Part 1 of 3 reply to MarsDominus on: How can the Philippines defend against a giant like China?
The short answer is that the Philippines can't do it on their own and they will NEVER acquire the requisite capability - it will be taking a James Bond movie spoof (like Johnny English staring Rowan Atkinson), seriously as an instructional spy video to be used by the CIA. But in the interest of clarity, on why the Philippines can't do it, let us spell it out. Further, I have a serious concern in that the premise of your proposed discussion is faulty. And because the premise is faulty, the foundation of your discussion is not sound, as I explain in greater detail why in a 35 point reply below:
As you guys well know, the Philippines is embroiled in a bitter territorial dispute with China.
1. Please don't use a premise based on a lie again to make a point, it does your credibility no good to other members of the forum.
2. With regard to the Philippine claim to the Spratly Islands (Chinese name: Nansha islands, Vietnamese Name: Quần đảo Trường Sa, Filipino Name: Kapuluan ng Kalayaan) are a disputed group of more than 750 reefs, islets, atolls, cays and islands in the South China Sea, there are three points to note:-
One, the Philippines (as a nation of islands) and China do not share a land border;
Two, the Philippines has a disputed claim on its declared EEZ and declared baselines. EEZ waters are not territorial waters; and
Three, the Philippines has disputed EEZ claims with Brunei, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Strictly speaking, EEZ disputes over rocks and water features are disputes over economic interests. Correctly understood, it is a dispute over exploitation of resources over maritime features.
3. While the Philippines tries to position itself as law abiding, the country does not always observe its own laws; and, on occasion, its agents engage in criminal acts of killing foreign nationals, while acting in an official capacity. In a second criminal killing at sea incident, the Philippine coast guard patrol (in Maritime Control Surveillance 3001) shot and killed a Taiwanese fisherman in May 2013. This resulted in Taiwan imposing economic sanctions against Philippines until the Philippine Government issued a formal apology, commenced investigations on the criminal act, compensated the fisherman's family; and the parties reinstated talks over fishing rights in the overlapping EEZ areas. Taiwanese sanctions against the Philippines were only lifted after the Philippines complied with these four conditions. Further, as far back as 1999, the Philippine Navy has been ramming and/or sinking Chinese fishing boats (incidents reported on 23 May 1999 and on 20 June 1990). The most recent reported incident of the Philippine Navy ramming a Chinese fishing boat that I know of was on 19 October 2011, which resulted in Manila issuing an apology to the Chinese embassy.
4. But China and Taiwan are not the only claimants being ambiguous. None of the Southeast Asian claimants have fully declared what it is they are claiming. The Philippines received plaudits for bringing its domestic legislation into line with UNCLOS in 2009. But Manila has yet to declare its extended continental shelf or which of the Spratlys it considers islands and which rocks. Hanoi, meanwhile, has not redrawn its territorial baselines, which in southern Vietnam violate the rules of UNCLOS. Nor has it declared all of its continental shelf or clarified the status of features in the Paracels and Spratlys. Malaysia has not officially issued territorial baselines or the remainder of its continental shelf, nor has it clarified the status of the Spratlys it claims. And Brunei has yet to outline its extended continental shelf, despite having declared in 2009 its intention to do so.
5. Without clarification, it is impossible to define what waters are actually in dispute. And without that definition, agreeing on areas of joint development or joint conservation is a tall order.
6. The rise of China needs to be managed, especially as it is accompanied by the rise of regional sea powers. Make no mistake, a number of powers in the Indo-Pacific is in the midst of an naval arms race (between at least China, India, South Korea and Japan) that complicates the security of the region's sea lanes to which the Philippines has a front row seat (and at the moment, not a master of its own destiny).
To build a minimum credible defense, the Philippines relaunced its program to modernize its armed forces. They recently acquired several ships from the United States and about a dozen more from Japan. They also bought 12 FA-50 fighter jets from South Korea.
7. Credible defence under President Aquino? It will never happen; and I rarely say never.
8. While the Philippine Navy is making an effort to modernise, under the current administration, they are not able acquire enough assets to challenge the PLAN in the South China Sea (who has blue water aspirations) or conduct naval patrols in the face of opposition over disputed waters. In capability terms the Philippine Navy is the least capable (amongst all other claimants in the South China Sea - even Brunei's Navy does better at participating in international exercises) of inter-operating with other advanced navies. The fact is the Brunei's tiny navy, can spank the Philippine Navy is surface warfare simply because the the Philippine Navy is armed like a coast guard and has not entered the missile age.
