RAN Discussions on SSNs only

[Lolcake]

Virginia just makes much more sense in terms for strategic strike with the advent of hypersonics. Astute is a wonderful attack sub, but launching one tomahawk at a time from a torp tube would simply remove the option and true ability to strike multiple targets simultaneously.

It's simply too much of a loss in a deterrence sense with the position we are in wrt china. It well and truly replaces the f-111s strategic strike option.

 

[swerve]

....Finally a lesson from history.
In WW2 the Kreigsmarine started with 57 small submarines (this number naturally grew to a final 1160 odd) ..

The Kriegsmarine never had that many submarines. Just over 1150 were built, of which 784 were lost during the war.

The peak number at sea was 159, & I think maximum strength was probably 500-odd. 379 surrendered, were scuttled by their crews or sailed away to friendly (i.e. Japan) or neutral countries at the end of the war.

 

[spoz]

We already have people who have completed a perisher equivalent; that is the prerequisite to command an RAN submarine. When the RN had conventional boats our people did the same course, now it is a Dutch course. It's called "perisher" for a reason; it's one of the most difficult courses there is.

However, given that we do have those people who are already qualified to command submarines, and we have a continuing program to develop and qualify such people, and it will take at least 10 years before we would be likely to see a new boat, and that we have successfully poached, ah recruited, people from the RN for years (and at least one of our Collins COs is a former RN SSBN CO) it would not seem impossible to suggest that we could acquire the senior officers and sailors to safely operate the boat quite quickly.

 

[alexsa]

Virginia just makes much more sense in terms for strategic strike with the advent of hypersonics. Astute is a wonderful attack sub, but launching one tomahawk at a time from a torp tube would simply remove the option and true ability to strike multiple targets simultaneously.

It's simply too much of a loss in a deterrence sense with the position we are in wrt china. It well and truly replaces the f-111s strategic strike option.

The Astute has stowage for 38 weapons and is fitted with 6 tubes. So ... in theory ... six land attack missiles could be fired at a time, then more with a reload. The current Virginia has four tubes and 12 VLS. Weapons stowage is 25 for the tubes and 12 for the VLS (37 weapons).

I don't see your issue unless you are suggesting we go for the Block V.

 

[Stampede]

Octobers edition of APDR is out with a focus on submarines.

https://venturaapdr.partica.online/apdr/apdr-october-2021/flipbook/1/

Still reading but thought I'd share



Regards S

 

[OPSSG]

Virginia just makes much more sense in terms for strategic strike with the advent of hypersonics. Astute is a wonderful attack sub, but launching one tomahawk at a time from a torp tube would simply remove the option and true ability to strike multiple targets simultaneously.

1. Let me add to alexsa’s post to correct your misunderstanding on the missile launch capabilities of the Astute class.

2. Tomahawk missiles can be launched from either a standard torpedo tube or, on certain submarines, like the Virginia, from a vertical launch tube. After the missile clears the submarine, a 7-second burst from its rocket boost motor blasts it out of the water. Once airborne, its turbojet engine starts, its wings spread, and it noses over to hug the surface at about 500 miles (800 km) per hour toward its target.

3. It is reported that Tomahawk cruise missiles are to be fielded on the RAN’s “Hobart-class destroyers and joint air-to-surface stand-off missiles extended range for our Royal Australian Air Force capabilities," Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison told reporters in Canberra. Please, I beg you:

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(a) NO STUPID attempts at suggesting a ADF rocket force from a counter value perspective — as any missile fired by Australia can meet a counter-response of 10 or more Chinese missiles in return. If that is not the direction of your discussion, I apologise in advance.​

​

(b) We had an Indonesian member that suggested a rocket/missile force for the TNI, as part of his plan to build an invasion force for Singapore, and he was eventually banned. If you want to be taken seriously, read and do some basic research that I present below to set an example.​

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(c) Given that you did not seem to understand that the Tomahawk cruise missiles being purchased serve a specific military purpose for the RAN (and it helps Australian destroyers survive in a hostile naval environment), I thought it would be better if I condemn counter-value discussions as unrealistic (early to avoid going down this rabbit hole).​

4. A RAN SSN’s role includes hunting other submarines, which are apex hunters of the deep. The PLA(N) has an all modern SSN fleet by now (of 6 to 9) and they are operating in your SLOCs. They are actively tracking Indian submarines, as far away as the Indian Ocean.

