Stuart Mackey
New Member
Oh? and your evidence for this assertion?Sea Toby said:
How foolish of NZ to behave in a democratic manner!
I have no idea.
NZ hypothetical: Reconstitute strike role with surplus USN S3's
- Thread starter Supe
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Stuart Mackey
New Member
I agree with this. The problem is the underlying strategic foundation of Labour's defence policy, that we exist in a "benign strategic environment". Unfortunatly, I dont think that National is capable of formulating a coherant defence policy, let alone working out what kind of strategic environment we live in.Sea Toby said:
Stuart Mackey
New Member
AHhh..only in Australia's constituion....gf0012-aust said:well, its is enshrined in both of our countries constitutions that we allow each other to merge into the others Federation as a discrete state if carried by a referendum.
Can't see it happening though.
ah mate, come to the darrrk side....Stuart Mackey said:AHhh..only in Australia's constituion....
Stuart Mackey
New Member
I can think of 12 000 reasons not to mateygf0012-aust said:ah mate, come to the darrrk side....
Stuart Mackey
New Member
Sea Toby said:
So you have no evidence that NZ has prohibited its forces from training with the US? But you have shown that the US is not prepared to train with NZ. Well done.
You said:
So, thanks for proving my point.
Do Kiwis actually think its a great legend not to participate in the American Navy's largest exercise in the Pacific each year? Its not just the navy either, the New Zealand army and air force also suffers from missing American sponsored exercises too. One can argue until the cows come home over the politics, but being a non participant isn't a sound defense policy!
Reflecting back some 60+ years, neither the Australians or the New Zealanders had a good grip of American politics or policy until General Douglas MacArthur and his staff arrived. While General MacArthur may not have had a great tactical mind, strategically Prime Minister John Curtin was well served by his knowledge of the political and military establishment of Washington D.C.
The New Zealand anti-nuclear legislation reflects New Zealand's small picture thinking instead of the large world wide picture of American policy. Sometimes you can lose sight of a forest if you look at one tree. While it is easy to question American policy, the world wonders whether any New Zealand policy disagreements with the Five Party treaty members and with Australia itself would be as easily swept aside as the ANZUS relationship. And from past history, the answer is an obvious yes.
Despite its nuclear legislation, the peaceniks in control of New Zealand politics would probably approve of America giving North Korea another breeder nuclear reactor to avoid a war. Today the American public would rather fight a war now than cowardly give North Korea another breeder reactor. You'll notice that South Korea and Japan are of the same opinion.
Reflecting back some 60+ years, neither the Australians or the New Zealanders had a good grip of American politics or policy until General Douglas MacArthur and his staff arrived. While General MacArthur may not have had a great tactical mind, strategically Prime Minister John Curtin was well served by his knowledge of the political and military establishment of Washington D.C.
The New Zealand anti-nuclear legislation reflects New Zealand's small picture thinking instead of the large world wide picture of American policy. Sometimes you can lose sight of a forest if you look at one tree. While it is easy to question American policy, the world wonders whether any New Zealand policy disagreements with the Five Party treaty members and with Australia itself would be as easily swept aside as the ANZUS relationship. And from past history, the answer is an obvious yes.
Despite its nuclear legislation, the peaceniks in control of New Zealand politics would probably approve of America giving North Korea another breeder nuclear reactor to avoid a war. Today the American public would rather fight a war now than cowardly give North Korea another breeder reactor. You'll notice that South Korea and Japan are of the same opinion.
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Stuart Mackey
New Member
It is in fact a domestic policy that has foriegn implications. It is a policy that has the support of the population and the political parties that represent them. It is a democratic choice by a sovrerign nation. That we do not exersize with the forces of the United State of America is the choice of the United States of America. For there is no choice in New Zealand for this state of affairs, by legislation or by policy, despite your assertion that there is, that says we may not participate in any exercize with United States forces.Sea Toby said:
We learned many things about America at that time, lessons that we learned well, and I must say, you are reinforcing them nicely. But perhaps not the lessons that you think?
