Middle East Defence & Security

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
That's a lot of unfounded speculation on your part, including putting words in my mouth that clearly are yours, in an attempt to dehumanize me somehow.

Yes, the Palestinians are to blame for the situation, solely because everyone has a responsibility for themselves. If Israel were to magically turn into a dictatorship, that would be our (Israelis) fault, because it's our responsibility to create a government, and any event that occurs in our country, or a policy of our government, is eventually a product of our culture and beliefs.
They desire sovereignty, but show complete inability to act on it. The one time they "choose" a government, it ends in a civil war in which one side is best known for terror innovation, and the other is a dictatorship striving for the "most corrupt government" title.
Logically, the Palestinians would ally with Israel to obtain a higher status such as basic human rights, even a citizenship, in the Arab states that currently hold them hostage, like Syria, Lebanon, and to an extent Jordan, but instead they choose not to utter a word against those who keep them in refugee camps for several generations, but to fight to the death Israel where Palestinians get full rights, citizenship, and even proper representation in the government and its institutions, as well as 1st world living standards.

There are nations/countries who are exemplary in how much they built and contributed vs how little they were helped, and then there are those who are exemplary in how little they contributed vs how much they were helped. Both Palestinian territories/factions belong to the 2nd group. It's indisputable. Donate either one even $10 billion, and see how nothing is built or improved, except for better rockets and attack tunnels.

At least when it comes to my opinions on things, when I criticize something or someone, I make sure to be able to provide a viable alternative.

In your criticism of Israel, can you provide some alternative course of action that would "win over" the Arabs, including Palestinians, and bring them to accept an everlasting peace?
Because criticism without an alternative is not criticism at all.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
That's a lot of unfounded speculation on your part, including putting words in my mouth that clearly are yours, in an attempt to dehumanize me somehow
Unless you have a short memory or aren't aware of what you wrote; my comments were in direct response to yours: wasn't as if they appeared out of nowhere or weren't relevant to the discussion. You mentioned "dehumanising"; this is ironic because your comments indicate that you are "dehumanising" the Palestinians.

You mentioned "unfounded speculation" well "unfounded soeculation" would include the statement that "all" Arabs dislike Israel; that the only or main reason Jordanians are against the peace deal is that because a significant part of the population are Palestinians and that the ungrateful Palestinians keep rejecting Israeli aid and goodwill gestures.

Yes, the Palestinians are to blame for the situation, solely because everyone has a responsibility for themselves.
You must as well state something as ludicrous as the existence of the tooth fairy or Rapunzel. The Palestinians are indeed responsible for a lot of the mess they're in but at the same time a lot of things are beyond their control.
beliefs.

They desire sovereignty, but show complete inability to act on it. The one time they "choose" a government, it ends in a civil war in which one side is best known for terror innovation, and the other is a dictatorship striving for the "most corrupt government" title.
Right, the Israelis are anxiously waiting for the moment when the Palestinians can sort themselves out so they can have their own sovereign state right? That's the only obstacle. As for Fatah and Abbas whom you described as viewed as a "collaborator" by the Israelis; I'll counter this by saying to a large extent the Israelis want a "collaborator". I'll also remind you that the reason they chose Hamas was because Fatah was/is seen as corrupt and ineffective.

In your criticism of Israel, can you provide some alternative course of action that would "win over" the Arabs, including Palestinians, and bring them to accept an everlasting peace?
You make it sound as if Israel is beyond reproach or criticism and are projecting the rich, self serving and fanciful narrative that Israel has never and can never do anything wrong. It has a benevolent policy towards the Palestinians and is anxiously waiting for the day when the misguided, brainwashed, ungrateful and unreasonable Palestinians can have their state.

Let me remind you that following the 6 Day War the hope on the part of the Israelis was that the Palestinian problem would just go away; that the Palestinians would give up and would move and eventually be absorbed by Jordan, Lebanon and Syria - this never happened. Remember Gold Meir's statement about the Palestinians nor existing? The Israelis for a long time stuck to the narrative that they want peace and are not holding on to Palestinian land [never mind that land allocated for a future Palestinian state is shrinking year by year due to the rapid and relentless building of settlements]. I know, you'll proceed to.give me an explanation of why the settlements are misunderstood and aren't a problem or obstacle.

