Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Going Boeing]

A small order to start with but it has potential to be a large ongoing order if HII are impressed with the strength and ease of welding with the Bisalloy steel planned for our SSN’s.

https://www.minister.defence.gov.au...oy Steel,builds US nuclear-powered submarines.

MSN

 

[Bob53]

Part of the issue is why Canada wants SSNs. To assert its sovereignty over the artic region, which is in conflict with US policy about freedom of navigation.

Also Canada doesn't see itself in the Pacific the same way as Australia and the US.
Other nations don't see Canada like Australia. Japan didn't rush to have a standing forces agreement with Canada, like it did with Australia.

Australia is very much, make a decision and others will join us type nation. Canada is not out their deploying troops independent of any organisation, treaty, alliance, joint mission in an uninvited way. They just see the world different. They aren't alone. Its the way NATO nations generally see the world.

These subs aren't about Australia securing Bass Strait or its Antarctic waters. Australia's sovereignty isn't threatened, its about propping up US supremacy. And 3 or 6 or 8 or 12 subs isn't enough, but Australia independently committing is. Australia can make that if the US was deadlocked, or confused, or focused elsewhere. Then the decision for the US would be to leave its greatest and most loyal and oldest ally (and probably a few more newer ones) out to die as it faces impossible odds, to defend America's interests, or unify and go forward with them. America wouldn't be making those decisions unilaterally, and realistically either would Australia.

Senior US diplomat lets the AUKUS cat out of the bag

US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has spelt out publicly the expectations Washington has of Australia to fight alongside it in the Taiwan straits.

www.afr.com

The Australian request is also causing huge issues for the Americans, as they already have a backlog of repair and build work for subs.

8 SSN isn't enough to make China baulk. That's only 2-3 deployed subs. But being able to galvanise US (and arguably all its allies) politically to a military commitment. That is. Totally. Everybody knows it. Including the US and China, and Japan and Korea.

So Canada in AUKUS, or Canada getting subs isn't the same thing. Its not NATO.

AUKUS only has the UK in it because Boris Johnson didn't want the UK completely left out of such an arrangement, and fair enough, because Australia has a similar relationship with the UK, and if Australia commits and leads, the UK would no doubt support and follow. UK also wants to be in the same pool as the US on subs and technology sharing.

Its not specifically just about nuclear Subs, and how they are used but they make a huge part of why it exists. IMO.

My only concern with any obligation to fight. In Taiwan if it is 100% correct is that we would be coughing up our independence and our Asian foreign policy is basically in lockstep with the US. This is what Keating was apocalyptic about.

 

[Stampede]

My only concern with any obligation to fight. In Taiwan if it is 100% correct is that we would be coughing up our independence and our Asian foreign policy is basically in lockstep with the US. This is what Keating was apocalyptic about.

Its a conundrum all nations face when equipping their defence force.
How wedded to the politics are you to a defence supplier from another country.
Is it just a commercial transaction?
Or are you somewhat obliged or vulnerable?
As no country big or small is 100% independent in equipping their defence force this dance is always in the calculus.
Do you have your eggs in many baskets to spread the load and provide for a level of redundancy in equipment procurement and hopefully achieve a level of political independence.
Do you accept the inefficiency of multiple suppliers and embrace a level of sovereignty.

Or do you go all in with a core group of like minded nations and embrace common platforms and ideas.
Embrace the efficiency of supply and interoperability.
Having done so can you still act independently?

Yes we are very much going to be lockstep with a particular group.

What that looks like on many levels is always worth questioning.
Is that anti alliance .........no!

In this Navy thread we must understand that a nuclear submarine is more than a propulsion system.
Its more than a hand shake.
Its a commitment.

No other bit of kit in the ADF signifies commitment like an SSN.

it will come with expectations!


Cheers S

 

[StingrayOZ]

My only concern with any obligation to fight. In Taiwan if it is 100% correct is that we would be coughing up our independence and our Asian foreign policy is basically in lockstep with the US. This is what Keating was apocalyptic about.

I'm not sure we will get them before Taiwan. But its completely valid questions, how deep do we want to get in US policy on that topic. In may mean firing the first shot. How clear is us policy in this area, and is it bipartisan on both sides of the ocean.

I don't think Australian assets will be sitting off the coast of Taiwan, it is still too far for Australian based assets. But Indian ocean and the straits. Oh yeh. Australia could apply huge pressure to those. Putting China in a US Kill box.

