NZDF General discussion thread

[Rob c]

It all goes back to our lack of awareness of how an aggressor can get to NZ and that is either by air or sea. However treasury and politicians have always preferred the army in recent times as the equipment is on the hole cheaper per unit and so they think they are getting more for their money. A past example would be the helicopter and LAV purchases, for a similar amount they got 105 LAVs and 13 helicopters. The 105 LAV's looks a lot better to both treasury and to the Polly in their simplistic minds as neither will want or have much military's knowledge.
We have to cover air and sea approaches to NZ but they are more interested in looking good politically

 

[Todjaeger]

Short answer is yes...

Long answer is our ANZAC's are much lighter than our Aussie counterparts so weight is not a problem... This was one of the concerns for the refits etc...Adding a few NSM canisters under the bridge like where the Aussie have their Harpoon also shouldn't be an issue. They were fitted for but not with for Harpoon when built, so shouldn't take to much to rewire it up for NSM...

That being said take it with a grain of salt anything can go wrong and as it will be a government project after all..

A question to ask is how long it would take to have NSM launchers fitted and the missiles themselves integrated into the Kiwi ANZAC-class frigate's CMS330? Depending on the answer, it might very well just be a waste of money and Vote Defence has already been too little, for far too long.

If the addition could be managed in NZ or Australia and done in a matter of a month or two per vessel, then it might be worthwhile. However, if it would require another transit back to Canada or somewhere else even more distant, and especially if it might take months, then it likely would not be worthwhile. IIRC the FSU took some ~two years to get completed per vessel, with the RNZN only having two vessels, it would IMO a rather poor decision to again reduce the fleet to a single in service frigate for months or even years at a time.

Personally, I tend to think it would be better for NZ to decide to bring the ANZAC-class frigate replacement programme forward, and get units ordered for delivering sometime between 2030 and 2032 if that can be managed, and ahead of any decommissioning of current Kiwi frigates.

 

[Todjaeger]

It all goes back to our lack of awareness of how an aggressor can get to NZ and that is either by air or sea. However treasury and politicians have always preferred the army in recent times as the equipment is on the hole cheaper per unit and so they think they are getting more for their money. A past example would be the helicopter and LAV purchases, for a similar amount they got 105 LAVs and 13 helicopters. The 105 LAV's looks a lot better to both treasury and to the Polly in their simplistic minds as neither will want or have much military's knowledge.
We have to cover air and sea approaches to NZ but they are more interested in looking good politically

One also needs to remember who was in charge and what or how the NZDF was envisioned by the gov't of the day. IIRC the NZLAV was selected because during NZ peace-keeping deployments in the Balkans, the Vietnam era Kiwi M113's had proven to be mechanically unreliable and it was believed that a wheeled replacement would be more efficient for/during the type of peacekeeping deployments they expected the NZDF to deploy to.

That is one of the other things people need to remember and keep in mind. Prior gov'ts had been so committed to having Kiwi personnel on UN deployments that it ended up overtaxing the NZDF. IIRC at one point nearly 10% of the total NZDF personnel, some 900 or so personnel, were on UN deployments. Compounding the issue is that these were not large concentrations of NZDF personnel, but in some cases involving only very small numbers since at one point there were some 27 different deployments going back in the 2006-2008 time period. By having some many personnel deployed and having them deploying in small groups all over the place, it can be very difficult for personnel to just maintain many of the standard skills needed, never mind having the ability to pass on skills and corporate knowledge to new/incoming personnel.

The impression I got was the the GotD was more interested into being 'good global citizens' and wanted to transform the NZDF or at least parts of it into a UN peacekeeping arm.

 

[swerve]

A question to ask is how long it would take to have NSM launchers fitted and the missiles themselves integrated into the Kiwi ANZAC-class frigate's CMS330? Depending on the answer, it might very well just be a waste of money and Vote Defence has already been too little, for far too long.

IIRC the Canadians will be fitting NSM to their River-class (Type 26 variant) frigates. They'll have the Canadian Tactical Interface, which seems to be something like the front end of CMS330 between Aegis & the weapons, etc.

NSM is fitted to ships with a few different CSMs, BTW.

