Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

Shanesworld

Well-Known Member
The moral of the Falklands is twofold.
Firstly, the loss of Sheffield has more to do with lack of intelligence re Argentinian capability, and;
Incompetence in the ship’s command team.
I don’t know if the ship had recently completed operational training (work up) at FOST Portland but given their reaction to the attack I suspect not.
Having been through both an RN PWO course and a FOST work up, both were superb training experiences.
The CO was a submariner, the XO an aviator so surface warfare experience was limited. (There are many examples of highly proficient surface ship commanders from these disciplines but there are also some duds).


I don’t usually provide links to the Guardian but this is an exception
As for the other losses;
Coventry was too close to land for her sensors to give adequate warning or for Sea Dart to function and she was struck by dumb bombs from A4s.
Type 21s Ardent and Antelope were in San Carlos Bay and with their sub standard weapons they stood no chance .

It simply illustrates the point, don’t close a hostile coast until total air superiority has been achieved.

I forgot to include a link re HMS Sheffield
Also the crews of ara san luis were inexperienced and junior as the seniors and particularly the senior weapons tech were un germany completing training. Given the stories abput san luis and the british pucket ships that could gave swung the war.
 

Scott Elaurant

Well-Known Member
Volkodav

i would agree that defence spending in the 1990s fell to undesirably low levels, resulting in many deferred costs that were self-defeating. Defence spending dropped well below 2% of GDP in that era and early 2000s. And of course, defence spending going up and down so that capability is not maintained is a recipe for waste. Shipbuilding is one of several examples.

This link shows a graph of the long term Australian Defense spend in %GDP from World Bank data.

That being said, I maintain again, that very few OECD countries maintain defence spending above 2% of GDP in the long term post 1990. In my view the ADF needs to make a long term spending plan, based on no more than 2.5% of GDP, and split between the services, with each tasked to maximise capability for the long term within that budget. Every other department has to do that (I spent the first half of my career working in government) and Defence cannot think in terms of one off program costs. If that means no more corvettes then so be it.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Worse than that, Hobart lost her bow to a torpedo in mid 43 and under repair for virtually the rest of the war, Australia and Shropshire were, for all intents and purposes, our cruiser force for the last two years of the war. If it wasn't for the Tribal Class destroyers being able to step up and back fill sufficient cruiser duties things would have been even worse.

Pre war the requirement was for a full flotilla of eight Tribal Class destroyers, we only completed three. The RN was suffering severe manning issues and there were discussions in relation to the transfer of HMS Ocean or even possibly HMS Implacable and Indefatigable to the RAN to serve with the BPF, it was likely they would be Australian crewed with NZ manned airgroups as the Kiwis made up a not insignificant proportion of RN FAA manpower late war. Too bad the staff discussing this didn't bother keeping the government in the loop and the whole thing fell over.

I think many people would be horrified if they realised just how small the RAN is and how few MFUs there actually are.
Stern actually. But you make a valid point about the reduction in major ship numbers. Certainly the destroyer numbers improved with the N and Q class along with the Australian Tribals (with two Battle Class to follow).

The Torpedoing of HMAS Hobart 1942 - Naval Historical Society of Australia (navyhistory.org.au)
1642297214728.png
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Agree 100%

So many deserving names that have been skipped over, up to this point at least.

Three of my favourites are of course the Daring Class DDs, Vampire, Vendetta and Voyager.
You can add Vengeance to the V list as well as we operated HMAS Vengeance (Majestic Class CV) while Melbourne was being completed.
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
You can add Vengeance to the V list as well as we operated HMAS Vengeance (Majestic Class CV) while Melbourne was being completed.
Mate, yes Vengeance would be another very good ‘V’ name.

Slight correction HMAS Vengeance was one of 10 Colossus class (not a Majestic class).

Sydney (ex Terrible) and Melbourne (ex Majestic) were two of six Majestic class.

Cheers,
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
That being said, I maintain again, that very few OECD countries maintain defence spending above 2% of GDP in the long term post 1990. In my view the ADF needs to make a long term spending plan, based on no more than 2.5% of GDP, and split between the services, with each tasked to maximise capability for the long term within that budget. Every other department has to do that (I spent the first half of my career working in government) and Defence cannot think in terms of one off program costs. If that means no more corvettes then so be it.
% of GDP isn't a magical number. It doesn't give you magical capabilities at 2%, nor does it have to come at a cost to the rest of the economy.
How you spend the money also matters.

