Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

iambuzzard

Well-Known Member
The naysayers at The Strategist are now trying to push a conventional sub co-development program with Japan, supposedly to complement AUKUS.
When is this nonsense going to end?
AUKUS has bipartisan support. It will happen.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
The naysayers at The Strategist are now trying to push a conventional sub co-development program with Japan, supposedly to complement AUKUS.
When is this nonsense going to end?
AUKUS has bipartisan support. It will happen.
True it appears that the three principal players in the UK ,the USA and Australia are keen for this to succeed.
I confess to being one of the naysayers.
Now is AUKUS criticism just click bait or is there a worthy discussion.
I guess it depends on your point of view.

Given it’s such early days in a program going for decades its fair to say questions will be asked

Healthy critique is good for any project.
Especially in such an expensive endeavour.

Cheers S
 

Bluey 006

Active Member
Considering some of the discussion of late, regarding OPVs (and LBASM for the matter). What additional capabilities (realistically) do we want the Arafura or an OPV class to have? (If any)

Anti-shipping?

Counter USV?

Precision strike?

Anti-air?

Anti-submarine?


I.e. What is the capability requirement?


How will a future Indo-Pacific conflict be conducted?

How distributed will our forces/or our adversaries be?

How many concurrent engagements are we in at any one time?

Do we (or our adversaries) expect a frigate to be stationed off the coast of every island we (or they) seek to control? If so, how many frigates can we dedicate to this? Given some will be needed for major task forces, escort, fleet-air defence, and so on. What does that mean?

These questions (and others) are relevant to these discussions.

I also thought I might drop these here:

Naval Spike-NLOS

Naval Iron-Beam

And as a point of note, Solomon Islands (for example) consists of about 900 islands, with the largest being Guadalcanal.

Guadalcanal's area is about 2,020 square miles (5,268 km²), with a length of about 130 miles (210 km) and a width of 30 miles (50 km).
 
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downunderblue

Well-Known Member
With the news re: The Pukpuk treaty, what is expectation regarding Manus/Lombrum naval base
That's a very interesting question.

Excluding a shoot out war where it likely will be used more, aren't we just going to see an occasional port visit?

The open source minimum runway length for a P-8 Poseidon is approximately 7,000 feet (2,134 meters). meaning they can't operate at the nearby Momote airport at Manus Island.

In fact the P-8's could only operate at three airports in PNG- Moresby, Lae and Mt Hagen.

Whilst spending $ on the naval base was important as the PRC would have happily supplanted AU if it hadnt, I do wonder whether developing forward airbases may offer more bang for your buck. With Indopacom worried about the PLARF enough to focus on the dispersal of aircraft from Andersen AFB, it does emphasise the need to maintain enough runways with sufficient length to forward operate. As the fourth longest runway in PNG but only 1870m long and limited in extension, Momote is just not big enough and in a shooting war we likely need more options.

Maybe Lae Airport is worth investing in?
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
That's a very interesting question.

Excluding a shoot out war where it likely will be used more, aren't we just going to see an occasional port visit?

The open source minimum runway length for a P-8 Poseidon is approximately 7,000 feet (2,134 meters). meaning they can't operate at the nearby Momote airport at Manus Island.

In fact the P-8's could only operate at three airports in PNG- Moresby, Lae and Mt Hagen.

Whilst spending $ on the naval base was important as the PRC would have happily supplanted AU if it hadnt, I do wonder whether developing forward airbases may offer more bang for your buck. With Indopacom worried about the PLARF enough to focus on the dispersal of aircraft from Andersen AFB, it does emphasise the need to maintain enough runways with sufficient length to forward operate. As the fourth longest runway in PNG but only 1870m long and limited in extension, Momote is just not big enough and in a shooting war we likely need more options.

Maybe Lae Airport is worth investing in?
USN Seabees extended the runway after the airfield was liberated in 1944. After the Seabees did this, the single runway was 2,400 m x 40 m, which I believe would be sufficient to operate P-8 Poseidons out of. Looking at satellite imagery, it appears that portions of the runway at each end have been allowed to become overgrown, with vegetation now growing through any paving as well as the coral base. This suggests to me that it should be possible to have the airfield upgraded and extended again.
 

