John Fedup
The Bunker Group
You could be correct but we will never know I guess. Sort of like what would Canada be like if Quebec never joined Confederation? Time to get back OT.
NZDF General discussion thread
- Thread starter NZLAV
- Start date
I remember Piggy Muldoon being asked a question about union with Australia by an Australian Journalist soon after the signing of some free trade agreement and he shut them up with a comment “If Australia is interested in joining with NZ we will think about it and maybe we could make them an offer”.
Time to get back on topic.
The Ministry Of Defence have released their 2019 Annual Report (pdf file). It's view on the strategic environment:
81 mm Mortar replacement contract was signed with Hirtenberger Defence Technology in May 2019 and the new mortars will be delivered before the current ones reach the end of their service life.
Te Kaha upgrade due to be completed late 2020 and Te Mana late 2021.
Manawanui’s capabilities are to be progressively released from 2020.
The Fixed HF Radio Refresh Project is in the process of negotiating terms with the preferred vendor. The business case will be submitted to Cabinet in late 2019.
P-8A deliveries schedule to commence in 2022. Been discussions with Australia, UK and Norway because they have either acquired or are acquiring the P-8A in order to take opportunity to share lessons learned.
Aotearoa is expected to be delivered to NZ in 2020 with release of most capabilities to NZDF by late 2021.
Network Enabled Army tranche 1 will achieve FOC late 2021.
CAE production handed over the NH90 flight simulator to their internal testing team ahead of schedule in April 2019. The simulator building at Ohakea is scheduled to be completed during the third quarter of 2019, prior to delivery of the simulator.
Two projects that are behind schedule are the Spec Ops vehicles and the Strategic Bearer Network. No details about these projects have been given in the publicly released version of this report.
“NEW ZEALAND’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 set out an assessment of New Zealand’s strategic environment.
New Zealand is navigating an increasingly complex and dynamic international security environment. We will face compounding challenges of a scope and magnitude not previously imagined in our neighbourhood, in particular in the South Pacific. While there may be noteworthy effects on New Zealand’s interests from singular developments, New Zealand’s security outlook may be shaped most powerfully by a combination of forces increasing pressure on the international rules-based order, which will play out in newly potent ways close to home.
The three key forces, and their dynamic intersections, pressuring the order are:
· the increasing importance of spheres of influence, with states pursuing greater influence in ways that, at times, challenge international norms
· challenges to open societies, driven by increasing disillusionment with existing arrangements within these societies, that threaten to reduce those states’ willingness to champion the rules-based order, and
· a collection of complex disruptors – including an array of impacts from climate change, new technologies changing the nature of conflict, extremist ideologies, national and regional tensions, and transnational organised crime. These may disproportionately affect open societies and weak states, and are forces for disorder.
New Zealand will face intensifying disruptors closer to home. Climate change, transnational organised crime, resource competition, together with the increasing influence and presence of non-traditional partners, will disrupt our neighbourhood, including our extensive maritime area, in complex and compounding ways.
Supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific region will increase in importance, with Pacific Island countries likely to require increasing levels of assistance, beyond humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
It is in New Zealand’s vital interest to act in support of international order. While the New Zealand Defence Force will conduct some missions on its own, most deployments will be undertaken alongside other government agencies and international partners. The Defence Force must therefore maintain and develop capabilities that support effectively operating with others.
The domains of cyber and space bring both vulnerabilities and opportunities. The Defence Force will need to be prepared to respond to increased threats manifesting in and through both space and cyber space.
Defence will have to act in new ways and at new levels to protect New Zealand’s values and interests.” pp. 11 – 12.
The Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 set out an assessment of New Zealand’s strategic environment.
New Zealand is navigating an increasingly complex and dynamic international security environment. We will face compounding challenges of a scope and magnitude not previously imagined in our neighbourhood, in particular in the South Pacific. While there may be noteworthy effects on New Zealand’s interests from singular developments, New Zealand’s security outlook may be shaped most powerfully by a combination of forces increasing pressure on the international rules-based order, which will play out in newly potent ways close to home.
The three key forces, and their dynamic intersections, pressuring the order are:
· the increasing importance of spheres of influence, with states pursuing greater influence in ways that, at times, challenge international norms
· challenges to open societies, driven by increasing disillusionment with existing arrangements within these societies, that threaten to reduce those states’ willingness to champion the rules-based order, and
· a collection of complex disruptors – including an array of impacts from climate change, new technologies changing the nature of conflict, extremist ideologies, national and regional tensions, and transnational organised crime. These may disproportionately affect open societies and weak states, and are forces for disorder.
