NZDF General discussion thread

[Zero Alpha]

Considering that we are a maritime nation with a 900 - 1000 nm moat surrounding us and we are highly dependent upon our SLOC then a policy of abandonment of long range fixed wing ASW is rather stupid to say the least. I realise that one recent NZ govt already went down that path as far as it could.

Consider this:

NZ is so unlikely to be the sole targeted of a maritime interdiction operation the idea isn't worth considering further.

If anyone decides to interdict trade, it will affect many, if not all, of the countries in the world that trade within the region. In this day and age that is just as likely to a South African manufacture as it is a European or a North American.

Any attack on commerce would hurt a large cohort of trading nations.

Many, if not all, of that cohort is likely to seek peaceful settlement first, and military response as a last resort.

There aren't any scenarios where only one of those countries responds militarily.

For a country like New Zealand, far removed from any likely choke points, contributing forces is likely to be expected, but not 'essential.'

The contribution NZ could make in that scenario is broad. It could range from contributing command and control personnel, to a warship, to an air element.

As long as there is something credible to contribute, we're meeting our obligations to the international community.

If the threat is from submarine, that contribution could equally be made from a surface platform as an air one.

If we want to contribute to the ASW scenario, the question is how we could best do that. It isn't dependent on owning particular air platform.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

Consider this:

NZ is so unlikely to be the sole targeted of a maritime interdiction operation the idea isn't worth considering further.

If anyone decides to interdict trade, it will affect many, if not all, of the countries in the world that trade within the region. In this day and age that is just as likely to a South African manufacture as it is a European or a North American.

Any attack on commerce would hurt a large cohort of trading nations.

Many, if not all, of that cohort is likely to seek peaceful settlement first, and military response as a last resort.

There aren't any scenarios where only one of those countries responds militarily.

For a country like New Zealand, far removed from any likely choke points, contributing forces is likely to be expected, but not 'essential.'

The contribution NZ could make in that scenario is broad. It could range from contributing command and control personnel, to a warship, to an air element.

As long as there is something credible to contribute, we're meeting our obligations to the international community.

If the threat is from submarine, that contribution could equally be made from a surface platform as an air one.

If we want to contribute to the ASW scenario, the question is how we could best do that. It isn't dependent on owning particular air platform.

Yes , but we are already limited in the ASW role, without current P3 orion or a similar ASW platform, we would have what, one frigate available, while the other doing piracy of somalia or or a training op? and thats if they were available at all. Last thing we need is to start chipping away at what capability remains.

 

[Todjaeger]

Yes , but we are already limited in the ASW role, without current P3 orion or a similar ASW platform, we would have what, one frigate available, while the other doing piracy of somalia or or a training op? and thats if they were available at all. Last thing we need is to start chipping away at what capability remains.

Not to be mean, but at present the NZDF does not really have an ASW capability. The P3-K2 should now be getting an ASW upgrade, however the last upgrade did not address ASW operations.

The LWT in inventory is the Mk 46 which is being a bit long in the tooth. IIRC the existing stocks were examined and/or re-manufactured to extend the service life, however the guidance is still the same. The frigates themselves have LWT launchers and a hull-mounted sonar, but lack a towed sonar array. The Seasprites can drop depth bombs and LWT's, but the capacity or capability of their sonobuoys, and whether they have a dipping sonar or not, are in question. Basically that means while the NZDF has a number of platforms which could engage a sub once it is detected, the number and capability of various platforms to detect a sub is questionable.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The LWT in inventory is the Mk 46 which is being a bit long in the tooth. IIRC the existing stocks were examined and/or re-manufactured to extend the service life, however the guidance is still the same. The frigates themselves have LWT launchers and a hull-mounted sonar, but lack a towed sonar array. The Seasprites can drop depth bombs and LWT's, but the capacity or capability of their sonobuoys, and whether they have a dipping sonar or not, are in question. Basically that means while the NZDF has a number of platforms which could engage a sub once it is detected, the number and capability of various platforms to detect a sub is questionable.

the upgrade path for the Mk46 is the Mk54, so they could get them hot-rodded

the bonus is that if NZ goes to the P8 then they can use a derivative of the Mk54 (HAAWWC)

 

[MrConservative]

the upgrade path for the Mk46 is the Mk54, so they could get them hot-rodded

the bonus is that if NZ goes to the P8 then they can use a derivative of the Mk54 (HAAWWC)

And that solution neatly encompasses both the lack of ASW assets viz a collective response with Aust + USN

 

[Todjaeger]

the upgrade path for the Mk46 is the Mk54, so they could get them hot-rodded

the bonus is that if NZ goes to the P8 then they can use a derivative of the Mk54 (HAAWWC)

Yeah, but to the best of my knowledge, NZ did not take it's existing stocks of Mk 46 and have them re-manufactured as Mk 54. Instead they were re-manufactured/life-extended as Mk 46's. IIRC the LWT inventory (which was a mix of Mk 44 & Mk 46) was set to expire in 2008. After which, a LWT launch would be a hit or ahem, mis-fire, event. The re-manufacture work was just done so that the LWT's would be re-certified as good, and no longer expired and therefore potentially unreliable.