But this is the problem will all the naval plans. They are too late, IMO. War is likely 0-4 years away. We don't even have 5 years. So we have likely already missed the window for the next war. But post that war, the world will change, and our navy will be very, very important in that world. Making sovereign decisions. Because like Singapore and the British, Empire can afford to lose far flung outposts, but we are in those far flung outposts.

So now we have two problems, one the immediate conflict 0-4 years (Taiwan). Two the intermediate conflict (5-10 year), US/Western global supremacy.

Taiwan may pass to Chinese control nonviolently. The Chinese were hoping for a Russian style Crimea campaign. Which was pretty successful for Russia at the time. The Chinese have taken Hong Kong. It is over, in a similar manner. But that one was clearly on borrowed time. The Chinese didn't rush it in 1999, they waited, a long time, for the right moment. But they also learnt a lot from that, and they now understand it won't be as easily, and grey and soft power are ultra important.

So yeh, lots of questions.

I do believe Australia would only be interested in Sovereign control of any asset. We would likely form a joint command, but Singapore taught us some interesting lessons about Joint Command.

 

[alexsa]

A small order to start with but it has potential to be a large ongoing order if HII are impressed with the strength and ease of welding with the Bisalloy steel planned for our SSN’s.

https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2024-04-12/australian-company-integrates-us-nuclear-powered-submarine-supply-chain#:~:text=Australian steel manufacturer Bisalloy Steel,builds US nuclear-powered submarines.

MSN

This may have quite a bit of potential. A lot of work went into the steel for the Collins class resulting in an alloy that was considere better that HY80. The genesis of this development work was the failure of steel made to the Swedish spec shattered. This resulted in quite a bit of work looking at alloys with four consituent materials with different proportions. The final result was refined bisalloy deveopted by BHP in conjunction with DSTO. This steel was stonger than HY80 had advantages in its weld characteristics. Yule and Woolner's book on the Collins gives some interesting open sorce information on this process.

Perhaps the agreement is based on this material.

 

[icelord]

I'm not sure we will get them before Taiwan. But its completely valid questions, how deep do we want to get in US policy on that topic. In may mean firing the first shot. How clear is us policy in this area, and is it bipartisan on both sides of the ocean.

I don't think Australian assets will be sitting off the coast of Taiwan, it is still too far for Australian based assets. But Indian ocean and the straits. Oh yeh. Australia could apply huge pressure to those. Putting China in a US Kill box.

But this is the problem will all the naval plans. They are too late, IMO. War is likely 0-4 years away. We don't even have 5 years. So we have likely already missed the window for the next war. But post that war, the world will change, and our navy will be very, very important in that world. Making sovereign decisions. Because like Singapore and the British, Empire can afford to lose far flung outposts, but we are in those far flung outposts.

So now we have two problems, one the immediate conflict 0-4 years (Taiwan). Two the intermediate conflict (5-10 year), US/Western global supremacy.

Serious question that I have...what happens if theres no war in 2027 as everyone seems to predict...what if by 2030 we haven't gone to war...new years day 2031 we just start launching missiles to make up for lost time?

I know all the reasons etc why Defence believes war in 2027 is coming but no one who briefs on this can answer my question...what happens if we dont go to war by the date every is pencilling in their calanders?

I'm of the expectatuon more proxy wars and a new cold war to see who can really survive are forthcoming.

People dont make money in all out war and the biggest proposer of war lives on money. Tell the US that the stock exchange will collapse and bankrupt the country, they will pause for thought.
Tell them 8000 troops will die, millions will suffer PTSD from operations and entire countries populations will suffer...but the US economy will be fine and they wont worry.

 

[John Fedup]

If there is no war by 2027, I suspect tensions will just continue to rise. Then there is the possible Trump factor. I agree the economic consequences for China and the US are dire. It could be other players drag the two superpowers into a bucket of $hit. Sadly there aren't any current leaders with solid diplomatic negotiating skills at the moment.

 

[hauritz]

Serious question that I have...what happens if theres no war in 2027 as everyone seems to predict...what if by 2030 we haven't gone to war...new years day 2031 we just start launching missiles to make up for lost time?

I know all the reasons etc why Defence believes war in 2027 is coming but no one who briefs on this can answer my question...what happens if we dont go to war by the date every is pencilling in their calanders?

I'm of the expectatuon more proxy wars and a new cold war to see who can really survive are forthcoming.

People dont make money in all out war and the biggest proposer of war lives on money. Tell the US that the stock exchange will collapse and bankrupt the country, they will pause for thought.
Tell them 8000 troops will die, millions will suffer PTSD from operations and entire countries populations will suffer...but the US economy will be fine and they wont worry.

Arms races, and make no mistake we are in a arms race, seem to historically end in one of two ways, either in war or one side or the other backing down.

