Yep agree it's difficult to determine how it'll translate to actual kit & the consequence of a distinctly possible change of Govt this year will no doubt have an impact, potentially more than we'd like. At the very least here we are finally the Govt has made the call publicly...the closest we've been to reality in 30 odd years... a big first step! Personally even if it does translate to increased $$$ I think it'll be a modest investment plan but at least in the right direction...one hopes!
NZDF General discussion thread
- Thread starter NZLAV
- Start date
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
Its possible that a of lot that happens now will really depend on how the CCP reacts; If they do their hory old wolf warrior thing or hold up NZ exports then that will push things along towards improved kit and more of it as they will demonstrate the need. On the other hand, if they ignore it then this could fizzle somewhat under a National government.
How does the NZ definition differ from NATO's? How much difference does that make to the headline figure, e.g. what NZ number would 2% by the NATO definition equate to?Interesting, mostly 1.5% (of GDP) is quoted when using the NATO measurement ... then very occasionally 1% is quoted (so which one is it).
Sooo if Andrew Little may be thinking, say, 1% > 1.5% (over time) ...... does that translate to 1.5% > 2% using NATO's measurement?
....
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
The question the impact of the 'capital charge' percentage that is levied on all defence capital and property. So you have the headline figure, but the treasury claws some of that back, so if you want a half billion dollar ship, be prepared to pay a percentage of that value each year to Treasury. So NZ's actual defence spend is not the headline figure, I think you have to take 15% off to get a truer figure.
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
The documents are not a shopping list, they are the justification for the shopping list that come out next year.
I dont know if the shopping list includes equipment to treat cardiac arrest for the staff of NZ Treasury though.
Costs for the treatment for any cardiac arrest in Treasury come out of the health budget.
Roadmap for future of defence and national security released
The Government has released the first two documents of the Defence Policy Review and New Zealand’s first National Security Strategy.
I have just finished reading all three documents and they have the appearance of aspirations rather than any solid policy. The National Security Strategy, Secure Together - Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki document has identified 12 core national security issues:
- "Strategic Competition and the Rules-based International System: For decades, New Zealand has benefitted from a rules-based system that reflects our values and supports our interests. Over recent years, strategic competition has intensified, impacting international cooperation and challenging the effectiveness of the rules-based system. China’s growing economic, political, and military power and more assertive pursuit of its interests abroad is a key driver of this competition. Other countries that do not view the existing rules-based system as in their interests, such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are exacerbating this dynamic. Strategic competition affects the full spectrum of New Zealand’s national security interests, both at home and offshore.
- Emerging, Critical, and Sensitive Technologies: Emerging, critical, and sensitive technologies bring many benefits to New Zealand with the potential to drive economic growth, domestic productivity, and environmental sustainability. At the same time, the breadth of new technologies, their rapid pace of development, disruptive and unpredictable impacts, and the lack of existing rules and norms governing their use present a range of challenges to our national security. Emerging technologies can be used to enable or commit harmful activity, such as foreign interference and espionage, violent extremism, and transnational organised crime, and may create disruptive social and economic changes that we must adapt to or overcome.
- Disinformation: Disinformation is false or modified information knowingly and deliberately shared with the intent to cause harm or achieve a broader aim.2 Disinformation can be created and spread by other countries as a means of foreign interference and by non-state actors from within or beyond New Zealand. It has the potential to drive societal discord, grievances, and fears, and undermine trust in democratic institutions. Though New Zealand probably has not been directly targeted by state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, the spread of disinformation in the global information environment may nevertheless threaten New Zealand’s security.
- Foreign Interference and Espionage: All countries engage in foreign influence activity to shape perceptions and decision-making in other countries. Such activity becomes foreign interference when it is intended to influence, disrupt or subvert another country’s interests by covert, corruptive, deceptive or threatening means. This includes activities by a foreign country to influence elected officials, explicitly or implicitly. Espionage refers to clandestine activities undertaken to collect information, materials, or capability to obtain competitive advantage at the expense of New Zealand’s security, international relations, and economic wellbeing. Foreign interference and espionage present a significant and growing national security threat to New Zealand. Government is building resilience to this threat in partnership with stakeholders across society.
- Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Violent extremism is an evolving threat, driven by increasingly complex and convoluted ideologies. Terrorism continues to threaten the safety of individuals, the security of democracy, and the cohesion of communities, globally and in New Zealand. New Zealand’s terrorism threat environment is dynamic and influenced by both domestic and international actors and events.
- Transnational Organised Crime: Transnational organised crime (TNOC) operates across national borders or is carried out in one country with strong links to other countries. TNOC spans a wide range of illicit activities, including illicit drug trafficking, financial crime, wildlife trafficking, cybercrime, and exploitation of people. TNOC is a worldwide problem that undermines community wellbeing, governance, economic development, and national security.
- Economic Security: Protecting our economic security is integral to our sovereignty. This requires working to reinvigorate the rules-based trading system while simultaneously strengthening our economy’s resilience to malicious threats to ensure that New Zealanders can access critical goods and services, and that we protect our technological advantage and intellectual property. In an era of strategic competition, New Zealand is particularly exposed to acts, such as economic coercion, that aim to exploit open market mechanisms to undermine our security.
- Pacific Resilience and Security: New Zealand’s national security is intertwined with the security, stability, and resilience of the Pacific region. Our geographic location and identity mean that we share in collective kaitiakitanga responsibilities. New Zealand affirms our commitment to the Boe Declaration, the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, and Pacific regionalism. By supporting Pacific approaches and priorities, we build resilience for all our countries.
- Maritime Security: New Zealand’s maritime security interests extend well beyond our immediate borders with our vast maritime area of interest covering 1/12th of the world’s surface area. Maritime security involves preventing, detecting, mitigating, and responding to risks introduced by illegal, malicious, unregulated, unreported, negligent, or harmful (or potentially harmful) activities at sea. There are a variety of current challenges that run counter to New Zealand’s maritime security interests, including maritime claims that are inconsistent with UNCLOS and threats to freedom of navigation and overflight. New Zealand also faces a significant seaborne illicit drug threat, and competition for maritime resources is increasing.
- Border Security: New Zealand’s border is one of our key interfaces with the world. It includes our physical border and extends offshore and into the digital domain. Effective border security is about safeguarding New Zealand and our people from threats, including transnational criminals, people smugglers, human traffickers, espionage agents, illicit drug and firearm smugglers, terrorists and violent extremists. The need for security is balanced with facilitating efficient flows of people, goods, and information across the border to contribute to New Zealand’s prosperity and wellbeing.
- Cyber Security: Cyber security means protecting people and their computers, networks, programs, and data from unauthorised access, disruption, exploitation, or modification. Malicious cyber actors, including state and non-state actors, present a persistent threat to all New Zealanders as well as New Zealand organisations, businesses, and government.
- Space Security: Many of the critical services New Zealanders increasingly rely on are supported by space-based infrastructure, from weather observations to banking and financial transactions. Space-based assets also help us observe our land and seas, understand climate change, and respond to natural disasters at home and in the Pacific. However, our reliance on space assets also makes us vulnerable to threats that would disrupt these services. Strategic competition and increasing space congestion raise new risks that could adversely affect our space infrastructure and access."
The other two documents, Defence Policy Strategy Statement 2023, and Future Force Design Principles 2023, need to be read in conjunction with the National Security Strategy - Secure Together document, because this informs those two and any future security and defence documents, including the DCP. The DCP will be the proof of the pudding.
