Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

Dear Mods...can we pin this para, please?



It has made me unpopular among certain areas, but I agree 100% I think that the pursuit of AShM for Land Forces is a waste of time and effort. Mainly for the three points you have very clearly outlined. But, some green-suiter's just don't like being dosed with reality. The last point is actually really important, I remember a PWO looking aghast when a LTCOL explained that AShM were always accurate and would have no problems discriminating in something like the Straits of Malacca. When the PWO explained how a AGM-84 seeker worked the LTCOL's response was 'and....?'

I think it is a distraction from our core business. If the RAN thinks an additional 4 or 8 missiles will aid their strike, then add FFG or use another P-8. Leave the maritime domain to the maritime experts.

This is where I see corvettes fitting.

Once you have accepted the cost of the missiles, sensors, associated support and defensive overheads required for truck mounted missiles, wouldn't it be easier just to mount the same missiles on corvettes?

 

[ADMk2]

All the core capabilities are proceeding, just not all of them are going to result in the numbers originally projected.

As none of these were going to be providing anything in the next few years, the effect out until then is negligible.

What matters is what new capabilities with now be funded.

Off the top of my head, there are no ‘new’ capabilities being funded under DSR. Every single thing in it, was already ‘in’ the IIP...

The big ticket items - HIMARS, Littoral Maneuver, Medium ranged AD, all had Gate 1 approval before the ALP were even elected.

The spin of course is that many if those projects weren’t funded by the previous government, in some sort of suggestion that the additional 2 budgets a re-election LNP would have had, as the ALP has had, wouldn’t have resulted in budget being allocated to approved projects, which of course is an absurd position.

The irony of course, is that many of them are not being funded now, as Gov has not accepted the DSR recommendation to increase budget provision and has in it’s own words re-directed existing funding…

 

[Bob53]

Just an ABC article on top of that, which includes a number of influential quotes.

How Australia was left with only one deployable submarine

Until Australia's submarine fleet can go nuclear the navy must keep its near-retirement vessels deployable. It's been a struggle.

www.abc.net.au

I would like to see how people in British and US circles would be reacting to this at the moment.

I can see this being immensely damaging - to recruiting sailors, to building a workforce, to our allies and to our intent to appear as a capable nuclear steward.

Yes we can count on the ABC to under mine the ADF. I want my $37 a year back.

 

[devo99]

As I had mentioned previously, I foresee some fairly significant potential problems with attempting to use land-based AShM in an Australian context.

I can see the USMC having some of the same issues under some circumstances, but people seem to mistakenly see what the USMC is doing and conflate that with something that the ADF can or should do. In reality, the USMC can do things which the ADF just cannot, whether people like this fact or not. The USMC is ~3x the size of the ADF, and the USMC is only one of the six branches of the US armed forces. The overall size of the US armed forces on active duty is over 20x that of the active component of the ADF. What this means is that some of the issues which the ADF would likely encounter, attempting anti-access/area denial tactics using land-based AShM could be mitigated or overcome by other elements of the US armed forces.

Again, this has to due with likely problems attempting to utilize land-based AShM in an Australian context.

One of the first and most obvious issues I see is where could such an Australian system be based/operate from whilst delivering an actual useful capability? Some could of course be based in mainland Australia and potentially make attacks upon Australian facilities more difficult or dangerous, but there are no real chokepoints within reach, particularly if using AShM like NSM or the like. Attempting to field extreme range (1,000+ km AShM has it's own, additional problems). What this issue of where useful launch sites are located introduces is the need for the ADF to have the ability to rapidly lift and deploy such launchers and associated kit away from Australia. Such an expeditionary capability would need to be able to be carried out both rapidly, and potentially against forces already in place requiring opposed landings. Further, since this would be an expeditionary deployment into hostile/opposed territory, Australia would need to be able to support and sustain the expeditionary force with an adequate logistical train when there would likely be multiple ways and opportunities for hostile forces to cut the supply lines.

