Exercise Trident
Australia, Singapore conduct ship-to-shore exercise - Channel NewsAsia
Singaporean and Australan exercise..
Australia, Singapore conduct ship-to-shore exercise - Channel NewsAsia
Singaporean and Australan exercise..
Possible Singaporean Aircraft Carrier
- Thread starter CheeZe
- Start date
Speaking to the media ahead of SAF Day on 1 July 2014, Dr Ng said Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines underlined the need for a Joint-Multi-Mission Ship (JMMS):
However, the centre should not simply respond when a crisis hits, he said. Instead, it should build networks – similar to United Nations agencies and voluntary welfare organisations – and pre-position them so that countries know where these resources are. Learning from its previous HADR missions, the SAF realised the value of having larger naval vessels which could act as springboards for extended helicopter operations, said Dr Ng. While the Endurance Class have served the SAF well, a larger JMMS that would have greater capacity and greater range to respond. There will also be some equipping changes for last mile delivery by the Singapore Army, which I would assume means having a more capable watercraft than the existing LARC V. In February 2014, the following was announced:-
Australian Assistant Minister for Defence Mr Stuart Robert visited the troops participating. Exercise Trident, one of the components of Exercise Wallaby, between the SAF and the ADF. Launched from RSS Persistence, Exercise Trident involves an amphibious landing with the objective of securing the beach front and involves more than 750 SAF personnel and 43 ADF personnel.
"A larger JMMS would be able to carry more helicopters or have more helicopters operating. When we responded to Typhoon Haiyan...basically, the typhoon was so devastating that comms and communication were knocked out. There was no centralised ability for command and control of the airspace. In that context, a ship like the JMMS would have been very useful."
However, the centre should not simply respond when a crisis hits, he said. Instead, it should build networks – similar to United Nations agencies and voluntary welfare organisations – and pre-position them so that countries know where these resources are. Learning from its previous HADR missions, the SAF realised the value of having larger naval vessels which could act as springboards for extended helicopter operations, said Dr Ng. While the Endurance Class have served the SAF well, a larger JMMS that would have greater capacity and greater range to respond. There will also be some equipping changes for last mile delivery by the Singapore Army, which I would assume means having a more capable watercraft than the existing LARC V. In February 2014, the following was announced:-
See a Humdinga Demo in Singapore: http://youtu.be/WKLaVvUyrDY
"Graham Jenkins, public relations and marketing director for Gibbs Amphibians, said that initially, ST Kinetic, also known as STK, will also have the opportunity to sell the Humdinga throughout the world. Gibbs is working on licensing agreements for the Humdinga with companies in other regions of the globe. The Humdinga is a 21.5-foot, four-wheel-drive fast amphibian that is capable of reaching the most challenging and remote terrain in the world. It is designed for use in flooded areas where it’s ability to go between dry areas, moderately flooded areas and deep water... The four-wheel-drive Humdinga is 21.5 feet long... “The government (customers of STK) are very interested in getting a vehicle to handle those kinds of conditions,” Jenkns said
STK is licensing Gibbs High Speed Amphibian technology, which includes its retractable suspension system, proprietary jet design as well as other design characteristics such as the hull shape that allows Gibbs’ vehicles to make have a shallow keel, which improves ground clearance on land. STK will also be able to use the Humdinga name, but it has not been decided whether it would carry the Gibbs or STK name. The Gibbs Humdinga is capable of 30 mph on water and highway speeds on land. STK will make some design modifications to the Humdinga, possibly including a new engine. STK will take one to two years to reengineer the vehicle and set up a production in Singapore. Jenkins anticipates that STK will produce about 200 units within a year of beginning production. Beyond that, production numbers are a pure guess, but he said that it could easily rise into the thousands per year. Gibbs is looking for three to seven additional partners for programs similar to the Humdinga. Jenkins said STK is paying Gibbs a large, upfront licensing fee and a royalty for each vehicle it sells. He did not disclose the amount of either the licensing fee or the royalty. The Humdinga is capable of 30 mph on water and highway speeds on land."
