Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[SpazSinbad]

Perhaps it is forgotten that in the years after WWII to 1980 or so the RAAF were totally in the aviation business whilst the RAN had the FAA as a part of it - not the be all and end all. There was some anti FAA sentiment in the RAN but mostly good natured and yet the submariners were really pissed that two Oberons were foregone for ten more A4Gs (to make 20 total). Talk about a David & Goliath struggle - it was all a bit lopsided RAN FAA fixed wing especially against RAAF.

However it is very encouraging to me to see the new equipment & facilities at NAS Nowra for our helicopters - what a change for a great outcome I hope.

 

[ASSAIL]

My reference was not to the 1960s RAN/RAAF submissions (although they would appear to be what has been stated) but to the later 1980-82 STOVL carrier submissions (when I believe the RAN thought 'carrier truths were self evident').

GIF graphic attached as indicated:

https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=9574726

Replacement Aircraft Carrier for HMAS Melbourne 21 Aug 1980-28 Jul 1982 from page 93-94

This quote is from above. Hindsight is wonderful but I just take joy that the RAN FAA is back in the dunkin' DipGang business:

And herein lies the reason that I resigned from the RAN. As one of the last CAGTASOs in HMAS Melbourne I was acutely aware of what organic ASW brings to a TG and the seemingly blind obvious being ignored by the govt of the day, later to be reviewed and endorsed by the Hawke govt.
This was catastrophic for ASW in the RAN and led to nearly three decades of atrophy of that capabilityas AAW and HADR were ascendant.

Despite what the RAAF espoused at the time I had been through too many exercises both in OZ and SEAsia to know the total unreliability of support by having RAAF aircraft being either u/s or tasked to more "important" operations.

Thankfully that abject disregard for Joint ops has eased but the thought of organic f/w ASW air still makes me salivate.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I think pre-Falklands the STOVL and Harrier were seen skeptically by many. It seems the RAN might have been a bit divided. If it was going to significantly cut the surface fleet that is I think a fair call.

I know there is a large collection of naval documents at Spectacle Island regarding the replacement carrier. It would be worth going through in more detail some of the proposals of a carrier replacement.

Still I think Australia is doing ok now. Effectively we have two of the replacements for the Spanish sea-control ships. And we still have the surface combat fleet, with a significant sub force and quite a significant OPV capability.

Amphibious capability is the argument that was really lacking in these 1980's documents.

With PNG Election seemingly unraveling, while not violent yet, it is highly likely the result will not be accepted by many (perhaps including Australia and the UN). Democracy is hard work in PNG.
PNG election: Voting delay an 'embarrassment, humiliation', former NZ governor-general says - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)

Talisman Sabre 2017 might need to evolve into operation PNG. Again highlighting the importance of Amphibious capability.

 

[ASSAIL]

It is no secret that RAAF staff training long left navy and army for dead when it came to teaching its potential future leaders to promote the air force ahead of the other services whenever considered necessary. Hopefully the RAN has finally learnt the need to have senior sirs who can play the political game and not just presume that a sound argument will be accepted by their political masters. To me the 1964/66 papers showed incredible naivety on the part of the RAN leadership at the time as well as prevarication and a lack of understanding by PM and cabinet. Having succeeded in convincing government to reduce the FAA from a two carrier strike force to a one carrier ASW oriented force in the second half of the 1950s, I believe there is no doubt whatsoever, that the RAAF senior brass was determined to undermine any effort to see its rebirth as a strike force. I don’t blame the RAAF for pushing its own needs but I thought it very disappointing that the RAN seemed incapable of doing the same.

I just hope that the RAN staff today is better trained and prepared to push its needs in the political arena.

Tas

I have no doubt that at this time, post Voyager, that the govt. had little faith in the RAN leadership. The way this crisis was handled, followed by the Frank E Evans collision where the RAN leadership sold out to Admiral King, gave them little faith in affairs naval. Subsequently the politicians became gunshy on carrier ops and supported their demise.

