Redlands18
Well-Known Member
The only way any part of the Sirius ever goes to sea again is in sailor's razor blades.I don't think ex-Sirius will be sea-worthy anytime soon.
The only way any part of the Sirius ever goes to sea again is in sailor's razor blades.I don't think ex-Sirius will be sea-worthy anytime soon.
She was still in the water in February. So much of her was already gone though I didn't initially realise it was her.I don't think ex-Sirius will be sea-worthy anytime soon.
All valid questions.“If we’re going to have less Hunters then all the assumptions made by industry in terms of becoming part of that supply chain will be wrong, as will costs.
“And how would the smaller ships be selected? Will a ship be mandated or will there be a competition that will take a couple of years? Will the construction yard need modifying? And if a replacement is to be built by a different company, then it’s a whole different design philosophy”.
The only way they could get her out of the water over here, was to strip her down to main deck level, then slice into 3 pieces while still floating.She was still in the water in February. So much of her was already gone though I didn't initially realise it was her.
The ALFA 4000 Frigates of Navantia - DIMDEX
Brent Clark (which the Australian mis-spells his title as "Austrliaan Industry Defence Network" makes a clear point, very worried about SME in the hunter program, and how a new ship design would happen.
- Notes Naval review
- Navantia's offer - 3 hobarts + six alpha 3000
- Luerssen offer - K130 and C-90 (Bulgeria)
- BAE dismisses reports of a 6 hunter + 3 AWD with 150vls.
All valid questions.
BAE managing director also wrote a peice.. most how important continious ship building is.
Considering the Australian couldn't spell "Australian Defence Network" and even failed to capitalized the author's name who knows. I thought maybe I had missed something, that Navantia had developed some special model for the RAN?The Corvettes up to 3000t are known as the Avante Family, the Alpha is a 4000t 120m Frigate design, so the Australian can't even get the name right. Are they referring to the Avante 3000 or the Alpha 4000?
Which makes me wonder when did that get there, and is it seeing some sort of competition between the Type 31 and Alfa3000?The ALFA 3000
100 crew, 27 knt, 5000nm at 15 knts. 16 VLS, 2x4 Anti ship launchers, 2x3 torpedo launchers.
600 million each if built in Spain. 800 million each if built in Aus.
The Alfa 4000 is longer/larger, has less range, more speed and 2x16vls + ciws
Type 31 still makes more sense. 7,000nm at 18 knt, 32 VLS, 100-120 crew. 750 million / 1 billion
Great, less range than a Daring. And fast routing speed is normally 18 or 20 knots, not 15
The ALFA 3000
100 crew, 27 knt, 5000nm at 15 knts. 16 VLS, 2x4 Anti ship launchers, 2x3 torpedo launchers.
600 million each if built in Spain. 800 million each if built in Aus.
The Alfa 4000 is longer/larger, has less range, more speed and 2x16vls + ciws
Type 31 still makes more sense. 7,000nm at 18 knt, 32 VLS, 100-120 crew. 750 million / 1 billion
Guess it depends on where the ships are based and what you use them for, doesn’t sound like they are after fast ships that can travel vast distances or escort in the middle of the South China Sea. Leave that task for the tier 1 ships.Great, less range than a Daring. And fast routing speed is normally 18 or 20 knots, not 15
Big difference in basing for a 1800t OPV with a crew of 40 with little combat capability and basing for an Anzac size Frigate with 120+ crew. The basing upgrades are badly needed for the Arafura'sGuess it depends on where the ships are based and what you use them for, doesn’t sound like they are after fast ships that can travel vast distances or escort in the middle of the South China Sea. Leave that task for the tier 1 ships.
Over 600 million in upgrades to Darwin and Cairns will give us some idea.