The engine change makes perfect sense, as it will enable the Singapore Army to standardize on the same Cat C-9 based power pack for the amphibious Terrex ICV that can drive on its own out the back of an amphibious vessel at least 12 miles from shore and swim at 8 knots (see this video of the Terrex swimming during the US Marines MPC swim trials: http://youtu.be/TpuP_dvcrUE) and STK's version of this new amphibious resupply vehicle that can swim at above 25 knots (before it is up-armoured), will be useful in future operations."Graham Jenkins, public relations and marketing director for Gibbs Amphibians, said that initially, ST Kinetic, also known as STK, will also have the opportunity to sell the Humdinga throughout the world. Gibbs is working on licensing agreements for the Humdinga with companies in other regions of the globe. The Humdinga is a 21.5-foot, four-wheel-drive fast amphibian that is capable of reaching the most challenging and remote terrain in the world. It is designed for use in flooded areas where it’s ability to go between dry areas, moderately flooded areas and deep water... The four-wheel-drive Humdinga is 21.5 feet long... “The government (customers of STK) are very interested in getting a vehicle to handle those kinds of conditions,” Jenkns said
STK is licensing Gibbs High Speed Amphibian technology, which includes its retractable suspension system, proprietary jet design as well as other design characteristics such as the hull shape that allows Gibbs’ vehicles to make have a shallow keel, which improves ground clearance on land. STK will also be able to use the Humdinga name, but it has not been decided whether it would carry the Gibbs or STK name. The Gibbs Humdinga is capable of 30 mph on water and highway speeds on land. STK will make some design modifications to the Humdinga, possibly including a new engine. STK will take one to two years to reengineer the vehicle and set up a production in Singapore. Jenkins anticipates that STK will produce about 200 units within a year of beginning production. Beyond that, production numbers are a pure guess, but he said that it could easily rise into the thousands per year. Gibbs is looking for three to seven additional partners for programs similar to the Humdinga. Jenkins said STK is paying Gibbs a large, upfront licensing fee and a royalty for each vehicle it sells. He did not disclose the amount of either the licensing fee or the royalty. The Humdinga is capable of 30 mph on water and highway speeds on land."
Thanks for hosting the SAF in Australia (see this cyberpioneer report). It looks like Ex Trident has been up-scaled this year, with a more complex exercise scenario, as a pair of Singaporean Apaches were providing over-watch for the landing by the ADF and the SAF (and it also included the deployment of the RSAF's SHIKRA Radar system, for the first time).
Australian Assistant Minister for Defence Mr Stuart Robert visited the troops participating. Exercise Trident, one of the components of Exercise Wallaby, between the SAF and the ADF. Launched from RSS Persistence, Exercise Trident involves an amphibious landing with the objective of securing the beach front and involves more than 750 SAF personnel and 43 ADF personnel.
To some extent "toxic nationalism" is a problem every nation face. Politicians and officials love to pander to it because it's an easy way to score points. People don't take them to task because it's psychologically easier to blame The Other instead of doing a careful self-examination (which might reveal things you'd rather not acknowledge) and fixing problems.
Luckily this segment remains a minority. Although the media likes to make news of incidents, quiet cooperation between the two countries is far bigger and far more comprehensive compared to the number and scale of incidents.
The problem is that this minority can cause an impact out of proportion to their numbers. They will be the minority, but they are striving to make themselves heard. Who knows what sort of influence they will have in future?
President Joko Widodo is from Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (or PDIP). PDIP is the party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno - the man who initiated the Konfrontasi. The daughter of the chief criminal who sent Indonesian Marines into Singapore and attacked Singaporean civilian targets (i.e. to deliberately engage in war crimes), is in control of the Indonesian Presidency (as a PDIP member) are the party in power. Even before the PDIP came to power, through the latest elections, the mischief was started with the ship naming. As Andrew Wan noted on his blog post on the two convicted terrorists (whom the Indonesian ship of shame was named after):
So what if PM Lee Hsien Loong attended the inauguration of Mr Joko Widodo as President of Indonesia, and personally offered his congratulations to Joko in Oct 2014? PM Lee may want to reaffirm Singapore's desire to continue the strong bilateral cooperation in a range of areas with the incoming Indonesian Government. However, the desire may be a one-way street.
There is no reason to be optimistic about the trajectory of Indonesia-Singapore relations with the PDPI in power. It should be noted that officers of the Indonesian Navy have their hands in numerous businesses, including running a smuggling ring (of duty-unpaid cigarettes) when their naval vessels call on Singapore. Some members of the Indonesian navy, who were here for a meeting, loaded cartons of contraband cigarettes onto the minibus that Ee Jin Liang and Ang Zi Heng were driving and directed the Singaporeans to drive to the carpark outside the naval base. Ee and Ang made a total of five to six trips and they received contraband cigarettes for helping with the smuggling (see PP v Ee Jin Liang, DAC 12097 – 12106 of 2009). In the case of Ee Jin Liang, on five occasions over a six-month period in 2008, he assisted Indonesian Navy personnel in smuggling contraband cigarettes to Singapore. In return for his assistance, the accused received bribes in the form of contraband cigarettes. The accused was arrested on 14 December 2008 by Customs while his vehicle was being loaded with contraband cigarettes. The amount of contraband cigarettes seized on that occasion amounted to 33,614 cartons, weighing 8,456.28 kg. This was one of the largest seizures of contraband cigarettes on record with unpaid customs duties amounting to over S$2.9 million. Ee faced ten charges and was sentenced to 4.5 years, and Ang was sentenced to 16 months for these criminal offences. The Indonesian Navy officers involved in running one of the largest smuggling rings in Singapore, were not punished for their criminal acts, demonstrating the need for security sector reform.
