Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

MickB

Well-Known Member
I'm not wedded to any particular platform, a platform is, after all, basically transportation and life support for the combat system. The RAN is progressively moving into the realms of systems thinking, systems of systems rather than platform centric.

It used to do my head in whenever we introduced new kit that had no commonality with anything else we used, on the basis it was "better value for money" to buy off the shelf than the "gold plate" and "Australianise". Then, with the notable exception of FMS, not long after the capability enters service we start hearing about availability issues, problems getting spares, problems training and retaining enough people etc.

At the end of the day, while designing the Hunter is beyond us, designing a patrol frigate, even a GP frigate, let alone a corvette or OPV is well within the capability of Australian industry, the problem is the lack of political comprehension of the capability. There is not enough time to do this obviously, so something would have to be adapted, but with adequate planning it is achievable.

Does anyone recall the offer of a Legend Class Cutter for what became our OPV program? I can't recall if it was for the Labor program, or the later Coalition one but it was somewhere around the 2010 to 2015 space. The Arafuras, while a massive increase in capability over the previous PBs, are still not warships, or even high endurance patrol vessels. My feeling is there has been a long term need for a patrol frigate or Sloop in the RAN going back to lessons leant in WWII and reaffirmed during the Malayan Emergency, Indonesian Confrontation, Borneo, Vietnam, the Gulf and East Africa anti piracy patrols.

There were the war built River and Bay class frigates that superseded the Sloops and Bathurst class corvettes. The plans for locally designed corvettes that grew into light destroyers and finally into the DDL that was lager and more capable than the FFGs bought instead. The RAN seriously looked at and even provided funding towards the Type 21 Amazon frigate (the RAN version was to have had a strengthened hull and USN combat systems). In the end the only actual patrol frigates we ever acquired were the ANZACs, which before the last ship had even been laid down, the government was already trying to turn into a replacement destroyer.

I do like the Type 31 and the Iver Huitfeld it is based on, I think it could meet out need as a patrol frigate or even a GP frigate, allowing the Arafuras to cascade to other roles, i.e. MCM, hydrography, even as APDs for the light suicide marine force some seem so enamored with ( on a more serious note they would be useful for transporting specialist units for rapid response security and HADR). I am not wedded to a platform, rather to the concept of something militarily useful, that incorporates in service systems, but only if it is never ever used as a replacement for high end combatants.
Another proposal that you have put forward for several years is a local variant of Japans DDH.
If a batch of 3 G P Frigates were built to increase MFU numbers as proposed above would the last three Hunters be a better option as a form of DDH?
As specialist ASW platforms they would not require Agis systems but rather CFAR for medium range air defence.
Production at the end of the Hunter run would provide a lot of time to design the changes required.
There would be large amounts of comminality in hull form , machinery and combat systems.
While not as large as Japans DDH this would provide an expanded combat capabillity.
The future of UAVs will also expand on the capabilities of such a ship.

Also am in no way putting this forward as a platform for the F35b.
That to me requires a dedicated carrier, which is another story.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Playing devil's advocate here, but I suspect F35 with SDB can probably reach to an equal if not better strike radius than Classic Hornet ever could with JASSM. Wouldn't surprise me to find it can do so even more survivably, and service several times the number of aimpoints in the process.

Granted, no substitute for an AGM158 derivative carried by the F35 itself, but food for thought regardless. It would be interesting to know what stands between the F35 and this capability (UAI?), and if we could have overcome it ourselves earlier.
I’m not 100% sure on that, using a standoff cruise missile is always going to be safer (albeit likely more costly) for us mere meat puppets than a manned fighter and it’s going to be a different target set for a warhead of the class of a JASSM compared to an SDB, but the point remains a valid an example, IMHO.

Our long range strike capability was vested in an aircraft that was retired and it will only be years before that capability will be directly replaced with like for like from the other strike fighters we maintain and to me only slow decision making is responsible for it, given we HAVE chosen to replace thet capability by fitting standoff cruise missiles to our other strike fighters. We just didn’t do it in anything like a seamless manner to ensure we don’t have any capability gap in the meantime…

Additionally we have seen with much fanfare in recent times defence boasting how they have (with the stroke of a pen) cut 12 months off project timelines, so if this time could be so easily found, what have we been doing so idly in recent years as our strategic position has literally fallen in front of our eyes?