Cairns is being upgraded to base 4 Arafuras.Big difference in basing for a 1800t OPV with a crew of 40 with little combat capability and basing for an Anzac size Frigate with 120+ crew. The basing upgrades are badly needed for the Arafura's
Mission Type | Primary Responsibility | Combatant Tier |
Local patrol duties in the waters within and immediately adjacent to Australia’s EEZ. | OPVs, future OCVs or corvettes | 3 |
Longer-range patrol duties in the Indian Ocean, maritime South-East Asia, the Pacific Ocean and Southern Ocean. | Patrol frigates | 2 |
Goodwill visits to countries across the Indo-Pacific to deepen relationships with Australia’s allies and friends. | DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) support to Australian communities and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. | LHDs, LSD | 3* |
Escorting civilian maritime traffic to provide protection against asymmetric threats from non-state actors (e.g. pirates and terrorists) in the waters within and immediately adjacent to Australia’s EEZ. | OPVs, future OCVs or corvettes | 3 |
Escorting civilian maritime traffic to provide protection against asymmetric threats from non-state actors (e.g. pirates and terrorists) in the broader Indo-Pacific region. | Patrol frigates | 2 |
Unilateral freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and any other maritime areas over which the PRC or any other nation might attempt to assert control. | DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
Multilateral FONOPS in concert with naval units from other nations (e.g. the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia). | DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
Escorting civilian maritime traffic to provide protection against threats from state actors in the broader Indo-Pacific region. | DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
Boarding operations on the high seas to enforce economic sanctions against state actors. | DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
Interdiction of enemy merchant shipping on the high seas to disrupt the flow of trade to enemy nations. | DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
Mine countermeasures operations to ensure that Australia’s sea lanes and ports are kept clear/cleared of mines. | MHCs, OPVs, future OCVs or corvettes | 3 |
Mine warfare operations to close enemy sea lanes and ports to maritime traffic. | SSKs, SSNs | 1 |
Amphibious warfare operations. | LHDs, LSD | 3* |
Escorting LHDs, LSDs and LPDs to perform AAW, BMD, ASW and ASuW roles in support of amphibious warfare operations. | DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
AAW, BMD, NGS missions in support of friendly forces ashore. | DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
Strike missions in support of friendly forces ashore. | SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
ASuW missions against enemy naval forces. | SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
Strike missions against enemy land-based forces and infrastructure. | SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
Integrating into U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) to perform AAW, BMD, ASW and ASuW roles. | SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates | 1 & 2 |
In my first post, I took a high-level view of what potential sources of conflict are foreseeable in the Indo-Pacific region in the coming decades (see post #4853 on 16 May 2023, page 243).
I have noted the recent mod posts about specific ship vs ship comparisons – I agree that such comparisons are really not what this thread is, or should be, about. Of course, I have my favourites, as I’m sure most other people on this thread do. But to be quite honest, I don’t really care about what the relevant platform is called, provided it is fit for purpose.
What I think would be really useful following the DSR is a discussion about the future of the RAN in the light of the DSR and the announced review into the surface fleet, given the Australian Government’s decision to acquire SSNs, and the DSR’s emphasis on increased long-range missile capabilities. With the future SSNs (both Virginia-class and AUKUS-SSN) representing a significant increase in the RAN’s submarine capability from the early 2030s, and the DSRs emphasis on a deterrence through denial strategy and increased long-range missile capabilities, I think the RAN is in line for a much-needed expansion in terms of both ship numbers and capabilities. It is therefore timely to consider what sorts of missions might the RAN surface fleet be called upon to perform in the Indo-Pacific region in the coming decades.
What I am going to focus on in this post, given the potential sources of conflict to which I referred in my first post, is what types of vessels would be best suited to fulfil the missions that might be required of the future RAN?