New Zealand will face intensifying disruptors closer to home. Climate change, transnational organised crime, resource competition, together with the increasing influence and presence of non-traditional partners, will disrupt our neighbourhood, including our extensive maritime area, in complex and compounding ways.
Supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific region will increase in importance, with Pacific Island countries likely to require increasing levels of assistance, beyond humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
It is in New Zealand’s vital interest to act in support of international order. While the New Zealand Defence Force will conduct some missions on its own, most deployments will be undertaken alongside other government agencies and international partners. The Defence Force must therefore maintain and develop capabilities that support effectively operating with others.
The domains of cyber and space bring both vulnerabilities and opportunities. The Defence Force will need to be prepared to respond to increased threats manifesting in and through both space and cyber space.
Defence will have to act in new ways and at new levels to protect New Zealand’s values and interests.” pp. 11 – 12.
81 mm Mortar replacement contract was signed with Hirtenberger Defence Technology in May 2019 and the new mortars will be delivered before the current ones reach the end of their service life.
Te Kaha upgrade due to be completed late 2020 and Te Mana late 2021.
Manawanui’s capabilities are to be progressively released from 2020.
The Fixed HF Radio Refresh Project is in the process of negotiating terms with the preferred vendor. The business case will be submitted to Cabinet in late 2019.
P-8A deliveries schedule to commence in 2022. Been discussions with Australia, UK and Norway because they have either acquired or are acquiring the P-8A in order to take opportunity to share lessons learned.
Aotearoa is expected to be delivered to NZ in 2020 with release of most capabilities to NZDF by late 2021.
Network Enabled Army tranche 1 will achieve FOC late 2021.
CAE production handed over the NH90 flight simulator to their internal testing team ahead of schedule in April 2019. The simulator building at Ohakea is scheduled to be completed during the third quarter of 2019, prior to delivery of the simulator.
Two projects that are behind schedule are the Spec Ops vehicles and the Strategic Bearer Network. No details about these projects have been given in the publicly released version of this report.
kiwipatriot69
Active Member
At Pacific 2019 Navantia Australia showed their JSS design for Australia and potential export to regional navy's in the Pacific, for a late 2020's release. What are the thoughts here on that for a potential replacement for HMNZS Canterbury plus spare? The timing would coincide with what the above article mentions.
If built in Australia, expensive. There are some things that I do like about it though, especially the capability to transfer fuels at sea. But it's only a concept design at the moment, so we'll wait and see what they actually come up with.
A Chinese company close to the CCP has leased the island of Tulagi for 75 years from the Solomons Islands. The deal was done in secret. Tulagi has a natural deep water harbour and there are no known oil or gas reserves in the area even though a document states that the Chinese are considering build an oil and gas terminal there. "The document also, states that the government will lease all of Tulagi and the surrounding islands in the province for the development of a special economic zone or any other industry that is suitable for any development.”
This does create a significant security concern for both Australia and New Zealand because if dual use facilities are built on Tulagi, then the PLAN and PLAAF will be able to operate regularly within our region, potentially creating all sorts of mischief.
China Is Leasing an Entire Pacific Island. Its Residents Are Shocked.
EDIT: Copied this over from the Pacific Islands - Polynesia and Melanesia thread.
This does create a significant security concern for both Australia and New Zealand because if dual use facilities are built on Tulagi, then the PLAN and PLAAF will be able to operate regularly within our region, potentially creating all sorts of mischief.
China Is Leasing an Entire Pacific Island. Its Residents Are Shocked.
EDIT: Copied this over from the Pacific Islands - Polynesia and Melanesia thread.
The Spring 2019 issue of Line Of Defence is out. On page 28 Wayne Mapp has an article, How to Defend New Zealand in which he discusses his views after Hugh White's recent lecture at Centre of Strategic Studies at Victoria University, discussing the historic challenges facing Australia and New Zealand in the way they each approach their security in the face of major-power rivalries in Asia. Hugh White has garnered criticism for his proposition in his recently published book that Australia needs to bolster its continental defence and build a "Fortress Australia", for want of a better term. Whites argument is that the US will abandon the alliances that it has built in the Indo Pacific since WW2 and that Australia and NZ must be prepared to defend themselves without US help. Amongst Whites arguments are his argument that Australian needs to concentrate on sea denial, therefore it has over invested in surface ships and under invested in submarines, maritime, and strike aircraft. White argues that Australia should have more strategic independence which means that Australia must have more military power.