 

[Todjaeger]

IIRC the Canadians will be fitting NSM to their River-class (Type 26 variant) frigates. They'll have the Canadian Tactical Interface, which seems to be something like the front end of CMS330 between Aegis & the weapons, etc.

NSM is fitted to ships with a few different CSMs, BTW.

I am aware that it (NSM) has been integrated into other CMS, the potential issue as I mentioned is how long it would take for it to get fitted to and integrated with the Kiwi's current frigates. It is not a question of whether it could be done, but whether the time and costs involved would be worthwhile.

Realistically the RNZN should probably start having the replacement frigates start entering service some time between 2030 to 2032-ish, if not sooner. Therefore, if fitting NSM would require each frigate to go back to Canada for a year or more would probably not be worthwhile IMO. If this was kicked off now, and it was deemed necessary for the frigates to go back to Canada, then the RNZN would likely be a one-frigate navy again until 2028.

If it turned out that the time to fit, integrate and conduct launch trials was longer, say 18 months per vessel, and/or Canadian facilities could not get started until 2027 or later, then the length of time they might be in service armed with NSM would be even less. One needs to remember that the current plans seems to have a tentative replacement date for the Kiwi frigates in the mid-2030's, when at present the newest Kiwi frigate is already over 25 years old. If the replacement frigate does indeed come into service as a replacement in mid-2035, then the oldest Kiwi frigate would be some 39 years old.

At a certain point the time and costs involved in expanding a vessel's capability cease being worthwhile due to how much continued service the vessel will reasonably have, as well as the costs associated with keeping the vessel in serviceable condition.

 

[swerve]

The RN declared IOC for the NSM just over 12 months after the announcement that the UK would procure it. That was with a CMS that AFAIK has no relationship with CMS330. It seems possible that work on the Canadian Tactical Interface might carry over to CMS330, & ease integration.

 

[Todjaeger]

The RN declared IOC for the NSM just over 12 months after the announcement that the UK would procure it. That was with a CMS that AFAIK has no relationship with CMS330. It seems possible that work on the Canadian Tactical Interface might carry over to CMS330, & ease integration.

Possibly, and if it is something which could be done fairly quickly and locally (admittedly, local for the NZ area is relative...) and that NSM might have other or further use with the NZDF, like from the P-8's, or future RNZN vessels then it might be a good idea.

Keep in mind though that the current RNZN frigates just came out of a significant modernization programme just a couple of years ago and at this point are planned for replacement in about ten years. It might not make much sense to take each frigate out of service again for another year or more each if that will again leave NZ with only a single frigate to call upon for a couple of years when the vessels themselves will only have a few more years of service after such an upgrade is completed.

I believe I have alluded to this before, but I tend to believe that NZ really should be getting replacement frigates sooner rather than trying to keep the current frigates until the mid-2030's because the vessels themselves will likely require more resources to maintain and support in order for them to be kept operational. In addition, as time moves on the current capabilities fitout will likely become less relevant and less appropriate for potential and likely threats.

It is distinctly possible that a Kiwi ANZAC-class frigate in 2031 might require an escort to safely transit through threatened waters like the Red Sea or the Gulf of Aden if Houthi capabilities remain comparable to what they are currently. Given recent attacks upon the USS Harry S Truman CSG have involved multiple inbounds, the max load and range available for the RNZN to engage with might well be insufficient now, never mind in another five or ten years.

 

[downunderblue]

A decent summary/ recommendation video from the 'greetings and salutations' fella on YouTube who sounds very ex-military.

Below is an AI summary of his recommendations:

-Naval Recommendations:

• Replace the two ANZAC frigates with three new frigates, potentially the Japanese Mogami or the German MEKO[03:14].
• Acquire two new enhanced sealift vessels with well decks, capable of amphibious landings, strategic transportation, medical support, and replenishment at sea [04:38].
• Consider joining Australia's program for a third ship to replace HMAS Choules, potentially reducing costs [05:28].
• Replace the Sea Sprite helicopters, potentially with the MH-60 Seahawk, and consider vertical takeoff UAVs like the MQ-8C Fire Scout [06:32].

