Yes, Boeing could develop a newer version of the P-8 based on the MAX but are there enough potential orders to make it worth their while? IMO France and Germany won't buy and the remaining tier two customers will probably opt for the Saab/business jet option assuming Airbus is smart enough to stay out of this.
IMO yes, there is the potential at least for enough orders to make such development worthwhile.
AFAIK much of the difficulty and expense in developing surveillance platforms like the RAAF's E-7 Wedgetail, or the P-8 Poseidon stems from the difficulties and costs associated with developing and integrating the avionics, sensors and mission systems.
In the case of both the E-7 Wedgetail, and the P-8 Poseidon, the most complex work has already been done and should there be future interest in such aircraft after production of the B737-700 and -800 series bodies, and the B737-800 and -900 wings have also ceased, IMO it would be a comparatively inexpensive and simple development to fit the avionics, sensors and mission systems to modified versions of the B737-MAX series of aircraft which themselves are similar to the earlier B737 versions.
Now it does seem likely that France and Germany will have to replace their current MPA fleets in the early to mid 2030's, assuming that they wish to maintain such a capability. Airbus has recently announced that they are evaluating developing a military version of the A320neo which has been referred to as
M3A to carry out "a range of ISR missions" as well as able to be fitted with modular ro-ro payloads to airlift cargo and passengers in troop, VIP or medevac configurations. What I am much less certain of is whether or not Airbus would be able to develop a military version of the A320neo (or other member of the A320 family) which would both be able to meet the capability requirements as the replacement MPA, and be in production in time to replace the MPA fleets of France and Germany.
Assuming that initial replacements need to enter service in 2032 (for France IIRC) looking at the numbers, that leaves 14 years systems design, development and integration, and the aircraft production. Looking at the timeline of the programme which led to the P-8 Poseidon being developed, it started in 2000, with the Boeing entry being selected in 2004, first flight in 2009, and entry into service in 2013. Now with US defence programmes, the DoD has an enormous amount of input to ensure that it gets the capabilities it wants. Looking at Airbus and some of the Euro consortium defence programmes, it does seem that when different nations provide their input and/or requirements, it can drag out the development and/or increase the difficulty. The A400M seems to provide a particularly painful and drawn out example of this, since the initial programme was started in 1982, there was a shakeup in the participating aerospace partners in 1989, a first flight in 2009, and initial entry into service in 2013 (31 years after programme start and IIRC not quite meeting programme requirements). Now if I am reading and understanding things correctly (always a risk, since I might very well not be...) Airbus and Saab for that matter, are or will be engaging in some commercial speculation in developing military aircraft for ISR and MPA/surveillance roles, since they see a potential market for such aircraft.
From my perspective, there is considerable risk for aerospace manufacturers to develop ISR aircraft on their own without gov't funding or support. For one thing, without such funding and support then the costs to develop the aircraft are carried entirely by the developing company. This in turn leads either to the company potentially expending significant funding designing and developing the aircraft without any guarantees that orders for it will be placed, or that comparatively minimal design and development work will be done to avoid excessive expenditures. IMO the Saab/Bombardier Swordfish/Global 6000 MPA is an example of the later since it only exists as a 'paper aeroplane' with no physical prototypes currently planned, never mind in production, testing or flight. Another area of significant potential danger developing a speculative ISR platform is that without gov't input on what ISR capabilities are required/desired, the designing aerospace company could completely undershoot or overshoot what the gov'ts might desire or require.
If the capability is deemed insufficient by gov't, then the gov't might go with a competing ISR platform submission, in which case all the resources the aerospace company expended were basically wasted, or gov't might require a redesign in which case only some of the resources might be wasted.
If the capability exceeds what gov't requires, it could again want a redesign to a reduced specification assuming that would cost less, or opt for a less capable and lower costing competing design.
And of course there is also the very possible and major risk that the expected gov't purchases might never materialize, since the targeted gov't might decide they do not have the need for such an ISR capability, they cannot afford it, or that they have opted to meet the ISR capability an alternate way, or a combination thereof.
Hit 10k character limit, see 2nd/follow-up post.
