has drawn on Mao and four other maritime scholars to deliver their strategic goals.
MAO his well known tenet of “ active defence” has been rebranded as “offshore waters defence”
It makes little sense to place the homeland and adjoining waters in jeopardy for the sake of secondary enterprises in faraway seas but if the PLA could defend the homeland and Pacific interests with land based weapons, diesel submarines and fast attack craft they could spare a sizeable fleet to venture beyond Chinas geographical environs and they could enforce open seas protection without risk at home.
Therefor if the US and her allies can compete effectively in the Western Pacific they can draw Chinese forces homeward to guard China proper and relieve Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and other areas of importance.
The US should subsequently focus on the East Asia area and apply all seaborne energies and resources there.
THE OFFSHORE CRUMPLE ZONE
Chinese anti access logic operates like a car crumple zone, some areas are sacrifices in sequence to protect the passengers.
Security for the near seas and mainland is what they treasure most further, they know they can’t erect a defensive perimeter that blocks out the US fleet altogether. What they can do is impose a high if not unbearable cost on the US fleet and their reinforcements surging westward to supplement the forward deployed forces.
In this they take inspiration from Carl Von Clausewitz who teaches that there are three ways to prevail in war, simply, one can smash, one can overawe and one can bankrupt a foe.
Therefore if China can dishearten her adversaries or drive the price so high that the US is unwilling to pay China can win without committing to a major fleet engagement.
Again Mao’s “active defence”. Forces will not try to protect a fixed outer perimeter, they will stage a fighting retreat while launching piecemeal attacks to cut the US fleet down to size in preparation somewhere in the crumple zone.
If Chinese anti access defences grow powerful enough to impose unacceptable costs on the US fleet they ,AU be even able to hold their battle fleet in reserve - why risk your fleet when you can fulfill your goals by sending expendable platforms out to the near seas to dispense punishment. This is a strategy that both Mao and Clausewitz would endorse.
MAHAN AND THE FORTRESS
The next faces of Chinese sea power are those of MAHAN and AUBE
These two foresaw maritime tactics that are only now coming into their own with the advent of long range precision guided weapons.
Mahan wrote decrying the Russian tactics of keeping the fleet in harbour under the protection of the fort guns during the Russo Japanese war of 1904-5. The protection of land based guns was erroneous as it limited fighting ships radius of action and bred timidity in commanders.
But what if the Port Arthur guns boasted both the range and accuracy of today, the Russian tactics would have been justified, they were facing a far superior Japanese fleet, the result would have been far different.
No longer is the ‘Fortress Fleet’ strategy wrong, it’s an obvious choice for China.
AUBE
The French Admiral promoted the “Jeune ecole” or young school 19th Century Naval strategy. It sought to counter the RNks ocean going hegemony, it sought to keep the RN away from French shores by harnessing asymmetric technology such as torpedoes, seagoing mines, patrol forces and submarines.
Aube’s strategies resonate today, technology has super empowered submarines and patrol craft reinforcing his “jeune ecole” strategies.
By merging jeune ecole and Fortress Fleet concepts you have a perfect solution for China’s defence.
FOOTLOOSE FLEET
Speaking at the 1908 Battleship Conference Pres. Teddy Roosevelt promoted coastal gunners and light forces as a means of guarding seaports.
This concept would free the battle fleet to roam the seas to search out and destroy a foe thus rendering the fleet “footloose”.
In this strategy both Moa and TR agree, a mass of PLA defences in the West Pacific would render the PLA fleet “footloose” and that is the goal of offshore waters defence.
If the home land is defenc
Dead by “fortress fleet” and “jeune ecole” platforms the bulk of the fleet is freed to mount a regular if not permanent presence in remote waters.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC IDEAS
All these concepts add up to a strategy that the US and her allies dare not take lightly. Chinese sea power is here to stay so what should the US do about it?
first understand the concepts impelling Chines maritime strategy, sound ideas from the past make sense in a modern world, Clausewitz, Mao, Mahan, AUBE and Roosevelt would instantly understand the strategies.
Second, fashion forces and counter strategies to punch through China’s crumple zone.
Third, study Chinese operating patterns. If they have faith in homeland defence and their crumple zone they will increasingly deploy further afield in greater numbers.
Hardware and methods need developing to pierce that zone.
ngatimozart, post: 339114
Link to the full article by James Holmes. I thoroughly recommend him as an author. IMHO he is very astute. The book of his that I thoroughly recommend is Red Star Over The Pacific.
Visualize Chinese Sea Power | U.S. Naval Institute
I addressed this on another forum when it first came out, but I wasn't that impressed with Holmes' thoughts:

I am not sure about this article. It argues for a wait and see attitude, which in itself is fine, but it builds on some flawed assumptions.