It is actually more than that as not only is the government charge deducted, so is depreciation. The government charge is a percentage deduction from all the capital inventory. Years ago I use to do a calculation on the combined percentage the deduction amounted to in the defence budget and it usually came out in the low 40% range, a lot more than 15%
My preferred option would be a fixed deduction of say 40% that went into a capital acquisition account that was kept always available so that defence could plan with confidence on their capital requirements.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
At one point a number of years ago, I had run calculations off Vote Defence figures and worked out that between the Capital Charge and IIRC it was GST, that ate up something like 36% of the Vote Defence annual budget and this was at a time what the gov't was claiming a defence budget of 1% GDP whilst really only being ~0.64% GDP.It is actually more than that as not only is the government charge deducted, so is depreciation. The government charge is a percentage deduction from all the capital inventory. Years ago I use to do a calculation on the combined percentage the deduction amounted to in the defence budget and it usually came out in the low 40% range, a lot more than 15%
My preferred option would be a fixed deduction of say 40% that went into a capital acquisition account that was kept always available so that defence could plan with confidence on their capital requirements.
As the saying goes, this was why the NZDF could not have nice things.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
A familiar story, just like Canada’s “Strong, Secure, Engaged” document. Unless acted upon, these reviews are just paper for a$$wipe.Costs for the treatment for any cardiac arrest in Treasury come out of the health budget.
Roadmap for future of defence and national security released
The Government has released the first two documents of the Defence Policy Review and New Zealand’s first National Security Strategy.www.beehive.govt.nz
I have just finished reading all three documents and they have the appearance of aspirations rather than any solid policy. The National Security Strategy, Secure Together - Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki document has identified 12 core national security issues:
There isn't much in the document WRT resilience, even though it's occasionally mentioned. I am also of the opinion that Natural Hazards should have been included, because they are a threat to the country.
- "Strategic Competition and the Rules-based International System: For decades, New Zealand has benefitted from a rules-based system that reflects our values and supports our interests. Over recent years, strategic competition has intensified, impacting international cooperation and challenging the effectiveness of the rules-based system. China’s growing economic, political, and military power and more assertive pursuit of its interests abroad is a key driver of this competition. Other countries that do not view the existing rules-based system as in their interests, such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are exacerbating this dynamic. Strategic competition affects the full spectrum of New Zealand’s national security interests, both at home and offshore.
- Emerging, Critical, and Sensitive Technologies: Emerging, critical, and sensitive technologies bring many benefits to New Zealand with the potential to drive economic growth, domestic productivity, and environmental sustainability. At the same time, the breadth of new technologies, their rapid pace of development, disruptive and unpredictable impacts, and the lack of existing rules and norms governing their use present a range of challenges to our national security. Emerging technologies can be used to enable or commit harmful activity, such as foreign interference and espionage, violent extremism, and transnational organised crime, and may create disruptive social and economic changes that we must adapt to or overcome.
- Disinformation: Disinformation is false or modified information knowingly and deliberately shared with the intent to cause harm or achieve a broader aim.2 Disinformation can be created and spread by other countries as a means of foreign interference and by non-state actors from within or beyond New Zealand. It has the potential to drive societal discord, grievances, and fears, and undermine trust in democratic institutions. Though New Zealand probably has not been directly targeted by state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, the spread of disinformation in the global information environment may nevertheless threaten New Zealand’s security.
- Foreign Interference and Espionage: All countries engage in foreign influence activity to shape perceptions and decision-making in other countries. Such activity becomes foreign interference when it is intended to influence, disrupt or subvert another country’s interests by covert, corruptive, deceptive or threatening means. This includes activities by a foreign country to influence elected officials, explicitly or implicitly. Espionage refers to clandestine activities undertaken to collect information, materials, or capability to obtain competitive advantage at the expense of New Zealand’s security, international relations, and economic wellbeing. Foreign interference and espionage present a significant and growing national security threat to New Zealand. Government is building resilience to this threat in partnership with stakeholders across society.
- Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Violent extremism is an evolving threat, driven by increasingly complex and convoluted ideologies. Terrorism continues to threaten the safety of individuals, the security of democracy, and the cohesion of communities, globally and in New Zealand. New Zealand’s terrorism threat environment is dynamic and influenced by both domestic and international actors and events.
- Transnational Organised Crime: Transnational organised crime (TNOC) operates across national borders or is carried out in one country with strong links to other countries. TNOC spans a wide range of illicit activities, including illicit drug trafficking, financial crime, wildlife trafficking, cybercrime, and exploitation of people. TNOC is a worldwide problem that undermines community wellbeing, governance, economic development, and national security.
