I think we’re talking at cross purposes here. I’m referring specifically to Defence procurement.
Australia most definitely is at the lower end of protectionism by international standards. We have an open, liberal, trade exposed economy. Amongst other things (eg exports to China) the reform we undertook in the 80s and 90s set us up for the extraordinary economic performance we’ve had since, as it has directed our resources in areas where we have a comparative advantage (e.g. primary production, services) and away from ones where we don’t (e.g. low and middle skill manufacturing).
That said, we have a strong history of protecting certain industries - the car industry is a notable one - despite their being little economic rationale for doing so. This support was politically driven, futile, and a tremendous waste of money.
There is a definite argument for industry support for defence manufacturing where those industries can reasonably form the core of a national mobilisation effort in wartime ie what are the things that we could reasonably manufacture in a timely fashion and expect to be in short supply (either high demand offshore or supply lines cut). Sovereign guided weapons, hawkei, IFV/ARV, SPH, maybe loyal wingman are all good examples of this, and it is acceptable for us to pay for higher labour costs / smaller production runs in Australia so we maintain the onshore manufacturing capability.
There are further good arguments for support for the set up of defence manufacturing where there are economies of scale from joining a larger supply chain with our close allies. SSN production and maintenance, and maybe Type 83 / Hobart replacement might fall into this category.
Outside of that all Defence procurement should be subject to rigorous cost benefit analysis, and if it’s a long lead time item, something we’re just not set up to produce or something someone else is excellent at doing already, we should probably just buy it off the shelf from offshore.
Speaking frankly I am sceptical about the value of manufacturing our own ships from top to bottom, but I think now that the investment has been made in ASC (which from what I understand has meant that Osborne is a truly world class shipyard) we should make sure, as you say, that we continue to ensure the viability of that facility by placing sufficient orders so that we get the efficiency benefits from it. That means lots of Hunters and Hunter derivatives on a predictable drumbeat for the foreseeable future. Again I am sceptical, particularly given the persistent rumours of cost blowouts, but if we’re going to be in we need to be all in.
I think that this also means that we need to seriously think about the business case for having any subsidies for ship production in WA. I can’t see a reason for doing this beyond the political.
I would argue that your apparent positions on the value of Australia being able to produce small production runs of certain pieces of defence kit, like PGM's, SPH, IFV's domestically vs. domestic naval shipbuilding are opposite of what is realistically viable.
One must keep in mind that there are a few ways to measure the 'value' of domestic defence/naval production capabilities. The first is of course the economic or financial cost, and for a number of things Australia is just not going to be able to competitively produce
XX materials or kit because of domestic production costs and wages. Let us also look at that realistically though, by asking this question, "would it be reasonable for Australia to have China export ship and armoured vehicle hulls to Australia, because that (is perceived to be) costs less than having that done domestically?
The second 'value' comes into play if and when Australia might want or need a specific type of defence kit and there are no facilities with available production spots for what Australia wants/needs and able to deliver in the time frame Australia requires. Or put another way, there is value to Australia in being able to have domestic production of kit, which might cost more financially, if that kit can be produced when needed vs. relying on importing the same or equivalent kit which might not be available when required for a whole host of reasons.
One thing which is a factor is how long a production facility (and therefore the workforce) can be kept occupied or engaged with meeting production orders. This is one of the significant problems with small production runs, especially for very specialized and/or complex kit that tends to have long service lives.
Take SPH's as an example, and keep in mind that most of the numbers I am taking from the WAG Institute. Now suppose the order for LAND 8116 SPH's gets cut down to perhaps just 18. Now further suppose that the Australian facility setup to produce those SPH's will be run at a fairly low production rate, delivering one SPH every two months or so, then we would be talking about the facility taking about three years to complete the LAND 8116 order. Now how long are these SPH's expected to serve in the RAA? Given that LAND 17 began replacing the M198 howitzers used by the RAA since the ~1983 in 2011 with M777 howitzers, then a roughly 30 year service life barring attrition loses sounds fairly reasonable. If the Australian facility does actually take three years to complete the RAA SPH order, that would result in the facility becoming largely idle absent further orders for either the RAA or export, until the SPH's start getting close to their expected end of service life and need replacement. I do not consider it realistic for Australia to keep a production facility going for 25+ years with a trickle of orders for kit in an effort to main a sovereign production capability. Alternatively, such a heavy industry production facility might be able to be re-roled to produce something else which is similar and therefore providing justification to maintain the facility and keeping the workforce active and engaged whilst also potentially enabling the facility to be re-roled again should there be a need for future defence production.
From my POV, I just do not consider it a realistic expectation that Australia would spend coin placing 'make work' orders to keep a production facility running for a generation, on the off chance that there is a need to re-order replacements or to have the facility able to produce a future generation of kit.
Now naval shipbuilding in Australia can be a bit of a different story and for a few reasons.
One of the first is that economic or financials costs for naval shipbuilding, particularly when there is high domestic content, is quite a bit different. I recall there having been studies done for Australia whilst the
ANZAC-class build programme was still underway, that determined that even with a 30% increase in the costs associated with building naval vessels in Australia, the overall economic return made it advantageous for a domestic build vs. importing. When one then also factors in the through life, maintenance and upgrade costs and the importance in having facilities and especially an experienced work force to conduct such work, paying an even higher premium can still end up being financially worthwhile.
There are some additional considerations for Australian naval construction as well. One of the first is that there are currently ~46 vessels either in the RAN, or operated by or on the behalf of the RAN. With that many vessels in service, and the potential for an even greater number in the future, there should be plenty of work available for an Australian naval yard and the work force occupied. Of course this is provided that AusGov does not end up deciding to reduce, delay, or outright cancel domestic build programmes, or if various polies did not and do not work towards their own local self interests by establishing or relocating defence production facilities to their own districts, or refusing to fund programmes that would utilize existing facilities and work forces that are in Opposition territories. That is in fact one of the other considerations, that there have been a number of instances where it appears that defence procurement decisions were made based upon what was good politically for those in power, and not upon what would deliver the best kit and capability to the ADF or at the best cost to Australia.
Had things been done differently in the past, Australia most likely could have avoided several of the boom-bust cycles in naval shipbuilding. A more holistic approach could have led to increased flexibility and capacity in shipbuilding, improved build quality, whilst also reducing costs because there would have been less need to recruit and transfer a skilled workforce around.