Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
- Thread starter icelord
- Start date
- Status
I think the whole premise of that article is flawed. No one has the resources to escort convoys consisting of the ships that form the worlds trade. Nor would Australia have the ability to form the convoys in the first place - that is not how the world’s economy works. The world war, battle of the Atlantic model is an extremely poor representation of the challenges of securing SLOC.
A far better model is how the British Empire controlled the world’s trade when they ruled the seas. By controlling the Channel, Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, Cape of Good Hope, Malacca Straights, Hong Kong etc, they controlled all the key choke points on which the world’s trade relied, and were able to respond rapidly to any threats. The same would be the case today. The western world needs to be able to control the key choke points to allow the world’s ships to continue plying their trade. This is largely what is happening, and is linked to the Australian maritime strategy. It is why we are fighting pirates off of the Horn of Africa, and resisting Chinese efforts to control trade through the South China Sea.
Expecting the RAN to be exporting convoys of merchant ships is ludicrous.
A far better model is how the British Empire controlled the world’s trade when they ruled the seas. By controlling the Channel, Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, Cape of Good Hope, Malacca Straights, Hong Kong etc, they controlled all the key choke points on which the world’s trade relied, and were able to respond rapidly to any threats. The same would be the case today. The western world needs to be able to control the key choke points to allow the world’s ships to continue plying their trade. This is largely what is happening, and is linked to the Australian maritime strategy. It is why we are fighting pirates off of the Horn of Africa, and resisting Chinese efforts to control trade through the South China Sea.
Expecting the RAN to be exporting convoys of merchant ships is ludicrous.
"John Saunders has an interest in defence and strategic policy and says he spends too much of his spare time reading The Strategist."
Perhaps he needs to broaden his reading horizon. This is not the first, nor will it be the last, article or statement from ASPI which is IMHO naïve and/or superficial and/or technically flawed. But that's rather the nature of academia although the normal rigorous debate which occurs in that environment when an opinion is aired seems to be somewhat thin in Australia when it comes to defence, strategic or even foreign policy related matters.
The pity is that the mainstream media, lacking the knowledge base themselves to be able to develop an informed opinion, assumes that everything emanating from ASPI is a fundamental strategic truth and the last word when it comes to Defence; which of course it is not - and to give Peter Jennings credit, I don't think he would claim that it was.
Perhaps he needs to broaden his reading horizon. This is not the first, nor will it be the last, article or statement from ASPI which is IMHO naïve and/or superficial and/or technically flawed. But that's rather the nature of academia although the normal rigorous debate which occurs in that environment when an opinion is aired seems to be somewhat thin in Australia when it comes to defence, strategic or even foreign policy related matters.
The pity is that the mainstream media, lacking the knowledge base themselves to be able to develop an informed opinion, assumes that everything emanating from ASPI is a fundamental strategic truth and the last word when it comes to Defence; which of course it is not - and to give Peter Jennings credit, I don't think he would claim that it was.
Ummm, I'm not convinced that's correct?
The BoAtlantic campaign was characterised by an adversary determined to sink as many tons of shipping as possible with the goal of blockading the islands of the UK.
In response the only hope was to convoy the targeted shipping, as was proven in WW1. The US paid the further price by being too slow to convoy, and gifted the Kriegsmarine a second 'happy time'.
Choke points simply denote a region where targets pass thru, many targets were hit mid Atlantic because the choke points were too well patrolled.
In a period of relative stability, I appreciate the notion of policing choke points, but that alone won't cut the mustard in securing transit of merchant goods.
Just because no body currently owns assets to reinstate convoys does not detract from enemy action making them a requirement. In fact it's a strategic weakness encumbered by any island nation.
I’d be interested to know what would have to change in the world for an adversary to want to sink as many tons of shipping as possible, as happened in the world wars. There aren’t too many scenarios where that would be a likely outcome. You might need to escort a convoy of ships as part of some military operation, but the idea you would be convoying all the ships that make up the world’s trade, like in the article, is pretty fanciful.