5. As a recent report by the US Congressional Research Service points out, while China’s current submarine force is now quantitatively smaller than it was in 1990, it has ‘greater aggregate capability than it did in 1990, because larger numbers of older, obsolescent boats have been replaced by smaller numbers of more modern and more capable boats’. A staff report for the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission puts the trend towards a more formidable Chinese submarine fleet by 2020 into a table:

China’s Submarine Fleet, 1990–2020

Type	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Diesel Attack	88	43	60	51	54	57-62	59-64
Nuclear Attack (SSN)	4	5	5	6	6	6-8	6-9
Nuclear Ballistic(SSBN)	1	1	1	2	3	3-5	4-5
Total	93	49	66	59	63	66-75	69-78

The report also notes the ongoing modernisation of the fleet, defining ‘modern’ submarines as those able to launch ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).

China’s Submarine Fleet, 1990–2020, approximate percent ‘modern’

Type	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
Diesel Attack	0%	0%	7%	40%	50%	70%	75%
Nuclear Attack	0%	0%	0%	33%	33%	70%	100%

That assessment is underlined by recent Congressional testimony from the US Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). The ONI also expects that by 2020 the ‘vast majority’ of China’s submarine force will be armed with ‘advanced, long-range ASCMs’.

 

[StingrayOZ]

The Astute has stowage for 38 weapons and is fitted with 6 tubes. So ... in theory ... six land attack missiles could be fired at a time, then more with a reload. The current Virginia has four tubes and 12 VLS. Weapons stowage is 25 for the tubes and 12 for the VLS (37 weapons).

I don't see your issue unless you are suggesting we go for the Block V.

The Virginia's could launch em faster, but not sure that is really an issue in the RANs world. We won't be pushing ~24 TLAMS out of our subs at a time, certainly not often. In the big scheme of things not deciding factor in choosing a sub. The Virginia payload module thing would be quite neat. I imagine it would be one of those things we will want on future generations.

Not sure a sub is the best platform for hypersonics either.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 4: Understanding Apex Predators

Do we still need a conventional sub for sovereignty after the collins?. A bunch of type 214s or a26s along with 6-8 nuke subs.

1. I have no bone of contention in a RAN discussion thread but even I find my eyes bleeding from the quality of certain posts in this thread. To be clear, every conventional submarine listed below are all not suitable for the RAN.

(a) It’s not even logical to talk about the super small 1,524 ton 214 for the RAN, when there are marginally longer boats, like the 70 m long Type 218SG (2,000 ton) that is already in the water. But even the 218 is too small and short ranged for the RAN.​

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(b) Please do a basic google search and survey the submarine but options for 5 mins before posting rubbish in the thread. If you are talking about an ongoing design and build effort (without a hull in the water), the Type 212CD will have a surface displacement increased by an incredible 65% from 1,524 tons to about 2,500 tons.​

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(c) By your logic in bringing up the 2,000 ton A26, the 2,500 ton 212CD is even larger and more suited (that the 214 or the 218SGS). The Type 212CD’s length (when compared to the original 212 design) is increased by nearly 30%, from 57.20 m (188 ft) to 73 m (240 ft). And the width is increased by nearly 50%, from 6.8 m (22 ft) to 10 m (33 ft). Height is also increased by 2 m (6.5 ft).​

Son of Collins is way too much work.
better off building a design that is already out there Or under contruction.
plenty of new conventional subs that can match what the Collins can do.

do We want or need medium Range subs like the Japanese, Germans or the Swedes + the added 8 nuclear long endurance?

nuke subs maintained in wa, conventional in sa?

Modified options
a26er
type 214/216
taigei

Why would Australia build a new SSK fleet and a SSN fleet? It does not have the funding to do both. Those subs that you mentioned didn't meet the requirements of SEA1000 first time around so what makes you think that they will this time? They don't meet the RAN CONOPS requirements. Why do you think that the Commonwealth of Australia has gone with SSN? It's not because they may or may not glow in the dark.

