Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

Are you taking about the ADF or the set up on this forum?

You really are a bit special aren't you. You come in here and start telling actual defence professionals to suck eggs, then your feelings get hurt and you start acting like a petulant child.

Push the mods and you will be gone, don't doubt it.

It's not too late, pull your head in, stop sniping at people and they will let you stay and join the discussion when the announcements start coming out. Up to you.

 

[old faithful]

In many ways defence seems to be undermining those who want careers. They look for unicorns then end up settling for what they can get, after discouraging many who really wanted a career from joining at all.

They then allow self appointed gate keepers to shaft anyone they deem doesn't fit. Whether someone who is good enough and wants a career, actually gets a career, often comes down to the luck of the draw of who their immediate supervisor is.

I would say that this comment is pretty fair and accurate.

 

[Massive]

The ADF is currently undermanned by 3000 personnel and the RAN has critical shortages within multiple categories including the comms & intel branches which is impacting on operational availability of MFUs while competing against private industry which is paying salaries $20K above ADF pay rates. So yes, crewing WOULD be an issue for your statement.

Thanks DDG.

To what extent is the RAN looking at automation to reduce crew numbers.

Just reflecting on the JMSDF and RSN approach to this and am interested in the RAN's stance.

More broadly though, I would have thought that it would not take much make a job in the RAN more attractive regardless of the $20k pay gap - my question would be whether the relevant leaders know what it would take and have the capability to make it happen.

Regards,

Massive

 

[DDG38]

Thanks DDG.
To what extent is the RAN looking at automation to reduce crew numbers.
Just reflecting on the JMSDF and RSN approach to this and am interested in the RAN's stance.
More broadly though, I would have thought that it would not take much make a job in the RAN more attractive regardless of the $20k pay gap - my question would be whether the relevant leaders know what it would take and have the capability to make it happen.
Regards,
Massive

Automation is not a panacea. The problem with reducing crew numbers beyond a certain point is that when the ship is at sea in company with other ships, a whole ship evolution literally becomes a whole ship evolution. When conducting things like a RAS every single member of ship's company has be involved (this was a lesson learned with the ANZACs), so there still needs to be a balance struck when trying to keep crew numbers down.
I'm sure lots of meetings/discussions/committees are being held to try and solve the recruitment issue, but at the end of the day, Navy life is unique in that you live and work in a dangerous environment for months on end so making it look attractive is a challenge.

 

[Todjaeger]

Automation is not a panacea. The problem with reducing crew numbers beyond a certain point is that when the ship is at sea in company with other ships, a whole ship evolution literally becomes a whole ship evolution. When conducting things like a RAS every single member of ship's company has be involved (this was a lesson learned with the ANZACs), so there still needs to be a balance struck when trying to keep crew numbers down.
I'm sure lots of meetings/discussions/committees are being held to try and solve the recruitment issue, but at the end of the day, Navy life is unique in that you live and work in a dangerous environment for months on end so making it look attractive is a challenge.

Not navy, but working in emergency services has given me a fair insight into what can happen when things go wrong.

This in turn has me somewhat wary about attempting to automate a vessel too much to reduce the crew size. In non-naval vessels, systems fail from time to time. In naval vessels which are intended to go into harms way there is even more potential for a catastrophic event causing (or caused by) a failure. A crew which is aboard a vessel that is highly automated might not have sufficient bodies to respond or manage ship systems in the event of a major automation failure and/or battle damage causing automation to fail.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

Thanks DDG.

To what extent is the RAN looking at automation to reduce crew numbers.

Just reflecting on the JMSDF and RSN approach to this and am interested in the RAN's stance.

More broadly though, I would have thought that it would not take much make a job in the RAN more attractive regardless of the $20k pay gap - my question would be whether the relevant leaders know what it would take and have the capability to make it happen.

Regards,

Massive

Automation is already used heavily in navy ships. Today’s warships have crews half the number of equivalent sized warships back in Vietnam War days (say 150 vs 300+) and probably a third of WWII crews, when you consider an 8000 ton “frigate” is the size of a WWII light cruiser which would have had a crew of 500+. French Suffren SSNs are down to crews of 60, which is amazing for an SSN with nuclear reactor requiring multiple watches on the reactor operation.