Because criticism without an alternative is not criticism at all.
So you say. There is an alternative but that requires comprehensive concessions [in your view the Israelis have been overly generous with their concessions] and the genuine acceptance that the Palestinians must have and are entitled to their state.

Israel can have land or it can have peace but it can't have both - period/full stop. As for the Palestinians they too have to make some hard choices and genuine tangible concessions. It would also be helpful if the U.S. adopted the position of being a honest broker instead of being highly tilted timecards Israel [yes to you the U.S. at times is not a real friend or ally of Israel]. Israel's security and its relationship with the Arab world would be enhanced and not compromised by a genuine lasting peace deal.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
You must as well state something as ludicrous as the existence of the tooth fairy or Rapunzel. The Palestinians are indeed responsible for a lot of the mess they're in but at the same time a lot of things are beyond their control.
beliefs.
I'll bite. Can you name a single historical event or item of policy, out of Palestinians' control, the result of which had significant bearing on the current situation of the Palestinians?

Unless you have a short memory or aren't aware of what you wrote; my comments were in direct response to yours: wasn't as if they appeared out of nowhere or weren't relevant to the discussion. You mentioned "dehumanising"; this is ironic because your comments indicate that you are "dehumanising" the Palestinians.

You mentioned "unfounded speculation" well "unfounded soeculation" would include the statement that "all" Arabs dislike Israel; that the only or main reason Jordanians are against the peace deal is that because a significant part of the population are Palestinians and that the ungrateful Palestinians keep rejecting Israeli aid and goodwill gestures.
Being able to find a single guilty party rather than classical "everyone's equally guilty", is not equal to dehumanizing.

And I am consistent on that in other subjects.
  • For example, Russia is solely to blame for the war in Ukraine and all its consequences.
  • Japan is solely to blame for all the consequences of its Pacific adventures.
  • Assad is solely responsible for every event in his precious civil war.
I can go on.

Right, the Israelis are anxiously waiting for the moment when the Palestinians can sort themselves out so they can have their own sovereign state right? That's the only obstacle.
This but without the sarcasm.

Except about the sovereign state. Part of them sorting themselves out would have to be more than cultural or political, but also how do they move a sizable chunk of their population to either Gaza or the West Bank because 2 separate territories is not workable unless you're in Europe. Only then can they think of a sovereign state, and ironically it was Trump's proposal (well not his, someone in the administration) that actually touched upon the topic that prevented previous peace deal and that is the fact Palestinians live in large numbers in neighboring Arab countries and they need to sort their issues there as well.

I'll counter this by saying to a large extent the Israelis want a "collaborator".
How is that a counter?

I'll also remind you that the reason they chose Hamas was because Fatah was/is seen as corrupt and ineffective.
Ironic, right?

You make it sound as if Israel is beyond reproach or criticism and are projecting the rich, self serving and fanciful narrative that Israel has never and can never do anything wrong.
Can't do anything but absolutes, can you?

Q: Can Israel do no wrong?​

Ans: It can. But if we are to look for a root cause of the current conflict and hatred, we see 99% of the blame lies with the Palestinian factions.

Their most significant historical event is the "Nakba", a mass exodus of Arabs, which was partially driven by rogue militias and politicians, and partially by the Arab states themselves that later enslaved the Palestinians.

Israel faced an even larger such event, as close to a million Jews were expelled from Arab countries. Most of these countries already signed a peace agreement or normalized relations with Israel.

It has a benevolent policy towards the Palestinians and is anxiously waiting for the day when the misguided, brainwashed, ungrateful and unreasonable Palestinians can have their state.
I wouldn't use such harsh language to describe Palestinians, generalization and all, but generally yes, Israel is waiting. But it won't wait forever. The Israeli public is growing tired, and even traditional supporters of dialogue with Palestinians are growing politically weaker. Meanwhile, dialogue with the Arab states is a significant source of pride for even the most right wing parties in Israel.

So being ethnically or nationally Arab is not the common denominator here.