Getti g back to Navy, does this not in part explain why we seemingly can’t substantially progress our ever so essential naval capabilities? Organisational indolence that is more concerned with risk and process than it is with it’s actual job?
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I’m not 100% sure on that, using a standoff cruise missile is always going to be safer (albeit likely more costly) for us mere meat puppets than a manned fighter and it’s going to be a different target set for a warhead of the class of a JASSM compared to an SDB, but the point remains a valid an example, IMHO.

Our long range strike capability was vested in an aircraft that was retired and it will only be years before that capability will be directly replaced with like for like from the other strike fighters we maintain and to me only slow decision making is responsible for it, given we HAVE chosen to replace thet capability by fitting standoff cruise missiles to our other strike fighters. We just didn’t do it in anything like a seamless manner to ensure we don’t have any capability gap in the meantime…

Additionally we have seen with much fanfare in recent times defence boasting how they have (with the stroke of a pen) cut 12 months off project timelines, so if this time could be so easily found, what have we been doing so idly in recent years as our strategic position has literally fallen in front of our eyes?

Getti g back to Navy, does this not in part explain why we seemingly can’t substantially progress our ever so essential naval capabilities? Organisational indolence that is more concerned with risk and process than it is with it’s actual job?
Like for like is dangerous. Some say B-21, but I wonder if we should be looking at a stretch and payload modules for hypersonic missiles in later batches of the Hunters. The US is fast tracking the capability and will have it at sea before our first Hunter hits the water, maybe this is a way forward.

On the whys, well my observation is while most ADF current and past have been, at least competent or on their way to becoming so (competence is knowledge, plus experience, plus a minimum required amount of intelligence), and some have been absolutely brilliant, there are some who are seriously flawed. Unfortunately, as per the Dunning Kruger Effect, the dumbest honestly believe themselves to be geniuses because they lack to intellect to realise they are clueless.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Like for like is dangerous. Some say B-21, but I wonder if we should be looking at a stretch and payload modules for hypersonic missiles in later batches of the Hunters. The US is fast tracking the capability and will have it at sea before our first Hunter hits the water, maybe this is a way forward.

On the whys, well my observation is while most ADF current and past have been, at least competent or on their way to becoming so (competence is knowledge, plus experience, plus a minimum required amount of intelligence), and some have been absolutely brilliant, there are some who are seriously flawed. Unfortunately, as per the Dunning Kruger Effect, the dumbest honestly believe themselves to be geniuses because they lack to intellect to realise they are clueless.
It’s only like for like in the broadest sense as there will be chalk and cheese between the capability of Hornet / JASSM / Harpoon and Super Hornet / JSF and JASSM-ER / LRASM…

But broadly I agree, we should be pursuing the highest levels of capability in all domains if the threat we face is as great as we are constantly told it is…

But the stately 3 monthly (or so) NSC meetings and the all good things in good time approach of capability submissions that even the Defmin is complaining about, is something that has led us particularly with respect to navy capabilities to our current situation where we are effectively ‘stuck’ with what we’ve got, for a very long time yet (or less even really, considering the upgrades Hobart, ANZAC and Collins have to go through soon)…

It’s almost as if some are comforted very much by the status quo and are afraid (even despite apparent necessity) to move out of their comfort zones, on these issues…
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Volk covered this on the AWD builds. By avoiding risk, it aged specs.

They were strong against any risk, so even the F-105 design was too risky, so F-104 with some low risk F-105 modifications was the original baseline for the AWD, Aegis was one of the first things ordered, the systems fitted were quite dated when they were fitted, and even more dated when launched and commissioned. This was identified before the AWD project even completed. Also it was just unlucky that Aegis was undergoing significant advancements in regards to BMD modes, and the Spy radar technology was going to go a generational leap.

While the gear is of an older design (and basically brand new in its age) its still quite capable.

A bit of the story can be covered here:

There is a wide range of reasons for the cost blow out. Some were deliberate decisions to slow build rates, which increased costs. There were build issues at BAE Williamstown. Blocks built in Spain needed rework. There were a cascade off issues, many were one off.

The Audit office looked in detail of the program.

While the hobart has limitations, it is at least in service with the RAN. IMO we should not think about keeping these ships for 40 years, we should look at shorter lives and handing still useful ships off to smaller navies, and building newer, better ships. We know the Hobarts are growth limited in terms of weight growth, power growth etc.

Most countries don't build a ship, then in less than 5 years, pull it out and refit 70% of it. I understand why, IMO lets just spend more money given the current situation.

