New Zealand Army

[Stampede]

We do have attrition reserves, we just dont need 30 more of them. Out of a total of 73 each of the 2 squadrons has @20 hulls along with a HQ element, and a few with guns and combat school. You do the math.

This is going around in circles. Deals done, not by you, not by me, by some people in the know, military included. 8 more to go even.

Comparing us to the US now???

The people in the know are juggling the deck chairs on the contracting NZ ship of defence.
Soon 73 will be too many because you will only have one Sqn which operates only on Wednesday during day light hours with fair winds while having just passed the hat around to purchase enough fuel to drive down to the range and back.

A generation ago I was lucky enough to do an exercise in NZ where we were ferried around in tracked APC's supported by Scorpions attacked by Skyhawks and Strikemasters with the knowledge NZ had more than two frigates off shore.
Different era and today they are dated platforms but its about options.

40 years ago NZ had a greater range of capabilities and had the numbers to back it up.
It was still a small defence force back in the 80's, but it is an even smaller one today trying to navigate in a world that is unfortunately much more contested and unstable.


Selling off some NZLAV's for bugger all return suggest a lot more about the state of play with NZ defence than just the platforms themselves.


Cheers S


.

 

[ngatimozart]

It was a major loss; one which could not have been replaced in the short term but I would argue it didn't break their back. From Nipe's ''Blood, Steel And Myth : The 2nd SS Panzer Korps And The Road To Prochorowka'' we know that German tank losses weren't catastrophic and that quite a number of damaged vehicles were returned to action. What IMO was more impactful for the Germans in terms of losing the initiative and material was the loss of Army Group Centre the following year.

The loss of Army Group Centre in the summer of 1944 must have been part of the Soviet's OP BAGRATION. It was a tremendous operation and started not long after OP OVERLORD in Normandy, France on 6th June 1944. The Wehrmacht were caught between two vices and couldn't really transfer forces from one front to the other because as BAGRATION got going the western Allies began breaking out of Normandy and encircled then destroyed the equivalent of probably 2 - 3 Corp in the Falaise Gap. Then Patton and his 3rd US went walkabout across France and Belgium pushing all before them.

@Stampede Well the way the price fuel is here at the moment, they may have to take a mortgage out on the Beehive and the Treasury to fill the spare jerrycan on the Brigadier's Mini Moke.

 

[RegR]

The people in the know are juggling the deck chairs on the contracting NZ ship of defence.
Soon 73 will be too many because you will only have one Sqn which operates only on Wednesday during day light hours with fair winds while having just passed the hat around to purchase enough fuel to drive down to the range and back.

A generation ago I was lucky enough to do an exercise in NZ where we were ferried around in tracked APC's supported by Scorpions attacked by Skyhawks and Strikemasters with the knowledge NZ had more than two frigates off shore.
Different era and today they are dated platforms but its about options.

40 years ago NZ had a greater range of capabilities and had the numbers to back it up.
It was still a small defence force back in the 80's, but it is an even smaller one today trying to navigate in a world that is unfortunately much more contested and unstable.


Selling off some NZLAV's for bugger all return suggest a lot more about the state of play with NZ defence than just the platforms themselves.


Cheers S


.

Numbers to back it up? Ironically we had @70 M113s back then as well including mortar carriers so looks as though we have gone full circle. So with this smaller army I guess you could be correct then, perhaps 73 is too many...

 

[Stuart M]

It was a major loss; one which could not have been replaced in the short term but I would argue it didn't break their back. From Nipe's ''Blood, Steel And Myth : The 2nd SS Panzer Korps And The Road To Prochorowka'' we know that German tank losses weren't catastrophic and that quite a number of damaged vehicles were returned to action. What IMO was more impactful for the Germans in terms of losing the initiative and material was the loss of Army Group Centre the following year.