Secondly, an expeditionary battery of AShM would require protection from attacking hostile forces which could be land, air, sea or even undersea. This means that such an expeditionary forces by necessity becomes even larger and requiring both more assets to carry out the initial lift and deployment, but also a larger logistical train to move the increased amount of supplies and personnel required. Such an increase in the size of an expeditionary deployment would also mean that Australia could only manage to carry out and sustain a few or perhaps even only a single such deployment.

Thirdly, Australia would likely have ISR issues which would limit the ability of the ADF to make effective use of OTH land-based AShM. If such missiles were of very long or extreme range (1,000+ km, etc.) Australia's sensor footprint problem would just get worse. After all, even if Australia could land and then sustain an AShM battery somewhere in the nearby archipelagoes, such a missile battery would be useless without an asset which could detect and then provide targeting data for the battery to fire upon. Assuming a chokepoint launch site was in Malaysia, Indonesia or the Philippines, would the ADF have the capability to constantly maintain ISR surveillance of the chokepoint which by necessity would be some distance from Australia. The ISR assets would need to be able to monitor the chokepoint, ID what is transiting through said chokepoint, and then deliver sufficiently accurate targeting data for AShM launches. Australia does possess systems which can give an awareness of something transiting through some of the chokepoints to the north, but AFAIK these systems cannot determine what is transiting, i.e. is that a tanker transiting the Malacca Strait, or an LHD belonging to a hostile power? Which then raises the question of whether the current and planned long-range ISR assets of the ADF would be sufficient to provide the necessary sensor coverage to make a deployed AShM battery expedition useful, particularly when one remembers that those assets would not be solely available to support the expedition.

You raise many valid points which I have no answer to, so I concede on this one.

 

[old faithful]

Yes we can count on the ABC to under mine the ADF. I want my $37 a year back.

Claim it on tax! For me, funding the ABC is insulting. It's like making a black man fund the KKK through his taxes.

 

[Volkodav]

Off the top of my head, there are no ‘new’ capabilities being funded under DSR. Every single thing in it, was already ‘in’ the IIP...

The big ticket items - HIMARS, Littoral Maneuver, Medium ranged AD, all had Gate 1 approval before the ALP were even elected.

The spin of course is that many if those projects weren’t funded by the previous government, in some sort of suggestion that the additional 2 budgets a re-election LNP would have had, as the ALP has had, wouldn’t have resulted in budget being allocated to approved projects, which of course is an absurd position.

The irony of course, is that many of them are not being funded now, as Gov has not accepted the DSR recommendation to increase budget provision and has in it’s own words re-directed existing funding…

That's not the purpose of the DSR, it is a high level strategic paper, not a shopping list.

This is where we have been struggling for years, government after government has been anouncing details and solutions without referencing the strategy driving it.

We are getting x number y, at this cost, in this time frame, with z local content, etc. But no explanation of where the requirement came from.

This has changed in recent years, the previous government started explaining why, initially as they released the details, then they moved to explaining why well before the details were realeased. The current government is following this example.

For quite some time there have been a lot of captain's picks, some even had brand new selection processes developed after their announcement, to justify them. Ironically the "competitive evaluation process" set up to rubber stamp the Japanese option, and inadvertently resulted in the now cancelled French option.

Then there was the bastardisation of the Kinaird procurement process, designed to streamline the acquisition of "off the shelf" equipment, i.e. do we buy a bespoke Oshkosh truck, unique to the ADF, or do we buy a commercial Hino?

This was twisted to select a destroyer and resulted in a number of superior options being eliminated. It could easily be argued that the Flight IIA Burke was the best "existing option", while the F-100 would have been much better if Navantia had been allowed to "evolve" the design as they offered.

If they actually had a strategy to refer to, i.e. why are we acquiring these ships, and what do they need to be able to do, Kinaird would never have been applied.

As we stand, most of what was going to be acquired is still being acquired. Numbers have and may change, but more detailed processes are now underway to determine future requirements and how best to meet them.

This is how it is meant to work, strategy, followed by requirements, followed by selection of equipment based on the requirements.

 

[Milne Bay]

Yes we can count on the ABC to under mine the ADF. I want my $37 a year back.