Its not just the money thing either. The ships will be out of action as a unit for quite some time, perhaps more than a year each, with only 3, 2 won't be able to deploy anything meaningfully, consistently. Careers will end at a desk on shore. Getting sea time on them will be difficult. We are at risk of losing our destroyer crews. Plus they will tie up facilities during the upgrade.

The US is going to have similar problems with the collapsing number of destroyers and cruisers, combined with refits for the existing fleet.
Can the current AWD ageis system be re used once swapped out on a slightly less capable ship?
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Can the current AWD ageis system be re used once swapped out on a slightly less capable ship?
That begs the question , what ship and for what purpose. AEGIS is a big system and is a bit of power hog. It only just fits into the Hobart Class DDG's so anything you are going to put it into will need both the space, the power generation and the sensors to operate it (remember SPY-1 is a radar and is not in itself AEGIS). So the new ship will need to be big enough but it will still need a considerable redesign and rework to take a system (as in baseline 7) that we are moving away from.

You should be aware that the new ships coming on line will have a CMS in the form of the SAAB 9LV (modernised). This includes the AOR's and Arafura Class OPV's (and derivatives of that design used in the hydro and MCM roles). I suspect sticking to this line and not trying to used the removed baseline 7 system is the most reasonable outcome. The baseline 9 going into the DDG and the Hunter will use 9LV as the tactical interface, integration of this system into baseline 7 would be a waste of resources.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
That begs the question , what ship and for what purpose. AEGIS is a big system and is a bit of power hog. It only just fits into the Hobart Class DDG's so anything you are going to put it into will need both the space, the power generation and the sensors to operate it (remember SPY-1 is a radar and is not in itself AEGIS). So the new ship will need to be big enough but it will still need a considerable redesign and rework to take a system (as in baseline 7) that we are moving away from.

You should be aware that the new ships coming on line will have a CMS in the form of the SAAB 9LV (modernised). This includes the AOR's and Arafura Class OPV's (and derivatives of that design used in the hydro and MCM roles). I suspect sticking to this line and not trying to used the removed baseline 7 system is the most reasonable outcome. The baseline 9 going into the DDG and the Hunter will use 9LV as the tactical interface, integration of this system into baseline 7 would be a waste of resources.
Thanks.

I don't think many realise how important the use of 9LV across the fleet is. It means common components and interfaces across different classes of ship, simplified training and support, and economies of scale for all of the above. The more we manage our systems to improve commonality the greater the savings but also the greater the efficiency and the more quickly we can introduce new systems into service.

Imagine we integrate RAM into 9LV, that means the 21 round Mk-144 launcher becomes a minimal impact option for most of the fleet. If we integrate a new CIWS or medium calibre gun, a new antiship missile, a new radar or coms system, all we need to do is integrate it to 9LV (well there is more than that but it is much easier).

Personnel can transition more easily from class to class, this is particularly important for technical sailors.
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
With Hunter - would it make some sense to explore an additional mid-ship module / hull plug?

Benefits being, additional space for current and future power generation requirements along with a second large VLS silo?

Rough example of what I mean shown in red using the Type 26 block diagram:

EdmI-LTWoAIVF0e.png
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
With Hunter - would it make some sense to explore an additional mid-ship module / hull plug?

Benefits being, additional space for current and future power generation requirements along with a second large VLS silo?

Rough example of what I mean shown in red using the Type 26 block diagram:

View attachment 49051
Agreed!

I know its not as simple as it sounds but in the long term it would fix a lot of the volume and weight issues, as well as provide space for hypersonic missile in payload modules. They are already bulging the hull so there are some major structural changes underway.

These ships are critical going forward so take the time to get them right and go an interim option if required to maintain capability as the ANZACs age (and rust) out.

There are off the shelf options that will give us greater capability than the ANZAC upgrade in a similar time frame, while providing a complementary capability for the Hunters as they come on line.
 
With Hunter - would it make some sense to explore an additional mid-ship module / hull plug?

Benefits being, additional space for current and future power generation requirements along with a second large VLS silo?

Rough example of what I mean shown in red using the Type 26 block diagram:

View attachment 49051
I've been thinking this for a while. I would imagine at least 16 cells would fit there quite nicely. I'd surprised if this isn't being investigated by the powers that be.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Can the current AWD ageis system be re used once swapped out on a slightly less capable ship?
Hobart/F101 is about as small as you can go and fit that equipment.

The Frodtjof Nasen class have a smaller radar, smaller fitout (76mm, 8vls, etc) and its still a 5,300t ship.