I would argue that it it did, the realisation that despite the Soviets massive losses, they would keep coming and the German army could not stop them. Certainly I think the Germans losses in both men and material, even if temporary in some cases, were to Germany what Midway was to to the IJN.

The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front ... Needless to say the [Soviets] exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative

Bergström (2007). Kursk — The Air Battle: July 1943

Guderians comments on losses and recoverable vehicles are also interesting, but when in retreat, things just got worse. I think now such endeavours would be more problematic, weapons are so much more capable than then.


Bagration, important though it was, was ultimately a footnote to the Germans failure with Citidal or any other place they chose to fight or not fight. Would Army Group Centre have been not done in if the Germans had not chosen the Kursk salient for an attack? Captain Hindsight suggests not fighting Kursk just delays the inevitable of course, the Germans were done regardless after Kursk, but it makes for an interesting counterfactual I guess. Nevertheless, when in such a war you permanently lose the initiative, your back is broken.. the rest is mere messy detail and a grubby suicide in a Berlin bunker.

 

[ngatimozart]

I would argue that it it did, the realisation that despite the Soviets massive losses, they would keep coming and the German army could not stop them. Certainly I think the Germans losses in both men and material, even if temporary in some cases, were to Germany what Midway was to to the IJN.


Bergström (2007). Kursk — The Air Battle: July 1943

Guderians comments on losses and recoverable vehicles are also interesting, but when in retreat, things just got worse. I think now such endeavours would be more problematic, weapons are so much more capable than then.


Bagration, important though it was, was ultimately a footnote to the Germans failure with Citidal or any other place they chose to fight or not fight. Would Army Group Centre have been not done in if the Germans had not chosen the Kursk salient for an attack? Captain Hindsight suggests not fighting Kursk just delays the inevitable of course, the Germans were done regardless after Kursk, but it makes for an interesting counterfactual I guess. Nevertheless, when in such a war you permanently lose the initiative, your back is broken.. the rest is mere messy detail and a grubby suicide in a Berlin bunker.

Captain Hindsight suggests that going after Stalingrad was the big mistake. It was a fools errand and it illustrates what happens when former Corporals get visions of grandeur and are let loose on society. Piggy Muldoon (former NZ PM) was another former Corporal too. Mind you Corporals can read maps and use compasses, unlike officers.

 

[STURM]

were to Germany what Midway was to to the IJN.

Midway was a major disaster but what really bleed the IJN were the attritional losses in air crew during the Solomon islands campaign.

Captain Hindsight suggests that going after Stalingrad was the big mistake.

It can be argued that the decision to have 2 main points of effort [something contrary to doctrine] was the major mistake; not the decision to go for Stalingrad per see. The Germans not only had to support a thrust along the bend of the Volga but also one into the Caucasus.

Overall; the decision to focus on the south; Operation Blau; was driven by economic and other imperatives; the need; the need for wheat; coal and oil.

 

[Rob c]

Numbers to back it up? Ironically we had @70 M113s back then as well including mortar carriers so looks as though we have gone full circle. So with this smaller army I guess you could be correct then, perhaps 73 is too many...

The point that I think Stampede was trying to make, was not about the numbers of M113's or other equipment that we had , but about the capabilities that we had at that time, Many which we don't have today. Lost capabilities which we had and lost may have struggled to get viable war capable equipment, but they meant that we had the know how to operate that type of equipment and this could be upgraded in the future. It takes a long time to re-establish a lost capability, far longer than most people think and a lot longer than it takes to get the equipment. For instance the RNZAF calculated that to restore a strike wing to the SAME CAPABILITY as they had with the previous Strike wing would take 15 years. I have no doubt that to give the army a tracked fire support agility would also take a long time. It is not just a matter of getting the gear and training some one to operate and maintain it. The problem is the building of an experienced command , control and maintenance structure so that it can be operated effectively and that takes time.
Of all our services the Navy has probably lost the least number of capabilities in the last 30 years, even though the numbers in each capability are poor. The Army would be next and the Air force have lost most of their combat ability. the rebuilding of these capabilities, most of which we need if we are serious about our freedom will take a long time and a lot of money. I would think that any money saved when these capabilities were deleted will be a fraction of the cost of re-establishment.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

