Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
And this is the nuts and guts. If the pandemic has taught us anything about logistics, it's that globalisation is good, but have strong domestic alternatives.

oldsig
I agree, but I think as many others do, we are closing in on the point where we aren’t able to do much more, all by ourselves. yet we will in all likelihood require much more…
 

Mikeymike

Active Member
With the Americans possibly needing/wanting to build three submarines a year themselves but struggling to have the capacity to expand in regards to skilled tradesmen/builders and needing investment in the yards etc is it possible that Osborne becomes a yard that supports this expansion?

Not necessarily building full submarines but contributing heavily to both Australian and American submarines allowing Australia to build a substantial amount for both programs. This would allow a smaller % of each submarine to be built in Australia but of a bigger number of overall boats allowing the yard to be sustainable while still supporting the end goals of both the USN and RAN.

Biggest roadblock to this would probably be the Americans allowing parts of their subs to be built overseas and not sure if there is legal issues that would need to looked into.
 

icelord

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
With the Americans possibly needing/wanting to build three submarines a year themselves but struggling to have the capacity to expand in regards to skilled tradesmen/builders and needing investment in the yards etc is it possible that Osborne becomes a yard that supports this expansion?

Not necessarily building full submarines but contributing heavily to both Australian and American submarines allowing Australia to build a substantial amount for both programs. This would allow a smaller % of each submarine to be built in Australia but of a bigger number of overall boats allowing the yard to be sustainable while still supporting the end goals of both the USN and RAN.

Biggest roadblock to this would probably be the Americans allowing parts of their subs to be built overseas and not sure if there is legal issues that would need to looked into.
The US Naval construction Law is pretty much defined on this. Ships to be used by the United States Navy must be built in the United states, the only exception is RHIBs but these are US made also. The inclusions are superstructures, hulls of any kind and major components.

The shitshow an amendment or repeal of this law would scare any US lawmaker into reconsidering their position.

10 U.S. Code § 8679 - Construction of vessels in foreign shipyards: prohibition


(a)Prohibition.—
Except as provided in subsection (b), no vessel to be constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may be constructed in a foreign shipyard.
(b)Presidential Waiver for National Security Interest.—
(1)
The President may authorize exceptions to the prohibition in subsection (a) when the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States to do so.
(2)
The President shall transmit notice to Congress of any such determination, and no contract may be made pursuant to the exception authorized until the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the notice of the determination is received by Congress.
(c)Exception for Inflatable Boats.—
An inflatable boat or a rigid inflatable boat, as defined by the Secretary of the Navy, is not a vessel for the purpose of the restriction in subsection (a).
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
The US Naval construction Law is pretty much defined on this. Ships to be used by the United States Navy must be built in the United states, the only exception is RHIBs but these are US made also. The inclusions are superstructures, hulls of any kind and major components.

The shitshow an amendment or repeal of this law would scare any US lawmaker into reconsidering their position.

10 U.S. Code § 8679 - Construction of vessels in foreign shipyards: prohibition


(a)Prohibition.—
Except as provided in subsection (b), no vessel to be constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may be constructed in a foreign shipyard.
(b)Presidential Waiver for National Security Interest.—
(1)
The President may authorize exceptions to the prohibition in subsection (a) when the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States to do so.
(2)
The President shall transmit notice to Congress of any such determination, and no contract may be made pursuant to the exception authorized until the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the notice of the determination is received by Congress.
(c)Exception for Inflatable Boats.—
An inflatable boat or a rigid inflatable boat, as defined by the Secretary of the Navy, is not a vessel for the purpose of the restriction in subsection (a).
And there is also the Jones act that prohibits foreign vessels from running between US ports. The cruise ship industry via an Alaskan Senator lobbied for having Canada permit ships to visit Vancouver so they could continue Alaska cruise cruises from Seattle to Juneau with a Vancouver stop over during COVID. Needless to say the response was a two word expression, first word 4 letters, second word 3 letters.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
But.....

You are making the assumption that ‘continuous’ is still on the table for submarines, my gut says that approach is history.

When the plan was for 12 x Attack class, continuous build was certainly the case, a nominal 24 mth drumbeat, evolving batches of three, maybe slightly larger gap between each evolved batch of three too.

Get to 12 and then start again, but I think the rules of that game have now changed.

And let’s not forget that the six Collins will retire at two yearly intervals starting in 2038 and end in 2048.