My post on 'Indonesia - Singapore Relations: Attempts at repairing the Damaged Relationship', has more details. Even just going down the road to repair the relationship is not an easy task, as noted in this Jakarta Post 'Commentary: General’s watch and his ‘retracted’ apology to Singapore.' SBY’s ‘one thousand friends, zero enemies’ mantra has been consigned to the dustbin of history. The centrepiece of Indonesia's foreign policy platform under President Joko Widodo includes a boost to Indonesia’s naval capabilities, enhanced Indian Ocean defence diplomacy, and a strong emphasis on the protection of Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty. In other words, a re-appraisal of ASEAN’s utility to Indonesia’s foreign policy interests.
Singapore's strategic location at the world's most critical SLOC in the world, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore means that it is one of many protectors of this 'mother SLOC'. Trade via this SLOC is vital to Singapore's economic viability, as well as the maintenance of the world's economies. Protecting this mother SLOC, keeping it open, and denying its use to hostile powers is critical to Singapore's survival, as well as other economic powers in the Pacific Rim (and this would include Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the US, to name a few). Since 2004 the SAF's operational experience has grown by leaps and bounds, including 998 (who served in Iraq and the Northern Arabian Gulf from 2004 to 2008), 492 (who served in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2013) and 1,400 (who served in CTF-151 - ongoing operations). Currently, the SAF is an Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2) force that has evolved from its humble beginnings.
IMO, in the late 2020s, the JMMS flying a mix of F-35Bs, attack helicopters, and supported by a fleet of four G550 Early Warning & Control aircraft, five MPAs, six A330 MRTTs and 40 F-15SGs would enable the SAF as a IKC2 force to control the SLOC within 1,000 km of Singapore (see 'Singapore Quietly Expanding Fighter Force'). The shallowness of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is a force multiplier in that it effectively eliminates the submarine threat (in certain constrained areas), except at either end, enhancing the preparation of the battlespace for limited sea control. It then becomes a matter of fleet opposed defence of the two connected straits: strike, and counter-strike warfare with an enemy that is forced to fight in two dimensions instead of three. The JMMS is a great platform for a small city-state like Singapore to not only defend the Singapore Strait, but to a lesser extent, to enable the Singapore Navy to carry the fight to the enemy up to 1,000 km from Singapore for sea denial- which explains Singapore's two Type 218SGs and two Archer Class Submarines.
"The story of Osman and Harun can be found in the statement of the Public Prosecutor at their trial, from the records of the Centre for International and European Law. This is a chronological summary of the account from the court proceedings:
I would hardly call their actions heroic. Unlike other accounts of Konfrontasi which described the infiltrators as saboteurs, trying to disrupt public utilities such as power stations, these guys went straight for Orchard Road. They were targeting civilians. They were terrorists. And from the way they flip-flopped in their testimony by first pretending to be fishermen/farmers, then trying to get protection from the Geneva Convention, then back to fishermen, they just seem to be two scared men doing whatever then can to get off the hook."
These two Indonesian marines were tried convicted and hanged as war criminals by the courts of Singapore (High Court), Malaysia (Court of Appeal) and England (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council).Osman and Harun came to Singapore from Java on 10 March 1965 at 11 am. They had come as part of "Kommando Operasi Tertinggi'" and their instructions were to carry a parcel and light it "at the electric power station ... or any other building." After lunch, they went to the Macdonald House and placed the Malaysian Airways canvas bag containing nitroglycerine under the staircase on the mezzanine floor. They lit the fuse at 3 pm and left on a bus. The bus conductor identified them later in a lineup, and remembered that they were in civilian clothes.
Three days later on 13 March at 8 am, they were rescued by a bumboat, hanging onto a plank some distance from Singapore. He swore that neither of the appellants was wearing uniform and that one of them was bare bodied and wearing a pair of darkish trousers and the other a sports shirt and pair of long trousers. In separate police statements, Osman first said he was a fisherman while Harun said he was a farmer. However, later in the day they provided the details of the bombing.
When the trial commenced, both Osman and Harun "asserted that they were both members of the Indonesian armed forces and that they were entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention". However, the judge ruled that they were not entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status, and he did not believe they were members of the Indonesian armed forces, given the overwhelming evidence that they were not wearing uniform. Furthermore, he stated his view that "members of enemy armed forces, who are combatants and who come here with the assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers and are captured, such persons are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war."
Osman and Harun then retracted their statement and instead "said that they had left Indonesia on March 13, and that their sampan had sunk while they were on their way to a place in Singapore to collect a boat."