H_K

Member
The naysayers at The Strategist are now trying to push a conventional sub co-development program with Japan, supposedly to complement AUKUS.
When is this nonsense going to end?
AUKUS has bipartisan support. It will happen.
But the Virginia SSNs are going to be delayed. The writing's on the wall on that one.

It's simple math... look at remaining USN SSN lifetimes, their (in)ability to put the oldest subs through extended overhauls and refuelings to extend service lives, their 2 shipyards' contracted production rates (which are already locked in for the next 10 years, with zero chance of any accelerated deliveries this side of 2035), the additional wild cards of potential build delays due to the learning curve rolling out the larger Block V subs with VPM modules, and the USN's stated willingness to reallocate Virginia workforce to prioritize Columbia class SSBNs (in a crunch)... it's an ugly situation all around.

I'd give a 90% chance that the first Virginia SSN isn't handed over until 2035-2036 (3-4 year delay) and a 50-50 chance that the RAN gets its 2nd Virginia SSN by 2040.

So... while a full-on new build SSK program doesn't make much sense, a stop gap purchase or temporary lease of used SSKs could help the RAN bridge the gap until 2040... Japan would seem like an obvious source as their SSKs are typically retired quite young.
 
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spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Having landed at Momote in a rainstorm, and slid off the runway, I can assure you that there are limits to the usability of crushed coral runways! There was always vegetation at either end - I believe it helped stabilise the end of the strip where it sticks out onto the beach. Of course, extending it would require land reclamation.
 

SammyC

Well-Known Member
But the Virginia SSNs are going to be delayed. The writing's on the wall on that one.

It's simple math... look at remaining USN SSN lifetimes, their (in)ability to put the oldest subs through extended overhauls and refuelings to extend service lives, their 2 shipyards' contracted production rates (which are already locked in for the next 10 years, with zero chance of any accelerated deliveries this side of 2035), the additional wild cards of potential build delays due to the learning curve rolling out the larger Block V subs with VPM modules, and the USN's stated willingness to reallocate Virginia workforce to prioritize Columbia class SSBNs (in a crunch)... it's an ugly situation all around.

I'd give a 90% chance that the first Virginia SSN isn't handed over until 2035-2036 (3-4 year delay) and a 50-50 chance that the RAN gets its 2nd Virginia SSN by 2040.

So... while a full-on new build SSK program doesn't make much sense, a stop gap purchase or temporary lease of used SSKs could help the RAN bridge the gap until 2040... Japan would seem like an obvious source as their SSKs are typically retired quite young.
I think this is a very complicated picture and pathway.

The Americans do need to make enough new Virginias to replace the old Los Angeles they are decommissioning. Taken by itself, I agree that it is at best line ball that they will hold or increase the number of new hulls. I think it is more likely that an overall reduction will occur.

Construction is however only one part of the plan to improve SSN availability. The bigger problem is maintenance, with by the last figures I saw in the order of 40% of the SSN fleet is out of service for maintenance. Many of these vessels aren't even in maintenance, thay are tied up waiting for access to a dry dock, work crews or parts. My understanding is that cannibalism is rampant, with major problems with suppliers.

Improvements in this area can offset an overall reduction in hull numbers, and it is probably an easier problem to fix. I think this is why the Americans pushed for Australia to accelerate the Henderson maintenance facility. It's why they are building an extra dry dock in Hawaii. Component manufacturers are either being upgraded or duplicated.

On maths, a reduction in the number of SSNs out for maintenance from say 40% to 30% would result in an extra 5-7 platforms being available for operations (note in FY08 the proportion of boats in maintenance was 22%, so 30% is still a soft target). That alone equates to about 5 years worth of construction output.

