Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

I'm aware of the teething issues that G.R.F has run into but I don't see how that makes the Fords a bad acquisition. If anyone can work through those problems it's the USN seeing as they're currently the world leader in those technologies, and at the end of the day they will be an effective and much needed upgrade from the Nimitz.

The USN missed an entire generation of new technology on new platforms and then had to play catch up by incorporating massive leaps at the same time as funding for sustainment was cut and multiple functions were out sourced.

The fleet got busier as numbers shrunk, personnel were required to step up and take on additional responsibility earlier in their careers, with less coaching, mentoring and supervision.

The entire thing was unsustainable and went on for years. It wasnt reversed until people started dying.

Thus wasn't down to the USN, but rather political games and cuts. The people in uniform did the best they could with what they had.

Try reading the reports into the USS John S McCain collision, as well as the Fitzgerald. Both were pre COVID.

 

[spoz]

While that is certainly true, the USN realised they had a problem and did something about it. And it seems to be working: Navy Seeing Better Trained Ensigns After Surface Warfare Reforms, Say Sailors - USNI News

 

[Volkodav]

E

While that is certainly true, the USN realised they had a problem and did something about it. And it seems to be working: Navy Seeing Better Trained Ensigns After Surface Warfare Reforms, Say Sailors - USNI News

Exactly!

I'm not knocking the USN by any means, I have the greatest respect for them, especially how they have endured and are recovering from three pretty politically challenging decades.

In many ways their experience has been similar, and in some ways harder than the RANs.

 

[StingrayOZ]

As long as your 10 minor combatants were equivalent to a modernised ANZAC or more in capability (ie like a Type 31) this sounds like it’d be an awesome outcome,

I am not holding my breath however.

I think that is the sweet spot 4000-7000t.
You get some very capable ships at that size (radar/weapons/endurance), and with remarkably small crews, similar to that of a corvette.

That 10 number will almost be entirely dependant on crew size. If they can keep it 60-80 maybe 10 if they can plan in some RAN people growth. If its more like 100-120 then numbers drop to 6-8. More crew, less ships. But also more weapons = more crew. There has been a shift to diesel engines over gas turbines, to improve endurance, but still quite fast, with four large diesel engines. It can also help with maintenance and redundancy.

But they could embark the weapons the RAN currently has, perform Anzac type missions.

But I think a broad concept CEP could be drawn up and a selection made from a number of good contenders with the capability to manage an Australian build. An advantage is that most of these are fitted with US weapons and systems from the get go.

But the critical natural resource is crew. More than procurement cost and yard time. Is crewing. It would be nice to look at a constellation class, but crewing at ~200 is more than Anzac level. Smaller crews are very advantageous, its much easier to find available crew, the bigger the ship the harder it is to manage to get a whole working crew onboard. The more crew, the more consuming is of the most valuable resource of the ADF, people. Platforms are meaningless without people to operate them.

 

[76mmGuns]

I'm a little confused about this supposed Hunter budget blowout. On one hand, the first 3 hunters are costing $6.1bn. On the other, the 9 will cost more than $45bn?

Is this another apples and oranges comparison for headlines in the media? Or the $45bn+ is for whole of life costs? In which case, it really doesn't seem so bad.

 

[seaspear]

How long is the whole of life then and does this make it an option to on sell it after so many years?

 

[Jason_DBF]

Earlier in this thread, there was a brief discussion about refuelling the PWR2 reactor, this article shows just how big a task that is.

Thankfully, the path chosen for the RAN’s SSN’s avoids any PWR2 involvement.

HMS Vanguard finally sails from Devonport after refit lasting more than 7 years | Navy Lookout

The reactor in a Virginia class SSN can still need to be refueled. Punching holes in the ocean flat out reduces the life of the reactor.

 

[ngatimozart]

I'm aware of the teething issues that G.R.F has run into but I don't see how that makes the Fords a bad acquisition. If anyone can work through those problems it's the USN seeing as they're currently the world leader in those technologies, and at the end of the day they will be an effective and much needed upgrade from the Nimitz.

This is not a seamanship problem, this is a supply and maintenance problem.

Are you an expert in things naval? Systems Addict is quite knowledgeable on the topic. Dial back the attitude.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Is this another apples and oranges comparison for headlines in the media? Or the $45bn+ is for whole of life costs? In which case, it really doesn't seem so bad.

Pretty sure the $45b+ is the whole lifetime cost.
I think the costings are a bit of mess. BAE is building Arafuras, which was never part of the plan because the Hunter isn't ready. I think key things is the Hunter was not suitable for the time frame given, maybe if we didn't modify it so much, used the exact same UK fitout for the first 3... By middle of this decade we should have been decommissioning Anzacs instead of upgrading them again..