If you are going to post rubbish like this you may find that you cannot post on any RAN related threads for a while. You have been on here long enough to know what's what with SEA1000 and why certain subs failed to make the cut. Sort it out and keep up with the play.

2. As to your suggestion, noooo!!!!! If the RAN goes for a fleet of at least 8 SSNs, please go the whole hog but there is risk that such all SSN plan will have execution issues, especially for the 1st two boats. As my fellow moderator has told me, big leaps often have big hurdles to overcome. As he said, it not just building the platform, it is developing the logistics plan for sustainment, developing the tactics to fight the enemy’s fleet, and the CONOPS needed to employ these SSNs effectively.

3. The RAN and ASC does not have unlimited number of engineers and if you split the build effort into both conventional and nuclear, you are more likely to have both fail. You don’t decrease risk, you increase it.

4. In 18 months or less, the RAN and the Australian defence minister will provide an update that will give more certainty on the path forward.

 

[Toptob]

Post 1 of 2: Navigating this SSN discussion

2. As to your suggestion, noooo!!!!! If the RAN goes for a fleet of at least 8 SSNs, please go the whole hog but there is risk that such all SSN plan will have execution issues, especially for the 1st two boats. As my fellow moderator has told me, big leaps often have big hurdles to overcome. As he said, it not just building the platform, it is developing the logistics plan for sustainment, developing the tactics to fight the enemy’s fleet, and the CONOPS needed to employ these SSNs effectively.

3. The RAN and ASC does not have unlimited number of engineers and if you split the build effort into both conventional and nuclear, you are more likely to have both fail. You don’t decrease risk, you increase it.

4. In 18 months or less, the RAN and the Australian defence minister will provide an update that will give more certainty on the path forward.

As always @OPSSG , your arguments are considerate and well thought out. This however is a topic that will attract a wider public then we are used to on this forum. A public that is not as knowledgeable as some on this forum and therefore their considerations miss a lot of things they could learn by for instance reading some of the original RAN thread or some of the excellent threads where some basic principles are explained about defense. Personally I have found that for lay people like me it's better to lurk more and post less, unless I really have something meaningful to add or when I have a genuine question I couldn't answer through other means.

However, as I said this is a topic that will attract the attentions of many people, especially because of all the attention it has been getting in the press everywhere. I get your feels though because I've been seeing all kinds of pundits that purport to be knowledgeable about all sorts of things dripping with "Dunning Kruger" spouting all kinds of nonsense, and it makes me cringe every time!

That being said, as you @OPSSG and other members above have done above. I want to give some advice to our new friends on the forum to prevent misunderstandings in the future:

1. The Australian submarine issue is a hot potato that has spawned many MANY pages of discussion in the original RAN thread. Therefore many issues have been discussed before, many questions have been asked and many answers have been given. This means that there are topics and ideas that are kind of played out and pretty much settled in the over 1500 pages of posts about the RAN.

2. It is annoying for the mods, experts and other members alike to revisit things that have been explained time and again and that have been discussed ad nauseum. Topics which therefore have more or less been declared taboo, or something you are to know about and consider in your arguments before you join the discussion.

 

[Toptob]

Post 2 of 2: Navigating this SSN discussion

1. I have no bone of contention in a RAN discussion thread but even I find my eyes bleeding from the quality of certain posts in this thread. To be clear, every conventional submarine listed below are all not suitable for the RAN.

(a) It’s not even logical to talk about the super small 1,524 ton 214 for the RAN, when there are marginally longer boats, like the 70 m long Type 218SG (2,000 ton) that is already in the water. But even the 218 is too small and short ranged for the RAN.​

(b) Please do a basic google search and survey the submarine but options for 5 mins before posting rubbish in the thread. If you are talking about an ongoing design and build effort (without a hull in the water), the Type 212CD will have a surface displacement increased by an incredible 65% from 1,524 tons to about 2,500 tons.​

(c) By your logic in bringing up the 2,000 ton A26, the 2,500 ton 212CD is even larger and more suited (that the 214 or the 218SGS). The Type 212CD’s length (when compared to the original 212 design) is increased by nearly 30%, from 57.20 m (188 ft) to 73 m (240 ft). And the width is increased by nearly 50%, from 6.8 m (22 ft) to 10 m (33 ft). Height is also increased by 2 m (6.5 ft).​