Plus its already in the Hobarts. You have to pull it out, put a new one in, then put the old one in another ship triple handling, triple the cost. As with the Friddtjof Nansen, is it really worth it over the Spanish base design building a smaller ship?

If we went with new ships, the new Ships would be able to target and fire munitions off the old ships through CEC, which can fuse data off multiple aegis platforms. The Hobart's older systems are still networked systems. The US will have ships with similar fitout for the next 15+ years and other navies perhaps longer. On the old hobarts, they can still carry new munitions like ESSMII, Tomhawk, LRASM, SM-6, SeaRAM etc. Targeting sensors can existing on newer ships like Hunters or other Aegis destroyers, or E7, F-35 etc.
With Hunter - would it make some sense to explore an additional mid-ship module / hull plug?
This is how the US is going with the Constellation class, they just lengthened it.
One of the primary differences between the Italo-French design and its American counterpart is length: the Constellation-class will be over 23 feet longer. The Navy anticipates using the additional space to accommodate larger, more powerful generators and provide future growth flexibility. Likewise, the Constellation-class’ total displacement increased by about 500 tons. In addition, the Constellation-class’ propellers will be fixed-pitch “for improved acoustic signature.”
 
Uhhmm are you sure? ITARS covers the export of US arms and weapons, not the security surrounding them. If that was the case it would have created problems with dual nationals on P-3s, P-8s, E-7As, F-111s etc.

The PWR3 is the only powerplant being built for US and RN subs, because PWR2 ceased production ages ago. If you read back through the thread you will see this. And how do you know the physical dimensions of the PWR3 vs the PWR2 because just about everything about those are classified so high that even God doesn't have the appropriate security clearance. So without hard data you are like the rest of us - you know nothing.
The USN doesnt use PWR3 its RN only. The USN uses S9G. PWR3 is a UK development that is believed to use significant S9G design input.
 
Ha
I agree. But certainly holding dual citizenship is a pretty good indicator of some sort of divided loyalties.
Hardly. It’s simply useful professionally for many and for others it makes travel easier ( for example a European passport). There is no basis for such a blanket statement.
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
I've been thinking this for a while. I would imagine at least 16 cells would fit there quite nicely. I'd surprised if this isn't being investigated by the powers that be.
In the scale of my diagram the additional length is about 12 metres, the same as the block/module just forward.

That's more than enough space for a strike length silo capable of fielding up to 64 cells (or future larger missile tubes).
So you could effectively end up with the same number of cells as a Burke (96), with the 32 cells forward.
 
I'm not wedded to any particular platform, a platform is, after all, basically transportation and life support for the combat system. The RAN is progressively moving into the realms of systems thinking, systems of systems rather than platform centric.

It used to do my head in whenever we introduced new kit that had no commonality with anything else we used, on the basis it was "better value for money" to buy off the shelf than the "gold plate" and "Australianise". Then, with the notable exception of FMS, not long after the capability enters service we start hearing about availability issues, problems getting spares, problems training and retaining enough people etc.

At the end of the day, while designing the Hunter is beyond us, designing a patrol frigate, even a GP frigate, let alone a corvette or OPV is well within the capability of Australian industry, the problem is the lack of political comprehension of the capability. There is not enough time to do this obviously, so something would have to be adapted, but with adequate planning it is achievable.

Does anyone recall the offer of a Legend Class Cutter for what became our OPV program? I can't recall if it was for the Labor program, or the later Coalition one but it was somewhere around the 2010 to 2015 space. The Arafuras, while a massive increase in capability over the previous PBs, are still not warships, or even high endurance patrol vessels. My feeling is there has been a long term need for a patrol frigate or Sloop in the RAN going back to lessons leant in WWII and reaffirmed during the Malayan Emergency, Indonesian Confrontation, Borneo, Vietnam, the Gulf and East Africa anti piracy patrols.

There were the war built River and Bay class frigates that superseded the Sloops and Bathurst class corvettes. The plans for locally designed corvettes that grew into light destroyers and finally into the DDL that was lager and more capable than the FFGs bought instead. The RAN seriously looked at and even provided funding towards the Type 21 Amazon frigate (the RAN version was to have had a strengthened hull and USN combat systems). In the end the only actual patrol frigates we ever acquired were the ANZACs, which before the last ship had even been laid down, the government was already trying to turn into a replacement destroyer.