As others have said, automation has its limits. Automation does simple predictable tasks well. Modern merchant ships are down to crews of 15 to 20 for ships > 100,000 tonnes (Maersk E class crew 13, tonnage 170,000). Yet that means they only steer and watch the ship. Zero maintenance, never mind repairs, and loading operations by the dockside workforce. They do not launch and fly helicopters, launch and remotely operate drones, monitor sensors of multiple spectra (sonar, radar, MAD, EMR), track or fire multiple weapons, monitor coms, sat com… Attempts at things like autonomous cars is proving that creating a machine to make decisions in these context sensitive sorts of decision making is very difficult. People (highly trained) are needed to run them.

I personally think there is very little scope for further automation. Replacing ship systems with drones removes the decision making to be one step remote, but still needs a decision maker.

The USN experience with the LCS class proves the point IMO. Cutting crews below a certain level only harms reliability. Modern diesel engines are very reliable but ships still need maintenanc. Modern freighters with tiny crews are often run till they are worn out and scrapped. This may occur in under twenty years, so an even shorter timescale than warships are expected to last.

 

[Volkodav]

Automation is not a panacea. The problem with reducing crew numbers beyond a certain point is that when the ship is at sea in company with other ships, a whole ship evolution literally becomes a whole ship evolution. When conducting things like a RAS every single member of ship's company has be involved (this was a lesson learned with the ANZACs), so there still needs to be a balance struck when trying to keep crew numbers down.
I'm sure lots of meetings/discussions/committees are being held to try and solve the recruitment issue, but at the end of the day, Navy life is unique in that you live and work in a dangerous environment for months on end so making it look attractive is a challenge.

To me it's a no brainer. Increased lateral entry, pupillage, dump the return of service commitment and replace it with a reward for service one.

If someone has useful skills make it easy to enter and use those skills at an appropriate level, adapt their training to a master and apprentice / pupil style where they learn on the job from the person they are meant to replace. When they are ready they step up and their master is then promoted etc.

Once they have completed four years, six years, whatever, offer them a diploma/degree/post grad, that they do on the job so long as they stay. Then they become the master.

Be less judgemental about who is let in but make sure to keep the ones who workout through incentives, especially the ones who didn't look like a good fit to start but ended up doing well. If they do leave, make sure they join the reserve and stay current.

There are lots of people who wanted to join but because there were stuff all opportunities they had to find something else to do. Making them reset their lives, take hits in pay and seniority is just stupid.

When a charge qualified CPO, or even a technical Kellick leave they often get senior jobs in industry in engineering management. Make it work both ways, when a senior engineering or technical person expresses interest in joining, make it worth their while.

I was working with an ADF unit when a twenty something ADF techno said, "if you were a tradesman, you would know". ADF tends to judge your level of skill and knowledge by your rank, therefore, if you don't wear a uniform you have no knowledge or skill.

If the ADF want successful mid career and lateral entry, then they need to give these people a suitable level of seniority to insulate them from ignorance and stupidity. If they can let an infantry corporal without a trade transfer to RAEME and keep there rank and seniority while gaining the trade, they can sure as give seniority to qualified civilians. They aren't there the command battles they are there to make stuff work, as well as train and mentor junior members.

 

[Volkodav]

As for numbers, expand the gap year program to something more akin the old Ready Reserve Scheme. Get them in, give them a taste, then hopefully some transfer to the permanent force, or at least the reserves, while others can be sponsored to undertake training and certification on a traineeship or cadetship basis with guaranteed seniority on returning to full time service.

 

[ddxx]

I think It's interesting to note that according to the ANAO, Anzac's crew size has grown to 192.

Compared to modern General Purpose Frigates that's a huge number of personnel for a Frigate of Anzac's size and capabilities.

We also dedicate almost 500 personnel across the Supply Class AORs and Choules - which in the USN and RN would be either fully or mixed crewed with uniformed civilian mariners augmented by role specific specialists from the Navy proper.

And that's before we consider the number of fully trained active personnel tied up in performing what are essentially Coast Guard duties augmenting and somewhat overlapping with the ABF Marine Unit - this set up surely needs a comprehensive rethink.

For comparison it's very interesting to see what the Republic of Singapore Navy is able to crew and achieve with around 25% of our active workforce ...

 

[ngatimozart]

I totally agree in regards to quantity having a quality of its own without a doubt.