3. I will list and explain some issues I've seen that are important to consider:

* The question of Australia operating nuclear submarines... Yes! Believe it or not, but not that long ago it was considered very unlikely if not impossible for the RAN to procure and operate nuclear submarines for a myriad of reasons (politics, cost etc.). And therefore it was deemed a fantasy discussion.​

​

*I think most of us can generally agree that SSN's are the optimal solution to Australia's particular circumstances i.e. long distances and long deployments.​

​

Son of Collins is way too much work.
better off building a design that is already out there Or under contruction.
plenty of new conventional subs that can match what the Collins can do.

do We want or need medium Range subs like the Japanese, Germans or the Swedes + the added 8 nuclear long endurance?

nuke subs maintained in wa, conventional in sa?

Modified options
a26er
type 214/216
taigei

*It is important to understand this, and the repercussions this has for the capabilities they are looking for. How is this different from other submarine operators and how does this affect the platform we build? To borrow a subject from @Reptilia , the Type 214 submarines are derived from the Type 209 and Type 212 (to some extent) subs designed for and operated by the German navy and the A26 class is designed for the Swedish navy. Both types are in the 1 to 2000 tonnes class of submarines, designed to operate primarily in the Baltic sea and in littoral areas. And while they can be fine boats for any navy to operate (this is illustrated by the Type 209 and 214's export success). If we contrast this knowledge with the Australian situation we can see that in the East we have the South Pacific and in the West we have the Indian ocean with very little other than water for many many miles. So in stead of shallow waters with lots of islands and shorter distances we find extremely long distances and deep oceans. So while the brave Australian submariners could no doubt operate something like a Type 214, it would be so far from optimal it's not even worth considering. Because that boat is not made for the way that Australia operates submarines. (Some navies that operate more similarly are the Dutch and the Japanese, both of which operate larger more long range submarines)​

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*The question of "strategic" capabilities! This is another one of those hot potato's and there's many a discussion about all sorts of platforms and ordnance, from ICBM's to B2 bombers it has all been discussed. Some things to mention about this are; costs! How realistic is it to operate something like a functional force of B2's for instance. What would you even hit? And what value does a conventional response have against a nuclear strategic attack? To summarize, what would a "strategic" capability have to cost to even make sense?​

Again, many interesting arguments have been made and many insightful discussions have been had about this issue... I suggest reading some.​

​

*Finally I would like to share some thoughts about submarines and the value they have (to Australia). Having a submarine in an area of operations is a big hindrance to any kind of ill intended naval operation you plan to execute in that area. I am not a subject matter expert, but what I've been able to glean from people who are is that finding a submarine that doesn't want to be found is no easy task. And even for some of the best like the Royal Navy and the JMSDF it takes a lot of effort in both training and materiel to present a somewhat credible ASW capability. And the repercussions for not finding the submarine are big because a modern torpedo would rip apart most things that float! What this means is that even the possibility of the presence of a submarine can tie down a lot of resources like no other weapon can.​

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Threat emanating from what PLA-Navy carrier groups? PLA- Rocket Force?

In case of the former a few Australian SSNs will not deter a Chinese carrier group even if the U.S or U.K agrees to lease two or three SSNs to Australia immediately. Just the PLA-Navy's South China fleet is larger than the combined fleet of Australia, NZ, India and Indonesia. And they have Asia's most extensive anti submarine warfare capability.

In case of the latter, Australia will need SSBNs and SSGNs capable of firing long range cruise and ballistic missiles.

More importantly, Australia does not need SSNs to deter China if it can develop Ballistic Missiles. Australia can simply place ballistic missiles in the country's northern parts that will cover most of China's southern provinces where a number of Chinese metro cities are located. Modern day ballistic missiles have modern inertial navigation systems that make them very accurate. Solid rocket powered ballistic missile that manouvers are very capable at evading enemy air defences.

To respond to @MilitaryIndustrialComplex who said "In case of the former a few Australian SSNs will not deter a Chinese carrier group " , I would say, I'm not so sure about that! First of, as I said ASW is difficult under the best of circumstances and the PLAN don't have the training or experience to be really good at it. But even the US Navy that does has enough reason to be weary of submarines sneaking through their ASW screen and wreaking havoc!