The following are my thoughts on the potential missions that might be required of the RAN and the vessel types best suited to them. What I am focusing on is where particular mission profiles should sit in a future RAN that has SSKs/SSNs and a well-balanced Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 surface fleet in which:
- SSKs and SSNs would of course be Tier 1 combatants – these would have a primary ASW mission plus ASuW and strike missions, and a secondary mine warfare capability;
- Tier 1 surface combatants would be DDGs and FFGs – DDGs should have a primary long, medium and short-range AAW mission plus additional BMD, ASW, ASuW and strike capabilities, while FFGs should have a primary ASW mission plus additional medium and short-range AAW, ASuW and strike capabilities;
- Tier 2 surface combatants would be patrol frigates designed for long-range patrol and close escort of high-value units (HVUs) and merchant/civilian shipping with more limited medium and short-range AAW, ASW, ASuW and strike capabilities than Tier 1 surface combatants; and
- Tier 3 surface combatants would be OPVs and potentially OCVs or corvettes – OPVs should be focused on general patrol and constabulary missions within Australia’s EEZ, while OCVs or corvettes would be surface combatants of smaller size and shorter range than Tier 2s, while still possessing some medium and short-range AAW, ASW and ASuW capability.
Mission Type Primary Responsibility Combatant TierLocal patrol duties in the waters within and immediately adjacent to Australia’s EEZ. OPVs, future OCVs or corvettes 3Longer-range patrol duties in the Indian Ocean, maritime South-East Asia, the Pacific Ocean and Southern Ocean. Patrol frigates 2Goodwill visits to countries across the Indo-Pacific to deepen relationships with Australia’s allies and friends. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) support to Australian communities and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. LHDs, LSD 3*Escorting civilian maritime traffic to provide protection against asymmetric threats from non-state actors (e.g. pirates and terrorists) in the waters within and immediately adjacent to Australia’s EEZ. OPVs, future OCVs or corvettes 3Escorting civilian maritime traffic to provide protection against asymmetric threats from non-state actors (e.g. pirates and terrorists) in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Patrol frigates 2Unilateral freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and any other maritime areas over which the PRC or any other nation might attempt to assert control. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Multilateral FONOPS in concert with naval units from other nations (e.g. the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia). DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Escorting civilian maritime traffic to provide protection against threats from state actors in the broader Indo-Pacific region. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Boarding operations on the high seas to enforce economic sanctions against state actors. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Interdiction of enemy merchant shipping on the high seas to disrupt the flow of trade to enemy nations. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Mine countermeasures operations to ensure that Australia’s sea lanes and ports are kept clear/cleared of mines. MHCs, OPVs, future OCVs or corvettes 3Mine warfare operations to close enemy sea lanes and ports to maritime traffic. SSKs, SSNs 1Amphibious warfare operations. LHDs, LSD 3*Escorting LHDs, LSDs and LPDs to perform AAW, BMD, ASW and ASuW roles in support of amphibious warfare operations. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2AAW, BMD, NGS missions in support of friendly forces ashore. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Strike missions in support of friendly forces ashore. SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2ASuW missions against enemy naval forces. SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Strike missions against enemy land-based forces and infrastructure. SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Integrating into U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) to perform AAW, BMD, ASW and ASuW roles. SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2
*LHDs and LSDs don't fit neatly into a Tier 1, 2 or 3 capability matrix, but in terms of the their ability to defend themselves and other vessels, they are definitely in the Tier 3 category, rather than Tier 1 or 2.
In my next post I’ll get into more specifics about what each type of combatant should be capable of doing – for now, please note that what I am not, and will not, be focusing on is a comparison of specific ship designs (e.g. Type 45 DDG vs Burke-class DDG, etc). Because the outcome of the review into the RAN surface fleet is still several months away, I’m putting my opinions on the merits of specific ship types aside to focus on what capabilities are appropriate for each mission type.
The key thing for any of the missions in the above table that any vessel in any tier might be required to undertake, given the long distances involved in both Australia’s local geography and the broader Indo-Pacific region’s geography, is that the future RAN’s missions in both peacetime and wartime require vessels with “long legs”, i.e. long endurance at moderate speeds – say 12 – 18 knots, combined with the ability to operate at higher speeds (20 – 30+ knots) for short periods when required.