-Air Force Recommendations:

• Equip the P8 Poseidons with air-to-surface missiles, such as the AGM-158C LRASM or the future Joint Strike Missile [07:45].
• Acquire long-range UAVs, potentially the MQ-4C Triton, to enhance maritime awareness and free up P8s for other missions [08:12].
• Replace the two Boeing 757s with Airbus A330-based KC-30 multi-role tanker transport aircraft, with a suggestion to purchase three, one for VIP transport [09:15].

-Army Recommendations:

• Upgrade the Army's LAVs with new turrets in the short term [10:48].
• Replace the LAVs with Boxer CRVs [10:54].
• Acquire more Bushmaster PMVs and consider Hawkeye PMVs for specific roles [11:34].
• Transition from 105mm guns to 155mm artillery, potentially wheeled self-propelled guns like the Boxer RCH155 or the Caesar [12:07].

-General Recommendations:

• Increase defense spending to 2% of GDP [00:10].
• Improve recruitment and retention through better housing, salaries, and conditions [12:51].
• Increase the size of the Defense Force by around 2,500 people by 2040 [14:38].
• Focus on long-range strike capabilities, range, endurance, platform persistence, and integration with Australian forces [14:43].

 

[SammyC]

A decent summary/ recommendation video from the 'greetings and salutations' fella on YouTube who sounds very ex-military.

Below is an AI summary of his recommendations:

-Naval Recommendations:

• Replace the two ANZAC frigates with three new frigates, potentially the Japanese Mogami or the German MEKO[03:14].
• Acquire two new enhanced sealift vessels with well decks, capable of amphibious landings, strategic transportation, medical support, and replenishment at sea [04:38].
• Consider joining Australia's program for a third ship to replace HMAS Choules, potentially reducing costs [05:28].
• Replace the Sea Sprite helicopters, potentially with the MH-60 Seahawk, and consider vertical takeoff UAVs like the MQ-8C Fire Scout [06:32].

-Air Force Recommendations:

• Equip the P8 Poseidons with air-to-surface missiles, such as the AGM-158C LRASM or the future Joint Strike Missile [07:45].
• Acquire long-range UAVs, potentially the MQ-4C Triton, to enhance maritime awareness and free up P8s for other missions [08:12].
• Replace the two Boeing 757s with Airbus A330-based KC-30 multi-role tanker transport aircraft, with a suggestion to purchase three, one for VIP transport [09:15].

-Army Recommendations:

• Upgrade the Army's LAVs with new turrets in the short term [10:48].
• Replace the LAVs with Boxer CRVs [10:54].
• Acquire more Bushmaster PMVs and consider Hawkeye PMVs for specific roles [11:34].
• Transition from 105mm guns to 155mm artillery, potentially wheeled self-propelled guns like the Boxer RCH155 or the Caesar [12:07].

-General Recommendations:

• Increase defense spending to 2% of GDP [00:10].
• Improve recruitment and retention through better housing, salaries, and conditions [12:51].
• Increase the size of the Defense Force by around 2,500 people by 2040 [14:38].
• Focus on long-range strike capabilities, range, endurance, platform persistence, and integration with Australian forces [14:43].

I'm thinking that the additional 1% GDP spending commitment is going to struggle to cover that shopping list. Perhaps it would cover 10% of it.

 

[ADMk2]

I agree with Kiwi in Exile.

Every dollar spent on the army is a dollar not spent on our navy.

Following on from that, in some ways it could be argued that the greatest threat to the Royal New Zealand Navy is the army.

New Zealand is a modern maritime island nation facing threats from PLAN submarines, warships, aircraft, and drones for control of our sea lines of communication, yet the army has some 6,781 active personal, while our Navy has only 2,830 active personal. Naval retention problems could be helped in large part by greatly increasing naval salaries through downsizing the army by a few thousand.

Case in point, it was great to see in February this year the RNZN & RNZAF cooperation in together tracking PLAN Task Group 107 in the Tasman Sea while our army was . . . polishing little tanks and firing little 105s both of which will be eliminated by enemy drones in any modern peer conflict...

The money being spent (wasted?) on updating turrets on LAVs and endlessly on army facilities is a painful lost opportunity cost for our navy.

And the minute anything happens on land? Your entire navy becomes a white elephant.

