Pentagon covering up flaws in Patriot missile: US scientist

mysterious

New Member
Pentagon covering up flaws in Patriot missile: US scientist

* Faulty missile system shot down British Tornado
* US Army claims of 96% success against Scuds an ‘insidious’ lie


WASHINGTON: The Pentagon has covered up major flaws in the US Army’s Patriot missile system that prompted a battery to shoot down a British Tornado during the Iraq war last year, said a top US scientist.

Theodore Postol, professor of science, technology and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), says “every one†of the claims made by a Pentagon probe into the shoot down was false. Postol led an MIT research group to analyse the success of the Patriot systems in the first Gulf war.

After that conflict, the US Army claimed the Patriots had intercepted 96 percent of the Scuds they had engaged.

“The real intercept rate was almost certainly zero. Now we have discovered a similar but far more insidious cover-up following Operation Iraqi Freedom,†says Postol, in a commentary to published in next Saturday’s issue of the British weekly New Scientist.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) ground-attack Tornado, Yahoo 76, was shot down by a Patriot air and missile defence unit over Kuwait on March 22, 2003 as it descended with another Tornado along a pre-planned “safe†corridor towards its home base west of Kuwait city. Both airmen were killed.

In its much-delayed investigation into the Tornado incident, the US Department of Defence concluded the mistake was caused “in major part†by incorrect setting of the plane’s Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system. The IFF is an electronic system that tells defence crews and other aircraft that the plane is friendly, not hostile.

The Pentagon also said the Patriot battery detected what appeared to be a hostile Iraq missile heading directly towards it.

The “missileâ€, though, turned out to be the Tornado. However, according to the report, the allied integrated defence system did not work correctly and failed to identify it.

“We believe that every one of these claims is false,†Postol says.

By sifting through the data in the appendix in the report, Postol says he discovered that the “missile†signal received by the Patriot unit was a “ghostâ€, an illusory signal that was probably generated by electronic inference from other Patriot units nearby.

And far from the assertion that the “missile†was heading towards the unit, this false target was in fact heading towards a troop encampment 15 kilometres (10 miles) to the north.

Had it been heading towards the unit, the battery’s weapons control computer would have classified it as a Category 1 Air Threat. Instead, it was tagged as Category 9, a threat level so low that the computer did not even mark it for engagement, says Postol.

Still, believing they were under attack, the Patriot crew fired an interceptor missile at the false target, which by this stage had “moved†in the area of the two Tornados.

Lacking any other target, the missile’s radar homed in on one of the planes and blew it up.

In addition to the false signal problem, the Patriot battery did not have high-speed data links that would have enabled it to “talk†to the rest of the air defence system. Eleven days after the Tornado was shot down another Patriot crew fired at another false target, destroying a US Navy F-18, killing its pilot. The US Army has yet to release its report into this incident. afp

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-9-2004_pg4_2

Looks like Patriot just got its share of bashing! Why in the world would Pentagon still want to use something as 'useless' (as I see) as this? Intercept rate in Gulf War 1 was 'zero'!! Now that is something I didnt expect. Is it time to go for something else other than the 'patriot'? :roll
 

lamdacore

New Member
Intercept rate in Gulf War 1 was 'zero'!!
Don't distort the facts! It said "Almost Zero".

First of all the time span from the GW1 to GW2 is a bit over ten years.

Patriots of GW1 were not tested completely or not even tested. Now the situation is a lot more different. The patriot was originally designed to intercept hostile aircraft. From the article it looks it managed to do that. If it only had a problem in its IFF then that is a software glitch. The US has invested a lot of time and money in this defence system. One or two articles such as these will not scrap the defence system. :smokingc:
 

tatra

New Member
Verified Defense Pro
lamdacore said:
Intercept rate in Gulf War 1 was 'zero'!!
Don't distort the facts! It said "Almost Zero".

First of all the time span from the GW1 to GW2 is a bit over ten years.

Patriots of GW1 were not tested completely or not even tested. Now the situation is a lot more different. The patriot was originally designed to intercept hostile aircraft. From the article it looks it managed to do that. If it only had a problem in its IFF then that is a software glitch. The US has invested a lot of time and money in this defence system. One or two articles such as these will not scrap the defence system. :smokingc:
"incorrect setting of the plane’s Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system"

"believing they were under attack, the Patriot crew fired an interceptor missile at the false target"

Sounds to me more like human errors on both the sending and the receiving end.
 
A

Aussie Digger

Guest
That's right. The missile itself did it's job. It shot down an indentified target. It's the crew training and Target ID procedures and methods that seem to be lacking, not the missile capability itself...
 