I hope this post will be of interest - as I have previously stated, I welcome responses, whether positive or negative, as long as they are expressed respectfully.
I agree to some degree but having lived in Darwin during the draw down of defence there I can also see the counter argument.We tried basing more combat power, Army admittedly, in the top end, and the word at the time was that it caused a significant increase in separations. Some, as from a Navy perspective our friend Assail, loved it. Many, however disliked the climate and the weather, or the physical and social environment, or the distance they or their partners were from family support, and voted with their feet. We already have retention and recruiting issues; we don’t need to add to them.
The same was true when Navy moved a lot of people who came from the east coast to the west, and told them they would spend their careers there, although at least the weather wasn’t a factor. 30 years or so later, that is still apparently a problem because the main recruiting base is, and will of course remain, the east coast. Let’s not make it worse when, for Navy at least, the strategic reasons to do so are, to put it mildly, not strong.
Thanks for your reply @Reptilia - those are all very good points. It will be interesting to see what the review of the RAN surface fleet recommends in terms of the balance between different tiers of vessels and capabilities, and I have no doubt that the role of unmanned systems will be of increasing importance for the future RAN.A tier 2 long range patrol frigate would have to come all the way from FBE or FBW. The planned ship lifts in Darwin and Cairns are the same size 103m long, 20 odd wide, 6m deep, 5,000 ton max lift, specifically for Capes, Arafuras, Anzacs and other smaller ships. You would think that rules out anything bigger or more capable than an Anzac being based in the North. If they want something more capable than a tier 2 Anzac (which has been stated by government), then the only option for the north is a corvette, smaller hull with greatly increased firepower at the cost of range, speed and versatility.
With a GPF, The cost of having more crew, a meaningless 2,500-3,000km journey from the east or west to the north and the cost of stopover or refueling in the north for a longer journey to patrol or escort far away from home is the routine of a tier 1 ship and doesn’t divert from the way we do things currently.
In my opinion hobarts, hunters, Anzacs and virginias will be meshed into 1 category for specific long distance roles, the tier 2 category being corvettes, opvs, pbs, usvs, uuvs, uavs protecting and further projecting from inside the eez and surrounds In a variety of roles.
Lots to think about.In my first post, I took a high-level view of what potential sources of conflict are foreseeable in the Indo-Pacific region in the coming decades (see post #4853 on 16 May 2023, page 243).
I have noted the recent mod posts about specific ship vs ship comparisons – I agree that such comparisons are really not what this thread is, or should be, about. Of course, I have my favourites, as I’m sure most other people on this thread do. But to be quite honest, I don’t really care about what the relevant platform is called, provided it is fit for purpose.
What I think would be really useful following the DSR is a discussion about the future of the RAN in the light of the DSR and the announced review into the surface fleet, given the Australian Government’s decision to acquire SSNs, and the DSR’s emphasis on increased long-range missile capabilities. With the future SSNs (both Virginia-class and AUKUS-SSN) representing a significant increase in the RAN’s submarine capability from the early 2030s, and the DSRs emphasis on a deterrence through denial strategy and increased long-range missile capabilities, I think the RAN is in line for a much-needed expansion in terms of both ship numbers and capabilities. It is therefore timely to consider what sorts of missions might the RAN surface fleet be called upon to perform in the Indo-Pacific region in the coming decades.
What I am going to focus on in this post, given the potential sources of conflict to which I referred in my first post, is what types of vessels would be best suited to fulfil the missions that might be required of the future RAN?