9. The other problem is the lack of technical competence (in naval engineering) by the Philippine Navy. They may acquire platforms, but they really don't have the disciplined organisational culture to maintain all the new gear acquired. Back in 1997, the Philippine Navy (PN) bought 3 second hand Peacock Class vessels from the Royal Navy. With a year, one of the 76mm guns did not work, and no one in their navy knew how to fix it. Like the Peacock Class saga, has again under invested in training their sailors and their personnel organisation, leading to sub-standard practices. In the short run, this might work but I am fairly confident that it will come and bite them in the ass just a little while later. Their US Navy adviser, who observed them on BRP Gregorio del Pilar, commented that while they 'mimic procedures' from the US, they 'lack the discipline to do them properly'; and it is clear that these problems can be traced to defective organisational culture, where there is an over reliance on junior officers for the requisite technical competence. To some degree and at an organisational level, they have not learnt from past mistakes and are incapable of making the changes necessary in their defective concept of maintenance for the better. They also have a system that does not train their junior sailors to do their jobs properly, and the leadership still wonders why things don't work after a while.
Strategic Sealift Vessel of the Philippine Navy coming without weapon system
...These Makassar-class LPD will act as Philippine Navy’s Strategic Sealift Vessel when delivered. With the budget of PhP4 billion or PhP3.864 billion contract price, PT PAL will not be able to build 2 ships completely if weapon and sensor systems are included in the contract. Weapon and Sensor system will be provided by the Philippine government in a separate acquisition or will temporarily use available resources.
The contractor will only provide basic navigation system. Currently, PT PAL in coordination with Philippine government is building vessels with specifications provided by Department of National Defense. Philippine Navy’s Strategic Sealift Vessels can act as the force’s floating command center while carrying out its main purpose as military sealift and transport vessel in events of disasters and calamities...
10. Beyond normal levels of technical incompetence, the PN have acquisition malpractice - where they constantly do really, really stupid things in an attempt to save money - in a manner that significantly increases project risk, while delaying the delivery of needed capability. Having never been involved a complex ship building project before (like the Strategic Sealift Vessel project), they can only think of weapons integration in terms of small calibre weapons mounts. They don't think holistically about ship stabilization or weapon/sensor stabilization - ship stabilization affect launch and recovery windows for helicopters, small craft and AAVs. That is the reason why the PN would choose to buy the SSVs without weapons integrated and tested as part of the acquisition process - I hope the Indonesians are prepared to provide proper training to help the PN sustain the SSVs over their life cycle.
11. I am aware that the specifications of the SSV included the weight and space provision for the installation of a main gun at the 'A' position. The PN are penny wise but pound foolish with regards to their failure to a main gun installed by the Indonesian yard. This is not an easy process due to the need for deck penetration. The last thing you want is a main gun that can't shoot to its specifications (eg. main guns can get derailed, if not maintained properly) or have the main gun's rate of fire affected by improper installation (or be a source of concern due to deck flex or harmonics). IMHO, they are the poster child of acquisition malpractice. The under-armed SSVs (when they are eventually upgraded) may be cheap to buy but real costs over the life of the assets acquired will be significant if you actually factor in the other 'real' costs such as weapons integration for the main gun and the Mk 38 Mod 2 mount(s) with the ship's fire control systems. Again, I assume the US will help out with the Mk 38 Mod 2 installation (just as they are going to do for the PN's 2nd hand 'frigates'). In an ideal world, with proper planning, the PN can arm the SSVs themselves, but I suspect that they may not have thought through all the integration issues they will face, as they DIY their own SSVs. And I wish them all the best with their DIY project of arming the SSVs.
12. Besides the fact that the Philippines lack platforms to patrol its EEZ waters, without technical competence the number of sea days their crews can stay at sea for patrols is limited. They have the train and sustain part of the equation wrong and they don't know how to fix it, at an organisational level yet. With regard to the PN, the Philippine Secretary of Defense Voltaire Gazmin has been quoted in 2011 as saying: “
This is truly deplorable but plain reality."
13. For an air force that operates mainly helicopters and less than 45 fixed wing aircraft (3 C-130s, 2 Fokker-27s, 5 S211s, 12 OV-10 and 20 SF-260), the Philippines needs to husband her scarce resources and also to have a capability management plan that includes recapitalizing her fleet of aircraft - in particular, I note with approval the current plan for the US to transfer two additional C-130Ts to the Philippines.
14. On 6 Nov 2012, Aerotech Industries Philippines was awarded a pesos 69.5 million contract to perform a Major Structural Inspection (MSI) of S211 #021 of the Philippine Air Force. MSI, alternatively referred to as Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) or Inspection Replace As Necessary (IRAN), is a process by which the subject aircraft is taken apart and all its components — with the exception of the engine, ejection seat, and similarly self-contained systems — are evaluated and then replaced when required.