See any problem with this sort of, er, “thinking“?

 

[ADMk2]

The RN declared IOC for the NSM just over 12 months after the announcement that the UK would procure it. That was with a CMS that AFAIK has no relationship with CMS330. It seems possible that work on the Canadian Tactical Interface might carry over to CMS330, & ease integration.

RAN signed it’s NSM contract in January 2023 and by late 2024 / 2025 had managed to integrate it up to the point of live fire testing on both AEGIS combat system equipped Hobart Class AWD‘s and SAAB 9LV combat system equipped ANZAC class frigates. From memory, images of NSM installation onto the ANZAC’s started appearing in September 2024 and the AWD live fire occurred in July 2024.

Kongsberg signs Naval Strike Missile contract - Australian Defence Magazine

Defence has signed a contract with Kongsberg to deliver the Naval Strike Missile (NSM), which will be employed on the Hobart Class destroyers and Anzac Class frigates, replacing the ageing Harpoon ant...

www.australiandefence.com.au

So approx 18-20 months to integrate the weapon onto 2 different classes.

I would imagine the work done on the physical installation onto the Australian ANZAC’s would significantly assist the potential NZ installation as well…

 

[Todjaeger]

RAN signed it’s NSM contract in January 2023 and by late 2024 / 2025 had managed to integrate it up to the point of live fire testing on both AEGIS combat system equipped Hobart Class AWD‘s and SAAB 9LV combat system equipped ANZAC class frigates.

Kongsberg signs Naval Strike Missile contract - Australian Defence Magazine

Defence has signed a contract with Kongsberg to deliver the Naval Strike Missile (NSM), which will be employed on the Hobart Class destroyers and Anzac Class frigates, replacing the ageing Harpoon ant...

www.australiandefence.com.au

So approx 18-20 months to integrate the weapon onto 2 different classes.

I would imagine the work done on the physical installation onto the Australian ANZAC’s would significantly assist the potential NZ installation as well…

Possibly, OTOH it might not be of much help either. It would sort of depend on what the wiring situation is for the Kiwi variants which at this point have a different CMS, likely some different electronics, different sensors and some different machinery and heating/cooling systems IIRC.

One of the other things which might have aided the RAN in fitting NSM to their ANZAC-class frigates is that the RAN had their frigates go through upgrade programmes which saw a pair of quad Harpoon AShM cannisters which have since been switched to cannisters for NSM. IIRC the original FFBNW plan would be fit quad Harpoon AShM cannisters amidships pointing to port and starboard just ahead of the mast. So there might not be available wiring to wherever NSM might get fitted to the Kiwi frigates, and therefore require more time to fit the needing wiring and everything else required.

Again, not saying it could not be done, but still saying that it might not be worth the time and expense.

 

[Rob c]

And the minute anything happens on land? Your entire navy becomes a white elephant.

See any problem with this sort of, er, “thinking“?

Well If the action is in the air or sea does not the army become a white elephant and there is a lot more sea and air in our region than land

 

[jbc388]

I agree with Kiwi in Exile.

Every dollar spent on the army is a dollar not spent on our navy.

Following on from that, in some ways it could be argued that the greatest threat to the Royal New Zealand Navy is the army.

New Zealand is a modern maritime island nation facing threats from PLAN submarines, warships, aircraft, and drones for control of our sea lines of communication, yet the army has some 6,781 active personal, while our Navy has only 2,830 active personal. Naval retention problems could be helped in large part by greatly increasing naval salaries through downsizing the army by a few thousand.

Case in point, it was great to see in February this year the RNZN & RNZAF cooperation in together tracking PLAN Task Group 107 in the Tasman Sea while our army was . . . polishing little tanks and firing little 105s both of which will be eliminated by enemy drones in any modern peer conflict...

The money being spent (wasted?) on updating turrets on LAVs and endlessly on army facilities is a painful lost opportunity cost for our navy.

