Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Todjaeger]

There's nothing out of ordinary about the statements in the RFT. There is only one RFT for the SEA 5000 Phase 1 programme.

The two CMS options stated where correct with one of them indeed being selected - "a US Aegis Combat Management System based on the version currently being used in the Air Warfare Destroyers". The timing of the CMS selection was indeed after the submission of tenders. What exactly is the problem?

There's no doubt as to the timing of the construction - which is indeed 2020 and also stated as such in the RFT. However this will be a prototyping phase which will then lead on to full ship construction up to 24 months after this point. The relevant RFT section is stated below:

3.4 Commencement of Construction in Adelaide in 2020

3.4.1 The Commonwealth requires the Project to achieve the Commonwealth's schedule requirements, including Commencement of Prototyping Activities in Adelaide in 2020.
3.4.2 The Commonwealth is seeking to prove ship production processes and workforce readiness through the Commencement of Prototyping Activities in Adelaide in 2020. This production system prototyping is expected to provide increased certainty that the shipyard facilities, production systems and processes, workforce and supply chain are fully capable prior to the Commencement of Ship Construction within 24 months of Commencement of Prototyping Activities. The prototyping activities also provide an opportunity for the parties to refine project and contract management activities, such as scheduling and cost estimation and reconciliation.

Never said there was anything out of the ordinary about it. What was said is that the RFT was released over a year ago and that there have been some subsequent decisions and announcements made which, depending on what they meant or how they are interpreted, can change the viability of the Type 26 design.

Both here, here and here, the SEA 5000 project time line and announcements have been made that Australia expects to Commence Construction of the Future Frigate in Adelaide in 2020. This could be referring to a prototyping activity, or it could be initial construction of the first in class and lead ship of the first batch, or a bit of both. One thing I would expect is that, barring design change requirements and/or manufacturing defects, manufactured materials produced starting in 2020 should make their way into the lead ship. As a side note, I would not anticipate any major design changes once construction starts in 2020.

I have a few takeaways from comments made by BAE Systems' SEA 5000 managing director Nigel Stewart which appeared on DefenceConnect here.

One of the first is that BAE expects to 'de-risk' much of the Type 26 kit on the Type 23.in use by the RN. While that notion seems plausible for the UK Type 26's, since some of the Type 23 kit might end up getting drawn forward into the Type 26, I have to question how plausible that 'de-risking' strategy is for any potential global Type 26 customers that will want to or have specified their own, differing kit requirements. How can BAE expect to use the Type 23's to 'de-risk' the fitout of an Australian (or Canadian) Type 26 that has a completely different gen set, electronics, sensor and weapons fitout? Especially since these fitout changes will certainly force changes in the layout of compartments and ship systems.

Another comment which I find questionable, especially when compared to both the RFT and the announcements from Defence and the minister, is that the Australian SEA 5000 programme is running five years behind the UK's Type 26 programme and therefore BAE can also use the three Type 26's currently in production or scheduled to be, to also 'de-risk' the Australian Type 26's.

Aside from again there being questions on how much 'de-risking' can be done one a design with a different fitout and layout between sub-classes, that assertion does not make sense, at least to me. First steel was cut on the future HMS Glasgow in July 2017. In order for Australia to be five years behind, that would mean BAE is expecting first steel to be cut on the lead SEA 5000 frigate some time in 2022. Yet the SEA 5000 project time line, as well as the Defence and Minister announcements are stating the construction is expected to commence in 2020... Even if that 2020 construction is 'just prototyping' I would not expect that the next two years of production work to just get completely discarded (unless of course it is absolute rubbish, which it should not be...) so that actual SEA 5000 construction does not start until 2022.

The more I read about the Type 26, the greater the impression I get that the design is less well developed for Australian needs in terms of both capability and time frame.

 

[matt00773]

Never said there was anything out of the ordinary about it. What was said is that the RFT was released over a year ago and that there have been some subsequent decisions and announcements made which, depending on what they meant or how they are interpreted, can change the viability of the Type 26 design.