Awang se

New Member
Verified Defense Pro
The real intercept rate was almost certainly zero
The missile was originally design to engaged aircraft so it's a small wonder the missile act poorly against ballistic missile such as scud, compare to the system originally design to intercept ballistic missile like S-300 or ARROW. Maybe the software they use is faulty. they might registered the high speed scud missile as "fireball", a false readings and ignore it.
 

mysterious

New Member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
  • #7
mysterious said:
By sifting through the data in the appendix in the report, Postol says he discovered that the “missile†signal received by the Patriot unit was a “ghostâ€, an illusory signal that was probably generated by electronic inference from other Patriot units nearby.

And far from the assertion that the “missile†was heading towards the unit, this false target was in fact heading towards a troop encampment 15 kilometres (10 miles) to the north.

Had it been heading towards the unit, the battery’s weapons control computer would have classified it as a Category 1 Air Threat. Instead, it was tagged as Category 9, a threat level so low that the computer did not even mark it for engagement, says Postol.

Lacking any other target, the missile’s radar homed in on one of the planes and blew it up.

In addition to the false signal problem, the Patriot battery did not have high-speed data links that would have enabled it to “talk†to the rest of the air defence system. Eleven days after the Tornado was shot down another Patriot crew fired at another false target, destroying a US Navy F-18, killing its pilot. The US Army has yet to release its report into this incident.
I'd still say all this means a major software hiccup! Some one should take a serious look in to this to prevent such mess from happening again. It certainly requires more improvements if not a complete overhaul.
 

berry580

New Member
This is stupid man. The Iraqis didn't even use any fighters and they (US) operate SAMs. Whats even more stupid is that friendly airdefence fire was the only thing that killed Coalition aircrews. LOL So the Coalition airforce may probably be safer WITHOUT those SAMs.
 

highsea

New Member
mysterious said:
I'd still say all this means a major software hiccup! Some one should take a serious look in to this to prevent such mess from happening again. It certainly requires more improvements if not a complete overhaul.
The report is talking about an incident that happened 13 years ago, with the first generation Patriot system. The problem was addressed a long time ago, the current PAC-3 is much improved over the original Patriot. I can't say that mistakes like this are now impossible, but I would say they are much less likely to happen today, especially considering the improvements the US has made in datalinking and broadband battlefield communications.
 

highsea

New Member
This is a couple years old, but:

PAC-3 Test Results.

Flight Test Number Date Intercept? Notes

DT-1 Sept. 29, 1997 n/a First control test missile (CTM) – no seeker or target

DT-2 Dec. 15, 1997 n/a Second CTM; extended range
Seeker characterization flight March 15, 1997 Yes Risk mitigation flight; intercept of short-range TBM with submunition payload

DT-3 Sept. 16, 1999 Yes Intercept of short-range TBM with bulk chemical warhead

DT-5 Feb. 5, 2000 Yes Intercept of short-range TBM with low-magnitude helix maneuver using 8 km remote launch

DT-7 July 22, 2000 Yes Intercept of low-altitude cruise missile

EOR-A July 28, 2000 Yes Intercept of low-altitude cruise missile

DT-6 Oct. 14, 2000 Yes (PAC-3); No (PAC-2 engaged the target but didn’t kill it) A multiple simultaneous engagement was attempted in DT-6. A PAC-3 intercepted and killed a tactical ballistic missile (with submunitions), while a PAC-2 engaged but did not destroy a subscale drone target simulating an aircraft. The PAC-2’s failure to kill the target was due to a hardware anomaly apparently unrelated to multiple simultaneous engagement test objective.

DT-8 March 31, 2001 Yes (1 PAC-3 and 1 PAC-2) This test was the first multiple simultaneous engagement of multiple TBM targets in the test program. This was the most complex flight test the program had undergone up to that date: five missiles (two targets and three interceptors) were all airborne at the same time. Two PAC-3s engaged a Hera modified ballistic re-entry vehicle that had a simulated unitary warhead. Both PAC-3 missiles were fired from the same Patriot launcher and were spaced several seconds apart. The first PAC-3 hit its target, causing the second PAC-3 to self-destruct. A PAC-2 missile simultaneously engaged a Patriot-As-A-Target (PAAT).

DT-9 July 9, 2001 Yes (1 PAC-3); No (1 PAC-3) Problems with the communications bus that links the communications between the missile's guidance processing units and seeker caused the miss. One of two fired PAC-3s hit a remotely piloted F-4 Phantom aircraft emitting radar-jamming signals at long range and low altitude, while the second PAC-3 missed its ballistic missile target. The goal was to see if the PAC-3 could function in an electronic countermeasures environment.