Let me remind you that following the 6 Day War the hope on the part of the Israelis was that the Palestinian problem would just go away; that the Palestinians would give up and would move and eventually be absorbed by Jordan, Lebanon and Syria - this never happened. Remember Gold Meir's statement about the Palestinians nor existing?
Well yeah in the 60's there wasn't really a Palestinian identity. It's a rather new thing. So there's a big difference between saying it 60 years ago and saying it today. Today it would not be agreeable.
  • But what does it matter what happened 60 years ago? Sounds a lot like the "France belongs to Russia because Napoleon did a thingy" BS I hear on Russian news.
  • What matters is an approach. If any country is held back by events that occurred 60 years ago, or 60 year old ideology, then it has serious issues.
That's why progress is only a meaningful value for advanced, prospering nations.

I know, you'll proceed to.give me an explanation of why the settlements are misunderstood and aren't a problem or obstacle.
Well, if you understand they're not an obstacle, why even raise the issue? None raised them as an obstacle in Gaza or Sinai.

There is an alternative but that requires comprehensive concessions [in your view the Israelis have been overly generous with their concessions] and the genuine acceptance that the Palestinians must have and are entitled to their state.
That is a very narrow approach. If you wish solve problems, truly, you have to widen it. Here's a question:

Q: Why for example wouldn't dispersed Palestinian autonomous regions in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank, and Gaza work, with the last two going to Jordan and Egypt respectively?​
Or perhaps a single consolidated Palestinian state in a Gaza that would extend into the Sinai?

There are more solutions that are just as viable, if not more, than 2 Palestinian states.

Israel can have land or it can have peace but it can't have both - period/full stop.
Q: What makes you think Israel is interested in land? Was it the Sinai experience that made you think that?

Either way, that's not a concrete step. I'm not seeing any concrete step proposed here, so without an alternative course of action, this is not criticism, just projection.

I can prove land for peace is a course of action Israel has tried and succeeded in some places, and tried and failed with the Palestinians.

Q: Can you prove any of the overly abstract things you proposed haven't been tried?​

It would also be helpful if the U.S. adopted the position of being a honest broker instead of being highly tilted timecards Israel
Do you expect that if asked to broker peace between Ukraine and Russia, the US would really be entirely neutral? No. Ukraine is a friendly nation, and Russia is incredibly hostile. The same dynamics are seen by the US regarding Israel and Palestinians. There's no potential broker that has no dog in this fight.
That doesn't prevent the US from being an honest broker though.

And much like peace between Russia and Ukraine should be concluded with more concessions coming from Russia than Ukraine, similarly logic tells us Palestinians would have to make more concessions, and Israel very little. But for a fact we've seen in every round of negotiations Israel making almost unfathomable concessions, and the Palestinians making between almost none to none at all.

All that while the US was a broker.

But again we're looking at blaming Israel for something again, so what can Israel alone do to change the situation? Because any answer that involves requirements from Palestinians would only go to prove my point that in many ways Israel's hands are tied and it cannot create a peaceful Palestinian state on its own.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Good day folks

This tread is becoming a two way conversation on an emotive issue. You both make valid points but I suggest this be addressed via PM's between you both as I suspect this will be a very long conversation.

Cheers

alexsa
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Good day folks

This tread is becoming a two way conversation on an emotive issue. You both make valid points but I suggest this be addressed via PM's between you both as I suspect this will be a very long conversation.

Cheers

alexsa
Agreed.

Iran reportedly conceded on some significant issues regarding the nuclear deal.

Two topics that were specified were IRGC's delisting as terrorist organization and IAEA's probe of undeclared sites.

On the former, not only are they not being delisted, but Iran's demand to remove sanctions from organizations and businesses affiliated with IRGC was also dropped.
The IAEA probe topic is even more significant. The US reinstated sanctions on Iran, effectively ending JCPOA, when multiple undeclared nuclear sites were identified. Since then Iran refused to explain them to the IAEA.

The report also specifies the US will somehow assure Iran's breakout time doesn't go below 6 months, but there isn't even a vague explanation of how, raising questions about its viability.

This is important because for many opponents of the deal, breakout time is more important than any momentary rate of work, and to increase the survivability of the deal, this point needs to be explained at least on the inter-governmental level (allies) and to US lawmakers.