The Americans are also extending the life of the Los Angeles class. I noted that the most recent retirements in FY24 and FY25 have all done more than 33 years (35-36), and another six are currently authorised to go through refuelling to extend beyond that time (will be in excess of 40 years). I suspect more of the 23 remaining flight IIIs will go into this refuelling program over time. This has not been without its difficulties, however again, this forms a stopgap that adds another half dozen (maybe a dozen) hulls to the fleet.

The third item relates to crewing. It is well known that the US has a severe shortage of SSN qualified officers and sailors. The impact is not well publicised, but from what I have read, upwards of 15-20% of the boats otherwise ready to deploy (so not restricted by maintenance), can't sail because of people. This is most acute with technical skills. The shortage is less the capacity to train, more the US Navy cannot recruit. The Australian submariner seconded workforce in the US is expected to hit in the order of 450 people over the next few years (it is already over 100), and this alone will keep several more SSNs at sea. Another 3-4 boats could be made available though this.

So, while construction is suffering, it is not the full picture. Bigger gains can be made from maintenance improvements, life extensions and recruitment. I would view the Americans are looking more at these levers when considering the impact of selling submarines to Australia than what is going on in the yards.
 
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hauritz

Well-Known Member
I think this is a very complicated picture and pathway.

The Americans do need to make enough new Virginias to replace the old Los Angeles they are decommissioning. Taken by itself, I agree that it is at best line ball that they will hold or increase the number of new hulls. I think it is more likely that an overall reduction will occur.

Construction is however only one part of the plan to improve SSN availability. The bigger problem is maintenance, with by the last figures I saw in the order of 40% of the SSN fleet is out of service for maintenance. Many of these vessels aren't even in maintenance, thay are tied up waiting for access to a dry dock, work crews or parts. My understanding is that cannibalism is rampant, with major problems with suppliers.

Improvements in this area can offset an overall reduction in hull numbers, and it is probably an easier problem to fix. I think this is why the Americans pushed for Australia to accelerate the Henderson maintenance facility. It's why they are building an extra dry dock in Hawaii. Component manufacturers are either being upgraded or duplicated.

On maths, a reduction in the number of SSNs out for maintenance from say 40% to 30% would result in an extra 5-7 platforms being available for operations (note in FY08 the proportion of boats in maintenance was 22%, so 30% is still a soft target). That alone equates to about 5 years worth of construction output.

The Americans are also extending the life of the Los Angeles class. I noted that the most recent retirements in FY24 and FY25 have all done more than 33 years (35-36), and another six are currently authorised to go through refuelling to extend beyond that time (will be in excess of 40 years). I suspect more of the 23 remaining flight IIIs will go into this refuelling program over time. This has not been without its difficulties, however again, this forms a stopgap that adds another half dozen (maybe a dozen) hulls to the fleet.

The third item relates to crewing. It is well known that the US has a severe shortage of SSN qualified officers and sailors. The impact is not well publicised, but from what I have read, upwards of 15-20% of the boats otherwise ready to deploy (so not restricted by maintenance), can't sail because of people. This is most acute with technical skills. The shortage is less the capacity to train, more the US Navy cannot recruit. The Australian submariner seconded workforce in the US is expected to hit in the order of 450 people over the next few years (it is already over 100), and this alone will keep several more SSNs at sea. Another 3-4 boats could be made available though this.

So, while construction is suffering, it is not the full picture. Bigger gains can be made from maintenance improvements, life extensions and recruitment. I would view the Americans are looking more at these levers when considering the impact of selling submarines to Australia than what is going on in the yards.
It is interesting to go back to the 2023 "Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal" paper.

Congress has given the president the power to sell no more than 2 SSNs from the navy's inventory. The third Virginia looks like it will be a new build which is less contentious than removing operational boats from USN service. The main condition is that the transfer will not degrade US undersea capabilities, which is rather an amorphous statement. As pointed out by Sammy the problems aren't just with getting the build rate up but also dealing with the current maintaince backlog.

With Australia you get that financial boost needed to increase production and you get access to the Henderson maintenance facility, which should increase submarine availability. To me that seems like it should compensate for the loss of a couple of middle-aged Virginias. As an extra bonus those boats will be similarily tasked as their USN counterparts.

