Partition as a Strategic Solution?
- Thread starter gree0232
- Start date
Feanor, is there a reason why the TOS systems are not likely to be manned by Syrians? After all, they are based on T 72/90 chassis. The only justification I can think of is the cost of the thermobaric munitions thus requiring a not too trigger-happy crew.
Trained operators combined with whether Russia is willing to gift or "loan" those systems to Syria. Despite Russian claims that they are "delivering APCs to Syria" the only BTR-82s in Syria appear to be manned by Russia. I've yet to see any solid evidence of a hand over.
I mean how far can Saudis and UAE go in supporting ISIS before they're enemies with the west?If I couldn't drill any more I would blow the rest up myself and accuse YOU of doing it
Then I would bathe in Saudi/UAE/etc support while you face the political backlash.
Is it state level activity or just corruption? What do you think the actual relationship between ISIS and Assad is?
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Probably some of both, but Daesh (sidenote: I always use this epithet for them since they apparently don't like it) definitely has a solid history with the Assad gov going back to their days in Iraq as AQI, and was accused by the highest-regime defector of controlling what would become Daesh.
The regime also took efforts to stoke the fires of Islamist insurgency very early on in the war, and has continued that by not interfering with Daesh-held territory for the most part (and certainly not to the same extent they do with other groups). Kyle Orton provides a good overview of the overall support to Daesh and other Islamists provided to the regime here, and it's worth a read given the time.
My overall understanding of the relationship between Daesh and the al-Assad regime is that they are de facto allies, with perhaps some more affiliation at the higher levels. The al-Assad regime views Daesh as a tactical ally; Daesh has been the most effective force in the field at destroying moderate and non-Daesh Islamist rebels, and for the most part, Daesh leaves the regime alone to focus on closer threats. The regime probably appreciates that they will have to deal with later, but thinks Daesh can buy them time (and also serves as a useful strawman to paint all of the opposition as fanatical Islamists). To quote the Der Spiegel article on Daesh's structure (another fantastic read on the subject):
I'm not entirely convinced by the argument that Assad created Daesh; I find some credence to the idea that the GSD co-opted (or thought it co-opted) a group that it already had ties to (from when it was AQI) and unleashed them as provocateurs (as the Algerians did, and as the UDBA did, and as the Cubans still do to Cuban-American groups). However, things like Dabiq magazine don't make sense in that role; to me it argues that Daesh really does believe that it can and will establish a caliphate (realistically, it already has) and eventually overthrow the al-Assad regime. I'll admit there's a possibility they started out as provocateurs from the regime but have moved more independent-minded on the belief that the regime can never again re-take control of the country. Or perhaps they are just hedging their bets. Maybe they learned in Iraq how powerful and how easy it is to get foreigners to come join their forces and view them as a powerful source of expendable bodies, and decided to keep it up.
Who knows? In summary I certainly don't think of them as enemies in any tactical or operational sense; maybe in a long-term strategic one, but I doubt that many people in Syria are thinking too long-term right now anyway.
I think I disagree. It's clear that Assad has made use of ISIS, but they're fighting at the tactical level right now near Damascus, and have many times in the past. From your own link.
"But a half year later, after IS conquered Mosul and took control of a gigantic weapons depot there, the jihadists felt powerful enough to attack their erstwhile helpers. IS fighters overran Division 17 and slaughtered the soldiers, whom they had only recently protected."
In other words, it's hard to say they're not enemies at the tactical level. It's the strategic level that one could claim they're not enemies right now, since ISIS seems to be facing trouble in Iraq, and Russia and Syria are focused on al-Nusra and the other miscellaneous rebel factions.
Overall your links were very helpful and informative, thanks for posting. It's interesting because essentially this means that Assad was enemies with Iraq for all practical purposes for a long time, while now being almost on the same side. What's even more interesting is that Russia and Iran support both Iraq and Syrian government forces (though in Iraq the support from Russia is more commercially motivated, with Russian companies working oil fields, and Russian weapons paid for in hard cash).
It's also very instructive that Assad, once essentially a backer of terrorism (arguably much more so then the vilified Saddam Hussein) is now part of an "anti-terrorist" coalition being hobbled together by Russia and Iran.