I would suggest to you that your veiw is that of yourself, that it is a genralisation without evidence. The veiw of NZ is that of our interests and our perspective of the world. Your attitude is one of the reasons for the nuclear legislation in the first place. Fact of the matter is that the veiws of the two nations are simply different, not wider or narrower.
I was not aware that you speak for the world. You make a gross genralisation, once again with out any evidence to sustain it.
And where is your evidence for this assertion? you seem to be very good at making unsubstantiated assertions, and I ask you to provide evidence to sustain this one, particuly given that you would need a crystal ball to divine the future actions of any government in circumstances that do not exist.
And that is Americas etc's choice, and it is a also a strawman argument: It has nothing to do with NZ forces exersizing with that of America's or not.
You have claimed that New Zealand forces do not wish to exersize with those of America, yet cannot provide evience for this. You have, when asked for evidence to support your statement, in fact provided nothing but redherrings and strawman arguments when history iself shows the evidence for all to see.
I must say that I am dissapointed, I expected better. But if you wish to debate on the merits of the anti nuclear legisaltion and New Zealand's, and America's, actions since its enaction and on that of world veiws then I would quote David Lange at the Oxford Union Debate
New Zealand took a veiw, democratically arrived at and democratically kept and held to this day, and we are punished for that choice by a nation that we counted as freind and ally. That NZ forces do not exersize with American forces is the action of America and America alone.David Lange said:
You are of course entitled to your opinion, but your demonstrated opinion here is a clear example of why we hold to our policy, for we will not be coerced, we will not be bullied for the sake of another nations interests.
Reminder:
Original Topic Title: NZ hypothetical: Reconstitute strike role with surplus USN S3's
It might pay for the current discussion on NZ-USA geopolitical relationships to be continued offline via PM's - its bearing little relationship to the thread title.
Back on track thanks gents...
GF0012Aust,
My questions are as follows:
1. Does NZ have a perceived MILITARY need to perform an extant or future mission in a way that supports the S-3 purchase?
2. Does another airframe support that need better than either the Viking or the P-3?
3. How often does NZ face a threat from other states or have alliance requirements that force it to support foreign partners?
4. Can the above conditions be met through a mercenary partnership plan with NZ's closest neighbor (prepositioned equipment to support Wedgetail and a detachment FOL of Hornets as we do with Iceland...)?
In Many Ways, NZ is indeed in a utopian position in that they are 'lee side of Oz and farside of South America' to the extent that no one can reach them.
That said, there will always be at least three NZ-unique conditions I can think of that might require a 'fighter like' performance capability:
A. CSAR.
Specifically the ability to use high definition, medium-low altitude sensors to find people and boats in the water.
2. ADIZ.
Airliners still go zombie. Smugglers still take the least defended route. Particularly where 'friendly assist' is as much a matter of course as hostile action, a long range, _jet speed_, patrol asset makes sense.
3. EEZ Patrol.
Fishing, Geo, Illegal Immigrants, Drugs. Again, the ranges are so bad and the weather occasionally _just awful_ (how many Cyclones this 'summer' for you folks?) that it makes sense to have a high speed Dumbo ability for humanitarian as much as militaristic reasons.
At the same time, I see the S-3 as more of a high-cost Predator than anything appropriate for longrange MPA work. Depending on it's altitude capabilities and compatibility with a strapon MAWS/DIRCM suite, I would _by far_ rather see it equipped with a Sniper Pod and a Gray Wolf (APG-76 or EL-2060) SAR capability plus broadband COMINT over AfG than some moron in an F-teen with all of 20-40 minutes in the combat area. Similarly, depending on how you gross out for loiter and density altitude after you restuff the innards, it seems likely to me that the Viking could do better as a X8 GBU-12 or X16 GBU-39 carrier than anything remotely related to 'fightering'.
It is too slow, too shortlegged and too aged (TF34's with that cast nickel steel core are the devils own to service or so I've been told).
Which is where I think that the real best-solution for the NZ'ers is likely going to be going in with Oz on a combined package deal (USN inventory-relief may help price too) on a P-8 MMA.