The cold war ended because the Soviet Union really just couldn't afford it any more. It effectively lost that war and paid a great price for it with the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. Before that we fought two great wars resulting in the best part of a hundred million deaths. I can't think of any examples of two powers mutually agreeing to de-escalate once the drums of war have started to beat.

No country can afford to continue spending the insane amounts of money required to build and sustain a massive military indefinitely. At some point something has to give.

 

[John Fedup]

The spending on arms isn’t sustainable but which country bankrupts itself first? The Russian economic model never stood a chance against the US model. The US China competition is much closer. Certainly Chinese manufacturing is out in front and their R&D expenditures are impressive but corruption, the huge financial resources required to control citizens and there is rising discontent albeit how much is unknown. Then there is China’s demographic problem. The US has debt and a dysfunctional government at the moment so interesting times.

 

[Morgo]

The best and hopefully most likely outcome is that we (the collective West) continue to rearm while China’s demographic collapse makes it clear that they won’t be able to achieve what they want to by force. The narrowing of the military edge we’ve seen in recent years should expand again.

China settles into being a very large, respected, important but stagnating middle income country within the global order. US primacy remains. Hopefully minimal bloodshed internally or externally.

Plan A is containment, and I think it’s a good one.

 

[John Fedup]

The best and hopefully most likely outcome is that we (the collective West) continue to rearm while China’s demographic collapse makes it clear that they won’t be able to achieve what they want to by force. The narrowing of the military edge we’ve seen in recent years should expand again.

China settles into being a very large, respected, important but stagnating middle income country within the global order. US primacy remains. Hopefully minimal bloodshed internally or externally.

Plan A is containment, and I think it’s a good one.

Don't want to continue to derail the RAN thread so my last comment is China is aware of their demographic problem so they will act before this restricts their window of opportunity along with increased Western military buildup ( probably very questionable rate).

 

[StevoJH]

The best and hopefully most likely outcome is that we (the collective West) continue to rearm while China’s demographic collapse makes it clear that they won’t be able to achieve what they want to by force. The narrowing of the military edge we’ve seen in recent years should expand again.

China settles into being a very large, respected, important but stagnating middle income country within the global order. US primacy remains. Hopefully minimal bloodshed internally or externally.

Plan A is containment, and I think it’s a good one.

My concern with China is that their industrial capability is just so large. They have commissioned 19 Type54 Frigates, 27 Type052 Destroyers and 8 Type055 Cruisers in the last 10 years. Not even counting the many smaller combatants.

The US has Commissioned 11 Destroyers in the same time period. The JMSDF has commissioned 10 Frigates and Destroyers (including the Izumo class). The RAN has commissioned 3 Destroyers and the ROK Navy 11 Frigates.

The only advantage is that the PLAN is constrained by geography.

 

[Todjaeger]

My concern with China is that their industrial capability is just so large. They have commissioned 19 Type54 Frigates, 27 Type052 Destroyers and 8 Type055 Cruisers in the last 10 years. Not even counting the many smaller combatants.

The US has Commissioned 11 Destroyers in the same time period. The JMSDF has commissioned 10 Frigates and Destroyers (including the Izumo class). The RAN has commissioned 3 Destroyers and the ROK Navy 11 Frigates.

The only advantage is that the PLAN is constrained by geography.

I would disagree that the only advantage is that the PLAN and (PRC and as a whole) are constrained by geography, I would also not dismiss how significant a constraint geographic location could be, particularly for the PRC. Yes, China has been able to commission quite a few new and presumably modern warships into service and likely has the bodies or at least access to bodies to crew said vessels. Having said that, there are at least IMO a few unknowns. One being how well the PLAN is able to 'fight' their vessels, both individually and in TF's. Most modern, allied Western nations have naval forces which are both experienced and regularly train and/or deploy on exercises to operate together as a group. This in turn should enable forces like the ROKN, RAN, JMSDF and USN to be able to achieve effects greater than the sum of the individual forces. The PLAN might be capable of such outcomes but lacking a history of such operations as well as having largely been a littoral force until just within the last ~30 years IIRC means that much of the PLAN's operations might be based more upon theory than actual practice. In a similar fashion, the PLAN's new vessels might, or might not be equivalent modern vessels in service with other navies operating in the Pacific. Historically though has been much more of a land power rather than a naval power.