That implies a full scale conventional war against a near peer (for the Western Alliance) enemy. Even supposing will, there is no such peer on the horizon at the moment as even China does not anywhere near approach the total capability of the full Alliance, and won't in the foreseeable future (and after all much of the shipping which it is suggested would need to be convoyed is theirs). But then again, I suppose the same view would have been held of the possibility of what became WW1 in say 1890.
Well, to mimic a full BoAtlantic scenario, I guess it does imply a larger 'full scale' war.
But the same issues are still relevant, we still need to move goods from A to B by sea.
However I think thats fairly narrow minded.
It does not take a peer adversary to invoke even a partial punitive blockade.
But the same issues are still relevant, we still need to move goods from A to B by sea.
However I think thats fairly narrow minded.
It does not take a peer adversary to invoke even a partial punitive blockade.
It might not take a peer to initiate a blockade, but I belive it would take one to sustain it.
Given the weight of retaliation the western alliance would inflict, (mostly targeted on the aggressors maritime assets) only a major power could maintain the ability to project military power long enough for a convoy system to need to be implemented.
Agreed, sustainment would be very demanding, but IMHO only really significant if the ops are continuous.
Retaliation im presuming is a factor if theyre caught in the act. - Would a govt attack a territory on mere suspicion, even if factors are co-incidental?
In the end of the day, we need guaranteed A-> B sea trade.
To date in the contemporary era i think we are lucky to not have had convoys FORCED upon us.
-perhaps this should be in ADF thread?
I find the threat profile disturbing.
Retaliation im presuming is a factor if theyre caught in the act. - Would a govt attack a territory on mere suspicion, even if factors are co-incidental?
In the end of the day, we need guaranteed A-> B sea trade.
To date in the contemporary era i think we are lucky to not have had convoys FORCED upon us.
-perhaps this should be in ADF thread?
I find the threat profile disturbing.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Using the Battle of the Atlantic is a rather poor and IMO extreme example. After all, the Kriegsmarine over the course of the war had over 1,100 submarines in service, plus sub tenders, recon/MPA aircraft, as well as intel sources. In short, it was a massive effort to interdict shipping from North America to Europe and tactics were developed to make the most of the capability. The use of 'wolfpack' tactics comes immediately to mind, which both increased the ability of U-boats to detect shipping and convoys, as well as to engage in coordinated attacks against convoy escorts to draw them away from a convoy.
With respect to carrying out mid-Atlantic convoy interceptions, it actually is not as difficult as one would think, given the resources the Kriegsmarine had available.
Suppose a convoy were to depart a US or Canadian port along the eastern seaboard, bound for Europe. It would not be all that hard for an intel source to note the departure and relay the information to the Kriegsmarine. That would provide a time frame and point of departure, which could then be used to extrapolate potential courses based upon the time of year, vessels/cargo observed, etc. The Kriegsmarine could (and did) order U-boats already within the likely areas to patrol sectors along the route and then radio in if they spot a convoy. A convoy heading to a European port might follow a route which could be 400 km wide North to South, but a line of four U-boats at the same longitude could easily cover 100 km. In effect, the U-boats were creating choke-points by their presence in numbers.
While it is not impossible for a future conflict to have something similar happen, it would require a major investment in capability for a nation to achieve this. After all, how many nations that operate subs have enough available for deployment at the same time to send multiple subs against a single port, naval base, or SLOC? Of those few that might be able to do this, how long can they sustain the effort?
IMO a large (or even medium-sized) maritime strike using air-launched AShM is more realistic and likely easier to achieve, but even that would be problematic to direct against Australia unless it was either launched by a nearby nation, or more likely by a hostile power that had established a presence on one of those nations' territory.
With respect to carrying out mid-Atlantic convoy interceptions, it actually is not as difficult as one would think, given the resources the Kriegsmarine had available.