Three days later on 13 March at 8 am, they were rescued by a bumboat, hanging onto a plank some distance from Singapore. He swore that neither of the appellants was wearing uniform and that one of them was bare bodied and wearing a pair of darkish trousers and the other a sports shirt and pair of long trousers. In separate police statements, Osman first said he was a fisherman while Harun said he was a farmer. However, later in the day they provided the details of the bombing.
When the trial commenced, both Osman and Harun "asserted that they were both members of the Indonesian armed forces and that they were entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention". However, the judge ruled that they were not entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status, and he did not believe they were members of the Indonesian armed forces, given the overwhelming evidence that they were not wearing uniform. Furthermore, he stated his view that "members of enemy armed forces, who are combatants and who come here with the assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers and are captured, such persons are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war."
Osman and Harun then retracted their statement and instead "said that they had left Indonesia on March 13, and that their sampan had sunk while they were on their way to a place in Singapore to collect a boat."
I would hardly call their actions heroic. Unlike other accounts of Konfrontasi which described the infiltrators as saboteurs, trying to disrupt public utilities such as power stations, these guys went straight for Orchard Road. They were targeting civilians. They were terrorists. And from the way they flip-flopped in their testimony by first pretending to be fishermen/farmers, then trying to get protection from the Geneva Convention, then back to fishermen, they just seem to be two scared men doing whatever then can to get off the hook."
Mr Joko Widodo (or Jokowi as he is better known), the mayor-turned-governor-turned-president, is unique in his lack of experience or power base that can stand-up to established behind the scenes evil-power brokers like Megawati Sukarnoputri.
So what if PM Lee Hsien Loong attended the inauguration of Mr Joko Widodo as President of Indonesia, and personally offered his congratulations to Joko in Oct 2014? PM Lee may want to reaffirm Singapore's desire to continue the strong bilateral cooperation in a range of areas with the incoming Indonesian Government. However, the desire may be a one-way street.
There is no reason to be optimistic about the trajectory of Indonesia-Singapore relations with the PDPI in power. It should be noted that officers of the Indonesian Navy have their hands in numerous businesses, including running a smuggling ring (of duty-unpaid cigarettes) when their naval vessels call on Singapore. Some members of the Indonesian navy, who were here for a meeting, loaded cartons of contraband cigarettes onto the minibus that Ee Jin Liang and Ang Zi Heng were driving and directed the Singaporeans to drive to the carpark outside the naval base. Ee and Ang made a total of five to six trips and they received contraband cigarettes for helping with the smuggling (see PP v Ee Jin Liang, DAC 12097 – 12106 of 2009). In the case of Ee Jin Liang, on five occasions over a six-month period in 2008, he assisted Indonesian Navy personnel in smuggling contraband cigarettes to Singapore. In return for his assistance, the accused received bribes in the form of contraband cigarettes. The accused was arrested on 14 December 2008 by Customs while his vehicle was being loaded with contraband cigarettes. The amount of contraband cigarettes seized on that occasion amounted to 33,614 cartons, weighing 8,456.28 kg. This was one of the largest seizures of contraband cigarettes on record with unpaid customs duties amounting to over S$2.9 million. Ee faced ten charges and was sentenced to 4.5 years, and Ang was sentenced to 16 months for these criminal offences. The Indonesian Navy officers involved in running one of the largest smuggling rings in Singapore, were not punished for their criminal acts, demonstrating the need for security sector reform.
My post on 'Indonesia - Singapore Relations: Attempts at repairing the Damaged Relationship', has more details. Even just going down the road to repair the relationship is not an easy task, as noted in this Jakarta Post 'Commentary: General’s watch and his ‘retracted’ apology to Singapore.' SBY’s ‘one thousand friends, zero enemies’ mantra has been consigned to the dustbin of history. The centrepiece of Indonesia's foreign policy platform under President Joko Widodo includes a boost to Indonesia’s naval capabilities, enhanced Indian Ocean defence diplomacy, and a strong emphasis on the protection of Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty. In other words, a re-appraisal of ASEAN’s utility to Indonesia’s foreign policy interests.
Singapore's strategic location at the world's most critical SLOC in the world, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore means that it is one of many protectors of this 'mother SLOC'. Trade via this SLOC is vital to Singapore's economic viability, as well as the maintenance of the world's economies. Protecting this mother SLOC, keeping it open, and denying its use to hostile powers is critical to Singapore's survival, as well as other economic powers in the Pacific Rim (and this would include Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the US, to name a few). Since 2004 the SAF's operational experience has grown by leaps and bounds, including 998 (who served in Iraq and the Northern Arabian Gulf from 2004 to 2008), 492 (who served in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2013) and 1,400 (who served in CTF-151 - ongoing operations). Currently, the SAF is an Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2) force that has evolved from its humble beginnings.