The ‘at least eight’ SSNs doesn’t allow that to happen.

So.....

A 24 mth drumbeat allows for the timely replacement of six Collins with six SSN on a one for one basis, stretching out the drumbeat screws that up.

Anyway, in just over 12 months from now we should have the answer, or an indication of the likely direction for the project.
With a minimum of 8 boats would the availability of a nuclear boat be higher than a diesel powered sub? If we had 8 how many would be available at any one time?
 

oldsig127

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
With a minimum of 8 boats would the availability of a nuclear boat be higher than a diesel powered sub? If we had 8 how many would be available at any one time?
If the common assertion that the USN submarine fleet works on a rule of fours is correct, the answer is fewer on station.

Said without any personal knowledge aside from reading this and other defence sites.

oldsig
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Indeed, but I still think that a rather ‘out there’ scenario. If nukes start getting lobbed, I cannot see what difference another few hulls of ANY type will make for us…

In a more reasonable state of the world, but one in which a reasonably rapidly expanded RAN were required, if for example we were to look at an evolved F100 based hull, or even a ’clean sheet’ F110 based hull, I suspect Navantia could produce these hulls in Spain, far faster than we will get even the first Hunter into the water…

Final fitout done down here for AEGIS etc and all our desired combat systems / Australianisation, would go close to the magical ‘politically acceptable’ local build percentage requirement anyway, as the LHD’s did, as one such example. Buying hulls elsewhere might not be so politically unpalatable when our shipyards are maxx‘d out already, yet we clearly need more capability...
Navantia had greater difficulty building and delivering F105 than they did any of the first four ships due to supply chain and workforce issues. Those issues are now more severe than they were a decade a half ago.

You point to the AORs and LHDs when they are actually much simpler ships than even a modern missile corvette, let alone a full capability destroyer or frigate. The most complex parts of the LHDs were actually fabricated, outfitted and installed in Australia.

It could actually be argued that we have more recent experience and success in building and delivering high capability warships than Spain does.

I've said it many times before, our issue is our political decision making. There's pork barreling in there but the biggest problem is we don't stick to things when we get it right. We delay decisions, we change our minds, we fluff around with contracts and then blame the people who actually have to do the work. Reality check, whether we buy or build, it's still the same people deciding what we buy, what we ask for, when we ask for it and how we pay for it.

The only real difference between buying and building is when we buy there is a parent navy and a foreign builder who are actually in a position to tell or politicians to get stuffed. Locally that's not an option, what the polies, or worse their advisors, want, they get, even if it is stupid.

Point in case, AWD upgrade. Thales wins it over government owned ASC, subcontracts it to BAE, who then assigns all the work to ASC. The government introduced increased costs and delays to involve two companies that add no value.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
If the common assertion that the USN submarine fleet works on a rule of fours is correct, the answer is fewer on station.

Said without any personal knowledge aside from reading this and other defence sites.

oldsig
It has been my understanding that unlike surface naval vessels and the Rule of Threes, subs (conventional or nuclear) work best on the similar Rule of Fours. I believe that this is why the RAN's contract for the Collins-class SSG was for 6 + options for 2 more which were never exercised. As it was, the planned Collins-class replacement which was designated as the Attack-class was for a total constructed force of 12 subs built in batches, but only ever having eight subs in commission.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
It has been my understanding that unlike surface naval vessels and the Rule of Threes, subs (conventional or nuclear) work best on the similar Rule of Fours. I believe that this is why the RAN's contract for the Collins-class SSG was for 6 + options for 2 more which were never exercised. As it was, the planned Collins-class replacement which was designated as the Attack-class was for a total constructed force of 12 subs built in batches, but only ever having eight subs in commission.
So if I understand correctly 8 subs = 2 available at any one time?
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
So if I understand correctly 8 subs = 2 available at any one time?
As I understand it, that is more or less correct. There could be some potential to surge the numbers and get a total of three or even four subs, but at least two should be available consistently, barring a major accident or incident.

It is also well worth remembering the outsized impact a sub can have upon potential hostiles. A hostile force operating in an area where they are concerned about the potential threat a single RAN sub might pose to a TF might detail several ships and their embarked aircraft (if any) to engage in ASW ops to try and detect or deter a RAN sub which might not even be present.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Happy 121st birthday RAN #seniorservice. Image courtesy of the ADF Image Library, best of 2020 collection.
So you're a real old salt and got your pension card eh? Must be your shout. Splice the mainbrace and gulpers from @DDG38 tot. :D
 

aussienscale

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
As I understand it, that is more or less correct. There could be some potential to surge the numbers and get a total of three or even four subs, but at least two should be available consistently, barring a major accident or incident.