However, from what basis or evidence are you basing your claim that a variant of CEAFAR or the SAAB 9LV CMS would be more expensive than other options, not just upfront but through life?

The costs of integration between our weapons and these systems has already been covered, adding additional unique systems would not only require additional cost in integration but also in training and sustainment due to lack of commonality.

And all that is even before we consider both the net economic contribution and the crucial underlying value of sustaining and encouraging Australian Sovereign technology.

In that particular post I didn't mention CEAFAR and the SAAB 9LV CMS. I was speaking about hi tech vessels in general. Everyone loves the hi tech capabilities with all the bells and whistles but these capabilities have a cost in that because of their expense navies can afford few vessels and that reduces a navy's ability to project it's force spatially or sustain losses. Against an enemy that has many platforms that can be a considerable risk.

WRT CEAFAR and the SAAB 9LV CMS, they're uniquely Australian and I sometimes wonder if they are VfM (Value for Money). Look at the RCN LMC CMS300 that's used on Canadian and RNZN ships, and I think Chile may have gone with it (not 100% sure on that). The number of RCN & RNZN vessels using it, combined, are larger than the RAN fleet. I sometimes think that all of the FVEY navies should use the same CMS because it means cross decking is simpler with personnel regardless of their cap tallie prefix (HMS, HMAS, HMNZS etc.,), being trained on and experienced with the common system. Yes it's a big ask and I understand that the USN operate various CMS across its fleet.

Well during times of uncertainty such as these one would usually up the defence budget to pay for such capability.
Japan, South Korea and other nations have dramatically boosted spending.
The suggested vessels numbers for commissioning would only have 2 extra hulls compared to what the RAN have forecasted for the same period to build so crewing wouldnt be an issue with my statement.

How about providing facts to back up your statements, instead of skirting around the issue. Other posters have asked you to provide data to substantiate your claims and you avoid that. You are on a slippery slope WRT the Moderation team.

 

[Todjaeger]

I think It's interesting to note that according to the ANAO, Anzac's crew size has grown to 192.

Compared to modern General Purpose Frigates that's a huge number of personnel for a Frigate of Anzac's size and capabilities.

We also dedicate almost 500 personnel across the Supply Class AORs and Choules - which in the USN and RN would be either fully or mixed crewed with uniformed civilian mariners augmented by role specific specialists from the Navy proper.

And that's before we consider the number of fully trained active personnel tied up in performing what are essentially Coast Guard duties augmenting and somewhat overlapping with the ABF Marine Unit.

For comparison it's very interesting to see what the Republic of Singapore Navy is able to crew and achieve with around 25% of our active workforce ...

The crew complement of the Supply-class at ~120 is in line with the crew size used by various US Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels. The John Lewis-class replenishment oiler has a crew of ~99, and the Lewis and Clark-class (that is a mouthful, esp for a class name) dry cargo has a joint civ mariner/naval crew of ~135.

Also, whilst the RAN might operate HMAS Choules with a crew of ~158 vs. the RFA operate Bay-class LSD's with a core crew of ~70, however I would expect that number to increase for some operational deployments, otherwise why differentiate between a core vs. full crew. Looking at some of the classes in service with the USN, the Whidbey Island-class and Harpers Ferry-class LSD's have crew (not embarked Marines, but officers and crew) of ~330 and 420 respectively. Yes, the USN does crew vessels differently due at least in part to having a different philosophy on damage control and therefore requiring a larger crew, but it still shows that vessels with sealift roles tend to be crew intensive, certainly more so than a comparably sized merchant vessel. Of course this makes sense if one considers that merchant shipping is going to be from port facility to port facility so the civilian mariners do not have to handle the actual loading or unloading of their vessel in port.

 

[ddxx]

The crew complement of the Supply-class at ~120 is in line with the crew size used by various US Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels. The John Lewis-class replenishment oiler has a crew of ~99, and the Lewis and Clark-class (that is a mouthful, esp for a class name) dry cargo has a joint civ mariner/naval crew of ~135.