IMO, in the late 2020s, the JMMS flying a mix of F-35Bs, attack helicopters, and supported by a fleet of four G550 Early Warning & Control aircraft, five MPAs, six A330 MRTTs and 40 F-15SGs would enable the SAF as a IKC2 force to control the SLOC within 1,000 km of Singapore (see 'Singapore Quietly Expanding Fighter Force'). The shallowness of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is a force multiplier in that it effectively eliminates the submarine threat (in certain constrained areas), except at either end, enhancing the preparation of the battlespace for limited sea control. It then becomes a matter of fleet opposed defence of the two connected straits: strike, and counter-strike warfare with an enemy that is forced to fight in two dimensions instead of three. The JMMS is a great platform for a small city-state like Singapore to not only defend the Singapore Strait, but to a lesser extent, to enable the Singapore Navy to carry the fight to the enemy up to 1,000 km from Singapore for sea denial- which explains Singapore's two Type 218SGs and two Archer Class Submarines.
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I don't think Singapore will have a particular issue with securing its immediate interests. But I guess the question will be how safe and secure the region will be beyond that 1000 km radius.
But as you have pointed out the region still has issues working together. While they may not be at war, to get unanimous agreement on anything is nearly impossible. Recent operations with the missing Malaysian airlines flight I think highlight some of the operational issues. Even sharing or communicating intel, is difficult. Even if military are on board working together (which is rare), politics can get in the way.
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That's the sticking point. We can't predict the future. The JMMS and the new submarines would be Singapore's contingency in that event. 1000km is already quite far from Singapore, which is traditionally on concerned with protecting its territorial interests. Local power projection rather than global projection is how the SAF assures its neighbours that its not looking to turn into a conquering army.
Hence why it is quite something for the RSN to operate warships out of CTF 151. The capability was present though when the ships were commissioned, I doubt anyone thought that they'd be used for anti-piracy ops off Africa.
Basically, beyond a certain range, Singapore doesn't pay much attention. Having a light carrier equipped with F35s changes that radius of caring from very close and proximate to Singapore to very much farther. Given the already fragile relationships in the region, MINDEF would be foolish to pass up the opportunity to improve its own force multipliers and capabilities. I grant however, that by doing so, they may also jeopardize those relationships but at the end of the day, no matter how ASEAN goes, each country looks after itself first.
At 14,000 tons, I presume that ST Marine is able to produce the hull in Singapore. But how many would MINDEF think of procuring? One? Two or three?
Hence why it is quite something for the RSN to operate warships out of CTF 151. The capability was present though when the ships were commissioned, I doubt anyone thought that they'd be used for anti-piracy ops off Africa.
Basically, beyond a certain range, Singapore doesn't pay much attention. Having a light carrier equipped with F35s changes that radius of caring from very close and proximate to Singapore to very much farther. Given the already fragile relationships in the region, MINDEF would be foolish to pass up the opportunity to improve its own force multipliers and capabilities. I grant however, that by doing so, they may also jeopardize those relationships but at the end of the day, no matter how ASEAN goes, each country looks after itself first.
At 14,000 tons, I presume that ST Marine is able to produce the hull in Singapore. But how many would MINDEF think of procuring? One? Two or three?
Gadjah Mada
New Member
A little bit out of topic.
I think may be other Indonesian just not willing to discuss this anymore. Ananda on the other ocassion has mentioned many times how close the connection between Indonesian elites and Singapore. Both from private sectors and government officials.
You called Megawati as evil power broker. Well this show how far your bias has been. Does she hate Singapore? She never said. But in case you do not know because of your ignorance, her late husband, Taufik Kiemas, the former Chairman of MPR, passed away in Singapore General Hospital last year. I bet many more prominent Indonesians will take their last breath in any Singaporean hospitals.
Jokowi's and SBY's sons, all of them went to schools in Singapore. Singapore is a country favoured by most Indonesian elites. Even in the last general election, there was no rethoric against Singapore. I bet in personal level, Lee Hsien Loong has good relation with both SBY and Jokowi, even much closer than any other ASEAN leaders. The last president who said a harsh statement on Singapore was BJ Habibie who called Singapore as little red dot, and a racist country. A bit ironic considering that he is actually the softer president Indonesia ever have. But it probably was caused by the fact that in personal level he, and Sukarno were those who did not have close relation with Singapore. Habibie's political opponents inside Soeharto's camp were mostly close to Singapore. Habibie never went to Singaporeean hospitals, he prefer german hospital. His sons went to Aachen. His wife passed away in Munich.
When you are talking about smugglers in the TNI, they have brought knightmare more to Indonesian than any other country. In many case, problems between undisciplined criminals in TNI has led into open brawl between units and many times also the police, such as the incident in Batam this month. In north sumatera, few years ago, shooting and assault on police office by TNI has brought destruction to public facilities and few people killed. In many case, the punishment is far from satisfying. Yet you are talking about smugglers?