• We all know about the leased Swedish sub that smashed the USN in exercises again and again.
• Some know about the French SSN that did great in an exercise in 2015.
• And some people know that the Dutch navy also has a pretty good track record practising against US carrier groups.

It may be a little unfair, but what makes you think the PLAN would do any better?

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 4: Understanding Apex Predators

3. I will list and explain some issues I've seen that are important to consider:

* The question of Australia operating nuclear submarines... Yes! Believe it or not, but not that long ago it was considered very unlikely if not impossible for the RAN to procure and operate nuclear submarines for a myriad of reasons (politics, cost etc.). And therefore it was deemed a fantasy discussion.​

*I think most of us can generally agree that SSN's are the optimal solution to Australia's particular circumstances i.e. long distances and long deployments.​

5. Agreed. Thank you for your wonderful post. Hope you don’t mind that I have formatted it a little more and split it into two, so that readers can see the original posts you were replying to.

​

(a) In April 2015, the PLAN commissioned 3 Shang-class (Type 093B) nuclear-powered attack submarines. The advanced Shang-class offers improvements in speed and noise as well as a new vertical launch system. The vessels are fitted with YJ-18 anti-ship ballistic missiles that have a range of 400 km. The PLA(N) has at least 6 Type 093Bs in service.​

​

(b) In 1999 the first of two Sovremenny DDGs arrived from Russia equipped with MG-335 MF bow sonar and MG-7 HF fire control attack sonar. Because of the clustering of the most modern Kilo and Sovremenny units in the Zhoushan area, it is probable that Russia established a maintenance and support group there for the ASW suites. China’s designation for sonar systems installed on various surface ships is “SJD” followed by a unique number.​

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(c) China possesses twelve Russian-origin Kilo-class submarines: two Project 877 vessels, two Project 636 vessels, and eight Project 636M vessels. The first of two PLA(N)’s, 877E Kilo submarines were procured in 1995 with MKG-400 and MG-519 sonar suites. Two additional improved-636 Kilos followed in three years, but the sonar suites were nearly identical. The MKG-400 was improved to the MGK-400 EM variant.​

​

(d) China has recently entered the submarine export market. State-owned CSIC sold indigenous designs to Thailand and Pakistan. In 2016 the Pakistani government approved the purchase of eight submarines fitted with AIP systems from China based on the Yuan-class (Type 039) for more than US$3 billion.​

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(e) The first leading-edge development challenge for Chinese naval construction was the Han nuclear attack submarine (SSN) occurred much earlier. Prior to this, China copied Soviet submarines, destroyer escorts and patrol craft. The Han had sonars installed in 1970, but systems were not certified until 1975. The active sonar was designated SQZ-3 and the passive version was SQC-1. The Shanghai 22nd Radio Plant reportedly produces the SQC-1, but too little time seems to have elapsed to develop the expertise to design and build a sonar more capable than the crude TAMIRs known to be in production.​

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6. Singapore’s 4 old Swedish submarines that are also in the USN carrier periscope photography club. In MULTIPLE exercises with the USN, Singapore’s very old submarines have managed to penetrate their carrier ASW screen. But there is context — in that even our latest AIP submarines can’t chase a US aircraft carrier (they move too fast) — rather we wait for them to enter a predicted ‘kill box’ and strike then.

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(a) In view of the 1995 sale of the 877E Kilo submarines to the PLA(N), the RSN began by acquiring 4 Swedish Sjoormen-class submarines between 1995 and 1997, which underwent refurbishment and were named as Challenger-class vessels — the last of which was commissioned in Aug 2002.​

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(b) For Col. Teo Chin Leong (commanding officer of 171 Squadron), the South China Sea are the home waters of our submarines and they regularly conduct deterrence patrols beyond 1,000 km from Singapore. "In the Five Power Defence Arrangements exercise, our submarine could not be detected by other ships, and in the bilateral exercise with India, we successfully fired a torpedo in the Andaman Sea," he said in Feb 2019.​

It may be a little unfair, but what makes you think the PLAN would do any better?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1443860394825506816

7. The Australian Collins-class submarines with their more powerful sensors, can strike at greater range than Singapore boats can as a littoral navy; which means any Australian submarine is more than just a pain the butt for the PLA(N).