The point that I think Stampede was trying to make, was not about the numbers of M113's or other equipment that we had , but about the capabilities that we had at that time, Many which we don't have today. Lost capabilities which we had and lost may have struggled to get viable war capable equipment, but they meant that we had the know how to operate that type of equipment and this could be upgraded in the future. It takes a long time to re-establish a lost capability, far longer than most people think and a lot longer than it takes to get the equipment. For instance the RNZAF calculated that to restore a strike wing to the SAME CAPABILITY as they had with the previous Strike wing would take 15 years. I have no doubt that to give the army a tracked fire support agility would also take a long time. It is not just a matter of getting the gear and training some one to operate and maintain it. The problem is the building of an experienced command , control and maintenance structure so that it can be operated effectively and that takes time.
Of all our services the Navy has probably lost the least number of capabilities in the last 30 years, even though the numbers in each capability are poor. The Army would be next and the Air force have lost most of their combat ability. the rebuilding of these capabilities, most of which we need if we are serious about our freedom will take a long time and a lot of money. I would think that any money saved when these capabilities were deleted will be a fraction of the cost of re-establishment.

Wasn't part of the issue with the Lav also that they were all of one type? No ambulance, mortar carrier or other variants that could of been purchased.

Also I'd question how a 20 plus ton vehicle like the lav would do I deployed in the pacific it's not going to be having well kept roads available all the time.

Seen plenty of rubbish ones I wouldnt drive a car on even in Fiji and Vanuatu while on holiday.

Some of these countries wouldnt have the money to spend on them. A better armoured vehicle like a Boxer with more firepower?

Say 35 tons of armour with a 30mm auto cannon ?

Where would we operate this in the pacific? Would they be able to be deployed off our sole Sealift HMNZS Canterbury to shore?

 

[RegR]

The point that I think Stampede was trying to make, was not about the numbers of M113's or other equipment that we had , but about the capabilities that we had at that time, Many which we don't have today. Lost capabilities which we had and lost may have struggled to get viable war capable equipment, but they meant that we had the know how to operate that type of equipment and this could be upgraded in the future. It takes a long time to re-establish a lost capability, far longer than most people think and a lot longer than it takes to get the equipment. For instance the RNZAF calculated that to restore a strike wing to the SAME CAPABILITY as they had with the previous Strike wing would take 15 years. I have no doubt that to give the army a tracked fire support agility would also take a long time. It is not just a matter of getting the gear and training some one to operate and maintain it. The problem is the building of an experienced command , control and maintenance structure so that it can be operated effectively and that takes time.
Of all our services the Navy has probably lost the least number of capabilities in the last 30 years, even though the numbers in each capability are poor. The Army would be next and the Air force have lost most of their combat ability. the rebuilding of these capabilities, most of which we need if we are serious about our freedom will take a long time and a lot of money. I would think that any money saved when these capabilities were deleted will be a fraction of the cost of re-establishment.

The scorpions were clunkers and literally death traps and the M113s were under armoured, under powered and well past their use by date. The fact all NZLAV have 25mm cannon was the happy compromise and combination of the FSV and APC into the IMV variant, arguably improving our overall fire support immensely along with the optics, sensors, NBC upgrades otherwise we would have only opted to replace a portion with 25mm (to "replace" the scorps) and the rest could have been the far simpler turretless versions with far simpler weapon systems like .50 cals.(to replace the M113s) as the turret is what actually makes for the training and maintenance demands with NZLAV. Point being we actually improved on both armoured fleets greatly and those separate capabilities remain, just now in a singular more modern and technologically improved platform.

