Middle East Defence & Security

[Yama]

What precedent?

The one quoted in the message.

Inheritance is enshrined in the principle of Uti Possidetis Juris, through which states defined their borders both before and long after Israel did. Ukraine and Jordan are examples that were raised and explained here.

'Inheritance' was created to prevent any outside power claiming territories of former state were 'terra nullius'. Actually, whole concept works against you here, as it means that West Bank and Gaza are not 'terra nullius' and thus not open to annexation and exploitation by an outside power, such as Israel.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

The one quoted in the message.

I understand your reference to the event. I asked what the precedent actually is.

Example:
"X vs Y trial" is the event.
"Parking on the sidewalk is now legal" is the essence of the precedent, and the part I am asking about.
My question was quite clear. I do not understand the general refusal to elaborate here.

'Inheritance' was created to prevent any outside power claiming territories of former state were 'terra nullius'. Actually, whole concept works against you here, as it means that West Bank and Gaza are not 'terra nullius' and thus not open to annexation and exploitation by an outside power, such as Israel.

If Israel is the outside power:
1. Who is the inheritor? Who was its first leader, and when is its date of foundation? Within what territories?

2. Why did Britain designate Israel specifically as an inheritor (Balfour declaration serving as declaration of intent)?

3. When and where did Britain designate Gaza and J&S as terra nullius that would not be inherited?

Fact is Britain left the entire area now considered Israel, J&S, and Gaza, minus Golan. It deferred diplomatic settlement between ethnic groups to the UN, which ultimately failed because its proposal was rejected.

The Arab nations, being the foreign power you referenced, invaded and occupied Gaza and J&S. Your "Terra Nullius" refers to them (Egypt and Jordan) as occupiers, not Israel.
In 1947-1948 there was no single Palestinian leadership or identity, and even by 1967 they had no intent for statehood. They were much more active in that front in Jordan.

So why would international law account for Palestinian statehood when there was no such thing in 1948, and even in 2025 there is no Palestinian intent for statehood?
Fact is that if Israel succeeded in 1948 to defend Gaza and J&S from the Arab nations, none would treat these any differently from other Israeli territory.

Finally, international law is by far the most "in spirit, not word" legal system out there.
So if the spirit of Uti Possidetis Juris is to discourage territorial conflicts against secessionists, then designating Gaza and J&S as separate stateless unclaimable territories, is exactly in opposition to the spirit, as it encourages, not discourages conflict.

EDIT: Note for @Feanor . The elevated status of spirit is particularly important to our debate. I should have raised it earlier. Although you haven't found any Israeli violation of the UN charter in regards to Gaza and J&S, you invoke it frequently and say it is binding. While some of its articles say that some of its resolutions may be binding, the legitimacy of the entire charter is tarred by the fact that the one charter's most frequent violators is the UN itself. It actively takes part in military actions against members and aggressively violates IHL, even right now by refusing to provide appropriate care for its hostages, and previously by knowingly employing Hamas and Hezbollah, including those who took part in the invasion, and refusing to acknowledge the fact.
There are more violations than that of course.

Much like the ICC which recently lost its jurisdiction by acting against international conventions in spirit and word alike, so did the UN many years ago.
UN membership is retained for purposes other than peacekeeping, e.g. diplomatic options. But as far as being a peacekeeper, it lost that title many, many years ago and gives no reason for members to apply relevance to its charter and laws.

An example for that is the League of Nations. As soon as it was deemed irrelevant for its task, it was replaced. The UN has had its League of Nations moment a long time ago. But it grew too big, so it's just slowly rotting until it's replaced.


EDIT 2:
Final note. I will not be commenting here on international law and legality of things discussed, unless specifically asked in a non-argumentative way.
I will respond in DMs though. Just want to keep this place cleaner.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

What Israel can do:

1. Set up "Emirates" in J&S and Gaza - Each capable of policing but nothing more.
   
   
2. PA and Hamas would be replaced, as are Fatah and other hostiles.
   
   
3. Israel could start a selection process for groups that are less antagonistic and extreme.
   
   
4. Use these groups to negotiate a longer term solution that solves territorial issues.
   1. Including perhaps a Golan model in J&S. Western half (in a moon shape) + Jordan Valley to Israel, eastern half to the Palestinians.
   2. Perimeter (2km) in Gaza and northern Gaza to Israel.
5. In exchange, Israel opens up economical integration options for them.
   1. The minimal bar is raised far high to include de-radicalization in schools and media.

I heard a logical theory today, that Israel may accept a ceasefire agreement with Hamas with the intent of starting a civil war in Gaza, similar to Syria.
This connects to point #2. However I did not speculate on whether a ceasefire would even occur.

The most influential group in Gaza right now, except Hamas, is the Popular Forces. Its leader Yasser Abu Shabab has been increasingly featured in headlines. The inverse trend of power change between Hamas and Popular Forces, puts Gaza on a path of regime change.
Israel could stall negotiations enough to make this trend largely irreversible.

Meet Yasser Abu Shabab:

 

[Big_Zucchini]

He explicitly names the Morag corridor but there are more.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1942583787243593999

There is the Netzarim corridor, Morag, and Philadelphi. All are strategic, each for their own reason.

• Netzarim - Seen in the orange vertical line to the left of Gaza.
• Philadelphi - Is essentially the Gaza-Egypt border.
• Morag - The orange line to the right of Philadelphi.

The area between Philadelphi and Morag is where the IDF set up most of the GHF sites.


Due to the return of most hostages, civilian pressure for a deal has overall reduced, while the liberal right camp is pressuring against a deal. Political pressure from within the coalition remains seemingly unchanged, and pressure from the US is unknown. Particularly due to the reason below.