It is also well worth remembering the outsized impact a sub can have upon potential hostiles. A hostile force operating in an area where they are concerned about the potential threat a single RAN sub might pose to a TF might detail several ships and their embarked aircraft (if any) to engage in ASW ops to try and detect or deter a RAN sub which might not even be present.
My understanding was the intention was the option of the extra 2 Collins for that reason, but then kept at 6 and the intention was to run the fleet in 3's, that did not work out too well as we all know, and for many different reasons discussed to death in the previous thread.

From what I had been told, and a previous member had said before, the intention with the Attacks was to again run the fleet to the rule of 3's, with a 12 boat program we could expect 9 commissioned at any one time with 3 "always" available, the continuous build program would then just lead into the successor class to take over.

So as you would commission boat 10, first of the last batch of 3 you are decommissioning boat 1, but already well underway into the successor, being a big step into SSN you would have to assume we would tie into the lead Navy's mantra around this issue, 4's makes sense for the USN, anyone have any insights into the RN with 7 Astute's ? bit of an unusual number ?

Cheers
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
My understanding was the intention was the option of the extra 2 Collins for that reason, but then kept at 6 and the intention was to run the fleet in 3's, that did not work out too well as we all know, and for many different reasons discussed to death in the previous thread.

From what I had been told, and a previous member had said before, the intention with the Attacks was to again run the fleet to the rule of 3's, with a 12 boat program we could expect 9 commissioned at any one time with 3 "always" available, the continuous build program would then just lead into the successor class to take over.

So as you would commission boat 10, first of the last batch of 3 you are decommissioning boat 1, but already well underway into the successor, being a big step into SSN you would have to assume we would tie into the lead Navy's mantra around this issue, 4's makes sense for the USN, anyone have any insights into the RN with 7 Astute's ? bit of an unusual number ?

Cheers
I would imagine only 7 Astutes was decided by the same thinking that resulted in only 6 T45s, money. Were these numbers being deciding upon now in the midst of the Ukraine invasion, perhaps the numbers would have been 8 and 9 respectively.
 

Mikeymike

Active Member
The US Naval construction Law is pretty much defined on this. Ships to be used by the United States Navy must be built in the United states, the only exception is RHIBs but these are US made also. The inclusions are superstructures, hulls of any kind and major components.

The shitshow an amendment or repeal of this law would scare any US lawmaker into reconsidering their position.

10 U.S. Code § 8679 - Construction of vessels in foreign shipyards: prohibition


(a)Prohibition.—
Except as provided in subsection (b), no vessel to be constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may be constructed in a foreign shipyard.
(b)Presidential Waiver for National Security Interest.—
(1)
The President may authorize exceptions to the prohibition in subsection (a) when the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States to do so.
(2)
The President shall transmit notice to Congress of any such determination, and no contract may be made pursuant to the exception authorized until the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the notice of the determination is received by Congress.
(c)Exception for Inflatable Boats.—
An inflatable boat or a rigid inflatable boat, as defined by the Secretary of the Navy, is not a vessel for the purpose of the restriction in subsection (a).
That was the law the I was thinking would be prohibitive though wasn't sure if exceptions could be made based on the agreements made to draw Australia and other allies into the defense industrial base.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
That was the law the I was thinking would be prohibitive though wasn't sure if exceptions could be made based on the agreements made to draw Australia and other allies into the defense industrial base.
The idea is to expand the allied defence industry, not cut it down and split it up across members. From the US perspective they don't see why Australia wouldn't invest fully in domestic industry and local production. They don't understand why when we have the money, we can support the industry, we choose not to do that. In the US, doing military things locally is generally bipartisan, probably one of the few things left that is. For example the F-35 workshare program has come under heavy criticism because countries like Canada have taken advantage of it, getting workshare, but not buying the plane. Turkey, who was using it for their own political aims caused significant difficulty. There would be no want to replicate that with ships and other programs.

The Americans are more than happy for allies to license build basically, anything. Australia's local missile production is something they support and understand. Skorea and Japan, license build many, many items.