I do like the Type 31 and the Iver Huitfeld it is based on, I think it could meet out need as a patrol frigate or even a GP frigate, allowing the Arafuras to cascade to other roles, i.e. MCM, hydrography, even as APDs for the light suicide marine force some seem so enamored with ( on a more serious note they would be useful for transporting specialist units for rapid response security and HADR). I am not wedded to a platform, rather to the concept of something militarily useful, that incorporates in service systems, but only if it is never ever used as a replacement for high end combatants.
Volko you just need to have patience I am confident the RAN will get there in the end.

timeline

Attack Class - too small we need bigger
Fremantle - damn still too small we need bigger
Armadale - ouch still too small we need bigger
Arafura - I think we know how this turns out
Arafura Replacement - Yay we got there
 
Uhhmm are you sure? ITARS covers the export of US arms and weapons, not the security surrounding them. If that was the case it would have created problems with dual nationals on P-3s, P-8s, E-7As, F-111s etc.
Yes I am 100% sure. ITARs has a myriad of restrictions in relation to dual and third country nationals and it does cause significant problems when acquiring and sustaining US sourced systems. And the USA does enforce the restrictions as well.
 
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It’s only like for like in the broadest sense as there will be chalk and cheese between the capability of Hornet / JASSM / Harpoon and Super Hornet / JSF and JASSM-ER / LRASM…

But broadly I agree, we should be pursuing the highest levels of capability in all domains if the threat we face is as great as we are constantly told it is…

But the stately 3 monthly (or so) NSC meetings and the all good things in good time approach of capability submissions that even the Defmin is complaining about, is something that has led us particularly with respect to navy capabilities to our current situation where we are effectively ‘stuck’ with what we’ve got, for a very long time yet (or less even really, considering the upgrades Hobart, ANZAC and Collins have to go through soon)…

It’s almost as if some are comforted very much by the status quo and are afraid (even despite apparent necessity) to move out of their comfort zones, on these issues…
There is a lot of this sentiment washing around from ASPI etc @ the moment but in fairness the criticism ignores two harsh realities. Firstly that the procurement workforce has been downsized and de skilled relentlessly by both parties over the last 15 years to the extent that there just isnt the workforce any more to take on all these extra projects that people want and secondly even if there was there is no funding to bring forward any significant capability acquisitions as the major capital program is committed years in advance. As someone else recently posted if you want to accelerate one project you need to delay another. The only time you will see rapid acquisition of a large system is when a seismic event occurs leading to a significant underspend thus freeing up mucho $$$. (thankyou French Submarine) When this happens the system shows it is quite capable of doing it.
 

Morgo

Well-Known Member
Ha

Hardly. It’s simply useful professionally for many and for others it makes travel easier ( for example a European passport). There is no basis for such a blanket statement.
Isn’t there? So you have one “real” passport and one of convenience - convenience to you that is?

If so is the Australian one the real one or the convenient one?

I think you have a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of citizenship, and the responsibilities (not just rights) that come along with it.

Edit: Apologies mods, this probably belongs in the ADF thread rather than here.
 
OK so my plan to plug the RAN capability gap by buying a CG-47 was deemed to be too high risk (despite the later ones being only 2 years older than HMAS ANZAC and the USN having a low risk stable upgrade work package to give 15 years more service) but the AWD upgrade makes the surface fleet shortfall even more acute and as it has been pointed out new builds in country may even slow Hunter making the situation worse.

So Biden 2023 budget suggests the USN may have to start Arleigh Burke disposal early do we buy 2 to cover the AWD gap and improve number of VLS? Would add a lot more capability than putting a bigger gun on Arafura (way too slow to work with proper warships in mixed TF BTW)
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
OK so my plan to plug the RAN capability gap by buying a CG-47 was deemed to be too high risk (despite the later ones being only 2 years older than HMAS ANZAC and the USN having a low risk stable upgrade work package to give 15 years more service) but the AWD upgrade makes the surface fleet shortfall even more acute and as it has been pointed out new builds in country may even slow Hunter making the situation worse.

So Biden 2023 budget suggests the USN may have to start Arleigh Burke disposal early do we buy 2 to cover the AWD gap and improve number of VLS? Would add a lot more capability than putting a bigger gun on Arafura (way too slow to work with proper warships in mixed TF BTW)
The DDG-51s that the USN will be retiring will be the Flt I ones that are old and full of rust and crap. They wouldn't be worth the kids pocket money. They're also crew heavy as well. Now if they were Flt III or late Flt II ones then we'd be cooking with gas, but that ain't gonna happen. Bugger.
 
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