Wayne Mapp argues that because we in NZ believe that the US has sovereign territory in the region, and the fact that Pearl Harbour is permanently burned into their psyche, it will defend those territories similar to how the UK defended the Falklands in 1982, therefore it is part of the reason why we don't see the issue in the same context as White or others in Australia do. Mapp then goes on to write:
"This is quite a different calculation to that of New Zealand policy makers. We think we can have more independence because we are more remote. And because we are small. In contrast, Australian decision makers think that New Zealand can make that choice because we automatically gain from a powerful Australia.
So, what does all this thinking actually mean for New Zealand? Should New Zealand embark upon a serious expansion of our defence forces, especially in the air and maritime domains?"
He asks a very important question there and then goes on to list reasons why not to:
Not an obvious compelling case to do so? I would think that the current geostrategic situation within the Indo Pacific would be a compelling case. Pray tell Mr Mapp, is your definition of a compelling situation when enemy warships are sailing into NZ harbours with enemy aircraft ruling our skys? We don't get the choice of where and when to start the fight. However, we do get the choice of whether or not we are prepared for it, leaving it to the absolute last minute and letting others fight our fights spending their treasure and spilling their blood because we were / are to penny pinching / stingy to invest in our own defence until we have no choice, is abhorrent and despicable to the average Kiwi. Only a politician and / or a party hack would think that as being acceptable. As someone who served in NZDF you should know better, far better.
Not obvious that that our or Australia's strategic position has weakened to the point where we have no choice in the matter. Unfortunately its somewhat late then because it takes to long in the modern world to rearm and retrain. This is not 1939 - 45 when the US had the industrial capacity to rearm the free world. It doesn't have anywhere near that capacity now and it would be struggling just to supply its own forces using its present industrial base.
He does think that we should've acquired 6 instead of 4 P-8 Poseidons. He states that the current situation shows that 2 frigates are not enough, and he thinks that the Type 31 may be a better acquisition that the Type 26, based purely on cost, meaning not increasing defence expenditure. The point he makes which, I think that really needs driving home is: "However, prudence would indicate that New Zealand does need to make serious decisions about defending the maritime domain." It is one that I heartedly full support and NZ needs to cure its seablindness. However, I do disagree with his assertion that: "This can be accomplished with the existing defence framework." My argument is that there is not enough funding in the current framework to support minimal, let alone adequate and sustainable air and naval maritime defence capabilities.
Wayne Mapp argues that because we in NZ believe that the US has sovereign territory in the region, and the fact that Pearl Harbour is permanently burned into their psyche, it will defend those territories similar to how the UK defended the Falklands in 1982, therefore it is part of the reason why we don't see the issue in the same context as White or others in Australia do. Mapp then goes on to write:
"This is quite a different calculation to that of New Zealand policy makers. We think we can have more independence because we are more remote. And because we are small. In contrast, Australian decision makers think that New Zealand can make that choice because we automatically gain from a powerful Australia.
So, what does all this thinking actually mean for New Zealand? Should New Zealand embark upon a serious expansion of our defence forces, especially in the air and maritime domains?"
He asks a very important question there and then goes on to list reasons why not to:
- Difficult to convince NZ public to substantially increase defence expenditure to say, 2% GDP.
- Not obvious a compelling case to do so.
- Not obvious that that our or Australia's strategic position has weakened to the point where we have no choice in the matter.
Not an obvious compelling case to do so? I would think that the current geostrategic situation within the Indo Pacific would be a compelling case. Pray tell Mr Mapp, is your definition of a compelling situation when enemy warships are sailing into NZ harbours with enemy aircraft ruling our skys? We don't get the choice of where and when to start the fight. However, we do get the choice of whether or not we are prepared for it, leaving it to the absolute last minute and letting others fight our fights spending their treasure and spilling their blood because we were / are to penny pinching / stingy to invest in our own defence until we have no choice, is abhorrent and despicable to the average Kiwi. Only a politician and / or a party hack would think that as being acceptable. As someone who served in NZDF you should know better, far better.