Why the LWT's were not re-manufactured as Mk 54's I suspect was due to cost. Not that it would necessarily have been particularly expensive, but with various Gov'ts not interested in spending money on defence why spend anything but the bare minimum. Of interest to note, the 2010 LTDP at the time had a planned replacement for the LWT's in 2015, or nearly a decade after they would have expired. The plan also did not have re-manufacturing the LWT's as an option either. That should give people an idea on how important an ASW capability was to the Gov't of the day.

The more I think about it, the more it seems that the Gov't wanted to have NZ follow the path Ireland has taken in being a non-aligned nation.

 

[Nick underscore]

...The more I think about it, the more it seems that the Gov't wanted to have NZ follow the path Ireland has taken in being a non-aligned nation.

Interesting post there Tod.

Your last sentence provokes other thought bubbles on my side..

Hoping the soon to be released NZ DWP, will realign focus on certain capability gaps. These have been covered in detail.

 

[MrConservative]

The MK46-5A and along with the MK82 500lb GP HE are again conducting training Ex's which also include ESUS to maintain an interim capability out to the P-3K2 replacement next decade.

For a number of years (2000-2008 the 'Irish' era ) ASW was allowed to atrophy. Since the last DWP there has been a steady rebuilding of capability. The delayed P-3K2 upgrade project transition meant that for a couple of years things were quiet as one would expect from a squadron shifting from legacy to upgrades platform. However the next DWP will inform future policy. It is unlikely to deviate from its current capability regeneration pathway.

It is not all bad within the NZDF. There are some good things happening. We should not lose sight of that.

 

[ngatimozart]

Consider this:

NZ is so unlikely to be the sole targeted of a maritime interdiction operation the idea isn't worth considering further.

Why not? Blockade is an age old naval tactic and long term strategy. NZ is an island nation and you don't have to invade it in order to coerce it when you can effect interdiction of its SLOC. Read Geoffrey Till.

If anyone decides to interdict trade, it will affect many, if not all, of the countries in the world that trade within the region. In this day and age that is just as likely to a South African manufacture as it is a European or a North American.

Any attack on commerce would hurt a large cohort of trading nations.

Many, if not all, of that cohort is likely to seek peaceful settlement first, and military response as a last resort.

There aren't any scenarios where only one of those countries responds militarily.

Depends on what data you input into your scenarios. It could be a non state actor with access to significant resources. They don't really have to sink ships but terrorise the merchant shipping. That's all that is needed for commercial shipping companies to reassess their routing. The effects on NZ Inc could be significant. There is more than one scenario and not all are obvious.

For a country like New Zealand, far removed from any likely choke points, contributing forces is likely to be expected, but not 'essential.'

A significant portion of our trade transits those choke points.

The contribution NZ could make in that scenario is broad. It could range from contributing command and control personnel, to a warship, to an air element.

As long as there is something credible to contribute, we're meeting our obligations to the international community.

If the threat is from submarine, that contribution could equally be made from a surface platform as an air one.

If we want to contribute to the ASW scenario, the question is how we could best do that. It isn't dependent on owning particular air platform.

Define credibility. Have a look at a map and see where our SLOCs are. It's all very well thinking and postulating about having other people pulling our chestnuts out of the fire for us, but it's quid pro quo and we are expected to take proper capabilities to the table that contribute and are not going to be a liability to any ally or coalition. NZ has to pull its own weight in its defence responsibilities, which it hasn't been doing for at least two decades. It bludges off others because it is to tight to equip its forces properly and has done so for decades. This is well known and even the NZSAS had to creatively acquire Hummers when they first went to Afghanistan or acquired BMW bikes from the German special forces in Afghanistan. That is documented in a book about the NZSAS.

Defence and security is not a business activity that has a profit and loss margin, which some people seem to think. It deals in situations that hopefully never happen, but unfortunately history has far too many examples of conflicts and wars. As much as some people would like to think that humanity has advanced sociologically, it hasn't all that much and the current global situation reflects that. We do not live in a benign strategic environment and that environment is further deteriorating with state and non state actors destabilising regions through overt and covert means.