People would say but the combat system, the stuff isn't what the RAN uses, well Hobarts was built with a selected combat system and we are refitting now with new ones < 3 years after touching water. We were modifying them for Helos before they even IOC.

So many broken dreams..



The OCV work is now the only thing that is happening and is being gobbled up by two yards we aren't currently building subs at all and future frigates, well very slow prototyping. We need to projects to come on line..

Costs are now a lot, even if we are building nothing..

Which is why we should just park/dispose of the Arafuras rather than up gunning them. Otherwise we are paying two yard not to do anything. all the SME will implode, no one will ever want to work on a defence project again. Which is why the hunter delays are spiraling everything out of control. Its not like everyone can go back to building commercial ships or something.

The reactor in a Virginia class SSN can still need to be refueled. Punching holes in the ocean flat out reduces the life of the reactor.

Go with a narrow hull, low drag design, and cruise at 15-20 kts not 30kt.. I'm not sure sticking a Virginia reactor into a UK design solves the fuelled for life problem. UK typically doesn't have quite a long transits as we will probably intend. Their sub designs prioritise stealth and capability over drag.

The americans aren't stupid. Their subs reflect what works for them and their missions. Virginia is a very refined design.

 

[Going Boeing]

The reactor in a Virginia class SSN can still need to be refueled. Punching holes in the ocean flat out reduces the life of the reactor.

Agreed, but no S9G has been refuelled to date (it has an estimated 33 years worth of fuel at the USN usage (8 years more than the PWR2’s Core H)) whereas 5 LA class are expected to be refuelled.

The S9G can provide enough power for a Virginia to cruise at 20 knots with just convection cooling - I do not know whether that reduces core fuel consumption.

 

[Systems Adict]

This is not a seamanship problem, this is a supply and maintenance problem.

@Devo 99 - Your initial request was for articles relating to the decline of seamanship. The Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of 'good seamanship' is " Good seamanship generally means skill in and knowledge of the work of navigating, maintaining, and operating a vessel".
Merriam - Webster - Seamanship definition

In the articles I posted links for & in the numerous other pages of information that is readily available across the internet, the data points to the fact that the US Navy is having serious issues in training, maintenance & support of the fleet. The GAO report was the culmination of a series of serious failures where lives were lost, due to poor judgement & training of those navigating, maintaining & operating vessels. THIS implies a decline in ability

Seamanship is not just the ability of the ship to float / to drive the ship from A to B, but the capability to operate it it effectively, in all states & conditions. This capability of the crew is being hampered by the ineffectual management by the US Navy due to issues with funding / training & issues in support of the logistics of maintenance / stores / supply.

I'm not here to poo-poo the 2nd biggest navy on the planet (their management team is doing a damn fine job of that without additional assistance), I'm simply passing on information, like you asked. As someone whose worked in shipbuilding for nearly 3 decades, I've seen the effects of the cold-war draw down - the 'good-ideas club' & the resultant output of ships that are trying to hard to do x1million things, when they really should only be doing a handful of things. This with the lack of leadership or punishment for those responsible for the quick & easy imagined scenarios that have cost billions of dollars & have resulted in x2 variants of ship to be effectively scrapped, but that will strangely continue to be built until contracts have been completed, beggars belief.

SA

 

[spoz]

BAE is NOT building the Arafuras; Luerssen is responsible for the build, with main construction work contracted to a part of ASC, which was not transferred to BAE for $1, in SA; and a number of firms, led by Civmec, in WA. People such as Taylor Brothers are involved in both sites.

The workforce in SA will, in most cases, probably roll off Arafura and on to Hunter; and their employer at the highest level corporately will be the same, ASC, but they will change from (I think I’ve got this right, it‘s a bit labyrinthine) ASC ShipbuildER to ASC ShipbuildING.

That must be an old diagram still calling them OCVs, that was a concept which was not pursued (possibly because, LCS like, it tried to use one platform for too many things) and the submarine dates reflect the planning of about 10 years ago.

And as one whois involved in both, I prefer the Oxford definition of seamanship, “skill in sailing a ship or boat”; the Miriam one given above is, in my view, too broad and encompasses what is generally considered seaworthines; they are different disciplines. Not that the word changes the issues the USN, and also the RN, are facing in the maintenance space. But in my definition of seamanship, the USN is addressing their issues

 

[devo99]

@Devo 99 - Your initial request was for articles relating to the decline of seamanship. The Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of 'good seamanship' is " Good seamanship generally means skill in and knowledge of the work of navigating, maintaining, and operating a vessel".
Merriam - Webster - Seamanship definition

In the articles I posted links for & in the numerous other pages of information that is readily available across the internet, the data points to the fact that the US Navy is having serious issues in training, maintenance & support of the fleet. The GAO report was the culmination of a series of serious failures where lives were lost, due to poor judgement & training of those navigating, maintaining & operating vessels. THIS implies a decline in ability

Seamanship is not just the ability of the ship to float / to drive the ship from A to B, but the capability to operate it it effectively, in all states & conditions. This capability of the crew is being hampered by the ineffectual management by the US Navy due to issues with funding / training & issues in support of the logistics of maintenance / stores / supply.