How many attempts at saving money in defence have gone on to blow massive amounts of money in the worst way possible.

Also we are no longer in the benign environment like post 1990's.
We are in the middle of a trade conflict with China.
We are in the middle of the break down of globalization.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Stern actually. But you make a valid point about the reduction in major ship numbers. Certainly the destroyer numbers improved with the N and Q class along with the Australian Tribals (with two Battle Class to follow).

The Torpedoing of HMAS Hobart 1942 - Naval Historical Society of Australia (navyhistory.org.au)
View attachment 48793
Thanks, my bad. I think I was getting my cruisers confused, was it one of the Boston's that lost her now?
 

John Newman

The Bunker Group
That being said, I maintain again, that very few OECD countries maintain defence spending above 2% of GDP in the long term post 1990. In my view the ADF needs to make a long term spending plan, based on no more than 2.5% of GDP, and split between the services, with each tasked to maximise capability for the long term within that budget. Every other department has to do that (I spent the first half of my career working in government) and Defence cannot think in terms of one off program costs. If that means no more corvettes then so be it.
Expressing Australian Defence spending as a % of GDP is now a redundant model.

If you go back to the 2016 DWP the Government actually ‘de linked’ Defence spending and GDP.

It produced a ‘10 year’ funding model with ‘hard dollar’ expenditure to actually match the dollars required for procurement, sustainment and manpower over that period.

The same was repeated again with the 2020 DSU, again the funding model has nothing to do with GDP, it’s all about funding the next ‘10 year’ plan:


Yes effectively we are now above 2% of GDP, but it doesn’t really mean anything any more.

I think the current model is good, you set a 10 year plan and produce a 10 year funding plan.

If it was ever linked back to GDP, you could actually see falls in Defence spending at times of contraction of the Economy.

Cheers,
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Mate, yes Vengeance would be another very good ‘V’ name.

Slight correction HMAS Vengeance was one of 10 Colossus class (not a Majestic class).

Sydney (ex Terrible) and Melbourne (ex Majestic) were two of six Majestic class.

Cheers,
Hard to believe now that Britain once built an entire class of 5x20,000t Carriers(Majestic's) that never served in the RN.
 

Morgo

Well-Known Member
% of GDP isn't a magical number. It doesn't give you magical capabilities at 2%, nor does it have to come at a cost to the rest of the economy.
How you spend the money also matters.

How many attempts at saving money in defence have gone on to blow massive amounts of money in the worst way possible.

Also we are no longer in the benign environment like post 1990's.
We are in the middle of a trade conflict with China.
We are in the middle of the break down of globalization.
100% agree. Most OECD nations are in a very different strategic environment to us and have been underinvesting for years.

Further to my earlier post there are no effective barriers to spending more other than the political will. I am not suggesting we spend 4% but the point is that if we wanted to we could. And yes this would need to be funded by either cuts elsewhere, borrowing or tax increases. It’s up to the government of the day to make the case.

Once again I think this is a moot point as the current trajectory of spending will get us a very capable fleet for our needs, and there is probably not much short of a national mobilisation which could accelerate current procurement except at the margins.
 

Morgo

Well-Known Member
It may
Expressing Australian Defence spending as a % of GDP is now a redundant model.

If you go back to the 2016 DWP the Government actually ‘de linked’ Defence spending and GDP.

It produced a ‘10 year’ funding model with ‘hard dollar’ expenditure to actually match the dollars required for procurement, sustainment and manpower over that period.

The same was repeated again with the 2020 DSU, again the funding model has nothing to do with GDP, it’s all about funding the next ‘10 year’ plan:


Yes effectively we are now above 2% of GDP, but it doesn’t really mean anything any more.

I think the current model is good, you set a 10 year plan and produce a 10 year funding plan.

If it was ever linked back to GDP, you could actually see falls in Defence spending at times of contraction of the Economy.

Cheers,
It may not be a direct constraint on the capability assessed as being needed and selected, but it’s still very relevant in determining how to pay the bill!
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
It may

It may not be a direct constraint on the capability assessed as being needed and selected, but it’s still very relevant in determining how to pay the bill!
AARRR AAARRR me hearties increase taxes. Tax the peasants until they bleed then tax them more. :p Now wait for @John Newman to bite.