What, in the article from the ABC, is untrue?
Can you please elaborate.
MB

 

[Volkodav]

What, in the article from the ABC, is untrue?
Can you please elaborate.
MB

The article was good, fair, evenhanded, the show was a wank fest by a self important wanker who thinks he's a journalist. This clown would actually be a better fit on ACA chasing dodgy tradies, because that was about the level of his interviewing technique.

@Volkodav Be mindful of the language please.

Ngatimozart.

 

[Bob53]

This is where I see corvettes fitting.

Once you have accepted the cost of the missiles, sensors, associated support and defensive overheads required for truck mounted missiles, wouldn't it be easier just to mount the same missiles on corvettes?

But wouldn’t availability count against that? I would expect ship availability vs truck availability would be much lower meaning that for 20 systems we might only have 6-10 available at any one time.

As to the missile range I think longer range provides greater flexibility. If you have a 1000 km missile and only send it 600 km to target you have still outraged the 240km missile option.

 

[Bob53]

What, in the article from the ABC, is untrue?
Can you please elaborate.
MB

I haven’t said it’s untrue. What they will look for is a poor performance and blow it out of the water in an effort to( my opinion) to undermine the ADF.They have done it time and time again. The reasons provided for the issues with sub availability are genuine and while not desirable, they can be understood. This was dressed us as incompetence in the report.

 

[Volkodav]

But wouldn’t availability count against that? I would expect ship availability vs truck availability would be much lower meaning that for 20 systems we might only have 6-10 available at any one time.

As to the missile range I think longer range provides greater flexibility. If you have a 1000 km missile and only send it 600 km to target you have still outraged the 240km missile option.

Even truck based it is a system. Having nine out of ten trucks available means nothing if the one that isn't available is carrying the targeting equipment.

 

[Trackmaster]

The article was good, fair, evenhanded, the show was a wank fest by a self important wanker who thinks he's a journalist. This clown would actually be a better fit on ACA chasing dodgy tradies, because that was about the level of his interviewing technique.

They lost me when they did a sail-by of the ASC facilities and were challenged by security.
They then wasted two minutes on the "don't you know who I am? I'm from the ABC" nonsense.
Straight out of the ACA playbook.

 

[Todjaeger]

Even truck based it is a system. Having nine out of ten trucks available means nothing if the one that isn't available is carrying the targeting equipment.

Of if the sensor systems are offboard on another asset, and that asset is unavailable when & where needed.

 

[Maranoa]

Which nations would happily allow us to use their islands to base our Land Based Anti Ship Missile capability? Indonesia? Papua New Guinea? Perhaps the Solomons?

 

[Takao]

However a SSM on the back of a small truck could be anywhere, making it a tad more difficult to find and eliminate. This is the basis of the USMC A2AD plan. They intend to insert small covert teams into various islands and resupply using small ships <4,000 ton displacement. The targeting info is received from off island assets, such as F-35, P-8A, HALE or MALE UAV etc. In an archipelago this could prove to be quite a good deterrent, closing off very large areas to enemy naval surface forces. This could work very well in both the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos.

Personally, I think the USMC concept you describe is one of the least thought through concepts I've ever seen, and is the absolute last model I would want to follow.

First off, insert with what? A C-130 needs a runway, and is detectable by a number of sensors. A amphib is slow, and detectable by a number of sensors. The later is especially notable as the LAW's planned speed is 15 kt! How is that going to get around unnoticed? I cannot help but look at the IJN efforts with the Tokyo Express - most runs were identified (although not all were intercepted) with 1942 technology, the LAW will be half their speed and twice their size.

Now, when are the launchers being snuck ashore? Too early and you risk being cut-off or detected or irrelevant, too late and you can't sneak or are identified. With an ATG cruising at 20 - 25 kt and a SAG cruising at 30 - 32 kt, you have a small window. The further away your island is, the smaller this window gets. And the more pointless - if you expect a SAG through the Straits of Malacca and your nearest forces are Australia, do you sneak a AShM Tp ashore with a 15 kt amphib or do you just scramble a flight of F-35 or F/A-18E?