The following are my thoughts on the potential missions that might be required of the RAN and the vessel types best suited to them. What I am focusing on is where particular mission profiles should sit in a future RAN that has SSKs/SSNs and a well-balanced Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 surface fleet in which:
- SSKs and SSNs would of course be Tier 1 combatants – these would have a primary ASW mission plus ASuW and strike missions, and a secondary mine warfare capability;
- Tier 1 surface combatants would be DDGs and FFGs – DDGs should have a primary long, medium and short-range AAW mission plus additional BMD, ASW, ASuW and strike capabilities, while FFGs should have a primary ASW mission plus additional medium and short-range AAW, ASuW and strike capabilities;
- Tier 2 surface combatants would be patrol frigates designed for long-range patrol and close escort of high-value units (HVUs) and merchant/civilian shipping with more limited medium and short-range AAW, ASW, ASuW and strike capabilities than Tier 1 surface combatants; and
- Tier 3 surface combatants would be OPVs and potentially OCVs or corvettes – OPVs should be focused on general patrol and constabulary missions within Australia’s EEZ, while OCVs or corvettes would be surface combatants of smaller size and shorter range than Tier 2s, while still possessing some medium and short-range AAW, ASW and ASuW capability.
m
Mission Type Primary Responsibility Combatant TierLocal patrol duties in the waters within and immediately adjacent to Australia’s EEZ. OPVs, future OCVs or corvettes 3Longer-range patrol duties in the Indian Ocean, maritime South-East Asia, the Pacific Ocean and Southern Ocean. Patrol frigates 2Goodwill visits to countries across the Indo-Pacific to deepen relationships with Australia’s allies and friends. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) support to Australian communities and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. LHDs, LSD 3*Escorting civilian maritime traffic to provide protection against asymmetric threats from non-state actors (e.g. pirates and terrorists) in the waters within and immediately adjacent to Australia’s EEZ. OPVs, future OCVs or corvettes 3Escorting civilian maritime traffic to provide protection against asymmetric threats from non-state actors (e.g. pirates and terrorists) in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Patrol frigates 2Unilateral freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and any other maritime areas over which the PRC or any other nation might attempt to assert control. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Multilateral FONOPS in concert with naval units from other nations (e.g. the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia). DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Escorting civilian maritime traffic to provide protection against threats from state actors in the broader Indo-Pacific region. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Boarding operations on the high seas to enforce economic sanctions against state actors. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Interdiction of enemy merchant shipping on the high seas to disrupt the flow of trade to enemy nations. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Mine countermeasures operations to ensure that Australia’s sea lanes and ports are kept clear/cleared of mines. MHCs, OPVs, future OCVs or corvettes 3Mine warfare operations to close enemy sea lanes and ports to maritime traffic. SSKs, SSNs 1Amphibious warfare operations. LHDs, LSD 3*Escorting LHDs, LSDs and LPDs to perform AAW, BMD, ASW and ASuW roles in support of amphibious warfare operations. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2AAW, BMD, NGS missions in support of friendly forces ashore. DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Strike missions in support of friendly forces ashore. SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2ASuW missions against enemy naval forces. SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Strike missions against enemy land-based forces and infrastructure. SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2Integrating into U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) to perform AAW, BMD, ASW and ASuW roles. SSNs, DDGs, FFGs, patrol frigates 1 & 2
*LHDs and LSDs don't fit neatly into a Tier 1, 2 or 3 capability matrix, but in terms of the their ability to defend themselves and other vessels, they are definitely in the Tier 3 category, rather than Tier 1 or 2.
In my next post I’ll get into more specifics about what each type of combatant should be capable of doing – for now, please note that what I am not, and will not, be focusing on is a comparison of specific ship designs (e.g. Type 45 DDG vs Burke-class DDG, etc). Because the outcome of the review into the RAN surface fleet is still several months away, I’m putting my opinions on the merits of specific ship types aside to focus on what capabilities are appropriate for each mission type.
The key thing for any of the missions in the above table that any vessel in any tier might be required to undertake, given the long distances involved in both Australia’s local geography and the broader Indo-Pacific region’s geography, is that the future RAN’s missions in both peacetime and wartime require vessels with “long legs”, i.e. long endurance at moderate speeds – say 12 – 18 knots, combined with the ability to operate at higher speeds (20 – 30+ knots) for short periods when required.
I hope this post will be of interest - as I have previously stated, I welcome responses, whether positive or negative, as long as they are expressed respectfully.