As for the "re-establishment" of a strike wing well I reckon I have just as much chance of winning the $10m lotto draw this week and having the winnings delivered by JA herself than that ever happening, sad but true. TBH I'm over the whole ACF fantasy anyway and the Ukraine crisis has only strengthened my belief in decent modern missile systems AA, AT and AS (and in decent numbers) along with high tech drones to create havoc and keep any enemy on their toes. IMO a much more realistic and affordable deterrent for would be invader in our current climate (pun intended). Failing that perfecting our propaganda game at least...

 

[Stuart M]

Midway was a major disaster but what really bleed the IJN were the attritional losses in air crew during the Solomon islands campaign.

Haemorrhage and ulcer really, but I've always thought their decline in pilot training and lack of substantial improvement in their aircraft was their real problem. Midway cost them their potential for offensive flexibility in a naval war, in any event Yammamoto was still right on war with the US.

 

[Stampede]

Numbers to back it up? Ironically we had @70 M113s back then as well including mortar carriers so looks as though we have gone full circle. So with this smaller army I guess you could be correct then, perhaps 73 is too many...

Over 100 APC plus 26 Scorpions = Commitment.
Firesales for negligible financial gain does not.

Lets agree to disagree

Cheers S

 

[Redlands18]

Captain Hindsight suggests that going after Stalingrad was the big mistake. It was a fools errand and it illustrates what happens when former Corporals get visions of grandeur and are let loose on society. Piggy Muldoon (former NZ PM) was another former Corporal too. Mind you Corporals can read maps and use compasses, unlike officers.

Hitler was the Allies best General in WW2.

 

[recce.k1]

The scorpions were clunkers and literally death traps and the M113s were under armoured, under powered and well past their use by date. The fact all NZLAV have 25mm cannon was the happy compromise and combination of the FSV and APC into the IMV variant, arguably improving our overall fire support immensely along with the optics, sensors, NBC upgrades otherwise we would have only opted to replace a portion with 25mm (to "replace" the scorps) and the rest could have been the far simpler turretless versions with far simpler weapon systems like .50 cals.(to replace the M113s) as the turret is what actually makes for the training and maintenance demands with NZLAV. Point being we actually improved on both armoured fleets greatly and those separate capabilities remain, just now in a singular more modern and technologically improved platform.

You make some great points there Reg, and some good food for thought.

What exactly was or is the issue with the LAV turret in terms of training and maintenance, and how could such issues be resolved?

 

[Gooey]

As for the "re-establishment" of a strike wing well I reckon I have just as much chance of winning the $10m lotto draw this week and having the winnings delivered by JA herself than that ever happening, sad but true. TBH I'm over the whole ACF fantasy anyway and the Ukraine crisis has only strengthened my belief in decent modern missile systems AA, AT and AS (and in decent numbers) along with high tech drones to create havoc and keep any enemy on their toes. IMO a much more realistic and affordable deterrent for would be invader in our current climate (pun intended). Failing that perfecting our propaganda game at least...

Okay Reg, I'll bite.

Agree with your first bit, for this week anyway.

In your opinion about a maritime nation having a land centric defence force (ala Ukraine) instead of an ACF, I highlight a few points:
i) a balanced Joint force, would be better to have, including the back-stabbing NZ Army with decent numbers of kit as well as a war-fighting navy and airforce
ii) an ACF gives your huge firepower, speed of maneuver, and mission flexibility; this is why air forces are independent 'forces' and not just brown-jobs flying stuff around like a truck
iii) an array of AA, AT, and AS missile is there waiting for things to happen; they are defencive in nature and gives the enemy a vote in where, when, and how; not the thing to rely on in winning a maritime centric war; again, a balanced force is, of course, better with the suitable equipment across the services
iv) an ACF allows you to fight away from your home-plate, as part of a coalition, avoiding the need to fight on the beaches and destroy Auckland etc
v) UAS are $hit in a contested environment; they devinately have theplace in ISR and limited CAS, but like helo gunships have significant limitations and costs

I hear your thoughts on LAV numbers and now more kit ala Ukraine, but for NZ in a maritime environment, if we ever pull our finger and stop being bludgers off our Oz mates, we should be concentrating on air and sea war fighting.