How long are these missiles going to be in location? Assume they can carry 7 DOS, what happens at Day 8? Noting the awesome speed of 15 kt, just how far is the LAW range from Darwin in 3 days? What is the resupply plan? What is the casualty plan? Remember, in SE Asia, non-battle casualties are likely to outnumber battle casualties, and are always present.

Now, what is the AShM Tp? Is it just a couple of launchers? Is it sensors? There are going to be some comms (which, by the way, blows stealth out the window). They are going to need some local security, probably a Coy or so. That's now 2x LAWs (with increased risk of detection) and 100-150 peeps dangling. There is also an increased signature, making them more susceptible to detection. The probably should be motorised at least, to enable moving from the beach, but that increases the logistic bill too. I know they talk about small teams, but a Coy is a small team for the USMC. It's also about the minimum you'd need - and remember that AShM are reasonably valuable elements of the force - they need that protection. Plus it'll be anti-ground and anti-air defence.

Taking the note that the targeting will be via other means, P-8 etc, every single one of those means is faster to react and better suited. Why spend hundreds of millions of AShM when you could by some additional missiles for the Super's or P-8s? If we go integral targeting, that's an emissions signature and a half - that'll get a response.

Now, what are the missiles? NSM is pretty easy, it's a Bushmaster sized vehicle. It'll be easy to move around a LAW and pretty easy to move around regional terrain. But, what if the missile is bigger? A Tomahawk ground launcher is longer than a HX-77 semi-trailer. That's going to be a dog to get around some places. The hypersonic fetish? Those missiles and trucks are even bigger. And just how stealthy am I in putting a Coy ashore with 2-4 massive semi-trailers?

Then there is extraction. Having fired 4 - 8 missiles (a paltry amount against any escort that has a couple of DDG or FFG) that's a pretty big signature. How are those forces getting out? A 15 kt ship?

Beyond that, where are these REDFOR ships sailing? Even the IJN stuck with reasonably known routes and didn't go through the small gaps - large chunks of their captured territory was just left alone. So, if you are REDFOR and you know where your convoys are operating, you can identify likely BLUEFOR AShM sites and pre-emptively supress them. There are not going to be many. Furthermore, anything that has a C-130-capable stretch of land is getting visited to prevent that happening.... The Tokyo Express happens because the IJN and USMC force a battle at Guadalcanal. There is a reason to be putting amphib forces ashore. If you don't need to be there, why would you go there?

The USMC concept is pretty flawed. It was held in high regard in AHQ in the late 10s until we started asking these questions. Frankly, I don't think is viable at all, for a small force like the ADF I suggest it's borderline criminal (if actually put into action and have deaths) or fraud (in peacetime).

 

[protoplasm]

The thing that gets me with the whole concept is that you have effectors that need to be moved around by ship and defended whilst en route and once in place. The movement is by ship to an island so that you are in a position to enact a missile attack against naval assets. It sounds a bit like reinventing the wheel, because we already know what this total system is, it's called a warship.

People just get sticker shock over the price of the total system that is the warship because you pay for it in one lot, but overall you aren't gaining much by the time you add up all of the logistics costs, the sensors needed to cue the effectors, and the costs of all the other elements needed to defend the total system.

It is true that the one advantage an island has is that you can't sink it, but that also goes the other way, you can't move it, all you can do is bring the system to the island or take it away, and that assumes the country responsible for the island actually allows us to be there.

This isn't supposed to be a pro-RAN post (to the detriment of other services), but it just seems like a flawed way of going about it. As Takao points out, as soon as the missiles get bigger than NSM this becomes a really complex exercise to move them around and support them. Or you could just put the missile in a VLS cell and move the launching vessel to where it's needed.

HINT, HINT - This is why any RAN warship needs to be big enough to carry basic defenses for itself for AAW, ASuW and ASW, as well as have enough range to get to a place where it can be effective, and the endurance to persist, and the space to carry enough effectors to be worthwhile.

 

[NewOzMember]

Interesting discussion lately; I rarely watch Defence related videos on YouTube and find most a total waste of time; this guy however is the exception, it's the best presentation by far of the A2/AD and how it may apply to Australia that I have seen. Many of his other videos are also thoroughly reasearched which each point made backed up by sources, which is rare for Youtube to say the least;

 

[Bob53]

Even truck based it is a system. Having nine out of ten trucks available means nothing if the one that isn't available is carrying the targeting equipment.