- Economic Security: Protecting our economic security is integral to our sovereignty. This requires working to reinvigorate the rules-based trading system while simultaneously strengthening our economy’s resilience to malicious threats to ensure that New Zealanders can access critical goods and services, and that we protect our technological advantage and intellectual property. In an era of strategic competition, New Zealand is particularly exposed to acts, such as economic coercion, that aim to exploit open market mechanisms to undermine our security.
- Pacific Resilience and Security: New Zealand’s national security is intertwined with the security, stability, and resilience of the Pacific region. Our geographic location and identity mean that we share in collective kaitiakitanga responsibilities. New Zealand affirms our commitment to the Boe Declaration, the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, and Pacific regionalism. By supporting Pacific approaches and priorities, we build resilience for all our countries.
- Maritime Security: New Zealand’s maritime security interests extend well beyond our immediate borders with our vast maritime area of interest covering 1/12th of the world’s surface area. Maritime security involves preventing, detecting, mitigating, and responding to risks introduced by illegal, malicious, unregulated, unreported, negligent, or harmful (or potentially harmful) activities at sea. There are a variety of current challenges that run counter to New Zealand’s maritime security interests, including maritime claims that are inconsistent with UNCLOS and threats to freedom of navigation and overflight. New Zealand also faces a significant seaborne illicit drug threat, and competition for maritime resources is increasing.
- Border Security: New Zealand’s border is one of our key interfaces with the world. It includes our physical border and extends offshore and into the digital domain. Effective border security is about safeguarding New Zealand and our people from threats, including transnational criminals, people smugglers, human traffickers, espionage agents, illicit drug and firearm smugglers, terrorists and violent extremists. The need for security is balanced with facilitating efficient flows of people, goods, and information across the border to contribute to New Zealand’s prosperity and wellbeing.
- Cyber Security: Cyber security means protecting people and their computers, networks, programs, and data from unauthorised access, disruption, exploitation, or modification. Malicious cyber actors, including state and non-state actors, present a persistent threat to all New Zealanders as well as New Zealand organisations, businesses, and government.
- Space Security: Many of the critical services New Zealanders increasingly rely on are supported by space-based infrastructure, from weather observations to banking and financial transactions. Space-based assets also help us observe our land and seas, understand climate change, and respond to natural disasters at home and in the Pacific. However, our reliance on space assets also makes us vulnerable to threats that would disrupt these services. Strategic competition and increasing space congestion raise new risks that could adversely affect our space infrastructure and access."
The other two documents, Defence Policy Strategy Statement 2023, and Future Force Design Principles 2023, need to be read in conjunction with the National Security Strategy - Secure Together document, because this informs those two and any future security and defence documents, including the DCP. The DCP will be the proof of the pudding.
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
Proof of pudding is the budget relative to threat and what a government thinks it can do, 'the art of the possible'. So while the language is interesting, I'm not paying much mind to what's being put out other than its entertainment value as it riles certain elements of the left and the Putin supporting right.Costs for the treatment for any cardiac arrest in Treasury come out of the health budget.
Roadmap for future of defence and national security released
The Government has released the first two documents of the Defence Policy Review and New Zealand’s first National Security Strategy.
I have just finished reading all three documents and they have the appearance of aspirations rather than any solid policy. The National Security Strategy, Secure Together - Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki document has identified 12 core national security issues:
There isn't much in the document WRT resilience, even though it's occasionally mentioned. I am also of the opinion that Natural Hazards should have been included, because they are a threat to the country.
- "Strategic Competition and the Rules-based International System: For decades, New Zealand has benefitted from a rules-based system that reflects our values and supports our interests. Over recent years, strategic competition has intensified, impacting international cooperation and challenging the effectiveness of the rules-based system. China’s growing economic, political, and military power and more assertive pursuit of its interests abroad is a key driver of this competition. Other countries that do not view the existing rules-based system as in their interests, such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are exacerbating this dynamic. Strategic competition affects the full spectrum of New Zealand’s national security interests, both at home and offshore.