Not obvious that that our or Australia's strategic position has weakened to the point where we have no choice in the matter. Unfortunately its somewhat late then because it takes to long in the modern world to rearm and retrain. This is not 1939 - 45 when the US had the industrial capacity to rearm the free world. It doesn't have anywhere near that capacity now and it would be struggling just to supply its own forces using its present industrial base.
He does think that we should've acquired 6 instead of 4 P-8 Poseidons. He states that the current situation shows that 2 frigates are not enough, and he thinks that the Type 31 may be a better acquisition that the Type 26, based purely on cost, meaning not increasing defence expenditure. The point he makes which, I think that really needs driving home is: "However, prudence would indicate that New Zealand does need to make serious decisions about defending the maritime domain." It is one that I heartedly full support and NZ needs to cure its seablindness. However, I do disagree with his assertion that: "This can be accomplished with the existing defence framework." My argument is that there is not enough funding in the current framework to support minimal, let alone adequate and sustainable air and naval maritime defence capabilities.
Wayne's problem is that he is 20 years out of date. He still works from the meme's espoused in New Zealand's Beyond 2000 report worldview which he helped Derek Quigley.
Despite a continuing presence in the strategic discussion around Australia’s defence White has never given up on his equally ancient views on “fortress Australia” rebadged as Defence of Australia with a few add ons such as “sea denial”.
Sometimes senior citizens such as Hugh White need to pause and refresh and drop the bone!
40 deg south
Well-Known Member
Advancing Pacific Partnerships 2019 launched
Defence paper seen as pushing back on China's Pacific influence
Government has published a paper on 'advancing Pacific partnerships', which the media are interpreting as pushing back against Chinese influence. Paper isn't yet on the MOD site.
Coincidentally published while a PLAN training vessel is alongside in Wellington!
Defence paper seen as pushing back on China's Pacific influence
Government has published a paper on 'advancing Pacific partnerships', which the media are interpreting as pushing back against Chinese influence. Paper isn't yet on the MOD site.
Coincidentally published while a PLAN training vessel is alongside in Wellington!
It's on the MOD site now....be warned, from my skim thru it's absolute soft hogwash... and any mention of capability is liimited to how the capabilities covered by the DCP will be part of this... nothing new to see really. You may like to read it properly but you're only likely to get warm fuzzies.
https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/...307e7/Advancing-Pacific-Partnerships-2019.pdf
Novascotiaboy
Active Member
Media outlook of the NZDFs ability to provide meaningful offensive power for FPDA is low as per this report.
The Future of the Five Power Defense Arrangements
The Future of the Five Power Defense Arrangements
t68
Well-Known Member
Not sure if anyone has seen these, I stumbled on these while surfing the net, still reading them but interesting none the less.
Nighthawk.NZ - Options for the NZDF and RNZN 2nd enhanced Sealift vessel
Nighthawk.NZ - Why do I think the Endurance 170 LHD is a good choice for the RNZN.
Nighthawk.NZ - Options for the NZDF and RNZN 2nd enhanced Sealift vessel
Nighthawk.NZ - Why do I think the Endurance 170 LHD is a good choice for the RNZN.
A good write up. He should correct the contention that it would only sail if escorted by a surface combatant. That is not strictly true in the sense that it is also quite capable of operating independently conducting HADR support and peacetime constabulary patrols in South Pacific waters in which it will likely spend a significant part of its life doing.
Agreed.
A NZDF LPD or LHD provide something that aid dollars don't. Actual presence and a reason to collaborate and integrate as StingrayOZ noted in another thread. It gives NZDF a peacetime presence to train with local forces with a light shoreside presence.
The 1st of class MRCV is being launched by end 2025 (to commission by 2027) — ST Marine should have a delivery rate of 2 MRCV vessels per year. This means JMMS first steel cutting may be in late-2o27 or mid-2028 (as a follow on order from MRCV). In the case of Singapore, the JMMS (aka LHD for NZDF), will be paired with the 5,000 ton MRCV (if ST Marine’s Vangard 130 design is chosen). It’s the plug and modules that are really useful for both classes of ships, and we can train other ASEAN navies on the use of these modules, including for socio-civic missions (eg. deployable medical containers), mine clearance or compliant VBSS drills (already developed and matured on the 8 LMVs).