1. Sea powerhas always been about effects on the land, not the decisive battle. While popular, winning a decisive battle at sea does not equate to winning a war. Trafalgar did not bring Britain victory, even Tsumisha didn’t. It helps, often dramatically, but there still needs to be a land component. Britain’s defeat of the Armada prevented an invasion, not win them a war

2. The idea that ships don’t fight forts is fine for Nelson; but incorrect since the rifled breechloader. Forts are now sitting ducks – the best example being USN operations against Pacific islands. No matter how much concrete the Japanese poured, 5” – 16” fire destroyed them. And Jutland had nothing to do with shore defences.

3. I love Mahan, but the idea of a single great decisive battle grants victory has not once come to fruition. I’d suggest it’s even more unlikely with peer enemies. Again, compare the RN or USN to IJN in the 40s. The latter’s push for a decisive battle is arguably a considerable factor to their failure from 1943 onwards.

4. I am not sure that jeune école has ever worked as hoped. It didn’t work for France (although never tested in battle), nor did it work for Germany in the 40s. Even the submarine heavy Soviet Navy would have struggled against the USN, although how jeune école they were is worth debate.

5. The other issue with jeune école is it often suggests physically small platforms. These usually aren’t economical or survivable – it is why CVNs are so capable and useful, despite costing 2x a LHD-sized CV.

There is also the assumption that sea power is about the sea. It never has been. It is about setting the conditions for a land effect. There is a symbiotic relationship, and always has been. The British Empire gave the RN the coaling stations it needed. Jutland secured the German surface fleet from breaking out. The USN enabled USMC / Army invasions in WW2, Korea and Vietnam. Even Mahan acknowledges this. The closest a purely naval strategy has coming to working is the two great submarine campaigns of WW2 – one successful and one not.

Wait and see is fine – but nothing in here gives a tangible guide to what the PLAN would do. I’d suggest they are looking closely at the most successful navy for ideas – so what would the USN do?
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I addressed this on another forum when it first came out, but I wasn't that impressed with Holmes' thoughts:

I am not sure about this article. It argues for a wait and see attitude, which in itself is fine, but it builds on some flawed assumptions.

1. Sea powerhas always been about effects on the land, not the decisive battle. While popular, winning a decisive battle at sea does not equate to winning a war. Trafalgar did not bring Britain victory, even Tsumisha didn’t. It helps, often dramatically, but there still needs to be a land component. Britain’s defeat of the Armada prevented an invasion, not win them a war

2. The idea that ships don’t fight forts is fine for Nelson; but incorrect since the rifled breechloader. Forts are now sitting ducks – the best example being USN operations against Pacific islands. No matter how much concrete the Japanese poured, 5” – 16” fire destroyed them. And Jutland had nothing to do with shore defences.

3. I love Mahan, but the idea of a single great decisive battle grants victory has not once come to fruition. I’d suggest it’s even more unlikely with peer enemies. Again, compare the RN or USN to IJN in the 40s. The latter’s push for a decisive battle is arguably a considerable factor to their failure from 1943 onwards.

4. I am not sure that jeune école has ever worked as hoped. It didn’t work for France (although never tested in battle), nor did it work for Germany in the 40s. Even the submarine heavy Soviet Navy would have struggled against the USN, although how jeune école they were is worth debate.

5. The other issue with jeune école is it often suggests physically small platforms. These usually aren’t economical or survivable – it is why CVNs are so capable and useful, despite costing 2x a LHD-sized CV.

There is also the assumption that sea power is about the sea. It never has been. It is about setting the conditions for a land effect. There is a symbiotic relationship, and always has been. The British Empire gave the RN the coaling stations it needed. Jutland secured the German surface fleet from breaking out. The USN enabled USMC / Army invasions in WW2, Korea and Vietnam. Even Mahan acknowledges this. The closest a purely naval strategy has coming to working is the two great submarine campaigns of WW2 – one successful and one not.