- Emerging, Critical, and Sensitive Technologies: Emerging, critical, and sensitive technologies bring many benefits to New Zealand with the potential to drive economic growth, domestic productivity, and environmental sustainability. At the same time, the breadth of new technologies, their rapid pace of development, disruptive and unpredictable impacts, and the lack of existing rules and norms governing their use present a range of challenges to our national security. Emerging technologies can be used to enable or commit harmful activity, such as foreign interference and espionage, violent extremism, and transnational organised crime, and may create disruptive social and economic changes that we must adapt to or overcome.
- Disinformation: Disinformation is false or modified information knowingly and deliberately shared with the intent to cause harm or achieve a broader aim.2 Disinformation can be created and spread by other countries as a means of foreign interference and by non-state actors from within or beyond New Zealand. It has the potential to drive societal discord, grievances, and fears, and undermine trust in democratic institutions. Though New Zealand probably has not been directly targeted by state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, the spread of disinformation in the global information environment may nevertheless threaten New Zealand’s security.
- Foreign Interference and Espionage: All countries engage in foreign influence activity to shape perceptions and decision-making in other countries. Such activity becomes foreign interference when it is intended to influence, disrupt or subvert another country’s interests by covert, corruptive, deceptive or threatening means. This includes activities by a foreign country to influence elected officials, explicitly or implicitly. Espionage refers to clandestine activities undertaken to collect information, materials, or capability to obtain competitive advantage at the expense of New Zealand’s security, international relations, and economic wellbeing. Foreign interference and espionage present a significant and growing national security threat to New Zealand. Government is building resilience to this threat in partnership with stakeholders across society.
- Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Violent extremism is an evolving threat, driven by increasingly complex and convoluted ideologies. Terrorism continues to threaten the safety of individuals, the security of democracy, and the cohesion of communities, globally and in New Zealand. New Zealand’s terrorism threat environment is dynamic and influenced by both domestic and international actors and events.
- Transnational Organised Crime: Transnational organised crime (TNOC) operates across national borders or is carried out in one country with strong links to other countries. TNOC spans a wide range of illicit activities, including illicit drug trafficking, financial crime, wildlife trafficking, cybercrime, and exploitation of people. TNOC is a worldwide problem that undermines community wellbeing, governance, economic development, and national security.
- Economic Security: Protecting our economic security is integral to our sovereignty. This requires working to reinvigorate the rules-based trading system while simultaneously strengthening our economy’s resilience to malicious threats to ensure that New Zealanders can access critical goods and services, and that we protect our technological advantage and intellectual property. In an era of strategic competition, New Zealand is particularly exposed to acts, such as economic coercion, that aim to exploit open market mechanisms to undermine our security.
- Pacific Resilience and Security: New Zealand’s national security is intertwined with the security, stability, and resilience of the Pacific region. Our geographic location and identity mean that we share in collective kaitiakitanga responsibilities. New Zealand affirms our commitment to the Boe Declaration, the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, and Pacific regionalism. By supporting Pacific approaches and priorities, we build resilience for all our countries.
- Maritime Security: New Zealand’s maritime security interests extend well beyond our immediate borders with our vast maritime area of interest covering 1/12th of the world’s surface area. Maritime security involves preventing, detecting, mitigating, and responding to risks introduced by illegal, malicious, unregulated, unreported, negligent, or harmful (or potentially harmful) activities at sea. There are a variety of current challenges that run counter to New Zealand’s maritime security interests, including maritime claims that are inconsistent with UNCLOS and threats to freedom of navigation and overflight. New Zealand also faces a significant seaborne illicit drug threat, and competition for maritime resources is increasing.
- Border Security: New Zealand’s border is one of our key interfaces with the world. It includes our physical border and extends offshore and into the digital domain. Effective border security is about safeguarding New Zealand and our people from threats, including transnational criminals, people smugglers, human traffickers, espionage agents, illicit drug and firearm smugglers, terrorists and violent extremists. The need for security is balanced with facilitating efficient flows of people, goods, and information across the border to contribute to New Zealand’s prosperity and wellbeing.