Both here, here and here, the SEA 5000 project time line and announcements have been made that Australia expects to Commence Construction of the Future Frigate in Adelaide in 2020. This could be referring to a prototyping activity, or it could be initial construction of the first in class and lead ship of the first batch, or a bit of both. One thing I would expect is that, barring design change requirements and/or manufacturing defects, manufactured materials produced starting in 2020 should make their way into the lead ship. As a side note, I would not anticipate any major design changes once construction starts in 2020.

I have a few takeaways from comments made by BAE Systems' SEA 5000 managing director Nigel Stewart which appeared on DefenceConnect here.

One of the first is that BAE expects to 'de-risk' much of the Type 26 kit on the Type 23.in use by the RN. While that notion seems plausible for the UK Type 26's, since some of the Type 23 kit might end up getting drawn forward into the Type 26, I have to question how plausible that 'de-risking' strategy is for any potential global Type 26 customers that will want to or have specified their own, differing kit requirements. How can BAE expect to use the Type 23's to 'de-risk' the fitout of an Australian (or Canadian) Type 26 that has a completely different gen set, electronics, sensor and weapons fitout? Especially since these fitout changes will certainly force changes in the layout of compartments and ship systems.

Another comment which I find questionable, especially when compared to both the RFT and the announcements from Defence and the minister, is that the Australian SEA 5000 programme is running five years behind the UK's Type 26 programme and therefore BAE can also use the three Type 26's currently in production or scheduled to be, to also 'de-risk' the Australian Type 26's.

Aside from again there being questions on how much 'de-risking' can be done one a design with a different fitout and layout between sub-classes, that assertion does not make sense, at least to me. First steel was cut on the future HMS Glasgow in July 2017. In order for Australia to be five years behind, that would mean BAE is expecting first steel to be cut on the lead SEA 5000 frigate some time in 2022. Yet the SEA 5000 project time line, as well as the Defence and Minister announcements are stating the construction is expected to commence in 2020... Even if that 2020 construction is 'just prototyping' I would not expect that the next two years of production work to just get completely discarded (unless of course it is absolute rubbish, which it should not be...) so that actual SEA 5000 construction does not start until 2022.

The more I read about the Type 26, the greater the impression I get that the design is less well developed for Australian needs in terms of both capability and time frame.

There's no question of a 2020 construction start date - it's just that there's more detail around what this actually means. The prototyping activity is really about de-risking the design and build process and actually makes sense after what happened in the SEA 4000 programme. De-risking of the T26 is also about the build and design validation process - something also discussed by Nigel Stewart.

It's impossible to comment on the BAE 2022 ship construction start date without seeing their prototyping strategy and activities. There's more to construction than just cutting steel however.

 

[alexsa]

Exactly because i see the good sides of the Type, since the FREMM doesn't have a growth potential, I must underline the bad sides no?

About prototype time the F-101 Took 5 years and two months, so there wasn't a difference between the first and last ship of the series.

The first FREMM took 5 years and 3 months.

And yes the F-5000 is clearly your best option, but it doesn't mean i cant be a fan boy for my team.

To Build ......... the design process preceded that as did the set up. And you certainly DID NOT refer to the F101 in your post. There is a very good video on the Navantia web site about the amount of work that went into designing the F100.

This was not a short process and was not without problems. We have no visibility of the time required for the T101 to go from delivery to full operating capability. The reference to the time frame for the T26 relates to ‘fully operational. Look at the Hobart Class DDG and the time from delivery (as opposed to commissioning) to operational acceptance.

You clearly not a fan of the T26 but in disparaging the design you best compare the ship by common end points.

 

[Meriv90]

I said build up thus not including designin, so from stell cut (that the spanish unluckly dont use, they normally just use the "botado" date and the comissioning one) in july 1997 to its comissioning in September 2002. No idea about the designing but the ship was autorized just at the beginning of 1997.

The design started in earliers 1990s after the sinking of the NFR project and in 1995 when they choose the AEGIS leaving behind the APAR.

By summer 2003 it had already trialed its CMS by intercepting practice with its standards(CSSQT). By the end of the year it was already partecipating in international trials.

For a non expert like me those looks like the milestone events. 1995-2003 from design to combat ready?

