What the DSR means for the RAAF: Summary - More pilots, upgrade to F-35s, no B-21s.
Air domain force structure design priorities
8.40 Australia’s Air Force must be optimised for all aspects of air warfare. The support of maritime, littoral and sustainment operations from Australia’s northern base network will be a high priority.
8.41 Air Force must be able to maintain:
a network of northern air bases with appropriate hardening and dispersal;
crewed and autonomous systems capable of air defence;
strike capability (maritime and land);
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance;
anti-submarine warfare;
command and control for integrated air and missile defence;
air-to-air refuelling; and
heavy and medium air mobility.
8.42 Air Force must increase the numbers of critical positions and implement a scalable aircrew training system to meet aircrew requirements across the force, commensurate with operational requirements.
8.43 Air combat crewing requires a new approach which is consistent with our strategic circumstances. Air Force must develop a plan to increase aircrew numbers to ensure that air combat and P-8 maritime squadrons have the crewing to operate all available aircraft at high tempo. This will substantially increase preparedness in the mid to long-term.
Air domain immediate investment priorities
8.44 F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft must be able to operate the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. The Joint Strike Missile (JSM) should also be integrated onto the F-35A. To enable the F-35A fleet to operate the JSM, the aircraft will need to be upgraded to Block 4 configuration.
8.45 MQ-28A Ghost Bat is a sovereign autonomous air vehicle designed to operate as part of an integrated system of crewed and uncrewed aircraft and space-based capabilities. MQ-28A is intended to be an attritable platform, which costs less than a crewed platform, and can be replaced rapidly. This program should be a priority for collaborative development with the United States.
8.46 The Review has undertaken detailed discussions in Australia and the United States in relation to the B-21 Raider as a potential capability option for Australia. In light of our strategic circumstances and the approach to Defence strategy and capability development outlined in this Review, we do not consider the B-21 to be a suitable option for consideration for acquisition.