Also, whilst the RAN might operate HMAS Choules with a crew of ~158 vs. the RFA operate Bay-class LSD's with a core crew of ~70, however I would expect that number to increase for some operational deployments, otherwise why differentiate between a core vs. full crew. Looking at some of the classes in service with the USN, the Whidbey Island-class and Harpers Ferry-class LSD's have crew (not embarked Marines, but officers and crew) of ~330 and 420 respectively. Yes, the USN does crew vessels differently due at least in part to having a different philosophy on damage control and therefore requiring a larger crew, but it still shows that vessels with sealift roles tend to be crew intensive, certainly more so than a comparably sized merchant vessel. Of course this makes sense if one considers that merchant shipping is going to be from port facility to port facility so the civilian mariners do not have to handle the actual loading or unloading of their vessel in port.

A couple of articles I’ve seen quote the crew size of the Supply Class being quite a bit higher at 174. This figure sounded a bit ridiculous to me, so I do hope you’re right.

 

[Redlands18]

The crew complement of the Supply-class at ~120 is in line with the crew size used by various US Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels. The John Lewis-class replenishment oiler has a crew of ~99, and the Lewis and Clark-class (that is a mouthful, esp for a class name) dry cargo has a joint civ mariner/naval crew of ~135.

Also, whilst the RAN might operate HMAS Choules with a crew of ~158 vs. the RFA operate Bay-class LSD's with a core crew of ~70, however I would expect that number to increase for some operational deployments, otherwise why differentiate between a core vs. full crew. Looking at some of the classes in service with the USN, the Whidbey Island-class and Harpers Ferry-class LSD's have crew (not embarked Marines, but officers and crew) of ~330 and 420 respectively. Yes, the USN does crew vessels differently due at least in part to having a different philosophy on damage control and therefore requiring a larger crew, but it still shows that vessels with sealift roles tend to be crew intensive, certainly more so than a comparably sized merchant vessel. Of course this makes sense if one considers that merchant shipping is going to be from port facility to port facility so the civilian mariners do not have to handle the actual loading or unloading of their vessel in port.

Amphibious Assault Ship (LHD) | Royal Australian Navy
For comparison The Canberra's carry a ships crew of around 400, including Watercraft and Flight Deck Crews. that compares to around 1000 for a USN Wasp.

 

[justinterested]

There was an article in the Guardian that stated that last June the chief of the ADF, Gen Angus Campbell, told the royal commission into defence and veteran suicide the ADF had begun considering candidates with a marginally higher psychological risk indicator for certain roles, to help fill gaps left by an increasing rate of soldiers discharging.
Apparently, in the 12 months to May 2022, the army lost 13% of its workforce while the navy and RAAF lost 9.3% and 8.7% respectively.
It must be a challenging problem to retain employees in the ADF and to increase the intake whilst at the same time screening out unsuitable candidates.

 

[buffy9]

There was an article in the Guardian that stated that last June the chief of the ADF, Gen Angus Campbell, told the royal commission into defence and veteran suicide the ADF had begun considering candidates with a marginally higher psychological risk indicator for certain roles, to help fill gaps left by an increasing rate of soldiers discharging.
Apparently, in the 12 months to May 2022, the army lost 13% of its workforce while the navy and RAAF lost 9.3% and 8.7% respectively.
It must be a challenging problem to retain employees in the ADF and to increase the intake whilst at the same time screening out unsuitable candidates.

Although it doesn't provide any earlier figures to compare with, I can definitely see why people may be choosing to discharge once their service is complete.

COVID and DACC tasks (including COVID assist) over the past few years may have had a significant impact on Defence. Extended naval deployments without being allowed ashore, being deployed to assist for bushfires, floods, covid and aged care, without doing exercises or courses while still being away from family if you have one. I can certainly see why the discharge rate would be higher than usual.

I don't think there is an easy solution. Paying people more can work, but Defence can't necessarily compete with some private indistry in terms of pay - and ideas of service and duty may not mean what they once did, less it can be reinvigorated.

 

[old faithful]

Although it doesn't provide any earlier figures to compare with, I can definitely see why people may be choosing to discharge once their service is complete.

COVID and DACC tasks (including COVID assist) over the past few years may have had a significant impact on Defence. Extended naval deployments without being allowed ashore, being deployed to assist for bushfires, floods, covid and aged care, without doing exercises or courses while still being away from family if you have one. I can certainly see why the discharge rate would be higher than usual.

I don't think there is an easy solution. Paying people more can work, but Defence can't necessarily compete with some private indistry in terms of pay - and ideas of service and duty may not mean what they once did, less it can be reinvigorated.