- Cyber Security: Cyber security means protecting people and their computers, networks, programs, and data from unauthorised access, disruption, exploitation, or modification. Malicious cyber actors, including state and non-state actors, present a persistent threat to all New Zealanders as well as New Zealand organisations, businesses, and government.
- Space Security: Many of the critical services New Zealanders increasingly rely on are supported by space-based infrastructure, from weather observations to banking and financial transactions. Space-based assets also help us observe our land and seas, understand climate change, and respond to natural disasters at home and in the Pacific. However, our reliance on space assets also makes us vulnerable to threats that would disrupt these services. Strategic competition and increasing space congestion raise new risks that could adversely affect our space infrastructure and access."
The other two documents, Defence Policy Strategy Statement 2023, and Future Force Design Principles 2023, need to be read in conjunction with the National Security Strategy - Secure Together document, because this informs those two and any future security and defence documents, including the DCP. The DCP will be the proof of the pudding.
recce.k1
Well-Known Member
That's the bit I'm also trying to figure out.
Looking at World Bank data and Trading Economics data they use the NATO definition and show NZ defence expenditure at approx 1.4% of GDP in 2021 (I also get approx 1.4-1.5% when looking at the budget 2023 figures).
So where the DefMin gets 1% I don't know ... unless that figure is actual expenditure excluding the likes of capital charge and depreciation?
Looking at the budget 2023 figures for NZDF it doesn't breakdown the figures for capital charge and depreciation ... I can only assume (rightly or wrongly) it is contained within the overall Departmental Output Expenses for each of the three services?
(If only Mr C was still around to crunch the numbers and give a detailed explanation)!
According to this analysis (1999) the NATO definition does not appear to include capital charge and depreciation.
And it has been reported that NZ's expenditure is only higher than usual at the moment because of major capital projects in motion (P-8A and C-130J).
As an aside former DefMin Dr Wayne Mapp uses a figure of 1.5% of GDP (presumably a 2022 figure) and explains how increases to 1.7% will expand the Army and allow for two Frigate replacements, 1.8% will allow for a third Frigate and >2% will allow for a F-35 squadron ($4b in CapEx and $500m/yr OpEx).
Personally I would debate the need to spend that amount on a single F35 sqn (which is unlikely to happen anyway, unless the minor parties such as ACT, post election 2023 push hard for a restored first tier ACF?) as we could spend approx 25-50% of that CapEx and with approx < 50% of the OpEx in acquiring second hand aircraft (with limited upgraded capabilities and ideally two squadrons not one) for the multi-year training/regeneration stages and be trained/tasked to support the Airborne Surveillance and Response Force (the P-8 capability and future maritime long range UAV capability, all of which fits NZG priorities for the Pacific). Anything "grander" (and expeditionary) to follow can be determined later in the decade as the world situation evolves. But hey - something for the 2024 DCP maybe and only likely if the pollies are pushed hard enough ...
Nighthawk.NZ
Well-Known Member
Depends on a variety of things, how government class what is in the yearly budget... compared to what they spend including buying new toys ... Some calucations the budget is only for running the defence force not new capital input etc... to fair and honest I am not 100% sure how NZ does it... example; the 20 billion over 15 years as part of the DCP 2019 wasn't technically classed as part of the yearly defence budget... but when the world bank look at it they include it ...
Also side note me and numbers don't mix well and as I said above I am not 100% sure how NZ calculates the budget as in what is included and what is not, seems to change more than I change my sock draw.
recce.k1
Well-Known Member
Thinking about it after I posted the above, I suspect the DefMin is simply rounding off figures in a general sense eg him saying "1%" as in, it's (1.4%) closer to 1% than 2%. Saying that because he wouldn't be excluding capital charge/depreciation (come to think about it) and seeing it is "built in" to NZDF budgets anyway.
So really probably nothing to see here (the 1% figure).
Except for the obvious, the higher the figure then the greater likelihood of having greater higher end capabilities ...