 

[Volkodav]

And herein lies the reason that I resigned from the RAN. As one of the last CAGTASOs in HMAS Melbourne I was acutely aware of what organic ASW brings to a TG and the seemingly blind obvious being ignored by the govt of the day, later to be reviewed and endorsed by the Hawke govt.
This was catastrophic for ASW in the RAN and led to nearly three decades of atrophy of that capabilityas AAW and HADR were ascendant.

Despite what the RAAF espoused at the time I had been through too many exercises both in OZ and SEAsia to know the total unreliability of support by having RAAF aircraft being either u/s or tasked to more "important" operations.

Thankfully that abject disregard for Joint ops has eased but the thought of organic f/w ASW air still makes me salivate.

Sea Harriers to slow and vulnerable for strike and reconnaissance missions in the opinion of the RAAF, their alternative solution, the P-3C! Extra Sea Kings (with their dunking sonars) were required to replace the Trackers, the RAAFs solution, remove the RANs ability to operate them at sea then buy a new type, total project more expensive than the new carrier would have been, to replace them. We ended up spending more money for less capability, the RAAF didn't even lobby for the capabilities they required to at least make good some of the losses, i.e. an increase in P-3 and F/A-18 numbers.

 

[SpazSinbad]

One may get a taste for RAAF antipathy in those years mentioned (late 1960s to early 1970s at least) from the stories told by RANHFV in Vietnam here:

We Envy No Man On Earth Because We Fly. The Australian Fleet Air Arm:
A Comparative Operational Study. 2016

https://www.faaaa.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/We-Envy-No-Man-On-Earth-Because-We-Fly.pdf (2.15Mb)

ADD: I hope this quote from above PDF puts to rest the' Gorton against FAA' myth:

"...A much needed and welcome reprieve came in the form of the newly elected Minister for the Navy, Senator John Gorton. It was his recollection of being rescued by the RAN as an Air Force pilot in World War II, that prompted his ‘sincere and active interest in his department’. In the words of David Stevens:

"By the time Gorton completed his five-year tenure, the decline of the RAN had been arrested and it was preparing for an enhanced role in regional security affairs."

As a result of the combined machinations of the RAN and Senator Gorton, Melbourne underwent a major refit in 1969 and embarked a further 16 Anti-submarine Warfare capable Tracker aircraft and 10 Skyhawks which provided both strike and defensive capabilities....

 

[Volkodav]

There's an interesting article in the July / September 2017 Aero Australia about WWI Australian aces who flew the Sopwith Triplane in the RNAS. Its a real shame naval aviation was rolled into an independent air force as, although Williams did his best to cover all bases, the RAF "experts", that the Australian government seemed to prefer, had very little regard for supporting the other services.

Ironically initially many of the RAN FAA personnel were RAAF volunteers, with a large percentage of ex RN FAA veterans from NZ. Its almost too bad there wasn't some tie into to the RAAF that would have seen some sea minded aviators progress to that services highest levels and prevent some of the cannibalistic behavior seen instead. Even these days we still see the RAAF in particular involving itself in major decisions relating to the other services, i.e. the AWD selection where the RAN got what the RAAF and army thought they needed, not what the RAN, allies and ship building experts new they needed.

 

[SpazSinbad]

Navy League of Australia Review [Jul-Sep 1988] of Wings Across the Sea by Ross Gillett

"...An interesting aspect that comes out when reading this book is the great debt that the RAAF owes the RAN. This debt becomes obvious when it is realised that people of the calibre of Wackett and Hewitt were transferred to the RAAF in the 1920s after the first RAN Fleet Air Arm [?] was disbanded. One wonders whether there is a Wacket or a Hewitt in the recent group of Naval Aviators that became Air Force pilots?..."

Prescient indeed - allo allo allo Air Marshal Mark Binskin CDF - earlier an RAN FAA A4G pilot then exchange Miracles then transferred to RAAF 1984.

 

[Tasman]

Still I think Australia is doing ok now. Effectively we have two of the replacements for the Spanish sea-control ships. And we still have the surface combat fleet, with a significant sub force and quite a significant OPV capability.