Because a 737 has the longrange, cruise-point Mach, and wingloading to act as both a 'QRA' asset for aircraft lost over the blue void. And as an external pylon missileer for hostile force engagement _if needed_ (missiles dogfight, planes don't, people die).
Indeed, if the aircraft had a baseline APG-79 or 80 in the nose, and AIM-160 MALI type weapons underwing, it would most likely match or exceed the capability of a Eurofighter, even with BVRAAM. Even a couple Alpha HMDS with ASRAAM underwing offers some potential against light aircraft and 'terrorist airliners'.
ARGUMENT:
If you rabid 'imperialist running dog' nationalist patriots want to sell something rocklike to a bunch of glass housers, _the way to do so_ is to make it seem like the platform can do things /other than/ explicitly conflict oriented military missions. On a day to day utility basis.
That you can then bid-up the overall capabilities of the system with add-ons after you've made your point (ENGINEER a PR opportunity 'rescue' for instance) should be a function of how well you act to contain the overall expenditure within budget.
Some options being: Does NZ's regional airline use or /need new/ 737s? Can you lumpsum logistics support under that program? Can you multi-rig a modular mission pallet so that instead of four specialist mission systems, you start out with two and add on? Can you include 'disaster monitoring' type options as either a flying ambulance or SAR platform and then lease out the good name of the RNZAF to the next Typhoon/Tsunami crisis? Can you retire 10 P-3's for 5 P-8's? Can you /sell on/ your Orions?
CONCLUSION:
THINK AHEAD. Don't make your woes sound like the LOMD penile envy of the rest of the military air-istocracy. Realize that, right or wrong, the Labourists are the folks you are going to have to work with for awhile. And that in turn means exploiting rather than confrontationally negating their POV.
KPl.
My questions are as follows:
1. Does NZ have a perceived MILITARY need to perform an extant or future mission in a way that supports the S-3 purchase?
2. Does another airframe support that need better than either the Viking or the P-3?
3. How often does NZ face a threat from other states or have alliance requirements that force it to support foreign partners?
4. Can the above conditions be met through a mercenary partnership plan with NZ's closest neighbor (prepositioned equipment to support Wedgetail and a detachment FOL of Hornets as we do with Iceland...)?
In Many Ways, NZ is indeed in a utopian position in that they are 'lee side of Oz and farside of South America' to the extent that no one can reach them.
That said, there will always be at least three NZ-unique conditions I can think of that might require a 'fighter like' performance capability:
A. CSAR.
Specifically the ability to use high definition, medium-low altitude sensors to find people and boats in the water.
2. ADIZ.
Airliners still go zombie. Smugglers still take the least defended route. Particularly where 'friendly assist' is as much a matter of course as hostile action, a long range, _jet speed_, patrol asset makes sense.
3. EEZ Patrol.
Fishing, Geo, Illegal Immigrants, Drugs. Again, the ranges are so bad and the weather occasionally _just awful_ (how many Cyclones this 'summer' for you folks?) that it makes sense to have a high speed Dumbo ability for humanitarian as much as militaristic reasons.
At the same time, I see the S-3 as more of a high-cost Predator than anything appropriate for longrange MPA work. Depending on it's altitude capabilities and compatibility with a strapon MAWS/DIRCM suite, I would _by far_ rather see it equipped with a Sniper Pod and a Gray Wolf (APG-76 or EL-2060) SAR capability plus broadband COMINT over AfG than some moron in an F-teen with all of 20-40 minutes in the combat area. Similarly, depending on how you gross out for loiter and density altitude after you restuff the innards, it seems likely to me that the Viking could do better as a X8 GBU-12 or X16 GBU-39 carrier than anything remotely related to 'fightering'.
It is too slow, too shortlegged and too aged (TF34's with that cast nickel steel core are the devils own to service or so I've been told).
Which is where I think that the real best-solution for the NZ'ers is likely going to be going in with Oz on a combined package deal (USN inventory-relief may help price too) on a P-8 MMA.