Suppose a convoy were to depart a US or Canadian port along the eastern seaboard, bound for Europe. It would not be all that hard for an intel source to note the departure and relay the information to the Kriegsmarine. That would provide a time frame and point of departure, which could then be used to extrapolate potential courses based upon the time of year, vessels/cargo observed, etc. The Kriegsmarine could (and did) order U-boats already within the likely areas to patrol sectors along the route and then radio in if they spot a convoy. A convoy heading to a European port might follow a route which could be 400 km wide North to South, but a line of four U-boats at the same longitude could easily cover 100 km. In effect, the U-boats were creating choke-points by their presence in numbers.
While it is not impossible for a future conflict to have something similar happen, it would require a major investment in capability for a nation to achieve this. After all, how many nations that operate subs have enough available for deployment at the same time to send multiple subs against a single port, naval base, or SLOC? Of those few that might be able to do this, how long can they sustain the effort?
IMO a large (or even medium-sized) maritime strike using air-launched AShM is more realistic and likely easier to achieve, but even that would be problematic to direct against Australia unless it was either launched by a nearby nation, or more likely by a hostile power that had established a presence on one of those nations' territory.
I would point out that while the Kriegsmarine did build 1100 Uboats, up until mid 1942 they usually had between 10 and 20 at sea which included those going to their patrol area and those leaving their area to go home, which could be up to half the number. In that time of limited defences, they sank 6 million tons. A significant number of early losses were ships sailing alone.
Sorry, a bit off topic.....
Are plans for a Tobruk replacement with a similar capability, LST?
Are plans for a Tobruk replacement with a similar capability, LST?
John Newman
The Bunker Group
Originally the replacement of Tobruk was part of JP 2048 (Ph 4 or 5? can't remember which phase exactly).
Basically Choules is the replacement for Tobruk (by default because of the early retirement of the LPAs).
The original plan was to replace the two LPAs and Tobruk with the 2 x LHD's and a 'Strategic Sea Lift Ship', Choules has become that Strategic Sea Lift Ship.
JP 2048 is complete, but with the exception of the replacement of the 6 x LCH, which appears to have 'disappeared' from the DWP and DIIP.
Escorting ships in ties of war only works when its in a convoy (Which the RAN I know has done around the Horn of Africa getting a number of ships altogether and escorting them through in one hit). Generally the bulk of the escorts where made up of corvettes.. Or for us that would be more like our future OPV's. As it sits for the RAN we just dont have the numbers to defend Australia, combat the enemy and escort convoys in and out. Would take the bulk of the navy just doing escorting to get the supplies and and trade out let alone watching the coast or attacking the enemy. Our best defence is literally to fight the enemy as far away as possible. Hold them at the choke points cause if not then there is bugger all else we could do.
edit
That is if operating alone forgot to add that.
edit
That is if operating alone forgot to add that.
Intermittant submarine attacks on our civilian shipping without a declaration of war, would likely be seen as state sponserd terrorism.
Which of our northern neighbours could/would carry out such an action and risk the results of discovery.
I belive the changes to the operational patterns of such a nations submarine force would become readily apparent.
Video from HMAS Hobart's first of class trials. CIWS and 5in gun shoots.
Joe Black
Active Member
RAN's New Mine Countermeasure Vessels
Steber’s big build for Australian Navy
Didn't see this coming. What a pleasant surprised.
Steber’s big build for Australian Navy
Didn't see this coming. What a pleasant surprised.
RAN's New Mine Countermeasure Vessels
Steber’s big build for Australian Navy
Didn't see this coming. What a pleasant surprised.
WOW ! OK did not see that one coming at all, very interesting indeed. There is a background plan on this one, at 3t there needs to be specific abilities to play with this new toy.
Just my initial reaction, need to look into this much further, thinking DARPA would be a good place to get some indication and background on this one, wish GF was still hanging around, reception must be bad on his travels
Yeah ... they are too big for the MCVs. They might be too large for the OPVs as well.RAN's New Mine Countermeasure Vessels
Steber’s big build for Australian Navy
Didn't see this coming. What a pleasant surprised.
The OPVs can fit two 20ft containers which probably isn't enough space to accommodate one these boats and the containerised mission management system.
With plans to keep the Huon in service until the 2030s it will be interesting to see what they will do with these things. Perhaps the future frigate might end up deploying them.
- Status