Law enforcement is a big problem in Indonesia. But I think just too far to discuss in a thread about Singaporean aircraft carrier.
I hear your political opinion, just as I have mine.
IMO, politicians should die in hospitals of their respective countries, while they are in office, but private citizens should be free to seek the medical care they desire. Regardless of differences, their privacy at a time of grief has been traditionally respected. And this will not change, which is why I did not bring this up.
Many, if not most Singaporeans are aware of that - it's on Lee Hsien Loong's facebook page that he had breakfast with Jokowi, when he came over - they had Selera Rasa Nasi Lemak from Adam Road and Roti Prata from Madras New Woodlands. BTW, I am an alumni member of one of these schools.
Indonesian elites create shell companies in Singapore and take advantage of the banking system to enable certain transactions, including some court reported ones. And again, I have kept silent on these cases in this thread, as it is off-topic.
Should we be thankful for our air? Am I supposed to be grateful for some haze free days, like today?
But I am saying that personal relations can only carry us so far and there are important limits to cooperation. I am saying that no matter how hard Singaporean leaders try, it is doomed to failure for some structural reasons.
Even though SBY has ruled over an Indonesia that is stable and a member of the G20, he did not really utilize his landslide victory in 2009 to create new reforms. On the contrary, his administration has been marked by risk-averse policies. In contrast, President Joko Widodo’s global maritime axis doctrine, the centrepiece of his foreign policy platform, can best be understood as the geopolitical component of a broader maritime development agenda. Its defence aspects include a boost to Indonesia’s naval capabilities, enhanced Indian Ocean defence diplomacy, and a strong emphasis on the protection of Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty and the security and welfare of its outer islands. Widodo’s projected increase in Indonesia’s defence spending from 0.8 to 1.5%of GDP within five years is to be concentrated on building naval capabilities. Increasingly, the TNI has responded with displays of hard power and diplomats under Indonesia’s new foreign minister, Retno Marsudi are re-calibrating foreign policy settings to reflect national interests in a more muscular manner. Further, the Russian government for example announced it will support Jokowi’s maritime policies and offer Indonesia ‘various types of ships, multi-level intelligence systems, as well as establish a ship service center and a production center for spare parts.’
Great way to build ties or is it an attempt to destroy them? There is a fair bit of travel between Singaporeans to Indonesia and Indonesians to Singapore but it is also objectively true that the trajectory of our bilateral relations is not trouble free, as Indonesia becomes more assertive. And as a Singaporean, I would suggest that is an eventuality that needs to be catered for in long term defence procurement (eg. the 2 Type 218SGs, the 8 LMVs & the JMMS), rather than hoping that the current status quo can continue beyond 2020.
In your opinion, are Indonesia-Singapore bilateral relations on a 'up cycle' or 'down cycle'? And how long is this latest cycle?
In the prior post above, I did not intent to elaborate on the limits of cooperation, as it might be seen as offensive to you and there is no intent to cause offense.
I am aware of that and as long it happens in Indonesia, it is not my place to comment. However, I did comment on a crime that took place in Singapore. A crime committed by Indonesian naval officers using navy ships calling on a Singapore navy base. We know who they are by name.
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Didn't Habibie denied calling it a little red dot, and the context was in reference to his problems in that he has over 200 million of them (citizens)? Certainly Habibies biggest problems were not Singapore, but were within Indonesia. It almost resulted in direct conflict with Australia and a civil war internally.
Which is I guess the context from what the TNI see cigarette smuggling as a minor offence. They haven't killed anyone, they weren't involved in public unrest, or interfering in politics or Indonesian police. Falintil actually got most of their weapons and ammunition from the Indonesian army, it is quite possible that other militant groups that are in direct conflict with the Indonesian state are getting arms from TNI or related personnel.
Some of the bigger rackets the TNI were involved in. A Sergeant was arrested in regards to the smuggling of 1000 people to Australia. Estimated to have made some $80,000.
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Which is I guess the context from what the TNI see cigarette smuggling as a minor offence. They haven't killed anyone, they weren't involved in public unrest, or interfering in politics or Indonesian police. Falintil actually got most of their weapons and ammunition from the Indonesian army, it is quite possible that other militant groups that are in direct conflict with the Indonesian state are getting arms from TNI or related personnel.
Some of the bigger rackets the TNI were involved in. A Sergeant was arrested in regards to the smuggling of 1000 people to Australia. Estimated to have made some $80,000.
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Gadjah Mada
New Member
Jusuf Kalla-the current vice president- once said that you should be thankful for the fresh air you breath from our rain forest for most of the year, and curse the haze for a few months. I never heard any Singaporean being thankful for that. Did you? Do you know the haze actually poison the lungs of more Indonesian than Singaporean, yet SBY never ask for any forgiveness from Indonesian, but once he said sorry to Singapore? Some politician sold this thing to attack him. It is called democracy in case you do not know.