Because a 737 has the longrange, cruise-point Mach, and wingloading to act as both a 'QRA' asset for aircraft lost over the blue void. And as an external pylon missileer for hostile force engagement _if needed_ (missiles dogfight, planes don't, people die).
Indeed, if the aircraft had a baseline APG-79 or 80 in the nose, and AIM-160 MALI type weapons underwing, it would most likely match or exceed the capability of a Eurofighter, even with BVRAAM. Even a couple Alpha HMDS with ASRAAM underwing offers some potential against light aircraft and 'terrorist airliners'.
ARGUMENT:
If you rabid 'imperialist running dog' nationalist patriots want to sell something rocklike to a bunch of glass housers, _the way to do so_ is to make it seem like the platform can do things /other than/ explicitly conflict oriented military missions. On a day to day utility basis.
That you can then bid-up the overall capabilities of the system with add-ons after you've made your point (ENGINEER a PR opportunity 'rescue' for instance) should be a function of how well you act to contain the overall expenditure within budget.
Some options being: Does NZ's regional airline use or /need new/ 737s? Can you lumpsum logistics support under that program? Can you multi-rig a modular mission pallet so that instead of four specialist mission systems, you start out with two and add on? Can you include 'disaster monitoring' type options as either a flying ambulance or SAR platform and then lease out the good name of the RNZAF to the next Typhoon/Tsunami crisis? Can you retire 10 P-3's for 5 P-8's? Can you /sell on/ your Orions?
CONCLUSION:
THINK AHEAD. Don't make your woes sound like the LOMD penile envy of the rest of the military air-istocracy. Realize that, right or wrong, the Labourists are the folks you are going to have to work with for awhile. And that in turn means exploiting rather than confrontationally negating their POV.
KPl.
Are you asking me specifically? I deliberately haven't stated a platform position, so i think you might be responding to someone else.Kurt Plummer said:
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #53
Kurt. U.S is withdrawing most of its assets (all fighters) and personnel from Iceland.
I'm sure the RNZAF wishes it had 10 P-3's. It currently has 6 P-3K's. I'm not sure the U.S Govt would be amenable to NZ getting P-8's and given the current ideology running NZ defence, I don't think a P-8 is on the cards even if it were available. If the Kiwis upgrade their P3 fleet, I'll backtrack on that. I reckon a coastwatch scheme might be set up in future - and who knows NZ could piggyback on a 'Global Mariner' type UAV that ADF is looking at, as well as manned civillian aircraft.
I don't know. I don't like the idea of overly depending on a commercial outfit for defence related solutions. If I were a brass hat, one concern would be availability. Since you don't explicitly own the asset (sharing) you're subject to many outside factors. While robust agreements between airline/contractor and military could go some way to ensuring agreement and use of asset is flexible, its no match for having an asset at your complete disposal and keeping it all in-house.KPl said:
GF0012-aust,
Not specifically targeted at you, just the 'last in the list', trying to realign the conversation towards some alternative platforms and operational issues and away from Ami-strategic angst.
Supe,
Aw shucks. Along with flying cars, they have some /really/ pretty blondes...
I knew they deactivated the Black Knights but I thought we still had a detachment system going strong.
NATO will be an EU alliance with reversed Franco-U.S. 'observer' roles before 2012 at this rate.
>>
I'm sure the RNZAF wishes it had 10 P-3's. It currently has 6 P-3K's. I'm not sure the U.S Govt would be amenable to NZ getting P-8's and given the current ideology running NZ defence, I don't think a P-8 is on the cards even if it were available.
>>
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3126/is_200209/ai_n7785693
Conceptually there are a LOT of alternatives (Gulfstream and Challenger) which the U.S. has only limited control over. Our fiscal situation may also (sooner than most think) get so desperate that we sell anything and everything to everyone to lever the trade imbalance and international debt holder 'penalties' arising from the mess in the ME.
IMO, the key is to sell the radius and speed issues for 'real world' missions that include rescue and rescap escort missions significantly further over-water than an Orion could respond to. Or faster than it could comfortably keep up with.
You ditch in that water and you've got minutes if your jacketed and hours if your rafted. You 'get lost' and the ability to Phone Home for directions can be severely limited.