Amphibious capability is the argument that was really lacking in these 1980's documents.

We do appear to be going OK but some of us are old enough to remember times in the past where the RAN seemed to be well on its way to something good only to then see what seemed like good plans fall apart.

Some examples include: a continuous build plan for destroyers that was proposed immediately post war, the 2 carrier task force planned in 1947, the 10 local build 'light destroyers' that turned into 4 imported and 2 locally built FFGs and plans to expand the submarine force to 8 all ended in disappointment. Expectations for a 4th Adams class DDG and more recently a 4th Hobart class AWD came to nought. Of course I am also a taxpayer and I understand and accept the need for wise spending. That is why things like the Sea Sprite fiasco and the strange helicopter decisions made by the army really annoy me. Once again it seems that the RAAF gets it right more often than navy or army when it comes to hardware purchases!

The present naval program looks good but my main concern now is that the government is under tremendous budgetary pressure so I wonder just how much will actually see the light of day.

I am also worried about the way in which the RAN's largest assets, the Canberra class LHDs, will be used. I know it is early days and they are still involved in trials but so far they seem to be sailing with very few embarked aviation assets and with comparatively small numbers of troops onboard. Is anyone aware of either ship having deployed anywhere with more than 5 helos embarked? I was surprised to read that 2 RAR is to lose its infantry companies and that it is to be 'fleshed out' with reserve units. If that is the case where will the ARGs be drawn from and how will soldiers concerned with amphibious operations get adequate time at sea. Is amphibious or HADR work the only role for these ships? They would seem to be ideal command platforms and their ability to support a large number of helos should also make them great ASW assets. Even when operating in amphibious roles it would seem logical to include at least a pair of MH-60Rs in the airgroup. If not needed for amphibious work they ought to be able to embark at least half a dozen MH-60s along with a TG command team. I hope that any additional infrastructure that is needed to enable these roles to be carried out will be forthcoming along with the already proposed upgrade to self defence (Phalanx and Nulka). For these ships to be fully utilised it also seems to me that both army and navy need more helos with at least one trooplift squadron being dedicated to amphibious operations and ideally equipped with helicopters designed to deploy efficiently at sea (MV-22, MH-60S, etc).

Tas

 

[Tasman]

One may get a taste for RAAF antipathy in those years mentioned (late 1960s to early 1970s at least) from the stories told by RANHFV in Vietnam here:

We Envy No Man On Earth Because We Fly. The Australian Fleet Air Arm:
A Comparative Operational Study. 2016

https://www.faaaa.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/We-Envy-No-Man-On-Earth-Because-We-Fly.pdf (2.15Mb)

ADD: I hope this quote from above PDF puts to rest the' Gorton against FAA' myth:

Thanks for the link.

I fully agree with you re John Gorton whose actions as minister, IMO, saved the RAN's fixed wing aviation from extinction in the early 1960s. I still remember at the time being appalled by plans for Melbourne to become an ASW helicopter carrier only, especially when there was a possibility of the RAN having to confront a potentially hostile Indonesian fleet that was built around a Russian built cruiser.

Tas

 

[rockitten]

And herein lies the reason that I resigned from the RAN. As one of the last CAGTASOs in HMAS Melbourne I was acutely aware of what organic ASW brings to a TG and the seemingly blind obvious being ignored by the govt of the day, later to be reviewed and endorsed by the Hawke govt.
This was catastrophic for ASW in the RAN and led to nearly three decades of atrophy of that capabilityas AAW and HADR were ascendant.

Despite what the RAAF espoused at the time I had been through too many exercises both in OZ and SEAsia to know the total unreliability of support by having RAAF aircraft being either u/s or tasked to more "important" operations.

Thankfully that abject disregard for Joint ops has eased but the thought of organic f/w ASW air still makes me salivate.

So how's the FAA's pilots felt about the disband of FAA's fixwing fleet? Some book said those A-4 pilots were quite happy about that as they had much better career path/promotion chance in RAAF than in RAN.