The interesting part is how the other parties are going to react to what is obvious to us but up until now has been ignored by most parties. Now that it has been made public, do they acknowledge the problem or continue to ignore it and hope it goes away. We may see defence as a political issue in the up coming election. That will be a first for a good number of years. it will be interesting to go through the various parties defence policy's in a few weeks time. I would almost put money on Mr Luxon, after an initial statement, look to join the ignore it camp.
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
When it comes to National I expect it to be ignored with 110% sweat slathered effort, and what's more I expect Labour to functionally do the same via budgetary means.The interesting part is how the other parties are going to react to what is obvious to us but up until now has been ignored by most parties. Now that it has been made public, do they acknowledge the problem or continue to ignore it and hope it goes away. We may see defence as a political issue in the up coming election. That will be a first for a good number of years. it will be interesting to go through the various parties defence policy's in a few weeks time. I would almost put money on Mr Luxon, after an initial statement, look to join the ignore it camp.
Something from both parties along the lines of; whilst we openly acknowledge the Issues the time is not right due to economic issues caused by covid and the war in Ukraine, nor can problems within education and health be ignored any longer, and there is of course several issues arising from this urgency and the parliamentary timetable, it may not be possible to acheive substantive change due too other pressing priorities, neglect of which would, seen objectivly, be rather courageous.
We are, however, committed in principle to rectifying problems in the relevant ministries in the fullness of time, and indeed the wheels are in motion, in principle.
At the current time I think that Labour is more likely to move on this at this time. The reports would have gone though cabinet before release and the defence ministers comments would have been approved prior to his public announcement so they have some solid backing. ACT is calling for the defence budget to be raised to 2% GDP in 3 years which could put pressure on Luxon.
The greens could be a sticking point for labour, however their policy is not as bad as I first thought, though not great either.
https://assets.nationbuilder.com/be...-Peacekeeping-Policy-2011-2023.pdf?1682560097
The greens could be a sticking point for labour, however their policy is not as bad as I first thought, though not great either.
https://assets.nationbuilder.com/be...-Peacekeeping-Policy-2011-2023.pdf?1682560097
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kiwi in exile
Active Member
TVNZ Q and A Jack Tame short interview with Def Min. Its pretty short
Talks of reducing ship types down from 6
Little sounds like he is open to drones: "I certainly see a role for drones in ISR ... we can make more use of that. In terms of combat [armed drones] I don't have a view about that"
He expects an increase in % of GDP spend on defence over time, over the next few budgets.
Little states we havent had a good public debate about defence in a long time, "lets have the debate" etc.
Talks of reducing ship types down from 6
Little sounds like he is open to drones: "I certainly see a role for drones in ISR ... we can make more use of that. In terms of combat [armed drones] I don't have a view about that"
He expects an increase in % of GDP spend on defence over time, over the next few budgets.
Little states we havent had a good public debate about defence in a long time, "lets have the debate" etc.
Stuart M
Well-Known Member
Its all a question of priorities; ACT, for example, maybe able to pressure Luxon, but they are the smaller party so they will have to decide which of their priorities they press National on, and defence may fall by the wayside in that talk and I think the same will happen for the Greens. But heres the thing, if we get a de-facto 1.6- 1.7% GDP (which is what I suspect it might be) on defence what do we really get for that, and does that get us to where we need to be?
But I think it's worth noting that the documents were released on a Friday, always a good day to release anything that's potentially controversial, and there hasn't been much media chatter on it beyond some minor leftwing/rightwing frothing, nor has there been much speculation of what this will mean for NZDF capacity let alone capability.
This is both good and bad; good in that if anyone really wanted to force the issue they would have done so and then a discussion can take place, or a change in direction can go ahead because no one objected and its not the governments fault they were drinking from home and not paying attention. But its also potentially bad in that if no one cares enough to notice it can be buried and forgotten about and money directed elseware because, again, its not the governments fault you were otherwise occupied with your home brew, so clearly its not a big enough priority.
So of a Monday morning I haven't seen much of anything that's substantial on this, so I'm hoping that the brains trusts are furiously writing about it, as it needs to be talked about, quickly and in depth.