8. In 2005, RSN bought and upgraded a pair of Swedish Vastergotland-class submarines that are now called Archer-class vessels. These 2 AIP boats in-turn will be replaced by the 3rd and 4th Type 218SGs that will enter service after 2026. In training exercises, Singapore’s Apex Predators have hunted and killed warships from multiple navies, including the USN, the RN, the RAN, the RMN and even the Indian Navy.

 

[STURM]

"In the Five Power Defence Arrangements exercise, our submarine could not be detected by other ships,

In a number of bilateral exercises, foreign ships have also had problems detecting RMN Scorpenes [non AIP boats]. In fact it's not uncommon for RMN ships to face major issues detecting the Scorpenes as well. As part of her pre delivery trials which included an exercise, the 2nd boat with an RMN crew and French evaluators managed to acquire a firing solution on a French SSBN which was undergoing post refit trials. Based in Sepanggar at the northern tip of Malaysian Borneo, the Scorpenes venture quite a distance from their base during regular patrols.

An incident I'm very interested about but which little information has been released is the circumstances in which a RNZN Leander detected a TNI-AL Type 209 which was shadowing the INTERFET convoy as it neared East Timor.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 3 of 4: Understanding Apex Predators

As part of her pre delivery trials which included an exercise, the 2nd boat with an RMN crew and French evaluators managed to acquire a firing solution on a French SSBN which was undergoing post refit trials.

9. Bravo Zulu to the crew.

Based in Sepanggar at the northern tip of Malaysian Borneo, the Scorpenes venture quite a distance from their base during regular patrols.

10. Yes, agreed.

An incident I'm very interested about but which little information has been released is the circumstances in which a RNZN Leander detected a TNI-AL Type 209 which was shadowing the INTERFET convoy as it neared East Timor.

11. Correctly understood, the Type 209 was detected earlier but localised by the RNZN ship in Sep 1999. At least two Type 209 submarines, together with several TNI AL logistic ships and surface combatants, operated off the coast of East Timor.

(a) Early identification of all contacts was an essential precaution, as the TNI AL seemed determined to make its presence felt. Some Indonesian warships, recalled Commander Cummins, ‘were more aggressive in their actions than others, they were all very quiet, they wouldn’t talk and they wouldn’t radiate and the first indication was generally a visual bearing and some of them got quite close especially at night’. Although mainstream thought within the TNI understood that mischance must be avoided, the Indonesian forces possessed some members ‘who, for other reasons, were not as worried about that, and some whose sense of outrage clouded their judgment’.​

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(b) While the two Indonesian boats were a concern during Operation STABILISE; there were also Australian aircraft and boats in the water to track the TNI AL boats and these assets provided situational awareness to Naval Component Commander (NCC), Commodore Jim Stapleton, RAN — with CTG 627.2 commanded by HMAS Adelaide. NCC eventually deployed to East Timor comprised only 16 RAN officers and other ranks, with various Coalition liaison officers.​

12. USS Mobile Bay entered the AO as the most sophisticated combatant available to INTERFET. Operational control of the cruiser remained firmly in USN hands, but she readily provided extensive support to the maritime task group in a variety of intelligence gathering and surveillance roles. Throughout her time in theatre, USS Mobile Bay remained Air Warfare Commander and her weapons, sensors and battle management systems meant that the force could operate with a high degree of confidence, even without the continuous presence of friendly fighter aircraft.