Yes I understand that but you follow my logic right? In the case you have mentioned…I would think targeting is coming from P8,:F35, Wedgetails or other assets. I can’t see how a truck mounted system could be providing targeting data for a 300 or. 1000km missile…

 

[knightrider4]

Personally, I think the USMC concept you describe is one of the least thought through concepts I've ever seen, and is the absolute last model I would want to follow.

First off, insert with what? A C-130 needs a runway, and is detectable by a number of sensors. A amphib is slow, and detectable by a number of sensors. The later is especially notable as the LAW's planned speed is 15 kt! How is that going to get around unnoticed? I cannot help but look at the IJN efforts with the Tokyo Express - most runs were identified (although not all were intercepted) with 1942 technology, the LAW will be half their speed and twice their size.

Now, when are the launchers being snuck ashore? Too early and you risk being cut-off or detected or irrelevant, too late and you can't sneak or are identified. With an ATG cruising at 20 - 25 kt and a SAG cruising at 30 - 32 kt, you have a small window. The further away your island is, the smaller this window gets. And the more pointless - if you expect a SAG through the Straits of Malacca and your nearest forces are Australia, do you sneak a AShM Tp ashore with a 15 kt amphib or do you just scramble a flight of F-35 or F/A-18E?

How long are these missiles going to be in location? Assume they can carry 7 DOS, what happens at Day 8? Noting the awesome speed of 15 kt, just how far is the LAW range from Darwin in 3 days? What is the resupply plan? What is the casualty plan? Remember, in SE Asia, non-battle casualties are likely to outnumber battle casualties, and are always present.

Now, what is the AShM Tp? Is it just a couple of launchers? Is it sensors? There are going to be some comms (which, by the way, blows stealth out the window). They are going to need some local security, probably a Coy or so. That's now 2x LAWs (with increased risk of detection) and 100-150 peeps dangling. There is also an increased signature, making them more susceptible to detection. The probably should be motorised at least, to enable moving from the beach, but that increases the logistic bill too. I know they talk about small teams, but a Coy is a small team for the USMC. It's also about the minimum you'd need - and remember that AShM are reasonably valuable elements of the force - they need that protection. Plus it'll be anti-ground and anti-air defence.

Taking the note that the targeting will be via other means, P-8 etc, every single one of those means is faster to react and better suited. Why spend hundreds of millions of AShM when you could by some additional missiles for the Super's or P-8s? If we go integral targeting, that's an emissions signature and a half - that'll get a response.

Now, what are the missiles? NSM is pretty easy, it's a Bushmaster sized vehicle. It'll be easy to move around a LAW and pretty easy to move around regional terrain. But, what if the missile is bigger? A Tomahawk ground launcher is longer than a HX-77 semi-trailer. That's going to be a dog to get around some places. The hypersonic fetish? Those missiles and trucks are even bigger. And just how stealthy am I in putting a Coy ashore with 2-4 massive semi-trailers?

Then there is extraction. Having fired 4 - 8 missiles (a paltry amount against any escort that has a couple of DDG or FFG) that's a pretty big signature. How are those forces getting out? A 15 kt ship?

Beyond that, where are these REDFOR ships sailing? Even the IJN stuck with reasonably known routes and didn't go through the small gaps - large chunks of their captured territory was just left alone. So, if you are REDFOR and you know where your convoys are operating, you can identify likely BLUEFOR AShM sites and pre-emptively supress them. There are not going to be many. Furthermore, anything that has a C-130-capable stretch of land is getting visited to prevent that happening.... The Tokyo Express happens because the IJN and USMC force a battle at Guadalcanal. There is a reason to be putting amphib forces ashore. If you don't need to be there, why would you go there?

The USMC concept is pretty flawed. It was held in high regard in AHQ in the late 10s until we started asking these questions. Frankly, I don't think is viable at all, for a small force like the ADF I suggest it's borderline criminal (if actually put into action and have deaths) or fraud (in peacetime).