How to pay the bill is governments and Treasury's problem. That's what you pay them for, but being the spineless people that they are they tend to try and avoid it. Sometimes I think that they believe that it's coming out of their pay packet. IMHO if the govt funds acquisitions individually as they are required rather than saying to Defence here is X dollars go buy stuff, the outcome will be better. There will still be significant planning required but as long as both Defence and government are open and clear with each other right from the start, it should work. In some cases the process can be quickened. That's how I see it.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
On the question, “what can we afford”, we need to be realistic. Few countries in the OECD spend more than 2% of GDP on Defense. Australia already spends more than that, without the nuclear subs spending under way. Total government spending is roughly 1/4 of GDP and there are lots of other things demanding funds including roads, schools, hospitals and police. Health (8% in Australia) is the biggest item of government spending in almost every OECD country. We will not return to 1960s levels of Defense spending because of the cost of an ageing population.

I think any realistic long term spending plan should assume Defense spending will not increase above current (high) levels in real $. If naval spending goes up, other areas will need to decline. This is why I question buys like the recent $3.5 billion on more M1 tanks. It is inconsistent with policy to seek to project power at a distance and that is $3.5 billion not available to buy other things.

Overall I think we would be better off getting more economies of scale with a smaller number of larger programs. That is why I hope we go ahead with a more affordable SSN (Astute), get a viable number of them (8 or 9) and maintain current numbers of surface combatants. I would rather we had enough money to properly maintain and sustain what we are already committed to than build lots of things we then cannot afford to crew, stock with weapons, or repair. We should forget carriers IMO. Even for the RN the cost of two new carriers crippled the rest of the RN budget for a decade.
Spending money on tanks!
Its the navy thread, but the tank question is valid in that we make choices of distributing limited finances to create the best out comes needed for our defence sovereignty.
When the Navy and Air force, plus most of the Army have done their stuff, someone has to do the ugly business on land closing in on that last 1000m making contact with the enemy.
Currently the answer is heavy vehicles including tanks.
Currently most modern army's have this as the answer.
The future may provide a different answer, but not today.

We have an army for a reason and it needs to provide a broad range of options to government just like the other two services.

Cheers

Regards S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
On the money side there have been some absolute travesties wasting billions, wasting more money in fact than many of the fantasy fleets would have cost.

  • Australia didn't just retire capabilities without replacement, we retired capabilities that were underpinning other capabilities that we intended to keep but then couldn't.
  • We cancelled projects then launched life extensions on old kit to cover off the capability, that completely ran off the rails, cost huge sums of money and failed to actually usefully extend the life of the capability. i.e. if we hadn't done the life extension the platforms would have lasted almost as long and been almost as capable.
  • We procured capabilities that were not fit for purpose and required major upgrades to deliver minimum capability, some even failed to do that.
  • We bought into highly development programs assuming they were MOTS
  • We beat the crap out of projects that we knew were developmental and were actually performing surprisingly well.
  • We procured capabilities that have failed so badly they never entered service, entered service late, and or were retired early.
  • We damaged industry and destroyed teams that had successfully delivered highly complex projects, despite the government completely screwing the contract and scope.
  • We spent tax payers money lining the pockets of industry players who never delivered a useful capability.
  • Best of all, we have a bare bones Public service meant to be administering and undertaking quality and governance of a multitude of projects that is so understaffed that between 40 and 50% of the workforce is made up of contractors on twice the pay as the public servants and paid out of project funds so the government an pretend the wages bill is only one third to a quarter of what it actually is.
There was never a shortage of money, it was just being wasted through dumb, usually parochially, politically or ideologically tainted decisions.
 

Meriv

New Member
It's a bit OT. But in Italy the Navy between all public branches is probably one that is well managed(an anomaly for our luck). Together with the healthcare of some regions (but that's a regional situation not national like for the Navy).

How representative your procurement is of the rest of the public functions in Australia?

Is your procurement an anomaly or is it in line with the rest of the public enterprise?
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
IMHO if the govt funds acquisitions individually as they are required rather than saying to Defence here is X dollars go buy stuff, the outcome will be better.
That’s the way it works now; each major capital project is funded independently by Government and it is illegal to “mix funds” that is use general funds for project purposes or vice versa.

And, all projects are ADF projects - there is no Army, Navy or Airforce and hasn’t been for 30 years. Project development and high level programming and managing is centralised, with members of all three Services and the APS as part of a team and considering all projects as a continuum.
 
