Nato in Afghanistan -'European nations must not turn 'coward.'

[USNavySEAL3310]

Directly at the MLR? I doubt it. The RPG threat is too great to drop in at the front of the attack and I doubt it's something they'd want to risk.

No reason to risk further casualties establishing control over a battlefield of no relevance. To pursue can easily be the road to diminishing returns.

Every battlefield is relevant in Afghanistan. Any area we can deny the transportation of supplies or troops is an area worth taking.

The British force did well. They retreated when a strong counterattack was beginning.

What went wrong? Did British intel expect a lot less resistence or did the Taliban expect the British and dig in?

 

[Grand Danois]

Directly at the MLR? I doubt it. The RPG threat is too great to drop in at the front of the attack and I doubt it's something they'd want to risk.



Every battlefield is relevant in Afghanistan. Any area we can deny the transportation of supplies or troops is an area worth taking.

The British force did well. They retreated when a strong counterattack was beginning.

What went wrong? Did British intel expect a lot less resistence or did the Taliban expect the British and dig in?

Problem here is that the journo reporting this don't necessarily have the knowledge to know what was going on.

Was this a large Marine attack with offensive objectives that was 'repelled'?

I doubt it.

You use squad sized + units for establishing rapport and gather intelligence on insurgents. You also invite attacks from them through your mere presence and probing on the patrols. If attacked, you mess the Taliban up like described in the article posted by FutureTank. I is not necessary to conquer and hold the battlefield - the Talibs are too fleeting for that IMV.

That is how you gather intel and asses enemy strength. My take is that it was such an operation and it was on above criteria succesfull, if you discount the sad loss of a Marine.

 

[Ths]

Grand Danois: You take the words right out of my fingers.

 

[FutureTank]

Directly at the MLR? I doubt it. The RPG threat is too great to drop in at the front of the attack and I doubt it's something they'd want to risk.

No, somewhere in the rear to cut the route for Taliban.

The British force did well. They retreated when a strong counterattack was beginning.

What went wrong? Did British intel expect a lot less resistence or did the Taliban expect the British and dig in?

The RM force was relatively small it appears, and did not have an objective as such. They apparently came under fire, and attempted a rush-job but encountered a far greater resistance in the process despite intelligence (or for lack of it).

 

[Ths]

I don't think anything went wrong.

To me it sounds like a recce patrol of some sort. When it hits opposition one of its tasks is to find out how serious it is - and extract itself. This took tactical air to do; but they did what they were supposed to do - and did it splendidly. I too deplore the loss; but when you are out looking for snakes and turn over stones - sometimes something slithers out and bites you - I deplore the loss the same way I deplore a workman falling off a scaffolding: It is a job that can never be made entirely safe - despite all our attempts.

 

[petrac]

As a military historian from Holland I read these posts with much interest.

What is needed to understand indeed is the pacifist nature many European nations have during and after the Cold War. The Army was neccesary to defend NATO against the WP forces, but after the fall of the Berlin Wall all armies were reduced.
Many countries also had negative experiences in UN operations (Dutch with Srebrenica in Yugoslavia or France in Congo and so on), which made them very cautious to engage in other operations.

Prime example is the Dutch presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The public opinion was not in favour of sending troops, esspecially not on a combat mission. The Iraq mission went well, but only after lengthy debates, additional combat power added to the battle group and clear rules of engagement and exit strategies. Three soldiers were killed, but we completed the mission. However, after 2 years we quit from Iraq as we wanted to focus our tiny budget to Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Not because we were scared, but because we were running out of money because we had too much troops abroad...

Now in Afghanistan we have an engineer unit as the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) with an airmobile battlegroup as protection. Our mission clearly was a supporting mission, aiding in security and reconstruction. Many people immediately said we didn't want to fight and when we eventually sent troops to aid the Canadians in an offenisve, many people did not agree with the government.
But we are doing it and we have the right tools for it. Slowly our armed forces are ready to take more complex challenges in Afghanistan and in other places. However, only based on the national strategy and after consultation and analysis of NATO requirements.

I think many other countries (Germany, Belgium, Norway for example) are also on that road, and I see many other examples within and outside NATO. Countries are taking their worldly responsibilities, but in their own strategies, not following only US doctrine and decision-making.

 

[Pro'forma]

History preventing.

This goes one generation fighting, second generation training wholeheartedly and third generation beginning with peace.

If it is not Nato trying to affect preventing lifefighting from worse; who is.

Sizeable man power may find self as get lost, and under defeat it's not
enticing; so you have reluctancy.
Don't need much to understand when looking blindly horrors of life,
being supportive is widely acknowledged approach.