As for the advantage of geography, that IMO is significant and potentially a fatal one should the PRC engage in open hostilities, at least until the PRC can establish both a large enough PLAN to support significant TF deployments away from China and the Pacific, as well as establishing strings of overseas bases from which to protect and logistically support such deployments. One needs to remember that global trade and China's position in world manufacturing cuts both ways. China needs to import significant raw mats and especially fuel, in order to keep things chugging along. If China were to suddenly start a shooting war, how long could the PRC maintain war ops with petroleum import routes subject to interdiction and/or tanker vessels, pipelines and rail lines targeted for destruction?

 

[Armchair]

Geography (and the opposing access denial strategies of the adversaries) also dictates the forces that units of the RAN would engage (in the extremely unlikely 2027 war). RAN surface vessels would be hunting PLAN submarines and RAN submarines would be hunting PLAN surface vessels and submarines. A Hobart class might make a contribution to the Tomahawk firing line (depending on the timing of the refit) but if RAN surface vessels are anywhere near Type 055 cruisers then somebody (most likely the PLAN) has really messed up.

 

[Salinger]

I've been pondering this for a bit. It seems reasonable that AI combined with expanding high resolution satellite imagery, and perhaps more advanced acoustic detection, could locate submarines that are snorting, at some point in the future (say 10-15 years). So this is plausable.

It does however beg the question why other nations intend to persist with diesel-electric designs. I believe the Canadians are considering long range submarines, but are only considering diesels, and the Japanese are building their latest class the Taigei with diesels (albeit with nice big batteries). Both nations have similar requirements to Australia, particularly extended range and underwater speed. Both are wealthy enough to afford nuclear.

One would think that if Australia had this view on future SSK stealth concerns, other nations (such as Canada and Japan) would be thinking along the same lines. At the moment it appears they are not.

The logical conclusions here are that either they disagree with this forecast, they intend to use their submarines differently (such as for coastal protection, rather than expeditionary surveillance), they see more promise with AIP systems, or they don't see a way to nuclear options.

It will be interesting to see how this space develops. Some other articles I have read indicate that the Japanese are seeking VLS capability on their next generation subs. This suggests they want an underwater strike option that necessitates long range ocean traversing. I struggle to see how this could be fitted on a diesel platform. I wonder if they would join a future AUKUS SSN build.

Japan's next-generation submarines with VLS capabilities are based on the Ministry of Defense's "out-of-theater missile" program. It is used for the purpose of attacking the enemy's main fleet with missiles from outside the theater of war and annihilating it.
It is not an underwater attack option that requires long-distance ocean crossings.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Serious question that I have...what happens if theres no war in 2027 as everyone seems to predict...what if by 2030 we haven't gone to war...new years day 2031 we just start launching missiles to make up for lost time?

I know all the reasons etc why Defence believes war in 2027 is coming but no one who briefs on this can answer my question...what happens if we dont go to war by the date every is pencilling in their calanders?

Entirely possible. This is the issue with crystal balling the future. You have to deal in probabilities.
But in 2027 there are multiple confluences that will likely lead to war. Its not just Taiwan. Its China's demographics, Chinas economy, US domestic issues, US economy, issues in states like Pakistan, Iran, Russia, India. Issues around Korea, North Korea, Japan. Environmental. Economic. Social. Political. Geographic. Technology.

I think the biggest risk isn't that that is isn't a war in 2027, is that we are already in one. Ukraine and Palestine are real conflicts, thousands have died, they will be on going, they will cause conflict to spread to other states. The US has expended more than 100 SM-2 missiles in the red sea conflict thus far. Ukraine uses something like 10,000 155mm shells every day.

Hopefully there are no wars. We have a stupid period of spending where defence spending goes up, sovereign manufacturing goes up. It is then followed by a period of cutting budgets/production back to sustainable levels. Things get stockpiled for a rainy day.

People giving the briefs are not usually the analysists and researchers directly. Its multi-faceted, multi-dimensional. They are mostly no in or have been in uniform, or even work in the defence space. They just know in their specific patch of research, which then gets picked up by meta research done by gov agencies on future planning.

Most of the planning pre 2027 was about avoiding future conflict, caused by accident. We are almost out of that period. Strategies used for avoiding conflict are already in their later stages of escalation.

Even if countries take a real push to avoid conflict, it may still occur. I believe Chinese recent efforts in trying to improve relations with Australia are genuine, or genuine enough. They can clearly see how their previous efforts against Australia, has made Australia go out and do things like the Quad, like AUKUS, like its ship building program, like its alliance effort with Japan and others, like its regional engagement.

There is no direct reason Australia and China should have direct conflict. There is no threat by either on territory, on sovereignty, on security by location. We are far enough away, confident states, surrounded by massive oceans, and we have huge trading relationships and basically do not compete any way economically with each other, in fact we are interdependent.