It is becoming increasingly clear that a ceasefire now may do more harm than good for Israel, especially in terms of cost to human lives. Just this morning the death of 5 soldiers (and 14 injured) has been announced, in a roadside bomb attack. This happened in an area previously cleared, from which the IDF withdrew and allowed Hamas to regain control as part of a previous ceasefire and hostage release deal.
This is not to diminish from the importance of the rescue mission and the responsibility for the hostages' fates, but is it really worth losing twice or 3 times as many in combat? This is a serious dilemma.

Anyway, Hamas is still making maximalist demands for only half of the hostages. Demands that could be very costly very soon. But tactically, if Israel stalls the talks for a bit, the combined efforts of the IDF in doing demolition in Gaza and Khan Younis; GHF in decoupling aid from Hamas; and proxies in filling up power vacuums; Israel could force Hamas to either give up most demands, or sell them to proxies in exchange for safety.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Interesting developments in Gaza, but a quick note on Iran and proxies.

Iran is still dealing with assassinations against IRGC figures, insurgency, failing infrastructure and accidents, and increasing shortages of water and electricity as well as associated rise in poverty.

Assassinations and airstrikes on terror infrastructure are still very much a daily occurrence in Lebanon.

$4.7 billion worth of NASAMS equipment approved for FMS to Egypt. This marks a shift as Egypt only had access to AIM-7 for F-16s. They will operate AIM-120C-8 and AIM-9X-2. This likely also means unlocking AMRAAM for its F-16.
I believe there are 2 main reasons here:
1. Keep Egypt interested in relations with US and not seek substitution with China.
2. Equip Egypt against Houthis, as NASAMS is very relevant for that threat but not against Israel.

South Syria has calmed down significantly and despite attacks on Druze, Israel is very much interested in maintaining Syria's stability and not undermine the STG's grip.


Now onto Gaza.
The IDF, under government orders, effectively initiated a unilateral ceasefire in areas of Gaza where a maneuver has not occurred (in this war).
I recommend reading the tweet in full.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1949344705277267992

Effectively, this is the ceasefire Hamas wanted but without giving up hostages.
This is not good news for anyone. Not for Israelis, not for the hostages, not for the Palestinians. Not for western nations. Perhaps only for Hamas.
There is the option that Israel made that decision to create a more permissive ground for hostage rescue ops. But I will intentionally exclude any covert operations and activities just in case, to give the pessimistic view.


It is my personal belief that the Israeli government has been dragging its feet, failing to implement necessary reforms, clashing with its military leadership, and as a result taking a lot of half baked measures and too late.

The 2 primary goals of the war are to remove Gaza's capability to threaten Israel, and to create conditions for the hostages' return.
Neither was achieved.
Another silent objective is to end the war ASAP. It takes a toll - in lives, families, and treasure.
Ideally every war would occur quickly and decisively but the conditions in Gaza are less permissive for that. It doesn't mean it can't be done much better.

I also believe Netanyahu is frequently caving to pressure primarily from the US. Both Dem and Rep policies are misguided. The former because they create conditions to start new wars, and the latter because they think wars should end quickly but not decisively.

Since the beginning of the war, Israel had 2 options regarding the humanitarian aspect:

1. Let the UN run things and disengage completely from the process.
   1. No water, food, electricity entering. Nothing.
   2. All these things provided by the UN in whatever way they choose.
   3. Easier and cheaper to implement but Hamas gets the financial means to survive.
      
2. Block the UN and handle things independently.
   1. Only GHF or equivalent operating in Gaza.
   2. Sufficient reach to completely replace UN.
   3. Expensive and tiring but chokes Hamas's funds.

Thing is, if you do both, you get the worst of both worlds. You put in the effort - in treasure, fatigue, and lives, and Hamas still get their financial lifeline.
And either way, the decision on either mechanism should have been made sometimes before November of 2023. It's an absolute disaster we waited until 2025 for that.


In related news:
Israel, USA, and mediators, have accused Hamas of backing out of the negotiations.
I mean, why wouldn't they? International pressure is working and Israel allows the UN to keep getting aid in despite GHF being active for months. France as usual surrendered and announced they'll recognize a Palestinian state. Israel will not maneuver in areas where hostages are held so they have immunity there, and here they got their ceasefire without making any concessions.

The goal should be very clear:

• End the war ASAP.
• Create conditions for reduction of Gazan threat.
• Create conditions for naturally increasing pressure on Hamas.

How to do that? With any of the proposals I raised earlier.
Examples:

1. Occupy and annex perimeter and north Gaza. Occupy the remaining red area (in tweet).
   1. Goals:
      1. Permanent threat reduction.
      2. Aspect of permanence in deterrence.
      3. Increased strategic depth.
      4. Reduction of Hamas's autonomy and power.
         
   2. Caveat: Retain the Gaza-Egypt border as a negotiation tool. Land for hostages.
      
2. Arm and bring proxies into reduced Hamas-controlled area.
   1. Goals:
      1. Create conditions for struggle over hostages.
      2. Proxies could sell hostages back to Israel = not sacrificing security for them.
      3. Truly clear Gaza off Hamas.
      4. No lives risked for this op.
         
3. Mass aid overflow.
   1. Goals:
      1. Break up Hamas's food black market.
      2. Use looting as opportunity to hit Hamas.
         
4. Siege on Gaza (notice not all examples are to be implemented simultaneously).
   1. Goals:
      1. Aid for hostages scheme.
      2. Internal pressure on Hamas.
      3. Uprisings could flush out Hamas tunnels.
         
         

The point of these examples isn't to push for a solution nor to suggest which is better or not, but to demonstrate that action is possible, but Israel actively chooses inaction, characteristic of Netanyahu's entire political career.