>>
If the Kiwis upgrade their P3 fleet, I'll backtrack on that. I reckon a coastwatch scheme might be set up in future - and who knows NZ could piggyback on a 'Global Mariner' type UAV that ADF is looking at, as well as manned civillian aircraft.
>>
The problem with anything in the HALE area and particularly the RQ-4 is that it is a 'national asset' classed U-2 replacement. While I am aware of at least two different attempts to get weapons on that platform, the sensitivity of the mission to 'intent vs. potential' aggression always kept it unarmed.
Maybe the EP-3E incident will change that. But I doubt it so long as the airframe's loiter and transit (nothing armed over X being a worldwide phenomena now) remain paramount and ABL with Upper Tier remain the preferred TBMD intercept options.
OTOH, MQ-9B just doesn't have the payload which is why it is being _paired with_ the P-8 for the BAMS effort. You throw radar pods and assorted other bilge on it and the 'fighter mission' is never going to happen.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...tinational-global-hawk-pacific-pool/index.php
>>
I don't know. I don't like the idea of overly depending on a commercial outfit for defence related solutions. If I were a brass hat, one concern would be availability.
>>
On-Ramp logistics can be shared or secure to service. It's the economies of scale I'm interested in for a _common not joint_ airframe standard that 'sets the pace' for the /next/ replacement cycle.
OTOH, if you are talking about Australian Coast Watch program, the very idea that they would use helicopters to cover the Torres Strait area bespeaks a lashup with a lot of 'political whimsy' (giftable contracts) involved.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...a-1b-australian-coastwatch-contract/index.php
One thing people /have to/ understand about drones is that, to conserve the value of the platform (total systems cost) without jeopardizing it or it's coverage, you _must_ have separation of mission betwixt endurant surveillance and response.
The latter can be as temporary or objective oriented as you like (within given minimums of payload:radius) but the former has weight and cost issues which carry across the board in terms of weather and threat vs. sensor footprint.
>>
Since you don't explicitly own the asset (sharing) you're subject to many outside factors. While robust agreements between airline/contractor and military could go some way to ensuring agreement and use of asset is flexible, its no match for having an asset at your complete disposal and keeping it all in-house.
>>
HSI/HCS, while it may sound all 'ergonomically humanist' is nothing more or less than an on-demand maintenance system similar to that which runs the airlines. While I don't necessarily by into HMO-for-MPA for a variety of reasons, the fact remains that the _commercial_ support activities are available to implement it, as they are for Airbus and others.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/p-8.htm
The civil aviation system dwarfing the military one at the MMH:FH and pipe management levels.
So long as the Armed Force in question is the sole-certifier and indeed has the right to maintain a man-in-shop observer mission, there should be no problem.
What is more significant is that some 250 P-3s are still in foreign service yet we are ourselves necking down from 196 to about 120 in anticipation of 108 P-8 replacements. When the U.S. inventory goes, all the maintenance will resource offshore and your costs will triple while your reliable delivery periods will be JIT-not doubled _because it is a milspec not commercial product_.
In short: Quit tying your lifeboat to the 3rd stack of the Titanic waiting for Carpathia. And at least /consider/ a program to make BAMS more than a PacRim effort to buy into RQ-4 as a picture taking force.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...tinational-global-hawk-pacific-pool/index.php
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...ralian-coastwatch-contract/index.phpHYPERLINK "http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-sen-australia.htm"
8,000 Fisheries Violations in 12 months is nothing to laugh about. And Oz can afford a much bigger buy than you can while they are already on the 737 for wedgetail and probably a light whale (if they're smart).
KPl.
Not specifically targeted at you, just the 'last in the list', trying to realign the conversation towards some alternative platforms and operational issues and away from Ami-strategic angst.
Supe,
Aw shucks. Along with flying cars, they have some /really/ pretty blondes...
I knew they deactivated the Black Knights but I thought we still had a detachment system going strong.
NATO will be an EU alliance with reversed Franco-U.S. 'observer' roles before 2012 at this rate.