But here we are. Deals like AUKUS may make it unavoidable, even if we don't support it. AUKUS changes the game. Its the iron clad, deal between highly collaborative societies (the go getters in the anglosphere, and the Chinese, the CCP can understand that, see their understanding of Han Chinese and unified political power).

The Chinese are clearly trying to reverse some of their easy to reverse economic policies to try to de-escalate things. In the hope to reestablish buffers and relationships that can then be used to secure a path away from conflict.

Conflict is of course a scale. War isn't the only point on that scale. It doesn't have to come to high intensity existential conflict where one side needs to be annihilated and the ground they stood, salted, and poisoned.

Most likely we will enter an intense grey conflict, much like the cold war with the soviets. But at any time it could go hot, and it will go hot through proxies. In that case. We will want ships and planes that can project our interest, and presence and size determines ownership. We are far enough away from everyone else, we can do that. That is an achievable goal for Australia. Logistically, Australia is hard to push around in its own backyard. Bearing in mind most of Australia is deadly desert, lacking water, poor soils for farming and the waters, deep and featureless and massive. The resources we do have, are easily and cheaply purchased at lowest commodity pricing.

 

[hauritz]

A war in that region would be disasterous for Australia. Perhaps more so than any other participant other than maybe those caught directly in the line of fire. China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan represent 60% of our trading partners. It is a trade balance which is currently very much in Australia's favour.

It isn't China coming for us that should be of concern but rather the collateral damage to Australia's economy if we can no longer trade with that region. Those extra billions we are pumping into defence spending will be money well spent if it helps prevent any war in that region.

 

[Bob53]

I'm not sure we will get them before Taiwan. But its completely valid questions, how deep do we want to get in US policy on that topic. In may mean firing the first shot. How clear is us policy in this area, and is it bipartisan on both sides of the ocean.

I don't think Australian assets will be sitting off the coast of Taiwan, it is still too far for Australian based assets. But Indian ocean and the straits. Oh yeh. Australia could apply huge pressure to those. Putting China in a US Kill box.

But this is the problem will all the naval plans. They are too late, IMO. War is likely 0-4 years away. We don't even have 5 years. So we have likely already missed the window for the next war. But post that war, the world will change, and our navy will be very, very important in that world. Making sovereign decisions. Because like Singapore and the British, Empire can afford to lose far flung outposts, but we are in those far flung outposts.

So now we have two problems, one the immediate conflict 0-4 years (Taiwan). Two the intermediate conflict (5-10 year), US/Western global supremacy.

Taiwan may pass to Chinese control nonviolently. The Chinese were hoping for a Russian style Crimea campaign. Which was pretty successful for Russia at the time. The Chinese have taken Hong Kong. It is over, in a similar manner. But that one was clearly on borrowed time. The Chinese didn't rush it in 1999, they waited, a long time, for the right moment. But they also learnt a lot from that, and they now understand it won't be as easily, and grey and soft power are ultra important.

So yeh, lots of questions.

I do believe Australia would only be interested in Sovereign control of any asset. We would likely form a joint command, but Singapore taught us some interesting lessons about Joint Command.

I’d hazard if there is a Taiwan war in the next 4 years we won’t be getting any Virginias. At all. The Us will need/ want them. If they lose that war it probably means they have lost more than a few subs….

 

[Bob53]

The best and hopefully most likely outcome is that we (the collective West) continue to rearm while China’s demographic collapse makes it clear that they won’t be able to achieve what they want to by force. The narrowing of the military edge we’ve seen in recent years should expand again.

China settles into being a very large, respected, important but stagnating middle income country within the global order. US primacy remains. Hopefully minimal bloodshed internally or externally.

Plan A is containment, and I think it’s a good one.

This demographic collapse. Why does everyone think once they hit this bubble, China will retreat.. I’m not sure a country that has invested a fortune in a 25 yer military build up will be too concerned with only having 700 million people.

 

[Morgo]

This demographic collapse. Why does everyone think once they hit this bubble, China will retreat.. I’m not sure a country that has invested a fortune in a 25 yer military build up will be too concerned with only having 700 million people.

I think you’re underestimating the economic burden of an aging population and just how dire China’s situation is on this front.

China’s dependency ratio was 10 to 1 in 2010. It’s 5 to 1 now. It’ll be 2 to 1 in 2040. It’s hard to overstate the strain this will put on the Chinese economy, and on internal political stability. This doesn’t mean that they won’t lash out but this would be a very stupid thing to do. They won’t be out producing anyone, especially a reindustrialising US. They don’t have the workforce to keep up.