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(a) The first amphibious lodgment activities added emphasis to the necessity of protection operations. The movements of high interest Indonesian contacts, such as the two submarines, were continuously observed, and surveillance responsibilities handed over between the Coalition’s naval units. There was no illumination by fire control radars, but this seamless monitoring left no room for TNI AL waywardness.​

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(b) During the first few days HMAS Anzac, HMS Glasgow and HMAS Darwin received additional support from HMAS Adelaide, HMNZS Te Kaha and USS Mobile Bay, which, when not providing close escort to and from Darwin, patrolled the eastern and western approaches to Dili.​

(c) The East Timor crisis also placed immense pressure on Darwin’s port, which saw a 300% increase in activities. The city also became the hub of international efforts overnight, hosting rear headquarters for the UN, foreign militaries, media outlets, and NGOs.​

 

[ngatimozart]

Back in the Falklands war after the RN SSN sank the Argentinian cruiser, General Belgrano, the Argentinian CV, Quinto del Mayo, promptly returned to port and was basically welded to the wharf. For all intents and purposes the Argentinian Navy surface fleet took no further part in the war. There submarine fleet didn't fare very well either. That single SSN put the fear of God up a whole surface fleet and unbeknownst to the Argentinians there were two SSN lurking in the depths off their coast. That's what a submarine can do to a fleet, a SSN even more, especially one operated by a navy that has considerable expertise in the use of submarines and submarine warfare.

 

[STURM]

Unless I'm mistaken an Argie sub did manage to get within range of the Task Force but it encountered FCS issues.

With regards to China, it has been maturing as a sub operator and has been looking closely at others. I will not assume that the qualatative edge enjoyed by other navies is stll as wide as it used to be or that it will be a deciding factor should conflict erupt.

A vital factor to take note of is that the South China Sea has become a regular stomping ground for PLA subs and Chinese survey vessels are active in the area. PLA sub COs by now will be very familiar with the area, including the acoustic conditions.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 4 of 4: Understanding Apex Predators

In a number of bilateral exercises, foreign ships have also had problems detecting RMN Scorpenes [non AIP boats]. In fact it's not uncommon for RMN ships to face major issues detecting the Scorpenes as well.

13. Agreed, the Scorpenes are very hard to find even with a towed array. And even if the ship finds them, it’s too late. Their heavy weight torp out ranges the RSN’s light weight torp. It’s the job of the naval helicopters to detect and localise them (at range) before the Scorpenes can have a chance to fire their Exocet (or heavy weight torp) but that is a team sport with the MPA or a friendly submarine vectoring the naval helicopter to a search area.

Unless I'm mistaken an Argie sub did manage to get within range of the Task Force but it encountered FCS issues.

14. Yes, correct.

15. In 1982, ARA San Luis faced the entire British task force on its own, in a five-week patrol where she emerged unscathed. Attacks on the British missed each time because of torpedo system malfunctions.

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(a) At the time, the RN operated 3 classes of frigates: (i) the Leander Class, which had been the one-size-fits-all post-WWII frigate specialising in anti-submarine work; (ii) the 1974 Type 21, a general escort; and (iii) the Type 22, a specialised sub hunter that was under construction in the late 70’s.​

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(b) Meanwhile, British ASW efforts against that single target proved futile. The British fired an astonishing 200 torpedoes at false contacts over 5 weeks, almost depleting their inventory. In this era, the principal ASW weapons systems were the Type 22’s Lynx helicopter and triple torpedo tubes, with 2087 towed array sonar, as part of the sensors fit.​

 

[MickB]

We already have people who have completed a perisher equivalent; that is the prerequisite to command an RAN submarine. When the RN had conventional boats our people did the same course, now it is a Dutch course. It's called "perisher" for a reason; it's one of the most difficult courses there is.

However, given that we do have those people who are already qualified to command submarines, and we have a continuing program to develop and qualify such people, and it will take at least 10 years before we would be likely to see a new boat, and that we have successfully poached, ah recruited, people from the RN for years (and at least one of our Collins COs is a former RN SSBN CO) it would not seem impossible to suggest that we could acquire the senior officers and sailors to safely operate the boat quite quickly.

I would also point out that the RAN has more command qualifed officers than ships.
If a current C O became ill we do not park the vessel for several years until a new commander can be trained.
The same applies to senior sailors, there are more who are qualifed than open positions.
This is one reason why a small expansion of vessel numbers is possible.(note I said small)
Yes it takes years to train senior crew, but there are some just waiting for additional higher positions to open.
This limitation on promotion has several times been listed as a reason for retention problems.
So more vessels, more promotion, greater retention.

 

[Reptilia]

Post 1 of 4: Understanding Apex Predators


1. I have no bone of contention in a RAN discussion thread but even I find my eyes bleeding from the quality of certain posts in this thread. To be clear, every conventional submarine listed below are all not suitable for the RAN.