I couldn't find any contentious issues in this paper. Rather there seems to be an acceptance that the Virginia program is behind schedule, and it will take a decade or more to fix regardless of Australia's requirement for few Virginias.

 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
It is interesting to go back to the 2023 "Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal" paper.

Congress has given the president the power to sell no more than 2 SSNs from the navy's inventory. The third Virginia looks like it will be a new build which is less contentious than removing operational boats from USN service. The main condition is that the transfer will not degrade US undersea capabilities, which is rather an amorphous statement. As pointed out by Sammy the problems aren't just with getting the build rate up but also dealing with the current maintaince backlog.

With Australia you get that financial boost needed to increase production and you get access to the Henderson maintenance facility, which should increase submarine availability. To me that seems like it should compensate for the loss of a couple of middle-aged Virginias. As an extra bonus those boats will be similarily tasked as their USN counterparts.

I couldn't find any contentious issues in this paper. Rather there seems to be an acceptance that the Virginia program is behind schedule, and it will take a decade or more to fix regardless of Australia's requirement for few Virginias.

The ramping up if the WA facilities will help take the pressure off US sustainment. By taking on maintenance that previously requires US yards, this will free up the US facilities for more major work.

Other changes include new sustainment capabilities that allows some work, previously requiring docking, to be done in service.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
I understand Navy are to get the Insitu RQ21 Integrator

Any idea what ships these will be deployed on and what numbers.

Army already have this system.

Cheers S
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
The ramping up if the WA facilities will help take the pressure off US sustainment. By taking on maintenance that previously requires US yards, this will free up the US facilities for more major work.

Other changes include new sustainment capabilities that allows some work, previously requiring docking, to be done in service.
One of the reasons for for slow build rate in the U.S submarine build is shortages of skilled labor perhaps Australia and the U.S could come to an understanding of using skilled Australian workers in this program not as a citizen route but to gain experience for when domestic production commences here
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Normal practice in Navy is for aviation assets to be managed by a squadron, which would be 822X in this case, and deployed as required. That would potentially mean any platform with enough space to host the launch, control and recovery systems. I’m not sure if the control system is containerised but even if not an Arafura or larger should have the capacity.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Normal practice in Navy is for aviation assets to be managed by a squadron, which would be 822X in this case, and deployed as required. That would potentially mean any platform with enough space to host the launch, control and recovery systems. I’m not sure if the control system is containerised but even if not an Arafura or larger should have the capacity.
I understand 822x did work with the older Scan eagle and the S100
The later appeared to have been selected then just disappeared???????
Always looked like the obvious choice for ships with its vertical takeoff and landing attributes without the need of lots of infrastructure coupled with decent range and load carrying capacity for its size.
Both Canada and the UK have adopted this platform as have many others around the world.

Army have in service the RQ21.
Given that navy will acquire the system wondering whether additional units will be purchased for that service.

While durable on a maritime platform the RQ21s separate launch and recovery mechanism looks physically space demanding.
For all the attributes of the small unit in flight, it does leave a big logistics footprint on the ship.

Any update would be appreciated

Cheers S
 

d-ron84

Active Member
I understand Navy are to get the Insitu RQ21 Integrator

Any idea what ships these will be deployed on and what numbers.

Army already have this system.

Cheers S
The RAN previously (2014-24) used the Scan Eagle UAS, the pre-curser to the RQ21. So it should be an easier integration then a new system.
Pretty simple setup for any vessel, just need the launch rail and recovery “wire” rig. Just need the space, which isn’t much.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
The open source minimum runway length for a P-8 Poseidon is approximately 7,000 feet (2,134 meters). meaning they can't operate at the nearby Momote airport at Manus Island.

In fact the P-8's could only operate at three airports in PNG- Moresby, Lae and Mt Hagen.
I thought the government spent the money to upgrade the airport, and that it regularly flies B737.. And can handle upto 737-800 series operations.

