We could NOT have had the “Australianised Arleigh Burke”, in fact a largely new design that being why it was described as the “evolved” option at the time, quicker and for less money.
And by that definition of “make”, which I largely accept, there are very few countries which do much more than assemble. The US, USSR, UK, China, to some extent Korea, Japan and France, to a lesser degree Germany and Italy, possibly the Netherlands - that’s about it.
Interestingly had we taken the workforce model for the evolved team, with its greater assurance and risk mitigation focus and applied it to the AF100 (or any of the other existing or even some of the other less drastic evolved designs) the project would have run much more smoothly with fewer surprises.
You probably know more about what I'm about to dribble a couple of paragraphs on but many others here don't because they have likely never come across it, so not aimed at you or others with experience.
There was so much that was meant to build to print on the AWD that was anything but, so many equipment's that were meant to be to spec and basically plug and play that were nothing like we ordered (i.e. dodgy OS suppliers not just substituting material for us but also for the same supplier for F105). When you are worried about something you watch it closely and can fix things early, if you assume all is good, because someone you don't know signed a piece of paper, you are more likely to get caught out and have to wear cost and schedule pain to fix it. There were many assumptions made somewhere (whether PM&C, Cabinet, the Alliance board room, DMO, I don't know) that by selecting the F-100 and the Navantia supply chain, they were mitigating all risk and we would just be able to build to print, without the expensive overheads of a significant engineering, quality and build assurance capability on the project. The planned workforce model was slammed by experienced people from BIW, ABS, RAN, ASC etc. who pointed out that not having these function in a greenfields shipyard with an unproven designer for export, especially for a customer with no equivalent to NAVSEA SUPSHIPS or other external assurance capability was courting disaster. There were not listened to until later in the project when the problems had already started.
On the Collins project there were multiple examples of major concerns working out because the required attention and resources were applied from the start but also of other things that were assumed to be ok going pear-shaped. The welding of the Australian built sections was very closely watched and inspected and ran smoothly, the sections entrusted to Kockums experienced work force were faulty and required expensive and time consuming rework in Australia (because this was fixed in Collins FCD after acceptance it all became ASCs fault so instead of a pat on the back for fixing someone else's problem it was a slap in the face for the FCD going over time and budget). The combat system was seen to be a mess quite early on but the powers that be assumed that Rockwell (being a renowned US defence contractor) would sort it and the issues were allowed to ride. The project wanted MTU, Kockums pushed Hedamora, how did that work out? The Shaft seals that leaked were from an experience overseas supplier, as were very many other faulty equipments, they weren't things were ever considered manufacturing here as there were OS suppliers who had been providing for other navies for decades that had problems.
Australians aren't perfect but be aren't worthless incompetents either, all major projects have issues, no matter where they originate, just read up on the LPD 17, a great capability now but a shocking mess to start with, the lead ship of the DDG 51 class, CG(DDG)-47 all late and over budget, the first several Los Angeles Class SSNs were constructed from the wrong grade of steel and had diving depth restrictions throughout their service lives. The Daring Class anyone? How about Frances CdeG CVN and its various problems. What needs to be done is suitably experienced, competent and capable people need to be available in sufficient numbers to mitigate as much risk as possible, risk that will always exist but that you don't always have visibility of, let alone control over.