I'm not here to poo-poo the 2nd biggest navy on the planet (their management team is doing a damn fine job of that without additional assistance), I'm simply passing on information, like you asked. As someone whose worked in shipbuilding for nearly 3 decades, I've seen the effects of the cold-war draw down - the 'good-ideas club' & the resultant output of ships that are trying to hard to do x1million things, when they really should only be doing a handful of things. This with the lack of leadership or punishment for those responsible for the quick & easy imagined scenarios that have cost billions of dollars & have resulted in x2 variants of ship to be effectively scrapped, but that will strangely continue to be built until contracts have been completed, beggars belief.

SA

Fair enough. I should've thought before speaking.

 

[devo99]

And as one whois involved in both, I prefer the Oxford definition of seamanship, “skill in sailing a ship or boat”; the Miriam one given above is, in my view, too broad and encompasses what is generally considered seaworthines; they are different disciplines. Not that the word changes the issues the USN, and also the RN, are facing in the maintenance space. But in my definition of seamanship, the USN is addressing their issues

This was the point I was trying to make but evidently I didn't do a good job of it.

 

[JohnJT]

To me at least, wouldn't it make the most sense to just focus on making Arafura really good at its role? I.e. Maritime security?
It can be either a brilliant, very capable OPV or a below average, slow and vulnerable corvette ...

Ships like the MMPV, Saar 6 and K130 all make absolutely zero sense in our geography.

The Arafura Sea alone is larger than both the Baltic Sea and Black Sea.
The Coral Sea alone is almost double the size of the entire Mediterranean Sea.

Corvettes are not designed for our kind of environment, and that's even before we consider presence beyond the seas right on our doorstep.

Totally agree. That's why I think the perfect vessel for the "corvette" role would be something like the Type 31. You'd get a vessel similar to a corvette in cost, armament and manning level, but with a >7000NM range, 60 day endurance and with multiple mission spaces allowing for mission flexibility.

Best of all, if the need arises, they are one upgrade away from being a front line frigate, with 32 strike length Mk 41 VLS cells, 16 x SSM, etc.

 

[Reptilia]

Totally agree. That's why I think the perfect vessel for the "corvette" role would be something like the Type 31. You'd get a vessel similar to a corvette in cost, armament and manning level, but with a >7000NM range, 60 day endurance and with multiple mission spaces allowing for mission flexibility.

Best of all, if the need arises, they are one upgrade away from being a front line frigate, with 32 strike length Mk 41 VLS cells, 16 x SSM, etc.

I think the type 31 sits between a tier 1 and tier 2 ship.


Tier 1

Hobarts AWD + Hunters ASW

7,000-10,000 ton, 28knts, 5,000nm-7,000nm at 18knts, 48VLS-32VLS, SSM, 180-220 crew

-

Tier 1.5

Type 31 GPF

5,500-6,500 ton, 28knts, 7,000nm at 18knts, 32VLS, SSM, 100-140 crew

-

Tier 2

Corvette(eez/offshore island/choke point protection and projection) or
Crossover(larger versatile combatant/amphibious ship for moving a wide range of vehicles to islands, possibly where transport planes cannot go)

2,000-5,500 ton, 25-30knts, 4,500-6,500nm at 15 knts, 16VLS, SSM, 70-120 crew



Think most people would be happy with
6AWD-6ASW-6GPF-6/+C

but atm it’s looking like
3-(6–9)-(8 for the next decade atleast)-(6-12)

 

[Scott Elaurant]

I'm a little confused about this supposed Hunter budget blowout. On one hand, the first 3 hunters are costing $6.1bn. On the other, the 9 will cost more than $45bn?

Is this another apples and oranges comparison for headlines in the media? Or the $45bn+ is for whole of life costs? In which case, it really doesn't seem so bad.

Like others I have been reading the Hunter audit and contract up to try to understand the audit findings.

AFAIK the $45 billion is the total Hunter Class construction cost NOT including sustainment, for the 9 frigates plus design, but measured in outturn costs. That is, the $45 billion includes inflation over the 20+(?) year contract period. Without that inflation, the present day cost of building the nine Hunters must be much less, say $30-35 billion in 2023 dollars. Against this, the ANAO audit has noted that the final cost of constructing nine Hunters will now be more than $45 billion by an unspecified amount.