Unless, you are independently briefing policians about how the UN mission is the center of a liberal democracies defence capabilities with pretty blue helmets in armour. Sorry for gratuitous service banter but Army deserves it.

Cheers

 

[RegR]

Over 100 APC plus 26 Scorpions = Commitment.
Firesales for negligible financial gain does not.

Lets agree to disagree

Cheers S

Really? I know we bought 66 M113s in 3 batches between 1970-72 and scored another 6 off Australia in the 80s so where did the rest come from? 48 were sold for scrap on retirement, the museum has 14 and there are at least a couple range targets so then who has the other @25 or so hulls? Are they parked in the warehouse with the 30 LAVs??

 

[RegR]

You make some great points there Reg, and some good food for thought.

What exactly was or is the issue with the LAV turret in terms of training and maintenance, and how could such issues be resolved?

No issue, they are just obviously alot more technical in nature than the old t50 turrets, 25mm cannon vs .50 HMG, optics vs sights etc. I have a mate who's pretty much fulltime job was to maintain the turrets alone, you need a minimum C4 licence so had to have your 22 DDP just to drive, gunners course, crew commander qual, it's not a case of just jump in and off you go like a hiace van all with the running costs to match. These are most probably the highest specced vehicles in the NZDF.

 

[RegR]

Okay Reg, I'll bite.

Agree with your first bit, for this week anyway.

In your opinion about a maritime nation having a land centric defence force (ala Ukraine) instead of an ACF, I highlight a few points:
i) a balanced Joint force, would be better to have, including the back-stabbing NZ Army with decent numbers of kit as well as a war-fighting navy and airforce
ii) an ACF gives your huge firepower, speed of maneuver, and mission flexibility; this is why air forces are independent 'forces' and not just brown-jobs flying stuff around like a truck
iii) an array of AA, AT, and AS missile is there waiting for things to happen; they are defencive in nature and gives the enemy a vote in where, when, and how; not the thing to rely on in winning a maritime centric war; again, a balanced force is, of course, better with the suitable equipment across the services
iv) an ACF allows you to fight away from your home-plate, as part of a coalition, avoiding the need to fight on the beaches and destroy Auckland etc
v) UAS are $hit in a contested environment; they devinately have theplace in ISR and limited CAS, but like helo gunships have significant limitations and costs

I hear your thoughts on LAV numbers and now more kit ala Ukraine, but for NZ in a maritime environment, if we ever pull our finger and stop being bludgers off our Oz mates, we should be concentrating on air and sea war fighting.

Unless, you are independently briefing policians about how the UN mission is the center of a liberal democracies defence capabilities with pretty blue helmets in armour. Sorry for gratuitous service banter but Army deserves it.

Cheers

Before you throw your toys dont get me wrong I would love an ACF, I served in the RNZAF as well as the army, I was even in when we had all that old kit (pun intended)....I'm not hear to argue what we should or shouldn't have I'm more interested in what we actually have or are likely to get and I'm just being honest, I dont think we are getting an ACF and I would actually think if you were serious with yourselves you would know that as well? I'm just not really that big on fantasy fleets based on what if scenarios stemming from perceived global threats. For example I personally see no reason at all that anyone would invade NZ, including China, which seems to be the flavour of the month, and especially not Russia, which tends to be the other. We are not a "Ukraine" in either status, position or location (either down here or all the way up there) and I just think if any country has the means then there are any number of more lucrative, strategic and beneficial target country's out there, I even believe Australia would be "invaded" before us and if anything we would go there to fight before here. But that's just me.

Russia, the superpower, has shown quite graphically that even invading your land sharing neighbour is not as easy as it once was and all this talk of rolling across Europe (never mind the pacific) is not just a simple flex of the muscle. But again just my view.