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John Newman

The Bunker Group
It may not be a direct constraint on the capability assessed as being needed and selected, but it’s still very relevant in determining how to pay the bill!
Let me see if I have this correct, you are suggesting that measuring GDP and Defence expenditure together (or against each other), is relevant in determining how to pay for that Defence expenditure, yes?

Can you please explain in detail why?

And just to repeat and be clear again, it’s current Government policy to ‘de link’ Defence expenditure from GDP.
 

Morgo

Well-Known Member
Let me see if I have this correct, you are suggesting that measuring GDP and Defence expenditure together (or against each other), is relevant in determining how to pay for that Defence expenditure, yes?

Can you please explain in detail why?

And just to repeat and be clear again, it’s current Government policy to ‘de link’ Defence expenditure from GDP.
Less “how to pay” and more “can we pay.”

The Government can state whatever they like but the reality is that any expenditure (including Defence) is limited by the ability of the Commonwealth to raise taxes and/or service debt. These are ultimately dependent on GDP.

If total government spending (again including Defence) gets too high this will inevitably impede economic growth in an advanced economy and impact our ability to service debt and raise taxes. Measuring spending (and debt) against GDP is a typical metric of the robustness of a government’s balance sheet for this reason.

It’s also a very relevant metric for the electorate to assess the appropriateness of the total size of government and the split of priorities (eg def vs health vs social security). Not that your average punter considers such things.

It shouldn’t (and to your point currently doesn’t, in theory) determine the size of the Defence budget - otherwise you get “use it or lose it” spending. But there is an upper constraint on it, which % of GDP indicates.

Finally, further to my earlier post I don’t think we are anywhere near that constraint and we have lots of options to fund further expenditure if we thought it was useful. But again I don’t think a radical departure from the current trajectory is needed, unless it funds a time machine so we can go back and start the recapitalisation a decade earlier.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Is it so black and white to state that defence spending is just sourced from the defence budget when it's possible that research and development programs can involve businesses that are able to claim some of their expenditure an example might be Boeing with its research and development here? Boeing opens largest R&D lab outside of US in Australia - PACE
Of course many programs may receive funding via the D.S.T.O or A.M.R.L even state governments can be involved in funding https://www.defenceinnovationpartnership.com/research-funding/our-funded-projects/
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
If total government spending (again including Defence) gets too high this will inevitably impede economic growth in an advanced economy and impact our ability to service debt and raise taxes. Measuring spending (and debt) against GDP is a typical metric of the robustness of a government’s balance sheet for this reason.
Not always, it can be used as a kind of stimulus. Pumping money around the economy, to improve confidence, employment, driving productivity, increasing the size of the economy in real terms.

Admittedly some does this more than others. a MOTS purchase of overseas gear doesn't have the same local stimulus as say building a ship, with Australian steel, with Australian workers, fitted with Australian systems, supplied by Australian suppliers. Some expenditures are dual use, infrastructure/military expenditure. Telecommunications cables, satellites, housing etc. Many of Australian industries are dual use. Civmec is an example. Encourage capability in one sector can benefit multiple sectors. Truck and bus construction and IFV production have overlap, so strengthening one can help the other find economies and efficiencies.

Defence has been a key source of pilots which has fueled the Australian aviation industry. The aviation industry fuels tourism. It isn't always a zero sum game.

There are plenty of damaging things that can happen to limit spending to GDP. Like the time we slowed down Hobart class constructions, with delayed the project 18-24 months additional, and deliberately make it cost nearly a billion dollars more, just to lower yearly expenses. This is exactly the type of destructive behavior decoupling defence from GDP is hoping to stop.

Plenty of high growth economies spend significant money on defence. Singapore, the US, China, etc. Plenty of high HDI countries spend big on defence, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, UK, France, Korea, Israel.

The idea that there is only a limited bucket with so much money isn't correct. It isn't a choice between having an economy and have a proper defence force, or funding education or defence, or health and defence. A well managed, healthy, economy can "do it all" within broad limitations.

European countries often seek mutual offsets, we buy planes from you, you buy helicopters from us. Having a defence industry enables deals like this. This really does more in terms of making the money go further. While it can be very restricting regarding platform selection, it can certainly show defence dollars aren't just generic dollars.

Historically Australia is probably more of a 2.5% of GDP country. We aren't Belgium, we administer ~25% of the earths surface.
 
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