B737 to Manus

I would think E7 and P8 operations are compatible with the airport. It seems the new runway is approximately 2010m in length. I would expect operations perhaps to some requirements on wind conditions/max load. But the min runway for a P8 might also include variety of irrelevant approach angles, frosty, high temp conditions etc. They seem to be able to operate fully loaded B737-800 from it regularly.
 

Going Boeing

Well-Known Member
2010m would be limiting for the P8 in that it may not be able to get airborne at MTOW which would limit its operational capability - 2500-2800m would be much better. The Air Nuigini B737’s that use Momote only have to fly short distances so they would be taking off well below MTOW.

The CFM56 engines last well if they use derated power for takeoff on a regular basis but deteriorate quickly if full thrust is used frequently. When QF had a mixed B737 fleet, new engines (26K thrust) would be fitted to the larger -800’s and when the hot section became worn, they would be transferred to the -400’s (24K thrust) and eventually to the -300’s (22K thrust). When they could no longer develop the required thrust, they would be overhauled but at least they got about 12 years out of each engine. The RAAF has a limited capability to transfer engines to the slightly smaller E7’s but, if they are required to operate out of shorter runways, they would require full thrust.

I believe that Defence should throw money at lengthening runways (eg Cocos) rather than the higher cost of overhauling engines because they are operating regularly at full thrust.
 
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Maranoa

Active Member
I landed at Momote Airport in June in an Air Nuigini in a 737, the pilot (an expat) dropped her hard on the very edge of the strip almost in the sea with a huge bang. I've since heard that that is the norm for Momote so I'd say Going Boeing is correct the strip is very tight for 737. Interestingly two US military personnel in camo were the only passengers that joined the flight.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
2010m would be limiting for the P8 in that it may not be able to get airborne at MTOW which would limit its operational capability - 2500-2800m would be much better. The Air Nuigini B737’s that use Momote only have to fly short distances so they would be taking off well below MTOW.
Cost a lot more money for that. They could probably squeeze another 50-100m for a lot more money.. but more than that would start to really increase cost and environmental impacts. Your reclaiming land from the ocean, from land already reclaimed from the ocean, so it starts to get deep and require significant engineering to keep it stable.

I suspect that it is upgraded enough to allow operations of E7/P8. It's not ideal, but it is enough to allow it to happen. It's probably going to be a secondary airport anyway.

MC-55a would however, be easily able to be accommodated there. Probably more suited to operations.
Momote, isn't a huge amount further anyway, and the extra range isn't a game changer for E7/P8.
I landed at Momote Airport in June in an Air Nuigini in a 737, the pilot (an expat) dropped her hard on the very edge of the strip almost in the sea with a huge bang. I've since heard that that is the norm for Momote so I'd say Going Boeing is correct the strip is very tight for 737. Interestingly two US military personnel in camo were the only passengers that joined the flight
Well it is handy if you wish to operate 737 military aircraft from an airport, to have existing civilian 737 traffic to that airport. I would imagine that there is experience and data about perhaps further expansion put together for a future budget. To be weighed against upgrading other airports elsewhere.
Australia and PNG just signed the defence deal, so a lot of the uncertainty, is gone now.

With that kind of deal, it may be if the Americans are repositioning that they would be interested in co-funding expansions, and then they might want it speced for their platforms not just for 737. They might see value in a whole second runway, if you want to make the primary longer, it wouldn't be much more to double the entire setup. If Guam becomes too hot to operate out of, then Momote becomes very useful for them, particularly if they wanted to quickly redistribute or disperse.

Manus and Momote are ideal for heading out to Guam or Micronesia (pohnpei is 737-800 capable an 1900m). Unlike micronesia, Australia can provide fighter jet/surveillance aircover around Momote. Our ships can be in that region almost all the time. Bigger stuff can move to continental Australia, and smaller stuff can move and operate out of these smaller airports at least temporarily. It already has a naval base. It could be expanded. The basic infrastructure is in place, the political stuff is now in place.
 
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