@Volkodav has hit the nail squarely on the head with his recent post (#4978). In this and my next post I’m going to focus on the major combatants (destroyers and frigates) the RAN surface fleet is going to need in order play an effective role in protecting Australia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region over the coming decades. In discussing these capabilities, I’m going to break my thoughts up into two phases:
- the short to medium term – the period from now until 2035-2040; and
- the long term – the period from 2040 onwards into the second half of the 21st century.
I’ve broken my thoughts into these periods because I anticipate that the announced review of the RAN surface fleet to be undertaken in the third quarter of 2023 is also likely to look at these periods, or something similar to them. Whether the review of the RAN surface fleet adopts a two-tiered or three-tiered approach to capability remains to be seen, but the future RAN surface fleet will clearly need a mix of high-end, mid-level and lower-end vessels and capabilities.
Short to Medium Term Focus: In the years from now until 2040, the focus should be on increasing the RAN surface fleet’s size and capabilities using existing and already-planned platforms, to increase the RAN’s ability to effectively defend Australia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region, whether unilaterally or as part of a coalition of forces. I see this period as being one of initial growth in the RAN surface fleet’s size and capabilities, following several decades of the fleet’s numbers and capabilities being progressively eroded.
Long Term Focus: Beyond 2040, the focus should be on continued growth in the RAN's surface fleet size and capabilities through the acquisition of new, more capable surface platforms, in addition to the AUKUS-SSNs, to enable the RAN to more effectively protect Australia’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region well into the second half of the 21st century, whether unilaterally or as part of a coalition of forces.
Short to Medium Term Increase in Fleet Numbers and Capabilities: What the RAN needs in the period from now until 2035-2040 is the development of a somewhat larger surface fleet with greater offensive and defensive capabilities that is capable of:
- unilaterally deterring and if necessary defeating potential aggressors in the waters and airspace immediately surrounding Australia (our EEZ and the waters and airspace adjacent to our EEZ); and
- contributing to deterring, and if necessary defeating, threats to the security of key trade routes and Australia’s interests in the wider Indo-Pacific region as part of a coalition of forces – in short, the RAN’s ships need to be capable of effectively integrating with allied naval forces.
Of the two capabilities above, I see the latter capability as being the one that should be prioritised – meeting threats to Australia's interests as far as possible from Australia's shores in co-operation with our allies and friends in the Indo-Pacific region is the key to Australia's security and prosperity. What does the RAN realistically require to achieve this in the short to medium term, and how could it be delivered?
More DDGs: If the government is serious about getting increased long-range missile capabilities into the ADF generally, and the RAN’s surface fleet specifically, as quickly as possible, the acquisition of three additional
Hobart-class DDGs would be an achievable step. The
Hobart-class DDGs are by far the most capable surface combatants the RAN has available.
Although unsolicited, Navantia’s proposal last year to build three more
Hobart-class DDGs makes a lot of sense in the light of the DSR’s recommendations. Building three
Hobart-class DDGs at Navantia’s yards in Spain at a cost of ~$2B each would be an efficient and effective way to increase the RAN's firepower in the short to medium term.
The
Hobart-class design is mature, so building more of them should not be too risky. Navantia has said they could respond immediately to a request from the Australian Government and have ships in the water by 2030 – I think that is very achievable. If the RAN surface fleet review is delivered by early October 2023 and a decision to build three new
Hobarts was to be taken by the Australian Government by the end of March 2024, then taking into account an average build time of 2.5 years per vessel followed by trials, delivery, acceptance and commissioning, the acquisition of three new
Hobart-class DDGs for the RAN could be accomplished fairly comfortably by 2035.
Any argument that building the ships in Spain would somehow hurt Australia’s domestic shipbuilding industry is spurious – the reality is that Australia’s existing naval shipbuilding capabilities at Osborne are already fully occupied by the
Hunter-class FFG program, and at Henderson by the
Arafura OPV project. Potentially, at least some of the final fitout for new
Hobart-class DDGs could be done in Australia, to provide opportunities for Australian contractors. Also, the sustainment program for the existing
Hobart-class DDGs is in place – expanding it to accommodate three additional DDGs would provide more opportunities for Australian contractors in the short to medium term.