 

[ASSAIL]

THere has been much comment on this previously unused term (in Naval shipbuilding at least) prototype for SEA 5000.
The term was first used by politicians in order to excuse the possibility of a slow build for the first ship so that a vehement press won't repeat the attacks on the project as was seen with the Hobarts and Collins.
It is a fact that first of type will be slower, will encounter some problems and will run over time and budget but this has been a fact in stop start shipbuilding and despite the protestations of "continuous build" it won't be. There will be a delay until the workforce is upskilled and the construction schedule finessed.

The reality of this is expressed in the build schedule and for the sake of the proletariat it's termed "prototype"
All IMHO, naturally.

 

[spoz]

New shipyards, and shipyards building a design from a source with whose design philosophy they are unfamiliar, often build a fairly simple block as a prototype to prove out the process - in the case of the AWD is was an after funnel. Something similar will almost certainly end up being done for Sea 5000 whoever wins, but it certainly wouldn't take three years to do that level of prototyping. Some of what is included in tender documents is usually aspirational, and some sets out what is the minimum acceptable outcome. Those dates could therefore reflect that; but we will have to wait and see.

 

[ASSAIL]

New shipyards, and shipyards building a design from a source with whose design philosophy they are unfamiliar, often build a fairly simple block as a prototype to prove out the process - in the case of the AWD is was an after funnel. Something similar will almost certainly end up being done for Sea 5000 whoever wins, but it certainly wouldn't take three years to do that level of prototyping. Some of what is included in tender documents is usually aspirational, and some sets out what is the minimum acceptable outcome. Those dates could therefore reflect that; but we will have to wait and see.

Yes I understand the simple bock prototyping but I should have been more specific, I was referring to the entire build form start to handover. AFAIK "prototype" has not been used in this context before.

 

[spoz]

Agreed, Chris. My comments were aimed more at a belief some had expressed that because something had been appeared in an RFT it would be so, whereas is reality there is an RFT response, a clarification activity, a draft contract, sometimes a BAFO,and a negotiation period which in the end result in a signed contract and a build program which bear some resemblance to the original RFT but in many areas, of which schedule is one, may be quite different. How much of that modification from the RFT will be true in the case of Sea 5000 I have no idea, but I would be very surprised if the signed contract was identical to what was asked for in the original RFT.

 

[alexsa]

I said build up thus not including designin, so from stell cut (that the spanish unluckly dont use, they normally just use the "botado" date and the comissioning one) in july 1997 to its comissioning in September 2002. No idea about the designing but the ship was autorized just at the beginning of 1997.

The design started in earliers 1990s after the sinking of the NFR project and in 1995 when they choose the AEGIS leaving behind the APAR.

By summer 2003 it had already trialed its CMS by intercepting practice with its standards(CSSQT). By the end of the year it was already partecipating in international trials.

For a non expert like me those looks like the milestone events. 1995-2003 from design to combat ready?

OK, Steel cut occurred in 1997 which is fabrication commencement. Prior to this the yard had been building the Santa Maria class (modified FFG7) and commercial ships. As such the yard was manned up for the project. The vessel commissioned in late 2002. It would not have been 'combat ready' from that point noting work up and first of class trials occur after commissioning. We have no visibility of the programme to accept the vessel as a fully operational unit (noting Hobart is still undertaking trials here and there and needs to head off to the missile range in the US to complete part of thisprocess) but its first major deployment appears to have taken place in 2007. If you were to bench mark it against being deployable then you have 10 years.

The problem is we do not know the metric applied. Unless you do,and the metric is the same, then you cannot claim the 10 year window is a problem.

 

[Meriv90]

No two years prior that, in 2005, it escorted the USS Theodore Roosevelt for a bombing run in Iraq.

 

[alexsa]

No two years prior that, in 2005, it escorted the USS Theodore Roosevelt for a bombing run in Iraq.

Fair enough, but the point remains .... battle ready is not when the vessel commissions.

 

[Volkodav]

THere has been much comment on this previously unused term (in Naval shipbuilding at least) prototype for SEA 5000.
The term was first used by politicians in order to excuse the possibility of a slow build for the first ship so that a vehement press won't repeat the attacks on the project as was seen with the Hobarts and Collins.
It is a fact that first of type will be slower, will encounter some problems and will run over time and budget but this has been a fact in stop start shipbuilding and despite the protestations of "continuous build" it won't be. There will be a delay until the workforce is upskilled and the construction schedule finessed.