>>
I'm sure the RNZAF wishes it had 10 P-3's. It currently has 6 P-3K's. I'm not sure the U.S Govt would be amenable to NZ getting P-8's and given the current ideology running NZ defence, I don't think a P-8 is on the cards even if it were available.
>>
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3126/is_200209/ai_n7785693
Conceptually there are a LOT of alternatives (Gulfstream and Challenger) which the U.S. has only limited control over. Our fiscal situation may also (sooner than most think) get so desperate that we sell anything and everything to everyone to lever the trade imbalance and international debt holder 'penalties' arising from the mess in the ME.
IMO, the key is to sell the radius and speed issues for 'real world' missions that include rescue and rescap escort missions significantly further over-water than an Orion could respond to. Or faster than it could comfortably keep up with.
You ditch in that water and you've got minutes if your jacketed and hours if your rafted. You 'get lost' and the ability to Phone Home for directions can be severely limited.
>>
If the Kiwis upgrade their P3 fleet, I'll backtrack on that. I reckon a coastwatch scheme might be set up in future - and who knows NZ could piggyback on a 'Global Mariner' type UAV that ADF is looking at, as well as manned civillian aircraft.
>>
The problem with anything in the HALE area and particularly the RQ-4 is that it is a 'national asset' classed U-2 replacement. While I am aware of at least two different attempts to get weapons on that platform, the sensitivity of the mission to 'intent vs. potential' aggression always kept it unarmed.
Maybe the EP-3E incident will change that. But I doubt it so long as the airframe's loiter and transit (nothing armed over X being a worldwide phenomena now) remain paramount and ABL with Upper Tier remain the preferred TBMD intercept options.
OTOH, MQ-9B just doesn't have the payload which is why it is being _paired with_ the P-8 for the BAMS effort. You throw radar pods and assorted other bilge on it and the 'fighter mission' is never going to happen.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...tinational-global-hawk-pacific-pool/index.php
>>
I don't know. I don't like the idea of overly depending on a commercial outfit for defence related solutions. If I were a brass hat, one concern would be availability.
>>
On-Ramp logistics can be shared or secure to service. It's the economies of scale I'm interested in for a _common not joint_ airframe standard that 'sets the pace' for the /next/ replacement cycle.
OTOH, if you are talking about Australian Coast Watch program, the very idea that they would use helicopters to cover the Torres Strait area bespeaks a lashup with a lot of 'political whimsy' (giftable contracts) involved.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...a-1b-australian-coastwatch-contract/index.php
One thing people /have to/ understand about drones is that, to conserve the value of the platform (total systems cost) without jeopardizing it or it's coverage, you _must_ have separation of mission betwixt endurant surveillance and response.
The latter can be as temporary or objective oriented as you like (within given minimums of payload:radius) but the former has weight and cost issues which carry across the board in terms of weather and threat vs. sensor footprint.
>>
Since you don't explicitly own the asset (sharing) you're subject to many outside factors. While robust agreements between airline/contractor and military could go some way to ensuring agreement and use of asset is flexible, its no match for having an asset at your complete disposal and keeping it all in-house.
>>
HSI/HCS, while it may sound all 'ergonomically humanist' is nothing more or less than an on-demand maintenance system similar to that which runs the airlines. While I don't necessarily by into HMO-for-MPA for a variety of reasons, the fact remains that the _commercial_ support activities are available to implement it, as they are for Airbus and others.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/p-8.htm
The civil aviation system dwarfing the military one at the MMH:FH and pipe management levels.
So long as the Armed Force in question is the sole-certifier and indeed has the right to maintain a man-in-shop observer mission, there should be no problem.
What is more significant is that some 250 P-3s are still in foreign service yet we are ourselves necking down from 196 to about 120 in anticipation of 108 P-8 replacements. When the U.S. inventory goes, all the maintenance will resource offshore and your costs will triple while your reliable delivery periods will be JIT-not doubled _because it is a milspec not commercial product_.