The relation between Singapore and Indonesia is up and down? isn't it common in most of bilateral relationship? I think it happen with our relation with Australia and Malaysia too. See the positive side. It is because of our interaction is much higher than for example, India or Thailand. And we also have common borders, and this creates issues. Indonesia is a complex country with complex problems. In the end of 90s most of the world thought that we were gonna broken into pieces just like the former Yugoslavia and USSR. Yet we survive the horror. This year is the 69th year of our country, but we still looking for formula to manage our own country. Each country has its own history and not necessarily as good.
With regard to maritim axis, I think you buy too much about Russian propaganda, if I can call it like that. Indonesian army (Ananda has said about this many times) has been less enthusiast about Russian weapons, that's why they went for Leo 2 instead of T-90, and planned the buying of Apache and Blackhawk instead of additional Mi-35 and Mi-17. The last Navy chief of staff who was fond of Russia is Slamet Soebijanto. Other than him, not so many. That's why despite the 1 billion dollar state credit provided by Russia, the Navy took the South Korean submarines instead. The air force may be has slight nostalgia with Russia, but anyway we have less Sukhois than Malaysia with less capable version. Surely not enough to threat other country. It is even not enough to police our air space. The navy ships are not only very limited in number and capability, they also do not have enough fuel. It is common that the Navy never operate them as supposed to be because they are already in debt to pertamina. Bad management as well as possible corruption is commonly indicated. Our seas sometime just like wild wild west, but I do not think Singapore will start to act like the US against Pancho Villa.
In my personal opinion, considering his tough encounter with Prabowo and his camp in the parliament, Jokowi needs to take the heart of the military by giving them some promise. He is an experienced politician. So far what he talk about maritim axis is more civilian projects. In the forum like APEC or G-20 he invited investors to invest in maritim infratructure development. Even when he met with President Putin in Beijing, they talk about how Russia could help Indonesia in building energy sector and Railway for coal shipment in Kalimantan. Not a single military issues. The only president who talked about security issues was Obama, mostly about terrorism and extremism, which has occupied our bilateral agenda since GW Bush era. Sad to see the US became less and less important to us economically than China. The children of my generation grew with great US influence, that's how I learned my limited English
As difficult English can be, it is surely much easier than Mandarin or Russian.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
Not wanting to hijack this thread to other topic,but here it is:
@gajahmada, you have to understand the suspicisions from OPSSG for Megawati. In some way, I also very suspicious with Megawati intention with Jokowi administrations. Face it Megawati 'is' the worst President in the history of Indonesian Republic. Her administrations full of incompentencies, and despite her parties talk of anti coruption including what Jokowi potrait himself at this moment, Megawati adminsitration coruption is mind blowing compared to SBY or other administrations in history including Soeharto. Thank god she has only 3.5 years to ruin Indonesia.
So, if people suspicious on how far Jokowi independency from Megawati, that's very understandable. Megawati foreign policy is not more than 'stupid' nationalism bravado..but full with 'back dooor' chanels than contrary with her Nationalism agenda. So when Jokowi begin more toughen nationalistics foreign policy, some suspicions including from 'nearly half' of people in Indonesia that not vote for him is also understandable. I'm belong to 'people' that not vote for him, and based on 'suspicions' that he's not more a 'puppet' from Megawati. How far he's proving himself on contrary of that remain to be seen. But no 'optimism' for Indonesia if he can not proved him self he's his own man, and not just some puppet being put by Megawati.
SBY critics put him slow in action, and to accomodative for many parties, is part of his 'risk-adverse' policies. However without that policies, he can not govern Indonesia effectively (yes he's govern Indonesia effectively despite the critics think of), and sort out the 'mess' Megawati left him from her 3.5 years of disasterous regime. Jokowi more self concious nationalistics policies, can only been done, due to SBY relatively stable politics that provide stable economic development.
@OPSSG, Jokowi more maritime concious policy is also understandable considering how much Indonesia has not been able to utilised her maritime potentials. However the Indonesian maritime regulators and enforcers still full of 'imbiciles' that SBY chooses not to eredicate much faster due to his policies of compromises (for stable political environment). That included our Navy and so called 'coast guard'. SBY begin to takcle the problem on his last two years in power, but in his own way, he 's doing it more slowly for not rocking the boat too much.
Jokowi based on his campign promises, want to do it more drastic. However based on his track record as Governor of Jakarta, he's also full of rhetorics. His Jakarta's tenure as Governor luckily helped by his Deputy Governor that are more 'crazy' facing Jakarta problems. Will see if he can do it now in National levels.
Back to the Topic:
The so called Singapore light carriers concept that ST already shown to public more as LPH. However with capabilities modules to add ASW capabilities if the need arrises. Will Singapore F-35B can be modified on the design ? I believe Singapore still inclined for F-35B than F-35A right ?