Sissi hosts summit of Arab leaders against backdrop of intensifying Iran talks.
  • No mention of Iran on the official agenda. And while closed door talks are a constant feature of these events, the fact that if talks on Iran occur they will be covert, affects the substance by reducing their volume.
  • It also could signal to Iran that the Arab nations have no unified policy/stance on Iran.
  • This is not good. Regardless of whether a unified policy was dovish or hawkish, it would be better than each going his own way.
  • It's the momentary weaknesses in individual regional countries, that Iran exploits and uses to establish presence.
Another possibility is they don't wish to publicly reveal their policy, which is fine, but it does miss the value of shows of force which is particularly effective on countries like Iran.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

STURM

Well-Known Member
It also could signal to Iran that the Arab nations have no unified policy/stance on Iran.
This has been apparent to Iran for quite a while now. Like they are on various other things; the Arabs are divided on Iran. Qatar has been basically doing its own thing and what countries like the UAE do are driven to a large extent by what Saudi decides on.

The recent series of meetings between the Gulf Arabs and Iran is a clear sign both sides desire some lessening of tensions whilst also accepting that major differences will take a while to sort out. The recent thawing in relations between certain Gulf states and Syria which have seen or are going to see the reopening of embassies and possible Gulf Arab assistance in reconstruction also has an Iranian angle/element.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
The recent series of meetings between the Gulf Arabs and Iran is a clear sign both sides desire some lessening of tensions whilst also accepting that major differences will take a while to sort out. The recent thawing in relations between certain Gulf states and Syria which have seen or are going to see the reopening of embassies and possible Gulf Arab assistance in reconstruction also has an Iranian angle/element.
IMO it's just them caving to Iran's pressure campaign, as Iran can make an effective use of its armed forces despite sanctions, while the Arabs cannot with all their money.

I think this alone will make this new deal a bit of a wild card - we don't know how the Arab nations will fare in about 1-2 years after the deal is signed.

Iran has hundreds of billions of dollars waiting for it immediately when sanctions end.

What I think will happen is Iran will attempt to throw Russia out of Syria and then cut a deal with Russia to let it keep the assets it (Russia) wants, and in return Iran will become a major arms supplier for Russia, and itself could buy Russian technology for its domestic industry.

(a) In Iraq, Iran will keep trying to create a Lebanon 2.0.​
(b) In Yemen, Iran will likely uphold the ceasefire agreement for a while to remain peaceful, then commit a huge flow of advanced arms to the Houthis for a renewed offensive in an attempt to take the entire Yemen.​

(c) Iran will frontload investment in its navy.​

(d) In Jordan, Iran will seek to expand its smuggling network and perhaps even some military presence, albeit chances of success are very low.​

(e) Iran will also try to create a new front in the West Bank, and maybe expand operations in the Sinai.​

All in all, these are all things Iran is already doing, but it will do them at a much, much faster rate. This is why despite the massive tensions, I think Iran will hold off with a Hezbollah attack on Israel until it has some financial relief, because right now Iran's regional proxy network seems rather fragile.

That's my vision on things, at least.

Anyway, some JCPOA drama:
On the right corner, US says Iran pulled demand IAEA stop probing unexplained nuclear sites and material.


And on the left corner, Iran says no nuclear deal until IAEA closes investigation.

 
Last edited by a moderator:

STURM

Well-Known Member
IMO it's just them caving to Iran's pressure campaign, as Iran can make an effective use of its armed forces despite sanctions, while the Arabs cannot with all their money.
Maybe but I don't see it that way. To me it's the Arabs deciding that some level of improvement is needed with regards to ties with Iran due to the realisation that past efforts to isolate Iran have failed; that they have all to gain and nothing to lose by better relations and due to their desire to wash their hands of Yemen. Iran too has its reasons; it needs to get out of Yemen and desires better ties with the Gulf Arabs for various reasons. Realpolitik.

As a junior UAE embassy official told me a few years ago; despite whatever bad blood there is and how good ties are with the U.S.; the Gulf Arabs still have to continue living next door to Iran. It has widespread influence and reach and always will be a regional player which the Gulf Arabs can't ignore.