So when you have to take and hold island(s) and fight on land what are you going to use?? Again when you need a large ground based support for earthquakes etc and it's 160km from the sea what then?? Marines?? the trouble with that is it would more expensive to equip a marine type force then to carry on with what we already have!! Also Marine type forces are alot smaller than most armies!
The reason why the navy is smaller is due to lack of ship numbers and now NZ has even less ships now to the submarine in the islands!! no replacement at this stage!!
As well the army/NZDF will be looking at anti drone systems/jamming etc. Another thing modern arty has much longer range that what we currently have, so that will be looked at as well.

 

[recce.k1]

New Zealand is a modern maritime island nation ....

So when you have to take and hold island(s) and fight on land what are you going to use?? ...

Some of us here (but admittedly not all of us here ... as some strongly disagree) periodically advocate for a "3rd battalion" to be stood up ... primarily as light infantry (or perhaps motorised) to supplement/relieve 1 and 2/1 Batt on deployments (in place of the Reserves who could possibly then be fully integrated in with the Regulars instead).

But re-thinking this, for these "maritime times", could we look across the ditch at the 2RAR model, in which the RNZN gains it's own "Marine" type capability in the form of a "3rd" Army battalion (or elements of) which, like 2RAR, specialises in amphibious reconnaissance?

From Wiki (as cannot locate anything specific on the official Aus Army site) 2 RAR consists of:

• Battalion headquarters
  'A' Company
  

  • Four infantry platoons

  [*][*]Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Company
  

  • Reconnaissance and Sniper Platoon
  • Small Boat Platoon
  • Signals Platoon
  • Joint Fires Team

  [*][*]Administration Company

So they wouldn't need LAV/Bushmasters or such like, however they will operate via helo or boat craft or amphibious vehicles and will deploy with the RNZN, currently the sealift vessel HMNZS Canterbury to gain experience (and jointly with 2RAR), but in time with the replacement LPD's.

Currently some of these skillsets (eg small boat craft ops & helo insertion) are carried out by the NZ Army already (although they just lack an amphibious vehicle capability), so it's a matter of specialising in this area, leaving 1 and 2/1 Batt to concentrate on joint battlefield taskings as per Plan ANZAC, and with this "3rd Batt" (for lack of a better name) to specialise as the advanced reconnaissance unit which goes in before them for island hopping type scenarios and working in with Navy hydro/rapid environmental assessment units and perhaps special forces?

https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2021-07-30/troops-come-ashore-quiet-beach-final-push

https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2022-03-01/amphibious-platoon-shows-its-versatility

So something perhaps for the "Future Indicative Investment" (2029-2039) category of the expansion of the NZDF.

 

[Rob c]

So when you have to take and hold island(s) and fight on land what are you going to use??

When it comes to holding islands, it is usually more successful to stop the threat before they get to your island. For example in WW2 it was American actions at sea that stopped the Japanese progress through the Pacific. If a seaborne invasion is allowed to get established on land they have a high success rate.
I am still of the view that a well balanced force similar to the late 1980's and 1990's is in our best overall interest when it comes to defending NZ and our region.

 

[swerve]

Keep in mind though that the current RNZN frigates just came out of a significant modernization programme just a couple of years ago and at this point are planned for replacement in about ten years. It might not make much sense to take each frigate out of service again for another year or more each if that will again leave NZ with only a single frigate to call upon for a couple of years when the vessels themselves will only have a few more years of service after such an upgrade is completed.

I've not heard that adding NSM has taken any RN ships out of service for a year. There was a gap between the announcement & work starting, & any CMS changes would only need to be designed once - & that was done in that year.

HMS Richmond got NSM last month, & is heading to the Pacific soon. She spent last year being busy in the Red Sea, the Atlantic, & the English Channel. She's certainly not been out of service for a year.

HMS Somerset was in & out of service in the year between the announcement of NSM procurement & IOC, but that wasn't due to NSM. She'd just had a refit, & there were problems with it. That's serious, & worrying, but wasn't caused by NSM. The other way round: her post-refit faults are reported to have delayed IOC with NSM.

 

[Todjaeger]

I've not heard that adding NSM has taken any RN ships out of service for a year. There was a gap between the announcement & work starting, & any CMS changes would only need to be designed once - & that was done in that year.

HMS Richmond got NSM last month, & is heading to the Pacific soon. She spent last year being busy in the Red Sea, the Atlantic, & the English Channel. She's certainly not been out of service for a year.