Secondly you appear to have little understanding of ASW by suggesting that contribution could equally be made from a surface platform as an air one. I suggest that you read up about it because it is not as simple as you appear to think. There are some on here who are very well versed in the dark arts of ASW. I have been looking at it myself and you do have to look because not much is available in the open literature.

 

[MrConservative]

And on the SLOC vein the grandfather of modern SLOC theory Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote about the mere forward posture of hostile maritime actors as an tactic whereby economic damage of an adversary is made possible through ramping up their costs of trade.

Attempts of sea denial are not something from the days of Sir Walter Raleigh. In 1978 and then again in 1988 Indonesia attempted to control the Lombok and Sunda straits, two of the most important choke points, which impacted the cost to NZ and Australian trade.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Yeah, but to the best of my knowledge, NZ did not take it's existing stocks of Mk 46 and have them re-manufactured as Mk 54. Instead they were re-manufactured/life-extended as Mk 46's. IIRC the LWT inventory (which was a mix of Mk 44 & Mk 46) was set to expire in 2008. After which, a LWT launch would be a hit or ahem, mis-fire, event. The re-manufacture work was just done so that the LWT's would be re-certified as good, and no longer expired and therefore potentially unreliable.

Why the LWT's were not re-manufactured as Mk 54's I suspect was due to cost. Not that it would necessarily have been particularly expensive, but with various Gov'ts not interested in spending money on defence why spend anything but the bare minimum. Of interest to note, the 2010 LTDP at the time had a planned replacement for the LWT's in 2015, or nearly a decade after they would have expired. The plan also did not have re-manufacturing the LWT's as an option either. That should give people an idea on how important an ASW capability was to the Gov't of the day.

I don't want to over trivialise whats required, but the upgrade model is similar to Rapier 1 to Rapier 2 (which I had some direct overview of). Its not lego "everything is awesome" - but it's not a show stopper converting existing sticks

The more I think about it, the more it seems that the Gov't wanted to have NZ follow the path Ireland has taken in being a non-aligned nation.

In the past I'd agree that the NZG was wanting a low viz approach, but after 9/11 that all changed and has been progressively changing back.

there's also a subtle difference between what various NZG's postured for the public politi and what they were doing behind the green door.

 

[gf0012-aust]

And on the SLOC vein the grandfather of modern SLOC theory Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote about the mere forward posture of hostile maritime actors as an tactic whereby economic damage of an adversary is made possible through ramping up their costs of trade.

Attempts of sea denial are not something from the days of Sir Walter Raleigh. In 1978 and then again in 1988 Indonesia attempted to control the Lombok and Sunda straits, two of the most important choke points, which impacted the cost to NZ and Australian trade.

it wouldn't take much for the indons to treat the Malaccas like the Dardanelles either, they've done that obliquely in the past to USN and RAN when it was clearly a regional interest to allow support from non Strait entities

 

[Todjaeger]

I don't want to over trivialise whats required, but the upgrade model is similar to Rapier 1 to Rapier 2 (which I had some direct overview of). Its not lego "everything is awesome" - but it's not a show stopper converting existing sticks

I do not imagine it would be. I just find it interesting that the decision was made to re-manufacture and/or re-certify existing stocks, rather than re-manufacture and upgrade at the same time.

As for my comment following the path Ireland has taken, if one looks at the overall force structure and capability set of the Irish military, it tends to be very Army-centric, with many international peacekeeping deployments. The naval service is capable of constabulary patrolling, and could provide some anti-piracy capability, but would not be particularly suitable for ASuW or ASW. The air service is much like the RNZAF in being limited to airlift and maritime patrol.

With the situation Ireland is in, the force structure works. Ireland's closest neighbour, the UK which has a partial land border, is largely friendly and unlike to invade (again, at least...) and th UK is close enough to quickly take action if a direct threat to Ireland presented itself and it would be within the UK's interests to do so. Indirect threats to Ireland would largely be handled by other European countries, because those indirect threats would largely be direct threats to those specific countries.

The situation for NZ is a bit different, in part because NZ is one of the larger and more capable/functional countries within the S. Pacific region. The closest neighbor which could come to NZ's direct aid is Australia which is about 2,150 km (Sydney to Auckland). For comparison, that is approximately the same distance between Dublin, Ireland and Lviv in western Ukraine.

The external chokepoints which would dramatically impact Ireland have other forces which could and would be brought to bear to resolve issues. Within the ASEAN region where SLOC chokepoints which could impact NZ exist, NZ is one of the countries which would need to respond.