 

[SpazSinbad]

So how's the FAA's pilots felt about the disband of FAA's fixwing fleet? Some book said those A-4 pilots were quite happy about that as they had much better career path/promotion chance in RAAF than in RAN.

"Some book"? Geebus I'll have to get it. Got any more sumbooks? You have got to be kiddin'me.

 

[ASSAIL]

So how's the FAA's pilots felt about the disband of FAA's fixwing fleet? Some book said those A-4 pilots were quite happy about that as they had much better career path/promotion chance in RAAF than in RAN.

That's not so. There was and is a a well worn path to Flag rank whether you're an aviator, submariner, diver or whatever sub specialisation you happen to be in you first decades of service. You stay in your specialisation while there senior positions are open to you. There are Commodores leading the submarine service and the Fleet Air Arm. By the time your in your mid thirties you have a fair idea of your promotion prospects and if the competition looks too hot you either revert to General Service or get out
The current CN happens to be an aviator.
I suspect that one advantage of joining th RAAF as a fw pilot is that you get to fly a little longer but then again you're then competing with mainstream Raffie Chappies.
I guess that makes Mark Binskin something special.

 

[Raven22]

I am also worried about the way in which the RAN's largest assets, the Canberra class LHDs, will be used. I know it is early days and they are still involved in trials but so far they seem to be sailing with very few embarked aviation assets and with comparatively small numbers of troops onboard. Is anyone aware of either ship having deployed anywhere with more than 5 helos embarked? I was surprised to read that 2 RAR is to lose its infantry companies and that it is to be 'fleshed out' with reserve units. If that is the case where will the ARGs be drawn from and how will soldiers concerned with amphibious operations get adequate time at sea.

You seem to think that if the LHDs aren't overflowing with troops and equipment 24/7, then they are somehow being under utilised. No other ADF asset runs around all the time full bombed up for war - the LHDs are no different. The whole point is, you can tailor what goes on board based on need. The max figures you see will rarely be embarked because they will rarely be needed, and indeed the ships don't actually operate very well when the max number of everything is embarked.

2 RAR isn't being fleshed out with Reserve units, I don't know where you read that. 2 RAR will no longer be responsible for fielding the Ground Combat Element as part of the ARE (or ARU/ARG etc), which will now simply come from the online brigade (usually the Ready Battle Group). The Ground Combat Element for Tal Sabre is coming from 1 RAR, which will give them the tick in the box for certification to become the RBG.

 

[StingrayOZ]

The present naval program looks good but my main concern now is that the government is under tremendous budgetary pressure so I wonder just how much will actually see the light of day.

I am also worried about the way in which the RAN's largest assets, the Canberra class LHDs, will be used..

The LHD's are amphibious ships, that we have just purchased. We have yet to even really come to grips with their value. Their acquisition will affect procurement for the next 50 years.

At this stage the amphibious capability has priority. There are multiple, very real situations developing right this very minute where we may be required to deploy a force similar or greater than InterFET in our region. If we can't meet that amphibious capability, there are other nation players that may be interested in interfering.

Certainly we are a lot better off than we were say early 1999. If you look at the RAN its tonnage has tripled from 2005.
3 x AWD Aegis- 1 Finished - 2 very close. Double the Charles F Adams class displacement.
9 x Light destroyers (most likely based off either the AWD and/or the type 26). Double the displacement of the Anzacs.
12 x Conventionals subs based off the newest nuclear submarine design. Nearly double the volume of the Collins.
12 x OPV's that are as big as the old Leander class.
2 x LHD's of the most capable and largest type outside of the US. Capable of fixed wing aviation - arguably what ever we had gotten in the 1980's we would be looking at these kind of ships now. 50% larger than Melbourne.
1 x LPD three times the displacement of Tobruk.
New auxillary ships, aviation ship, all the existing ships we have, mine, survey, etc.

Sure I would like it if we had 12 burkes, 2 America class, etc. But the RAN has some serious capability now. If it seems a bit light, its most likely because all this stuff is just coming online now.