Australia's governments spend billions supporting overseas yards and the ship yards of our (trade?) enemies.
$1.13 billion to China on what could have been directed at building better boats locally.
Over $2.7 billion in rail assets.

Not only that, the boats were defective. Delayed, required extensive rectification locally.

The government is now apparently taking a different approach. Understanding the issue with overseas builds.

Why would Australian governments be buying ships non-allied countries deconstruct their own industry? Why would the US government then sacrifice their own military build capability to support Australia's parasitic attachment? While we then go off and order more boats from China and under order on our own local builds?

To the Americans, our strategy seems confusing. Again, if we want something, license build it. There has been plenty of reviews and reports. The RAND report the Economic References Committee, etc.

If we wanted more capable ships, we could instead of upgrading the Hobart's, build 3 more, replacing 3 anzacs.
  • The money for this is already ~60% there - due to the extensive nature of this upgrade we are replacing nearly all major systems radar, combat, consoles, power, cooling, etc
  • Most of the systems are already being ordered and manufactured
  • Some of the design work is already being done as it is required to upgrade the existing ships,
  • The F-100 design was refreshed for the US FFGX bid and has been used in other bids for other navies (Poland). It is also a design we are very familiar with and have spent a lot on.
  • The crew is already there, as the new ships would replace existing Anzac ships.
  • The training systems are already in place and the hull is in service currently.
  • Block work can be conducted at Civmec/Foracs Henderson/Newcastle and consolidation at Osborne or hull consolidation at Henderson and final fit at Osborne dockside. The project could be done through ASC, Navantia. and Civmec.
  • Because this work would be de-risked on the new ships, the existing hobarts could go through with an upgrade later, or a less significant upgrade or be retired earlier and sold. By doing this for all 6 the per ship cost will likely decrease. This happens in other navies. We will still have 3 new latest platform DDG's either way.
But it still costs money. It requires another change of direction from an existing plan. Again it would be a small run of 3 ships, an inefficient build, and is more demanding on ship yards than waiting. It has political risk, because its a project with tangible outcomes. The RAN would need to work out what is more valuable, 3 older Hobart's or 3 Anzac's. Given the US would be operating similar non-upgraded Burkes for a few years, as will Spain, it would seem a moderate compromise. Difference operating costs between a Hobart class and an Anzac class. Difference in various mission capability between them. How survivable either will be ~2040.

Typically we spend a lot on upgrading existing ships, even if its not economically viable to do so (FFG up?), or if new platforms are only fractionally more expensive. We try and adapt ships that were not designed for one purpose, into another (Kanimbla), under some idea of reduced cost.

You could in theory build another design like the A140 or heck something like the Meko300. But its a new hull type, with design and systems not in process with a type not in service with the RAN and the project would start further back with less people on the ground and less familiar with the design. As a build process it would take ~10 years. So the idea of quickly plugging gaps is not possible. Why building new ships does is allow the existing ships to continue to serve for the next few years without being pulled out of the water for long, complex, expensive upgrades. With only 3 DDG's in the fleet, that is a huge capability loss.

There will already be a global shortage of western destroyers/cruisers. Due to decommissioning's and upgrades. Australia needs to understand, that if we pull our DDG's out for significant upgrades, that will further compound this global problem. By deficit, I am talking 30-50+ ships less than now. A deficit that won't be resolved for decades.

With the PLAN presence in our own waters now a thing, that means ships like the LHD, AOR and the Anzacs may not be able to deploy in our immediate region, even for HDAR to friendly areas. We may have to curb our participation in RIMPAC and other activities.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The idea is to expand the allied defence industry, not cut it down and split it up across members. From the US perspective they don't see why Australia wouldn't invest fully in domestic industry and local production. They don't understand why when we have the money, we can support the industry, we choose not to do that. In the US, doing military things locally is generally bipartisan, probably one of the few things left that is. For example the F-35 workshare program has come under heavy criticism because countries like Canada have taken advantage of it, getting workshare, but not buying the plane. Turkey, who was using it for their own political aims caused significant difficulty. There would be no want to replicate that with ships and other programs.

The Americans are more than happy for allies to license build basically, anything. Australia's local missile production is something they support and understand. Skorea and Japan, license build many, many items.

Australia's governments spend billions supporting overseas yards and the ship yards of our (trade?) enemies.
$1.13 billion to China on what could have been directed at building better boats locally.
Over $2.7 billion in rail assets.

Not only that, the boats were defective. Delayed, required extensive rectification locally.