 

[Todjaeger]

Depends on what data you input into your scenarios. It could be a non state actor with access to significant resources. They don't really have to sink ships but terrorise the merchant shipping. That's all that is needed for commercial shipping companies to reassess their routing. The effects on NZ Inc could be significant. There is more than one scenario and not all are obvious.

From memory, when the piracy situation off Somalia was particularly bad around 2010, the transit was costing on average an extra $100k (not sure what currency, USD$?) per voyage for extra insurance, fuel to navigate alternate routes, or have embarked security detachments, or a combination thereof.

A significant portion of our trade transits those choke points.

I listed the numbers in this thread a month ago, here. A quick re-cap is that 53% of exports from NZ, and 62% of imports to NZ go through the SCS, which has a number of potential chokepoints. The Malacca Straits being among them.

Define credibility. Have a look at a map and see where our SLOCs are. It's all very well thinking and postulating about having other people pulling our chestnuts out of the fire for us, but it's quid pro quo and we are expected to take proper capabilities to the table that contribute and are not going to be a liability to any ally or coalition. NZ has to pull its own weight in its defence responsibilities, which it hasn't been doing for at least two decades. It bludges off others because it is to tight to equip its forces properly and has done so for decades. This is well known and even the NZSAS had to creatively acquire Hummers when they first went to Afghanistan or acquired BMW bikes from the German special forces in Afghanistan. That is documented in a book about the NZSAS.

Defence and security is not a business activity that has a profit and loss margin, which some people seem to think. It deals in situations that hopefully never happen, but unfortunately history has far too many examples of conflicts and wars. As much as some people would like to think that humanity has advanced sociologically, it hasn't all that much and the current global situation reflects that. We do not live in a benign strategic environment and that environment is further deteriorating with state and non state actors destabilising regions through overt and covert means.

Secondly you appear to have little understanding of ASW by suggesting that contribution could equally be made from a surface platform as an air one. I suggest that you read up about it because it is not as simple as you appear to think. There are some on here who are very well versed in the dark arts of ASW. I have been looking at it myself and you do have to look because not much is available in the open literature.

I do not think it is quite 'quid pro quo' however, if a situation were to arise which presented as a threat or hardship to NZ, and NZ was unable to contribute in a meaningful way to resolving the situation, then I firmly believe that other nations would pay little heed to NZ concerns about the outcome.

As it is, NZ lacks the ability to contribute meaningfully to reopen the SLOC if it was closed via a number of different methods. Some of which could be implemented by non-state actors that are reasonably organized and funded.

 

[Zero Alpha]

Why not? Blockade is an age old naval tactic and long term strategy. NZ is an island nation and you don't have to invade it in order to coerce it when you can effect interdiction of its SLOC. Read Geoffrey Till.

Prey tell, just who exactly do you think would want to target just NZ? Your straw man is absurd. You think NZ is going to offend some country so previously that they'd want to dispatch a fleet to NZ? Or to wait until a ship carrying NZ goods sails past and ignore all others?

Do you think China woulds and by and watched if Indonesia trade a trade blockade? Even a shortage of baby milk powder caused a near panic in China, the idea of the food trade being disrupted would probably see rioting in the streets.

 

[ngatimozart]

Prey tell, just who exactly do you think would want to target just NZ? Your straw man is absurd. You think NZ is going to offend some country so previously that they'd want to dispatch a fleet to NZ? Or to wait until a ship carrying NZ goods sails past and ignore all others?

Do you think China woulds and by and watched if Indonesia trade a trade blockade? Even a shortage of baby milk powder caused a near panic in China, the idea of the food trade being disrupted would probably see rioting in the streets.

It isn't about straw men - its about what can and can't be done to us by one group or many. It's basic naval strategy used for centuries. If you don't understand that then you don't know the basics.

It's time for you to dial back the arrogance and actually digest what people are saying. There are people here who are widely read very well informed on the subject(s). I would suggest rather strongly that you take this advice seriously.

 

[Lucasnz]

Prey tell, just who exactly do you think would want to target just NZ? Your straw man is absurd. You think NZ is going to offend some country so previously that they'd want to dispatch a fleet to NZ? Or to wait until a ship carrying NZ goods sails past and ignore all others?

Do you think China woulds and by and watched if Indonesia trade a trade blockade? Even a shortage of baby milk powder caused a near panic in China, the idea of the food trade being disrupted would probably see rioting in the streets.

NG statement is a statement of fact - blockades have been a standard method of exerting pressure on various nations. Nor does it take a fleet to institute an effective blockade. For example during WWII HMNZS Achilles was able to stop German merchant ships from sailing from ports up and down the West Coast of South America (I think - might have been East - Need to read the official history again) simply through her presence.