In short: Quit tying your lifeboat to the 3rd stack of the Titanic waiting for Carpathia. And at least /consider/ a program to make BAMS more than a PacRim effort to buy into RQ-4 as a picture taking force.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...tinational-global-hawk-pacific-pool/index.php
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com...ralian-coastwatch-contract/index.phpHYPERLINK "http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-sen-australia.htm"
8,000 Fisheries Violations in 12 months is nothing to laugh about. And Oz can afford a much bigger buy than you can while they are already on the 737 for wedgetail and probably a light whale (if they're smart).
KPl.
Stuart Mackey
New Member
Our P3's are being upgraded with new 'mission systems' new radar and avionics etc. Nothing is being done to upgrade the anti-sub capability but they are supposed to get Harpoon in the future. The airframes are also being extensivly overhauled to give another 15-20 years of life, iirc.Supe said:
P8 would be nice, but not for a while yet.
*snip remainder*
It is worth noting that with a huge overall increase in onboard processing power, the chances of finding a submarine with the existing sensors will probably increase significantly. The ISAR radar will provide an order of magnitude improvement in finding submarines at periscope/snorkel too.Stuart Mackey said:
It's hard to see a scanario where NZ would be operating indepdently that submarines could constitute a threat. Having a limited anti-submarine capability is sensible, but not at the expense of more frequently used systems. Survaillance and C3 capabilities are the areas likley to be of most use for the RNZAF.
The American navy had plans to improve 200 P-3 Orion aircraft during this decade, but only 50 or so were funded by Congress. While the Orion has larger range, in a typical mission the Boeing 737-700 can match their endurance. With pressure from Boeing for the Congress to purchase the P-8, along with lesser operational and maintenance costs, Congress would rather fund acquiring new P-8s rather than fund updating older P-3s. When its all said and done, the US Navy will drop to around 100 P-8s from over 200 P-3s. While the American numbers will be dropping significantly, many of the older P-3s, especially those recently upgraded, will be offered abroad to nations that don't operate this type of aircraft presently.
Looking into my crystal ball, it appears that a good time for New Zealand and Australia to purchase new Boeing P-8s will be in the 2015-20 time frame. By this time, the American navy will have tested their new aircraft significantly, eliminating any problems. This time, New Zealand should purchase in the same buy as the Australians, at least within the option window. Maybe a cheaper version, possibly with some sensors dropped, but a similar aircraft.
Its my opinion that the P-3 Orion in twenty years will be fire fighting planes.
Looking into my crystal ball, it appears that a good time for New Zealand and Australia to purchase new Boeing P-8s will be in the 2015-20 time frame. By this time, the American navy will have tested their new aircraft significantly, eliminating any problems. This time, New Zealand should purchase in the same buy as the Australians, at least within the option window. Maybe a cheaper version, possibly with some sensors dropped, but a similar aircraft.
Its my opinion that the P-3 Orion in twenty years will be fire fighting planes.
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Is the system being installed the same one as the ditched Project Siruis, but without the ASW capability?Rocco_NZ said:
It depends what you define as limited. 1960's vintage ASW equipment is not limited, its dumb when you consider the advances in Submarines over the last 40 years. I agree that NZ does not need a full ASW outfit on its P-3's but I would suggest that a limited ASW capability, is one where certain elements are deleted, my preference is for the MAD, while the rest of the system is maintained upto date.
I know Auntie Helen doesn't think submerged Submarines pose a threat to NZ but I disagree. I consider that a single submarine in a mine laying role or blockade / anti shipping role poses a serious threat to the economy. I'll happily acknowledge there is no apparent threat but it suggests that NZ must be capable of acting independently in a sub surface threat environment.
For that matter we could extend that to the need for an air combat force, 4 Frigates. I see these as essential in order to ensure New Zealand can act independently in its own interests. The current force structure makes NZ dependent on overseas countries for much of its defence.
When I look at the inventory of the New Zealand navy, its appears to be one frigate short. However, if the decision has been made to acquire frigates in twos, 15 years apart to avoid block obsolescence, then its two frigates short. One of the older frigates can do the training ship role better, freeing the MRV from that role.
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