Recruitment and Crewing: With the right focus on recruitment, the RAN could bring in enough additional personnel to crew three additional
Hobart-class DDGs by the early 2030s, without having to pull personnel from other classes of ships to crew them. An RAN that is expanding and getting new, more capable ships including modern DDGs, FFGs and SSNs is a very different organization to the RAN I left, where the RAN had consistently over decades been required to do more tasks with fewer ships with less capability. I think the RAN is going to become a much more attractive career option over the coming decade than it has been for several decades prior to this one.
However, if recruitment and crewing is a problem, then a solution would be to decommission three of the
Anzac-class frigates earlier than planned, and move their crews to the new
Hobart-class DDGs. Each
Hobart-class DDG has a core crew complement of 186 (not counting aircrew for a single MH-60R). Each
Anzac-class FFH has a complement of 177 – only 9 less than a
Hobart-class DDG. This would see one
ANZAC-class FFH replaced by a
Hobart-class DDG as each new DDG enters service. If possible, each decommissioned
Anzac-class FFH could be sold to a friendly nation to offset the cost of each new
Hobart-class DDG to at least some extent – the
Anzacs should still be quite serviceable, and they feature a world-class short-range anti-ship missile defence capability for both own-ship and high-value unit (HVU) defence based on the CEAFAR radar and ESSM, as well as a decent AShM load for their size, some ASW capability via an embarked helicopter, and a medium-calibre gun, which should make them attractive to countries looking for a frigate capability.
Increased Fleet Size: If three additional
Hobart-class DDGs can be acquired and crewed without needing to decommission any
Anzac-class FFHs, this would increase the RAN’s surface combatant numbers from 11 to 14 (6
Hobart-class DDGs and 8
Anzac-class FFHs) by the early to mid-2030s. Based on the rule of threes, this would enable the RAN to have two
Hobart-class DDGs and two to three
Anzac-class FFHs deployed or ready for immediate deployment at any given time. This represents a much better balance between higher-end and medium-level capabilities compared to the current RAN fleet.
Increased Firepower: Three additional
Hobart-class DDGs would substantially increase the RAN’s missile firepower capabilities (both offensively and defensively) in line with the DSR. Currently the RAN’s 11 surface combatants have a total of 208 VLS cells between them (3x48-cell Mk 41 VLS on the three existing
Hobart-class DDGs for a total of 144 cells, and 8x8-cell Mk 41 VLS on the eight
Anzac-class FFHs).
Adding three new
Hobart-class DDGs to the fleet would increase the number of VLS cells in the fleet by 144, to 352.
If the
Anzac-class FFHs receive the upgrade that I think they are going to get (see post #4962) and each receives a second 8-cell Mk 41 VLS alongside the existing one, that adds a further 64 VLS cells, bringing the total in the fleet to 416.
In short, three more
Hobart-class DDGs combined with an upgrade to the
Anzac-class FFHs, could double the number of VLS cells in the RAN surface fleet within the next decade, prior to the first
Hunter-class FFG joining the fleet. Assuming three
Hunter-class FFGs are in service by 2040 and three upgraded
Anzac-class FFHs have been decommissioned, that would bring the total number of VLS cells in the RAN surface combatant fleet to 464.
Of course, simply increasing VLS cell numbers is only a very crude measure of actual capability, but it is still helpful, it is in line with the DSR’s recommendations, and some politicians might even be capable of understanding the simple mathematics.
The strike-length Mk 41 VLS on the
Hobart-class DDGs and the
Hunter-class FFGs can be loaded with long-range strike weapons (e.g. Tomahawk) and long-range AShMs (e.g. LRASM), in addition to SM-2, SM-6 and ESSMs. They will also carry canister-launched NSMs. This would substantially increase the RAN surface fleet’s offensive capabilities in the short to medium term.
In my next post, I'll look at what the RAN surface fleet's long-term major combatant composition and capabilities should be. For now, I welcome responses to this post, provided they are expressed respectfully.