I think it would be great if Nighthawk could explain to laymen how a naval task group (with coalition frigates paired with a LHD) could perform a number of useful roles beyond war fighting or HADR, including support for operations like:
(1) counter piracy or maritime security patrols, concurrently using helicopters and boarding teams to support our neighbours or CTF-151 (where NZ provides the navy crew and Singapore or Australia provide the air detachment and helicopters or vice versa);
(2) WWII or other modern mine clearance operations in distant waters as a support vessel (eg. Straits of Hormuz or the Pacific);
(3) non-combatant evacuation due to civil disorder or natural disaster or conduct social-civic missions to engage with local communities during peacetime; and
(4) anti-submarine patrols with naval helicopters — to augment NZDF’s P-8As — in the event submarines are a potential threat during a UN peace support mission (as was the case in East Timor deployment — see: Operation STABILISE in Timor revisited – The Australian Naval Institute).
The list could be longer but these 4 came to my mind.
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China is sounding more like Nazi Germany every day.
'Absolutely no mercy': China's brutal detention regime revealed in leaked documents
I find this all scary as hell. I see definite parallels between the human rights atrocities, mass detentions of people based on ethnicity, unprecedented military build up, ignoring world concern/authority and pushing into territory they have no claim to of late 1930s Nazi Germany.
Is the world going to repeat history and do nothing until it's too late?
NZ and it's allies need to wake up.
'Absolutely no mercy': China's brutal detention regime revealed in leaked documents
I find this all scary as hell. I see definite parallels between the human rights atrocities, mass detentions of people based on ethnicity, unprecedented military build up, ignoring world concern/authority and pushing into territory they have no claim to of late 1930s Nazi Germany.
Is the world going to repeat history and do nothing until it's too late?
NZ and it's allies need to wake up.
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This paper discusses the issue that the west has lost strategic control of the SCS for the second time in less than 100 years. From a NZ POV, a significant SLOC of ours transits the region. Chinese Strategic Control of the South China Sea – Maritime Trade Implications for Australia - Australian Institute of International Affairs
The NZ Herald ran a story 18/11/19 about this Australian 60 Minutes episode (below), and whilst it is Australian centric, it is very much applicable to NZ as well. It is about the PRC gradual take over of the South Pacific, through its maritime silk road initiative and economic development policies. Take special note of the reference towards the end to the southern blue economic passage heading down to Antarctica thru NZ. Also, note how well the planning is done for the various plans that they have put into motion. Strategically they would be able to cut Australia and NZ off from the US, once PLAN & PLAAF units were established in the region.
This is an essay that discusses the influences upon Chinese seapower and is informative, giving some wider background on the PLAN. The Influence of Seapower upon China – South Asia Journal
The image is from the essay above and shows the defensive island chains and blue economic passages. No 4 is the southern one and in the 60 Minutes video that has been updated. If the conclusion of the 60 Minutes program is correct, then the NZ political and public service elites need to wake their ideas up, quickly.
EDIT: 20/11/2019 to correct source of where I found the story.
The NZ Herald ran a story 18/11/19 about this Australian 60 Minutes episode (below), and whilst it is Australian centric, it is very much applicable to NZ as well. It is about the PRC gradual take over of the South Pacific, through its maritime silk road initiative and economic development policies. Take special note of the reference towards the end to the southern blue economic passage heading down to Antarctica thru NZ. Also, note how well the planning is done for the various plans that they have put into motion. Strategically they would be able to cut Australia and NZ off from the US, once PLAN & PLAAF units were established in the region.
This is an essay that discusses the influences upon Chinese seapower and is informative, giving some wider background on the PLAN. The Influence of Seapower upon China – South Asia Journal
The image is from the essay above and shows the defensive island chains and blue economic passages. No 4 is the southern one and in the 60 Minutes video that has been updated. If the conclusion of the 60 Minutes program is correct, then the NZ political and public service elites need to wake their ideas up, quickly.
EDIT: 20/11/2019 to correct source of where I found the story.
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shanes_world_05
Member
That is a very interesting and concerning report (60 mins). Reminds me of this one from last year.
Given the potential does everyone here think 3 or even 4 frigates would be adequate, (if we could get them) and could we do more than that?
Given the potential does everyone here think 3 or even 4 frigates would be adequate, (if we could get them) and could we do more than that?