Wait and see is fine – but nothing in here gives a tangible guide to what the PLAN would do. I’d suggest they are looking closely at the most successful navy for ideas – so what would the USN do?
I don’t Read this sentiment into the essay, he simply offers the five faces espoused by the various strategists to illustrate how the CCP will develop maritime strategy.
First by securing their home seas and establishing a zone in which they can incur risk and unacceptable cost to a potential attacker and second by making that defence so secure that the main battle fleet can embark on operations in areas way beyond the western Pacific.

Knowing this enables the US to develop there own counterstrategies to penetrate that crumble zone and force the main forces to return to near defence of their homeland, I don’t think this is wait and see at all.

Finally the point of the jeune ecole is that the 19th century context may not have worked but with the development modern sensors and weapons the lethality of asymmetric forces has increased to a point where they are effective and with weight of numbers their survivability matters not.

I think the whole point of the essay is that dated concepts that wouldn’t work up to a decade ago are being recast by the Chinese in the light of modern circumstance and therefore are shaping their maritime strategies.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The Chinese are avid disciples of Mahan and his theory, which along with Mao Zedong thought informs their maritime strategies. Personally, I prefer Corbett, but it will be interesting to see what eventuates from this marriage of Mahan and Mao. Most other navies are post Mahanian in strategic thinking, but only time will tell which theory has the greater validity. One thing we should remember, is that we need to look at Chinese strategies through a Chinese lens, because their culture, history and political thought are the foundation upon which their strategical conceptualisations are built.
 

d-ron84

Member
Just some info about Phalanx CIWS,
Each system has a 300 degree firing arc and fires a 20mm Sabot with a 12.7mm tungsten penetrator (no longer D.U.)
FFGs and DDGs put the stern, either the port or stbd side, to an oncoming missile so that you have most FC channels and weapons on target as well as putting the flight deck and hanger to catch debris. So the Hunter class will have two CIWS on the target
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
There was mention of deployable land based anti-ship missile in the white paper. I assume these will be based to whatever future Anti-ship missile system will be selected by the navy.
I think this would be an error - a 400km+ ballistic missile from HIMARS launcher obviates the need for an additional system.

I would have a HIMARS (massed fires/ASuW) brigade - it is a huge multiplier and very manpower light.

The only options for the navy to expand its capabilities in the short term would be to arm its OPVs and ... I know this idea has been done to death ... upgrade the Canberras to carry fixed-wing fighters.
I can't see how this provides strategic weight.

The RAN's only true strategic option is subs - we will have 12 - the question is:

1. Whether this number is sufficient?
2. Do we have the right bases in the right place to support them?
3. Can we protect them when they are at base and vulnerable?

My answers would be yes, yes, no.

Regards,

Massive
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
The Chinese really don't have much of a tradition as far as modern naval warfare is concerned.

Even if you look at recent PLAN history up until the 1980s it was just a very large coast guard and it wasn't until the beginning of this century that they started to develop into a blue water navy.

While I am sure that Mahan has some interesting theories nothing really compares to the knowledge you gain from practical experience and the US and its allies have this in bucketloads.

The real strength the Chinese navy is a massive shipbuilding industry coupled with cheap labour and an inexhaustible supply of sailors to man those ships.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I think this would be an error - a 400km+ ballistic missile from HIMARS launcher obviates the need for an additional system.

I would have a HIMARS (massed fires/ASuW) brigade - it is a huge multiplier and very manpower light.



I can't see how this provides strategic weight.

The RAN's only true strategic option is subs - we will have 12 - the question is:

1. Whether this number is sufficient?
2. Do we have the right bases in the right place to support them?
3. Can we protect them when they are at base and vulnerable?

My answers would be yes, yes, no.

Regards,

Massive
You will get no arguments from me. Submarines are the most potent strategic tool we will have available to us ... but it will take a couple of decades before we can start to build the numbers up to 12. Shorter term our options are much more limited.

I can't say that I know a lot about HIMARS but I haven't been able to find anything about it having an ASuW capability.
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
Shorter term our options are much more limited.
I am not sure that the other short term naval options are worth doing - outside of potentially surface assets and other sensors to ensure sea control off HMAS Stirling.

If concerned about aggression that threatens Australia directly I would focus on scaling up the airforce (F-35A, P-8) and hardening and expanding the army to deter any threat.

Regards,

Massive
 
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