Likewise the $6 billion initial contract does NOT include construction of the first three Hunters but rather:

“the initial budget of $6 billion for the design activity to incorporate the Australian requirements, to conduct prototyping of ship blocks in the new shipyard under construction at Osborne in South Australia, and to order long-lead items for the first three ships.”

This was from:

https://www.defence.gov.au/project/hunter-class-frigate

 

[ngatimozart]

Totally agree. That's why I think the perfect vessel for the "corvette" role would be something like the Type 31. You'd get a vessel similar to a corvette in cost, armament and manning level, but with a >7000NM range, 60 day endurance and with multiple mission spaces allowing for mission flexibility.

Best of all, if the need arises, they are one upgrade away from being a front line frigate, with 32 strike length Mk 41 VLS cells, 16 x SSM, etc.

Ok lets sort this out. The Type 31 is not a corvette. It is a GP frigate. With the loadout you suggest that makes it a high end frigate and you are already building those. A corvette isn't intended to take on an enemy main fleet. It is used in secondary areas, such as convoy escort and patrol in order to free up frigates for the main combat force. Hence corvettes can be built faster and cheaper than frigates and you can use them to bulk out your fleet, letting the high capability assets concentrate on their core mission.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

I have some questions of my own about the Hunter Class for anyone who knows:

1. The ADF webpage I quoted said of timing “December 2022: Steel cut on the First of Class at Osborne Naval Shipyard - South in Adelaide”. However the ANAO audit says that the Hunter program is now running 16 to 18 months late. Does that mean first steel has not yet been cut on Hunter?

2. What is the construction drumbeat for the Hunters? The 8 Anzacs were all launched within 10 years between 1996 and 2006. Can Hunters match that? If launch of Hunter (1) slips from 2031 to 2032 Anzac will be 36 years old. Unless the eighth Hunter is in the water by 2042, the eighth Anzac will be eve; older when it gets replaced. So does anyone know what drumbeat is planned?

3. The growth in Hunter class tonnage due to the addition of the bigger radar and other systems has been widely reported. Wikipedia (sorry I know) lists tonnage as 10,000 tonnes full load compared to 8000 tonnes full load for the Type 26. The engines for the Hunter, Type 26 and RCN CSC ae all listed as the same:

• 4 × Rolls-Royce MTU Type 20V 4000 M53B high-speed diesel generators

So to me the obvious question is will RAN Hunters have the same range and speed as Type 26 if they are 25% heavier but have the same engines? I assume a few knots of top speed does not matter that much for an ASW ship but what about the range? That must matter a lot for the RAN.

I have been following this thread and reading people’s posts on the Hunters. At this stage I would not like to see anything delay the start of construction further.

From my comments on timing and drumbeat I am concerned that if we are late replacing Anzacs as well as subs we may not have an ASW “capability gap” as such, but there must be some risk we will start losing numbers of experienced seagoing crews? I assume these will then be hard to rebuild. Is there any prospect of additional destroyer/frigate construction as a “catch up”?

Navantia made an offer to build another 3 AWDs at a competitive price ($6 billion) by 2030 to avoid this gap. Assuming that was in addition to, not instead of Hunters, is this not worth pursuing? Otherwise I don’t see how we can make up the time lost without the (“tier 1”) fleet of major vessels (frigates and destroyers) shrinking in the 2030s. Could Henderson build some AWDs (with Spanish help) while Adelaide continued with Hunters?

 

[Systems Adict]

Navantia made an offer to build another 3 AWDs at a competitive price ($6 billion) by 2030 to avoid this gap. Assuming that was in addition to, not instead of Hunters, is this not worth pursuing? Otherwise I don’t see how we can make up the time lost without the (“tier 1”) fleet of major vessels (frigates and destroyers) shrinking in the 2030s. Could Henderson build some AWDs (with Spanish help) while Adelaide continued with Hunters?

I have narrowed out this point very specifically, to make comment.

It is my understanding that Navantia put the offer in as A - they have limited workload for the shipyards in Spain. B- That the ships would be built & fitted out there, with minimal work in AUS once they arrived.

The reality of this is two-fold
#1 -Navantia can build the ships CHEAPER in Spain, so would make a lot of money off the contract.
#2 - The skills learned by the workforce if the ships were built in AUS (plus any monies spent on materials / along with the fact that the workforce & suppliers then spend that cash in AUS, keeping the money & taxes in-country) benefits AUS.

The point I'm tryuing to make is that AUS pays a lot of money for x3 ships, but doesn't gain as much in return, in effect it would cost the country more. This might be part of the main socio-economic/ political drive to ignore the offer & keep everything effectively in-house.

SA