DT-10 Oct. 19, 2001 Yes (1 PAC-3 and 1 PAC-2) A PAC-3 intercepted a BQM-74 cruise missile flying at a low altitude, while a PAC-2 intercepted the Raytheon MQM-107, which is a low-altitude sub-scale aircraft target. The microprocessor that caused the communications problem and consequent failure in DT-9 was taken out of the PAC-3 system. This test marked the end of the EMD phase for the PAC-3.

OT-1 Feb. 16, 2002 Yes (1 PAC-2); No (1 PAC-2 and 1 PAC-3) One PAC-3 was fired vs. a drone simulating a cruise missile; two PAC-2s fired vs. two targets (full-scale QF-4 Phantom jet drone and a subscale drone aircraft). The only missile to hit its target was the PAC-2 aimed at the drone. The other PAC-2 missed due to an electrical arc in the radar, which lasted less than a second just before the planned intercept but managed to delay critical target information. The PAC-3 missed because an error in the ground computer caused it to provide the interceptor missile with inaccurate target location information, said Army Col. Tom Newberry.

OT-2 March 21, 2002 Yes (1 PAC-3 and 1 PAC-2); No (1 PAC-3) Two PAC-3s were fired vs. a Hera BM simulating a Scud; 1 hit its target, the other failed to launch. One PAC-2 hit an MQM-107 drone aircraft.

OT-3 April 25, 2002 No (2 PAC-3's) This test was initially reported as a partial success: it was at first thought that one PAC-3 destroyed another Patriot which was simulating a ballistic missile target, while the other PAC-3, which was to intercept a Storm II ballistic missile target (composed of a Minuteman II second-stage booster and a Pershing II reentry vehicle), failed to launch. However, after studying the data collected, it was announced that the PAC-3 only hit its target and did not destroy it; thus, the test could not be counted as a successful intercept.

OT-4 May 30, 2002 Yes (1 PAC-3); No (1 PAC-3) This final operational test was supposed to showcase the “ripple firing†doctrine, in which two PAC-3s are launched against one target – a two-stage ballistic missile. One PAC-3 intercepted the target, while the other PAC-3 failed to launch. MDA decided to delay moving PAC-3 into low-rate initial production for a year (it originally was to start in September 2002). Because of the many problems that surfaced in operational testing, follow-on operational testing will be required.
http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/tests-pac3.cfm

A little more:
In a recent test, that took place at White Sands test range on Sept 2, 2004, a fifth in a series of realistic "ripple fire" scenarios, PAC-3 missiles successfully demonstrated interception of ballistic missiles and cruise missile type targets. In the recent dual engagement test, two PAC-3 Missiles were "ripple-fired" at an incoming Patriot-As-A-Target (PAAT) TBM, a legacy Patriot missile modified to represent a short-range TBM. In a second simultaneous engagement, a single PAC-3 Missile was fired at a low-flying MQM-107D cruise missile target. Preliminary data indicates both the TBM target and cruise missile target were destroyed. All test objectives were met. Test objectives included demonstrating the system's ability to detect, track and engage a TBM and cruise missile simultaneously, and validating the performance of several components of the PAC-3 Missile that were part of on- going cost reduction initiatives. These include an Advanced Master Frequency Generator (AMFG), Multi-Band Radio Frequency Data Link (MRFDL) and a Simplified Inertial Measurement Unit (SIMU).

In March 2004 the PAC-3 destroyed a short range ballistic missile in another test. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) March-April 2003, a mix of PAC-3 missile interceptors and PAC-2 air defense missiles destroyed a series of short range ballistic missiles fired by Iraq, failed to engage and intercept several cruise missiles fired on Kuwait City from Iraqi coastal missile batteries.
http://www.defense-update.com/products/p/patriot-pac3-abm.htm
 

highsea

New Member
Why don't you go the the page I linked, where the tests are laid out in a table. It might be easier for you to read.. :roll
 

redsoulja

New Member
yeah i read it
and im not stupid so that icant read iinfo
its just i dont have time to analyze soemthin to which i already knwo the answer

and i think thiswhole missile shield is wothless crap
its provento not be effective
end of story
 

highsea

New Member
That's fine with me redsoulja.

Next time I will ignore your request for data, as I also don't have time to rub asses with some smart-a$$ kid who already has all the answers.
 

redsoulja

New Member
thats not what i meant
it is that my view ont eh missle shield cant be necessarily changed and ive watched lots of docs showing the flaws
its too expensive and not worth it if 1 SINGLE missile go through
and ti screwed horribly in iraq
i dont want canada to get involved in this crap
we already had problems with the subs becuz we wanted to please the yanks

AND IM NOT A KID
 

highsea

New Member
Apparently you have the Patriot system confused with NMD. They are very different things. And yes, 15 years old is a KID.

Who after just 14 days and 120 some posts has just made it to my ignore list.

Have a nice day.
 
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