To me even having a $bn ACF is rather pointless if our govt (any govt) wont A. Fund it accordingly ie upgrades and top of the line defensive/offensive packages, numbers, support etc (the fact we ditched it so easily proves that) and B. Commit it to anything in the first place ie would we even send jets to bomb designated targets (our mild mannered foreign policy would rather not upset anyone directly, enemies included), so without a radical (RADICAL) shift in political stance would, again, provide no real teeth anyway. I mean we can be the best at all the excersises we want but when push comes to shove, they are just excersises and you dont get much more combat orientated than a fully bombed up fighter jet.

As for defending NZ from "any threat" the thing is seriously what would a single squadron that's not on QRF routinely and pretty much shuts down for the weekend going to do? Either not do it (most likely) or burn out trying maintain 2 or even a single in constant readiness anyway as the way I see it unless "Chinas" gonna give us a heads up before they come knocking then somehow I feel we would just carry as before, as in the entire ACFs in 75 sqn hangar, the whole navy is tied up at Devonport wharf and the 30 LAV are warehouse 3. Seriously a section of their elite could cripple or DF in a weekend never mind 3 well placed cruise missiles. We are just not geared to that way of thinking, we were literally joking about it over a few ANZAC beers about how back in the day you could just flash a piece of cheese at the guard but and they would wave you through or how you could just jump the back fence into camp, it's a euphemism for NZ in general. Even Ukraine was still shocked when Russia actually invaded crossed the border and the writing was on the wall well before that, imagine how we would fair honestly? 4-6 jets were taken out on the ground in the first day and seemingly Russia hasnt actually really had a gameplan in all this so imagine how little old NZ would handle the situation if/when/how it arose? I'm literally just saying a whole gang of mobile missiles, drones seem to be doing the damage more than an aging, underfunded, un-assuming ACF (sound familiar) would regardless of how amazing our pilots were/would be and at a fraction of the cost, which is something I factor in considering our govts track record (which nothing has led me to think otherwise), just being realistic under the circumstances. As an example, we dont have missiles or drones either, literally....

You can preach to me all you want about the benefits of a well funded modern military C/W jets, frigates, tanks etc etc but I'm not the one holding the bag, I'm just looking in it, and it's pretty empty. Best I can do is a few bushmasters, a few new C130s/P8s (with great optics, but again, limited offensive/defensive weaponry) to placate joe public.

I get it, we are in need of some serious upgrades, we are just not geared or thinking that way and even when we do the costs/excuses get in the way of progress, and this is all despite what you, me or anyone says on here or how good of a case/scenario/theory you present. I'm not the one you need to convince, I'm just not seeing it happening bar some kind of miracle in the beehive and on the streets.

 

[recce.k1]

No issue, they are just obviously alot more technical in nature than the old t50 turrets, 25mm cannon vs .50 HMG, optics vs sights etc. I have a mate who's pretty much fulltime job was to maintain the turrets alone, you need a minimum C4 licence so had to have your 22 DDP just to drive, gunners course, crew commander qual, it's not a case of just jump in and off you go like a hiace van all with the running costs to match. These are most probably the highest specced vehicles in the NZDF.

Thanks, that nicely and precisely explains the situation.

So ideally we need more maintainers ...

That just happens to have all those qualifications, and I accept that's not as easy as it sounds (question: if retainment is an issue, does their pay reflect these skillsets? Would higher pay cause unintended consequences or distortions for other trades/roles etc)?

Could there be an acceptable compromise (to having all these qualifications)? Or not, as that is the ABCA standard etc?

(Asking as how does this compare to for example Navy & Air Force weapons maintainers - they don't have to learn to "command" their particular assets in question etc)?

Is there a place to have any or some of the maintenance contracted out (eg back to General Dynamics etc (letting maintainer qualifications to become their issue to keep current) in the form of presumably experienced ex-Army maintainers anyway)?