(a) It’s not even logical to talk about the super small 1,524 ton 214 for the RAN, when there are marginally longer boats, like the 70 m long Type 218SG (2,000 ton) that is already in the water. But even the 218 is too small and short ranged for the RAN.​

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(b) Please do a basic google search and survey the submarine but options for 5 mins before posting rubbish in the thread. If you are talking about an ongoing design and build effort (without a hull in the water), the Type 212CD will have a surface displacement increased by an incredible 65% from 1,524 tons to about 2,500 tons.​

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(c) By your logic in bringing up the 2,000 ton A26, the 2,500 ton 212CD is even larger and more suited (that the 214 or the 218SGS). The Type 212CD’s length (when compared to the original 212 design) is increased by nearly 30%, from 57.20 m (188 ft) to 73 m (240 ft). And the width is increased by nearly 50%, from 6.8 m (22 ft) to 10 m (33 ft). Height is also increased by 2 m (6.5 ft).​

2. As to your suggestion, noooo!!!!! If the RAN goes for a fleet of at least 8 SSNs, please go the whole hog but there is risk that such all SSN plan will have execution issues, especially for the 1st two boats. As my fellow moderator has told me, big leaps often have big hurdles to overcome. As he said, it not just building the platform, it is developing the logistics plan for sustainment, developing the tactics to fight the enemy’s fleet, and the CONOPS needed to employ these SSNs effectively.

3. The RAN and ASC does not have unlimited number of engineers and if you split the build effort into both conventional and nuclear, you are more likely to have both fail. You don’t decrease risk, you increase it.

4. In 18 months or less, the RAN and the Australian defence minister will provide an update that will give more certainty on the path forward.

I’m an idiot, my bad. I was referring to the oceanic version of the a26 (ER) (3,000+ ton variant) and the newest type 214 which has the same range as the Collins. The 218 is not really an option and the 216 is just a paper design.

 

[OPSSG]

… my bad. I was referring to the oceanic version of the a26 (ER) (3,000+ ton variant)…

You have managed to misread the information presented to you, again and again, to correct the factual errors in your post.

I have to conclude you either have an inability understand that every conventional German or Swedish submarine listed by you is either not suited for RAN operations (or does not exist). The A26 is a 2,000 ton boat. The largest submarine being designed by TKMS is the 2,500 ton Type 212CD being built for the German Navy and Norwegian Navy.

… the newest type 214 which has the same range as the Collins.

Since you like to write nonsense and ignore accurate information, I issue a source challenge for you provide a link to show a new 1,690 ton Type 214 can illogically have the “same range as the Collins class.”

If you can’t provide it in 24 hours you will be banned.

 

[hauritz]

I choose to believe, perhaps unwisely, that the government has a plan to bring nukes into service in a reasonable timeframe. I have had a couple of thoughts.

The Astute is designed to serve at least 25 years. This may have more to do with the UKs desire to have an ongoing submarine construction program and it is possible that the actual life expectancy of the Astute could be perhaps 5 to 10 years longer than that. Some of the Trafalgar class have already seen 30 years service and probably more like 35 years before the last of the Astutes commission.

If the SSN(R) program progresses reasonably smoothly then it is possible that Australia could transition into secondhand Astutes from the mid to late 30s. That timeline could work, with Australia then having a stepping stone from the Collins through to when we start taking delivery of our own nuclear subs. I notice that the submarine drumbeat for the UK sees a new submarine laid down every three years or so which could see construction commence on the Astute replacement around 2028 with an in service date 9 to 10 years after that.

Of course this does depend on the SSN(R) program going smoothly, which could explain the press release on work commencing on the Astute replacement just two days after the AUKUS announcement.

UK Starts Work On A New Nuclear Submarine Right After Australia Says It's Looking To Buy

The replacement for the Astute class may be a fit for Australian requirements, but the US could put forward competing offerings.

www.thedrive.com

As much as I like US subs I think the British boats will be more affordable, and their manufacturing process would be easier to duplicate in Australia. It would also allow Australia to have timely replacements for the Collins class until our own new subs become available.