I doubt there is any navy on the planet that has seen the tonnage and capability growth the RAN has seen in the last 10 ten and the next 25. There are plenty of options to bulk up the Navy.

 

[Massive]

There are plenty of options to bulk up the Navy.

I would question if you would buy more ships if you wanted more ASW capability.

Suspect you would get more P-8s - particularly given the shift in strategy signaled in the 2016 White Paper.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Tasman]

You seem to think that if the LHDs aren't overflowing with troops and equipment 24/7, then they are somehow being under utilised. No other ADF asset runs around all the time full bombed up for war - the LHDs are no different. The whole point is, you can tailor what goes on board based on need. The max figures you see will rarely be embarked because they will rarely be needed, and indeed the ships don't actually operate very well when the max number of everything is embarked.

2 RAR isn't being fleshed out with Reserve units, I don't know where you read that. 2 RAR will no longer be responsible for fielding the Ground Combat Element as part of the ARE (or ARU/ARG etc), which will now simply come from the online brigade (usually the Ready Battle Group). The Ground Combat Element for Tal Sabre is coming from 1 RAR, which will give them the tick in the box for certification to become the RBG.

Re my comment about 2 RAR being fleshed out with Reserve units, The Army News (15th June edition) states that reserve companies will be integrated into the establishment of 2 RAR.

ahttp://armynews.realviewdigital.com/#folio=10ny

In a news article the CO of 2 RAR, LTCOL Pashley, stated that "while the ORBAT will be reduced to around 300 fulltime members, the Battalion will have two companies of Reserves permanently attached to it."

https://nscnews.com.au/2rar-changes-course/

I do agree with your comments about the utilisation of the LHDs. Of course I don't expect them to carry a full complement of troops, vehicles, helos, etc 24/7 in the way that forward deployed USN LHDs do. What they carry will be tailored to a specific mission. However, I have been surprised that neither vessel yet seems to have tested its capacity to operate a more sizeable force of helicopters than has been observed so far. Perhaps I am expecting the development program to move faster than is reasonable but I was surprised that HMAS Canberra deployed to last year's RIMPAC exercise with such a small aviation element attached. The positive side of this was that there was plenty of empty flight deck space for USMC helos to demonstrate their ability to operate comfortably from the Aussie LHDs! Perhaps as I get older I am getting more impatient for things to happen quickly so that I will still be around to see them!

Tas

 

[Ballistic]

You seem to think that if the LHDs aren't overflowing with troops and equipment 24/7, then they are somehow being under utilised. No other ADF asset runs around all the time full bombed up for war - the LHDs are no different. The whole point is, you can tailor what goes on board based on need. The max figures you see will rarely be embarked because they will rarely be needed, and indeed the ships don't actually operate very well when the max number of everything is embarked.

2 RAR isn't being fleshed out with Reserve units, I don't know where you read that. 2 RAR will no longer be responsible for fielding the Ground Combat Element as part of the ARE (or ARU/ARG etc), which will now simply come from the online brigade (usually the Ready Battle Group). The Ground Combat Element for Tal Sabre is coming from 1 RAR, which will give them the tick in the box for certification to become the RBG.

I'm pretty sure the Army Newspaper stated that aim with Reservists and 2 RAR.

Here's the quote (June 15 p. 10): "As an example of our next steps, to support 2 RAR's general infantry and specialist amphibious roles, we will need to integrate reserve companies into its establishment."

EDIT: Tasman beat me to it. That's what I get for running off to stop dinner from burning...

 

[FormerDirtDart]

Preface that I have in no way done a "deep dive" into the 2 RAR's training and development. But, reading the article linked by Tasman, I get the feeling that 2 RAR will be adopting a role somewhat akin to the US Marine Corps' divisional Reconnaissance Battalions

 

[Massive]

Naval ASW

Given the intermittent discussion on through deck helicopter carriers I thought the following was interesting. Modelling pretty limited (and scenario very simplistic) but worth a read.

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/simulating-anti-submarine-warfare/

Regards,

Massive