In NZ more recent history; During the Rainbow Warrior incident the French operated a sub out of the one of their South Pacific bases. Had French political efforts being unsuccessful in influencing NZ though trade threats in Europe; think about the impact that sub would have had to NZ Shipping in terms of Insurance etc. - It would only have had to sink one vessel or have its presence announced to the world to have an impact on NZ economy. I would note back then NZ had a much larger merchant navy (Union Steamship Co, Shipping Corporation of NZ etc)

The Rainbow Warrior incident highlights a number of areas for me, that emphasize the need for effective Maritime Forces. It also emphasises that a blockade solely against NZ is not an impossibility. In the context of the ANZAC relationship a blockade against NZ is a realistic possibility in order to prevent or delay NZ assisting in the defence of Australia. These are remote possibilities, but given NZ does not operate in isolation from the rest of the world any blockade will more likely be in the context of wider Asia Pacific issues.

I suggest you reconsider your last comment about NZ ships carrying goods to sail by. NZ no longer has a merchant navy per say - that was destroyed via various means years ago. In the context of NZ - freight is exported via foreign flagged container ships, carrying freight from multiple countries, on a continuous world / regional circuit. For one shipping company that operates out of NZ all of our exports to Europe go via Singapore. Have a think about the strategic and operational implications of that for NZ and other exporting nations.

I would strongly suggest you heed NG friendly warning.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Prey tell, just who exactly do you think would want to target just NZ? Your straw man is absurd. You think NZ is going to offend some country so previously that they'd want to dispatch a fleet to NZ? Or to wait until a ship carrying NZ goods sails past and ignore all others?

NZ like Australia runs a version of its own combat capability scenarios - and those scenarios include unlikely players as well as rogue leaders who might ascend a friendly partner. Those vignettes even in extremis are run because stranger things have happened and that they can't be discounted.

Its smart and necessary forward planning. Its the kind of thing that gets pulled out at 0400 to give to the PM because something has gone arse up which we never in our wildest dreams thought would happen. The CCS also deal with friendlies who no longer decide to be friendly. or friendlies where a change of Govt can result in latent hostility to extant alliances and divergent foreign policy aspirations even though they may nominally still be allies.

 

[Zero Alpha]

It's time for you to dial back the arrogance and actually digest what people are saying. There are people here who are widely read very well informed on the subject(s). I would suggest rather strongly that you take this advice seriously.

Repeatedly telling people to listen to you without being able to persuade them why it's a good idea is the definition of arrogance.

When I say your argument is implausible, let me categorically state that I have heard a former Defence Minister say the idea was totally fanciful.

This forum has a thread on it somewhere telling people to stop talking about countries buying the F22 because it's been ruled out. Some of the arguments in this thread are similar.

 

[Zero Alpha]

NG statement is a statement of fact - blockades have been a standard method of exerting pressure on various nations. Nor does it take a fleet to institute an effective blockade. For example during WWII HMNZS Achilles was able to stop German merchant ships from sailing from ports up and down the West Coast of South America (I think - might have been East - Need to read the official history again) simply through her presence.

I don't disagree that blockages are effective. I disagree with the idea that somehow NZ would find itself in the sole position of needing to deal with a blockage.

In NZ more recent history; During the Rainbow Warrior incident the French operated a sub out of the one of their South Pacific bases. Had French political efforts being unsuccessful in influencing NZ though trade threats in Europe; think about the impact that sub would have had to NZ Shipping in terms of Insurance etc. - It would only have had to sink one vessel or have its presence announced to the world to have an impact on NZ economy. I would note back then NZ had a much larger merchant navy (Union Steamship Co, Shipping Corporation of NZ etc)

You're talking about an escalation from a deniable covert action to one involving direct use of conventional forces in a way that would loose all deniability. That's a seismic geopolitical shit. It would be like NZ inviting the Soviets in the Auckland to protect our port.

I suggest you reconsider your last comment about NZ ships carrying goods to sail by. NZ no longer has a merchant navy per say - that was destroyed via various means years ago. In the context of NZ - freight is exported via foreign flagged container ships, carrying freight from multiple countries, on a continuous world / regional circuit.

That's my point - it is impossible to discreetly target one country and improbable that only one country would choose to respond militarily. It's equally improbable that countries responding would only accept one type of military contribution to any coalition operation. Some contributions are clearly more valuable than others, but that doesn't mean the only acceptable policy response NZ could offer is an airborne ASW platform.