HMS Somerset was in & out of service in the year between the announcement of NSM procurement & IOC, but that wasn't due to NSM. She'd just had a refit, & there were problems with it. That's serious, & worrying, but wasn't caused by NSM. The other way round: her post-refit faults are reported to have delayed IOC with NSM.

There are a bunch of unknowns though, which could make carrying out the installation and integration of NSM on Kiwi frigates somewhat more complicated and/or somewhat less straightforward than the experiences of other nations. Please keep in mind though that I am also acknowledging that it might also be the case that these potential issues might not exist either.

One difference to start with between RN Type 23 frigates and the Kiwi version ANZAC-class frigates is that whilst the Type 23's were originally armed with two quad Harpoon AShM cannisters, the Kiwi frigates at one point were FFBNW space for Harpoon cannisters. This in turn means that the Kiwi frigates might not have any of the mounting or wiring/connecting points to fit any ship-launched AShM at this point, or it might not be in a position that is effective. Again going from memory, the original FFBNW plan had set aside real estate to mount a pair of quad Harpoon cannisters facing port and starboard amidships just forward of the mast. As can be seen looking at RAN ANZAC-class frigates, it was decided to install the quad cannister elsewhere instead. The certainly lets us know that the position just forward of the bridge can take AShM, but it would require some work to get the area there ready for missile cannisters to be installed and wired into the rest of the ship. What we do not know (though actually there might be a couple of people here who actually do know) is just what was required to physically have that space ready for the cannisters. Is it a fairly simple matter or running some power and networking wires to where the cannisters will be, plus some prepping of the deck and bridge windows to handle the hot exhaust of a missile launch, or is it something more complex? If the deck beneath where the cannister are to sit needs reinforcement to handle stresses exerted by missiles during launch and/or a change in the layout or the contents of the compartment immediately beneath where the launcher is to be need to be moved or rearranged in order to fit the appropriate connections, that might require structural changes done in a yard.

There are also the questions relating to the integration of the NSM into LockMart Canada's CMS330 and what, if any other changes to shipboard electronics would be required. One of the questions is simply, would an NSM installation require another weapons work station get installed into the CIC or bridge, or would an existing station be able to get re-purposed to control the AShM? If another station would need to be installed, do the Kiwi frigates have space for it in the bridge or CIC, wherever the ship would be 'fought' from? As for the integration with the CMS, is that something which NZ could do themselves, domestically? Or would the vessels need to transit back to BC where the sensors and CMS where changed/installed in the first place?

Again, not saying fitting NSM cannot or should not happen, but am pointing out that there are multiple potential issues which could make the idea a bad one. I would also point out that at this point I do not feel that RAN FFGH's could be used as a reference design, since the internals for the two variants of frigate have some of their internal layouts diverge starting back in 2007 with the NZ Platform Systems Upgrade which saw some compartment configurations change.

 

[swerve]

All things that have to be considered, certainly. Retrofitting it to Type 23 may have been easier, since it simply replaced Harpoon. Same location, presumably able to use either the same wiring or at least the same wiring channels, & perhaps also fitting into the CMS hardware exactly in place of Harpoon. And fitting the launchers & loading the first load of missiles is done in Norway, which is a day or two's sail away, not the other side of an ocean.

This -

As for the integration with the CMS, is that something which NZ could do themselves, domestically? Or would the vessels need to transit back to BC where the sensors and CMS where changed/installed in the first place?

- might have another option. Fly out the kit & people from Canada to NZ to fit it.

Of course, I have no idea of whether it's worthwhile, or cost-effective, to fit it to the RNZN ANZACs.

 

[ADMk2]

Well If the action is in the air or sea does not the army become a white elephant and there is a lot more sea and air in our region than land

There is a tendency to ignore history when contemplating military engagements. Very few historically speaking have no land engagements whatsoever - hence the philosophy of "something, something joint force"...

In any case, I must admit I never realised fighting China in the Tasman Sea or the South Pacific were the sole intended purpose of the NZDF, nor even the ADF for that matter. Guess I'll go re-read those strategy documents again, because they both have very unusual force structures for forces apparently designed for such a specific operational context and no other...