I have suggested in the past, that rather than giving pay increases, give tax incentives to those that choose to stay on. Do this in increments. Reduce income tax after 4 years, 6 years, 10 years service etc. This amounts to more money in the pocket, while only effecting 30 to 80,000 Australians maximum. Not a burden on the economy at all.

 

[seaspear]

Would an incentive be that the skills based training provided for free be changed that it is incentive based on length of service otherwise the cost of training is passed as a type of HECS fee ? This might address some headhunting of specific skilled individuals by industry

 

[icelord]

Worth noting for RFA and USNS ships, they add a complement of Royal Marines and USN Security personnel respectively when deployed outside of their waters.

Within RAN, these roles are taken on by ships company

 

[Scott Elaurant]

On AUKUS submarines there was a story in the Australian on Tuesday (sorry I can’t link it) called:

Australia to train 2000 workers for Submarines by Jacquelin Magnay

”Australia will train 2000 workers in the next five years as part of the AUKUS submarine project, many of whom will rotate through the pact’s three shipyards in the United States and United Kingdom to gain valuable training.

Defence Industry minister Pat Conroy this week visited the British submarine shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness – where worker numbers are rising from 10,000 to 16,000 with a 1000 new workers added each year, partly to prepare for the new AUKUS produced nuclear propelled submarine.

Details about the AUKUS submarine are expected to be announced in the coming weeks in Washington. It is believed major sections of the first subs may be built in the United Kingdom as Australian workers gain experience in building the submarine, while the nuclear propulsion will be a self-contained modular nuclear power unit built by the United States.”

If the construction and timing is as promised, this would be a good outcome. Both the timing and the UK work component suggest it will be a UK design, either a modified Astute with US S9G reactor in place of the PWR2, or an SSNR design that is not greatly different to Astutes and complete much sooner than assumed previously. I can’t imagine Australia would be sending 2000 workers to UK to learn to build a US design at Barrow. Personally if the RAN ended up with eight SSNs of a modified Astute design with S9G reactor I’d be delighted and relieved.

No other source to quote except the Australian article. They do quote the Federal Minister on the workforce arrangements.

 

[Volkodav]

Trading an Anzac for a Hobart class type ship I get. You get way more firepower and capability for slightly more crew. We have only 3 hobarts, we need more than 3 hobarts. 48+ VLS, Aegis, 5" blah blah, it make sense. It aint perfect, but it has a clear niche to fill.

Trading an Anzac for a Corvette I don't get.
Modern Corvette/small frigate has a crew of about 100.
Anzac has a crew about 160.

So for two Anzacs you get three Corvettes in terms of crewing.

• But the corvette is smaller
• But the corvette has less range
• But the corvette has an inferior and smaller radar and a lower radar mast
• But the corvette has less than half the helo capability
• The the corvette has a smaller gun
• The corvette has worse sea keeping capability.
• The corvette ties up a naval yard and costs ~500-1b...
• Corvettes typically don't have a layered defence.

Not sure this is the trade off we are looking for. The Anzac are old, but they sport the very latest radars, ESSM, soon NSM, and two helos.
Can't help but look at 4000-6000t class, where you could get similar manning and a whole lot more capability. Unless the corvette is super fast to build....

Who on earth is trading an ANZAC for a corvette?

Even the governments references (thin as they are) has been to possibly build corvettes instead of OPVs, i.e. as replacements for the Armidales.

The Hunters are the replacements for the ANZACs, which is fair enough as the ANZACs were the dumbed down, DOA patrol frigate replacement for the River Class DEs.

The elephant in the room is we never replaced the DDGs, then replaced six FFGs with three FFGs but called them destroyers.

The whole idea of the corvettes is to reverse a 1990s decision not the build corvettes to replace the Fremantle class PBs, i.e. F off the basically useless PBs and build actual combatants, something the RAN has been trying to do for over 40 years.

The glaring gap in the orbat is a sufficient number of big powerful ships, going type 31, Navantia whatevers or Lurssen whatevers because they are called frigates, instead of Hunters, even going extra Hobarts instead of Hunters, makes things worse, not better. By all means plan for a bigger better ship to supplement the Hunters and Hobarts but don't cancel the Hunters.

Also the ANZACs carry a single helo how do you halve that?