@gajahmada, you have to understand the suspicisions from OPSSG for Megawati. In some way, I also very suspicious with Megawati intention with Jokowi administrations. Face it Megawati 'is' the worst President in the history of Indonesian Republic. Her administrations full of incompentencies, and despite her parties talk of anti coruption including what Jokowi potrait himself at this moment, Megawati adminsitration coruption is mind blowing compared to SBY or other administrations in history including Soeharto. Thank god she has only 3.5 years to ruin Indonesia.
So, if people suspicious on how far Jokowi independency from Megawati, that's very understandable. Megawati foreign policy is not more than 'stupid' nationalism bravado..but full with 'back dooor' chanels than contrary with her Nationalism agenda. So when Jokowi begin more toughen nationalistics foreign policy, some suspicions including from 'nearly half' of people in Indonesia that not vote for him is also understandable. I'm belong to 'people' that not vote for him, and based on 'suspicions' that he's not more a 'puppet' from Megawati. How far he's proving himself on contrary of that remain to be seen. But no 'optimism' for Indonesia if he can not proved him self he's his own man, and not just some puppet being put by Megawati.
SBY critics put him slow in action, and to accomodative for many parties, is part of his 'risk-adverse' policies. However without that policies, he can not govern Indonesia effectively (yes he's govern Indonesia effectively despite the critics think of), and sort out the 'mess' Megawati left him from her 3.5 years of disasterous regime. Jokowi more self concious nationalistics policies, can only been done, due to SBY relatively stable politics that provide stable economic development.
@OPSSG, Jokowi more maritime concious policy is also understandable considering how much Indonesia has not been able to utilised her maritime potentials. However the Indonesian maritime regulators and enforcers still full of 'imbiciles' that SBY chooses not to eredicate much faster due to his policies of compromises (for stable political environment). That included our Navy and so called 'coast guard'. SBY begin to takcle the problem on his last two years in power, but in his own way, he 's doing it more slowly for not rocking the boat too much.
Jokowi based on his campign promises, want to do it more drastic. However based on his track record as Governor of Jakarta, he's also full of rhetorics. His Jakarta's tenure as Governor luckily helped by his Deputy Governor that are more 'crazy' facing Jakarta problems. Will see if he can do it now in National levels.
Back to the Topic:
The so called Singapore light carriers concept that ST already shown to public more as LPH. However with capabilities modules to add ASW capabilities if the need arrises. Will Singapore F-35B can be modified on the design ? I believe Singapore still inclined for F-35B than F-35A right ?
I think the key issue now is that we don't even know the tonnage of the ship. If it is indeed 16kt, then it would be more suitable as a LPH (albeit a small one).
My take: wait and see. So far there's not much news on this - it is probably still being conceptualised, and I suspect that the final design will be quite different from what ST displayed.
whatever platform is chosen, I would be betting that the singaporean combat capability vignettes would be factoring in a flight package of onboard JSF.
I wonder how small you can go an still get reasonable operation out of a F-35B. It might only require some general modification and refinement but could still remain under 20kt.
Also how would Singapore operate such a carrier. It would be unlikely to deploy her far away and unsupported, so having large fuel/weapon storage would not be needed. In fact she could be operating within flight distance (~500 miles) of Singapore, leaving all/most maintenance etc to be done on shore. So traditional carrier requirements may not be in the mix for Singapore's requirements.
More of a lillypad to extend flight operations 1000-1500 miles in and around sea lanes. Obviously working with allied forces could considerably extend that.
t68
Well-Known Member
The Invincibles were 22 at full load and 209m long, that long enough forF35B?
Ananda
The Bunker Group
For me, the ballpark size of Italian Carvour is the minimum for operating F-35B efficiently. So we are talking 25,000 - 30,000 dwt and 230m - 250m deck length. Lets see the image of Carvour to ST Endurance 160 design. If we use that EH-101 in Carvour as bentchmark for F-35B, comparing the size of heli model in Endurance design, seems the design need to be enlarge at least 50%, to match Carvour flexibility for STVOL operations.
Question is, since I'm far from expert in naval design, can that Endurance 160 design have flexibility to be enlarge and stregthen in to Carvour ballpark size ?
Question is, since I'm far from expert in naval design, can that Endurance 160 design have flexibility to be enlarge and stregthen in to Carvour ballpark size ?
The Endurance 160 appears to be very capable vessel given the dimensions but would any F-35B option be for lilly pad operations given the vessel si not repleat with a large hanger/vehicle deck and larger levators would have to be worked in (which cut into that space further).
As for streching the design, the vessel has a pretty doo length to beram ration but a 50% increase would make it pretty long and thin (and woudl be interesting from a girder strength issue). As soon as you start playing in that paddock you really are inot a new design IMHO