The government is now apparently taking a different approach. Understanding the issue with overseas builds.

Why would Australian governments be buying ships non-allied countries deconstruct their own industry? Why would the US government then sacrifice their own military build capability to support Australia's parasitic attachment? While we then go off and order more boats from China and under order on our own local builds?

To the Americans, our strategy seems confusing. Again, if we want something, license build it. There has been plenty of reviews and reports. The RAND report the Economic References Committee, etc.

If we wanted more capable ships, we could instead of upgrading the Hobart's, build 3 more, replacing 3 anzacs.
  • The money for this is already ~60% there - due to the extensive nature of this upgrade we are replacing nearly all major systems radar, combat, consoles, power, cooling, etc
  • Most of the systems are already being ordered and manufactured
  • Some of the design work is already being done as it is required to upgrade the existing ships,
  • The F-100 design was refreshed for the US FFGX bid and has been used in other bids for other navies (Poland). It is also a design we are very familiar with and have spent a lot on.
  • The crew is already there, as the new ships would replace existing Anzac ships.
  • The training systems are already in place and the hull is in service currently.
  • Block work can be conducted at Civmec/Foracs Henderson/Newcastle and consolidation at Osborne or hull consolidation at Henderson and final fit at Osborne dockside. The project could be done through ASC, Navantia. and Civmec.
  • Because this work would be de-risked on the new ships, the existing hobarts could go through with an upgrade later, or a less significant upgrade or be retired earlier and sold. By doing this for all 6 the per ship cost will likely decrease. This happens in other navies. We will still have 3 new latest platform DDG's either way.
But it still costs money. It requires another change of direction from an existing plan. Again it would be a small run of 3 ships, an inefficient build, and is more demanding on ship yards than waiting. It has political risk, because its a project with tangible outcomes. The RAN would need to work out what is more valuable, 3 older Hobart's or 3 Anzac's. Given the US would be operating similar non-upgraded Burkes for a few years, as will Spain, it would seem a moderate compromise. Difference operating costs between a Hobart class and an Anzac class. Difference in various mission capability between them. How survivable either will be ~2040.

Typically we spend a lot on upgrading existing ships, even if its not economically viable to do so (FFG up?), or if new platforms are only fractionally more expensive. We try and adapt ships that were not designed for one purpose, into another (Kanimbla), under some idea of reduced cost.

You could in theory build another design like the A140 or heck something like the Meko300. But its a new hull type, with design and systems not in process with a type not in service with the RAN and the project would start further back with less people on the ground and less familiar with the design. As a build process it would take ~10 years. So the idea of quickly plugging gaps is not possible. Why building new ships does is allow the existing ships to continue to serve for the next few years without being pulled out of the water for long, complex, expensive upgrades. With only 3 DDG's in the fleet, that is a huge capability loss.

There will already be a global shortage of western destroyers/cruisers. Due to decommissioning's and upgrades. Australia needs to understand, that if we pull our DDG's out for significant upgrades, that will further compound this global problem. By deficit, I am talking 30-50+ ships less than now. A deficit that won't be resolved for decades.

With the PLAN presence in our own waters now a thing, that means ships like the LHD, AOR and the Anzacs may not be able to deploy in our immediate region, even for HDAR to friendly areas. We may have to curb our participation in RIMPAC and other activities.
Back when we were building the DDGs I couldn't understand why we weren't building at least six, but preferably eight of them. Definately once the issues with the FFGUP were realised, and the destroyer build was stretched, it would have been a no brainer to order another three or five.
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
You could in theory build another design like the A140 or heck something like the Meko300. But its a new hull type, with design and systems not in process with a type not in service with the RAN and the project would start further back with less people on the ground and less familiar with the design. As a build process it would take ~10 years. So the idea of quickly plugging gaps is not possible.
I think it's worth noting the RN's Type 31 / AH140 timeline:

Nov 2019 - Contract Awarded / Signed
Sep 2021 - First Steel Cut
2028 - All Five frigates planned to have been delivered.

Under nine years from contract award to delivery of all five frigates.
With all five planned to be fully commissioned by 2030.

Roughly speaking, utilising this timeline, if a hypothetical contract was awarded in late 2023 and steel cut in late 2025,
we'd have five frigates delivered by 2032 and fully commissioned by 2034.

That's the same year (2034) that the first Hunter Class Frigate is due to reach IOC.
 
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