15. Capability management is organized around a concept of operations (CONOPS), because the CONOPS describe how a specified course of action is to be executed. The ability to execute the specified course of action depends on many factors and the relationship between those factors. The most important of which is defined by three interdependent factors: combat readiness, sustainable capability and force structure. For the Philippine Air Force (PAF) to be well regarded in capability management, PAF's combat readiness, sustainable capability and force structure needs to improve. Further, capability management is:-
(i) not about the platform alone;
(ii) much more than buying the 'best' or the 'right' platform;
(iii) about training PAF's people to a certain level of combat readiness in order to execute a plan in accordance with a CONOPS;
(iv) having the right organisational structure to support the CONOPS; and
(v) about sustainable capability and this includes retaining the technical ability and the budget to sustain the assets/platforms after acquisition. In this regard, PAF has a poor record (over the years PAF acquired 12 C-130s but are only able to keep 3 operational) and there are 3 additional points on Filipino technical ability to take note of:-
One, traditionally, PAF has not been able to budget enough sustain its C-130 fleet, leading to
crashes (last crash in
August 2008, off-Davao and another in December 1993) and pre-mature scrapping of air frames (and without preserving parts, engines and spares that could have been preserved). If I am not wrong, there are currently 3 working C-130's in the PAF inventory, comprising a single C-130B (3633) from the 1960s and two C-130Hs (4704 & 4726) that are manufactured in the 1970s.
Two, IMHO the PAF NEEDS to want to FIX ifself and change from its current dysfunctional state and it needs the endorsement of the USAF more than it knows. If the US as a treaty ally still does not believe in the progress made by the PAF (after the Lead-In-Fighter-Trainer is acquired), to find some F-16s as EDAs, then the PAF's capability development trajectory must be in big trouble.
Three, it is hard to be optimistic with PAF's track record and the Attack Helicopter (AH) acquisition project (AFPMP-PAF-00-06-042) that was awarded to PZL Swidnik for the attack version of the W-3 Sokol, is a good example. AH award decision was cancelled in September 2010 due to suspected anomalies. The
Aqunio administration seems to be keen to undo all the prior administration procurement decisions because of a fear of prior deeds of corruption. Thereafter the attempt to acquire Fennec helicopters (originally destined for Pakistan) had failed. It was the fourth in a series of attempts that dated back to 2006. This lack of continuity across different administrations and lack of bureaucratic logic will handicap PAF procurement for some years to come.
16. For those that are interested, read this CNAS article by Richard D. Fisher, Jr. (which I have cited before), namely "
Defending the Philippines: Military Modernization and the Challenges Ahead".
Richard D. Fisher said:
"Since the early 1980s the Philippines has lacked a credible air defense capability: modern fighters, anti-aircraft missiles, long-range air defense radar and the maritime patrol aircraft to monitor its vast maritime territory and economic zones...
In 2012 or 2013, the PAF expects to purchase its first modern maritime patrol aircraft, a mission that has been carried out by OV-10s – two of which were intercepted by Chinese fighters in early 2011. This year, the PAF is also expected to purchase new long-range radar to support its air defense mission...
...
In an article published in the PLA Daily on April 14, Chinese Academy of Military Science scholar Wang Xinjun warned that China has 'relative military superiority' over the Philippines and that China’s use of coast guard ships conveyed 'restraint, not weakness'.
...
But as part of its reaction to growing assertiveness by Beijing, at the July 2010 foreign ministers’ meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Obama administration offered to assist multilateral negotiations to settle conflicting South China Sea claims..."
17. The size of the PAF operations budget was a historical problem but the current bigger problem is that the PAF purchases items on a piece-by-piece basis in a bureaucratic manner that defies logic (all in the name of clean government, when it is actually a model of bureaucratic inefficiency and symptom of government waste). For example, the AFP Procurement Service about has about 7.9 million pesos worth of bid invitations. Instead of establishing a service support agreements with pre-qualified aircraft suppliers (and there are many around in Asia, be it in Malaysia, Singapore or Korea), the AFP Procurement Service invited potential suppliers to submit 18 individual bids for C-130 components. This mode of procurement is inherently more expensive and less efficient in keeping C-130s operational.
From the way I see it, the Philippines is decades away from remotely posing a threat to PLA-N and PLA-AF. In fact, a Filipino senator adimitted that even with the 12 fighter jets, the Philippine Air Force will not last a couple of hours against PLA-AF.
18. Agreed. I am not sure if what the PAF bought should be considered as fighters, as the squadron's primary role is to serve as Lead-In-Fighter-Trainers, with a limited surface attack capability. I am sure you can mount something like a sidewinder or two on the Korean plane but it strains credibility to consider a training squadron as a fighter squadron.
19. I admire the Philippine ability for hyperbole of labelling the aircraft in a training squadron, as fighters; and the reason why the Philippine Press buys into this lie, it is because the press in the Philippines is not noted for their competence on reporting defence matters.