One of the most sensible posts.

 

[Bob53]

Personally, I think the USMC concept you describe is one of the least thought through concepts I've ever seen, and is the absolute last model I would want to follow.

First off, insert with what? A C-130 needs a runway, and is detectable by a number of sensors. A amphib is slow, and detectable by a number of sensors. The later is especially notable as the LAW's planned speed is 15 kt! How is that going to get around unnoticed? I cannot help but look at the IJN efforts with the Tokyo Express - most runs were identified (although not all were intercepted) with 1942 technology, the LAW will be half their speed and twice their size.

Now, when are the launchers being snuck ashore? Too early and you risk being cut-off or detected or irrelevant, too late and you can't sneak or are identified. With an ATG cruising at 20 - 25 kt and a SAG cruising at 30 - 32 kt, you have a small window. The further away your island is, the smaller this window gets. And the more pointless - if you expect a SAG through the Straits of Malacca and your nearest forces are Australia, do you sneak a AShM Tp ashore with a 15 kt amphib or do you just scramble a flight of F-35 or F/A-18E?

How long are these missiles going to be in location? Assume they can carry 7 DOS, what happens at Day 8? Noting the awesome speed of 15 kt, just how far is the LAW range from Darwin in 3 days? What is the resupply plan? What is the casualty plan? Remember, in SE Asia, non-battle casualties are likely to outnumber battle casualties, and are always present.

Now, what is the AShM Tp? Is it just a couple of launchers? Is it sensors? There are going to be some comms (which, by the way, blows stealth out the window). They are going to need some local security, probably a Coy or so. That's now 2x LAWs (with increased risk of detection) and 100-150 peeps dangling. There is also an increased signature, making them more susceptible to detection. The probably should be motorised at least, to enable moving from the beach, but that increases the logistic bill too. I know they talk about small teams, but a Coy is a small team for the USMC. It's also about the minimum you'd need - and remember that AShM are reasonably valuable elements of the force - they need that protection. Plus it'll be anti-ground and anti-air defence.

Taking the note that the targeting will be via other means, P-8 etc, every single one of those means is faster to react and better suited. Why spend hundreds of millions of AShM when you could by some additional missiles for the Super's or P-8s? If we go integral targeting, that's an emissions signature and a half - that'll get a response.

Now, what are the missiles? NSM is pretty easy, it's a Bushmaster sized vehicle. It'll be easy to move around a LAW and pretty easy to move around regional terrain. But, what if the missile is bigger? A Tomahawk ground launcher is longer than a HX-77 semi-trailer. That's going to be a dog to get around some places. The hypersonic fetish? Those missiles and trucks are even bigger. And just how stealthy am I in putting a Coy ashore with 2-4 massive semi-trailers?

Then there is extraction. Having fired 4 - 8 missiles (a paltry amount against any escort that has a couple of DDG or FFG) that's a pretty big signature. How are those forces getting out? A 15 kt ship?

Beyond that, where are these REDFOR ships sailing? Even the IJN stuck with reasonably known routes and didn't go through the small gaps - large chunks of their captured territory was just left alone. So, if you are REDFOR and you know where your convoys are operating, you can identify likely BLUEFOR AShM sites and pre-emptively supress them. There are not going to be many. Furthermore, anything that has a C-130-capable stretch of land is getting visited to prevent that happening.... The Tokyo Express happens because the IJN and USMC force a battle at Guadalcanal. There is a reason to be putting amphib forces ashore. If you don't need to be there, why would you go there?

The USMC concept is pretty flawed. It was held in high regard in AHQ in the late 10s until we started asking these questions. Frankly, I don't think is viable at all, for a small force like the ADF I suggest it's borderline criminal (if actually put into action and have deaths) or fraud (in peacetime).

After reading the posts from yourself and Volk I have come to the conclusion that a shore based system is a worthwhile asset but should not be our primary Anti Ship Area denial capability. That should come from ships, subs and RAAF.

This then leads me to what becomes of the role for the army? If they don’t look after land based AAM, we have only a small Shore based ASM missile capability and a significantly reduced IFV and SPH numbers … the Army starts to look like an after thought.