Perhaps as a safeguard with the requirement for NZDF to also have their own Army maintainers for active deployments (otherwise working alongside the contractors at Army bases etc? Could also be a pathway for those Army personnel wanting to get out away, after doing their service (and starting families etc), or when retiring?

(I think we've learnt that outsourcing everything can cause major issues so simply suggesting a mixed approach).

 

[RegR]

Thanks, that nicely and precisely explains the situation.

So ideally we need more maintainers ...

That just happens to have all those qualifications, and I accept that's not as easy as it sounds (question: if retainment is an issue, does their pay reflect these skillsets? Would higher pay cause unintended consequences or distortions for other trades/roles etc)?

Could there be an acceptable compromise (to having all these qualifications)? Or not, as that is the ABCA standard etc?

(Asking as how does this compare to for example Navy & Air Force weapons maintainers - they don't have to learn to "command" their particular assets in question etc)?

Is there a place to have any or some of the maintenance contracted out (back to General Dynamics etc, letting maintainer qualifications to become their issue to keep current ... in form of presumably ex-Army maintainers anyway)?

Perhaps as a safeguard with the requirement for NZDF to also have their own Army maintainers for active deployments (otherwise working alongside the contractors at Army bases etc? Could also be a pathway for those Army personnel wanting to get out away, after doing their service (and starting families etc), or when retiring?

(I think we've learnt that outsourcing everything can cause major issues so simply suggesting a mixed approach).

Yes they have both military and civilian maintainers, trainers, mechanics etc and yes alot of the civis are ex regular force so easy transition and already speak the speak, so to speak.

It's not that they're short, well actually some trades are but that's besides the point, it's just that like anything technical it requires more attention, has more moving (and therefore breakable/usable) parts so requires more intensive and ongoing training in terms operation, maintainence and repair. like alot of military kit it serves a distinct purpose with some direct outcomes so needs to be used professionally, safely and generally as part of a bigger network to be effective. Simply put its not just a simple process and there are some checks and balances to become/stay proficient, hence all the courses, ongoing training, excersises etc but again that applies to alot of high tech military grade kit. Can be alittle dangerous otherwise...

 

[Rob c]

The scorpions were clunkers and literally death traps and the M113s were under armoured, under powered and well past their use by date.

Again you have completely missed the point, yes I would agree with you that they were well past their use by date. but they represented a capability that could be improved on with the man power still in touch and experienced in tracked armoured warfare including tracked fire support. As I have pointed out before you need to have experience leadership in place to make a capability successful including experienced maintenance personnel and leadership

As for defending NZ from "any threat" the thing is seriously what would a single squadron that's not on QRF routinely and pretty much shuts down for the weekend going to do?

As I have pointed out before, we are outside of the combat radius of any strike aircraft from any land base. That means that any threat that wants to come to NZ has to either cover their approach with an aircraft carrier or continue on into an area were we have air superiority and given the right weapons load this could be a great deterrent, Your comments regarding weekends , while this was true during normal operations, during exercises and practices we worked to 24/7 cycle and did this for several weeks at a time. The problem regarding warning could be covered by good surveillance and intelligence. Being a member of 5 eyes it would be very unlikely that we would not have significant warning. The big thing an ACF brings to the table is deterrence and mobility and the deterence is what we want as you don't ant to have to fight a war if you can deter aggression.
On the matter of invasion. I believe that should an invasion to Australia occur an invader would want to take us out at the same time, as by doing that the make it very hard for the US to send help to the Australian east coast especially if they are operating in the Solomons.
A capability is not just a matter of training people to operate equipment, It is the whole ethos and experience to use the capability in the correct tactical manner that the leadership has to gain experience in and this does not happen quickly . it takes years and decades are even better
On the question of what are the correct numbers of gear to have, I think that the only thing you can have too much of is enemies and people who say it can't be done. It is easy to pick holes in idea's but harder to come up with the ideal.