The reality of this is expressed in the build schedule and for the sake of the proletariat it's termed "prototype"
All IMHO, naturally.

Just got to love inventing new terms for old things, what's wrong with "first of class", "pilot build" etc.
When you read Friedman's works on USN design historys etc, estimated costs of "first of class" vs "repeats", "lead yard", etc. comes up all the time, the repeats are always cheaper than the first of class and minor upgrades are cheaper than major redesigns. Conversely, while the first of class of a new design takes longer to build and is more expensive than a repeat of an existing design, when new technology and capability is required a new class in it entirety will usually work out better value for money (if not actually cheaper) than a modified existing design.

 

[76mmGuns]

The decision is still for April, right? Not long now.

Have to say, the subs and opv have been surprised choices. If they continue the trend, it might be the type 26 chosen.

Or for a completely left field choice, they'll choose the Arleigh Burke

 

[Todjaeger]

The decision is still for April, right? Not long now.

Have to say, the subs and opv have been surprised choices. If they continue the trend, it might be the type 26 chosen.

Or for a completely left field choice, they'll choose the Arleigh Burke

The decision is to be made sometime in 2nd Quarter 2018, so it might be just a few days away (like originally planned in the RFT documents) or it might not be for another two months.

 

[John Fedup]

Absolutely hope it is sooner rather than later as it will really stimulate the debate in Canada, regardless of the outcome, but a certain outcome may result in more stimulation.

 

[hauritz]

Absolutely hope it is sooner rather than later as it will really stimulate the debate in Canada, regardless of the outcome, but a certain outcome may result in more stimulation.

Actually I imagine that the US would be interested as well.

Whichever frigate wins this competition would be a good match for the FFX program ... unless the type 26 gets up.

 

[alexsa]

Just got to love inventing new terms for old things, what's wrong with "first of class", "pilot build" etc.
When you read Friedman's works on USN design historys etc, estimated costs of "first of class" vs "repeats", "lead yard", etc. comes up all the time, the repeats are always cheaper than the first of class and minor upgrades are cheaper than major redesigns. Conversely, while the first of class of a new design takes longer to build and is more expensive than a repeat of an existing design, when new technology and capability is required a new class in it entirety will usually work out better value for money (if not actually cheaper) than a modified existing design.

And that may be one reason the T26 has an edge even though it is not in service yet and the design needs to be modified quite a bit to meet Australian needs. Even if it is the premier ASW platform it will still have an impressive ABM/AAW capability if the utterances of the DoD and Ministers is to be believed.

 

[Jack Wyatt]

I started to feel a little uneasy with comments about major mods to meet our needs. Also risk and maturity of design came to mind. I browsed through the ANAO's report on the AWD and happened upon footnote 17 which made pretty sobering reading.

The ANAO has previously observed that it is not uncommon for major projects, including Defence projects, to experience cost overruns and integrations issues. There is a tendency for initial estimates to be optimistic, contingencies to be too low, the severity of risks to be underestimated, delays to be more extensive than anticipated and the complexity of integration issues not to be fully appreciated. ANAO reference its report on the Seasprite.

 

[John Fedup]

The ANAO has previously observed that it is not uncommon for major projects, including Defence projects, to experience cost overruns and integrations issues. There is a tendency for initial estimates to be optimistic, contingencies to be too low, the severity of risks to be underestimated, delays to be more extensive than anticipated and the complexity of integration issues not to be fully appreciated.

Pretty much the norm for defence projects, especially in Canada.

 

[Hazdog]

In reference to this article:
Adelaide class frigates sale discussions ongoing - Defence Connect.

The article reads: "The vessels could provide enhanced ballistic missile defence to Poland, given the frigates are armed with a Mark 13 missile launcher for SM-2 missiles."

I am almost 100% sure that the SM-2 missile and the Adelaide Class frigates cannot perform any BMD role. Does anyone else recognise this or does the SM-2 really have any BMD capability?

On another note, an old video from BAE shows the outline for the production of the Future Frigates

.