What I think will happen is Iran will attempt to throw Russia out of Syria and then cut a deal with Russia to let it keep the assets it (Russia) wants
If we go back to the beginning when both countries entered Syria is a big way; both were there for slightly different strategic reasons and both needed each other there. As of 2022; IS and other anti Assad groups have been largely defeated and Assad is firmly in power but I doubt very much Iran has the desire or even the means to eject Russia out of Syria.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
US reportedly conducts airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria, seemingly in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the US Al-Tanf base.
Although many would rush to connect this to the nuclear deal talks, the US has a track record of responding to Iranian attacks. But it is not out of the question that Iran decided to attack the American (coalition, actually) to send a message of strength regarding the nuclear talks.


This tweet accurately reflects the discourse in the Israeli government regarding the talks.
Israel's current situation is that with or without a deal, Israel will be the one to bear the brunt of Iran's response/actions. But with a deal, Iran's response will be far more potent and comprehensive.
Hundreds of billions will flow to Iran in a very short period of time, and Israel will have to vastly increase defense spending to cope with the change. But Israel is already among the top global spenders on defense.
Israel can try and get additional aid from the US to avoid having its economy crippled by excessive defense spending, but it has pledged not to request any additions until the current deal expires in FY2028.
Therefore Israeli protests to the deal are a natural and predictable phenomenon. It should be mentioned that Israel's intelligence community, defense establishment, and the government itself, are all united against the deal, and vehemently oppose it. Former PM Bennet reportedly managed to hold off the deal in April, but couldn't stop it entirely.

And as predicted, Russia is speculated to use Iran to bypass sanctions by using it as a middle man in oil trade, as soon as deal is signed.


If we go back to the beginning when both countries entered Syria is a big way; both were there for slightly different strategic reasons and both needed each other there. As of 2022; IS and other anti Assad groups have been largely defeated and Assad is firmly in power but I doubt very much Iran has the desire or even the means to eject Russia out of Syria.
You took my words a bit too literally. What does Russia want in Syria? Bases for global reach, yes, but also economical assets. It wants a share in rebuilding Syria, it wants its energy sector, and it wants a loyal ally.
By saying "drive Russia out", I didn't mean entirely. I meant to get the soft power in Syria by drawing Assad closer (now possible with all that money), get its energy sector, and well the rebuilding will likely go to China anyway. The military assets will remain there, and Russia may get a bit of all, but a much smaller share, which makes sense as Russia hasn't the attention span and resources to support Assad right now, be it in military power (which is less needed right now) or any other "soft" matter.

Specifically in being a security guarantor for Syria, both Iran and Russia have high potential but huge drawbacks, and despite China not having the same issues, it's likely Iran and Russia will still fight for that role especially seeing as China is not really exerting military influence in the region beyond the occasional arms deals.
So both Russia and Iran are under sanctions, and have the potential to bounce in and out of a state of crippling sanctions in short periods of time, and Syria understands that. Russia is an economically and militarily stronger country with a stronger scientific base, but Iran is closer and has a higher degree of independence in its defense industry.
What's of key importance here is that Russia specializes in building platforms, but has a difficulty producing munitions and small systems. For Iran it's the exact opposite. So while it may seem that they'll strike some balance, it is Iran that holds the advantage here. Syria only needs to secure itself against internal opposition, which will be easy with Iranian help (and expertise), and as long as it aligns against the west, also a capability vs Israel.
Against Israel, platforms won't do. A balanced armed force like that of Israel can easily hunt down expensive platforms. But if the opposing force (Syria) has a dispersed systems' based structure, then it becomes a more durable, cheaper-to-maintain, and more powerful enemy. The same approach is taken by Hezbollah and other Iran-affiliated proxies. They can't occupy territory and bring the fight to the enemy (barring Hezbollah's not so large Radwan unit), but can entrench very well, which Syria will desire, especially since, and I reiterate, this approach is cheaper.
 
Last edited:

STURM

Well-Known Member
If anything I think Iran would want greater Russian involvement in Syria but of course it isn't possible. Russia may not have the resources to do more for Assad but neither will it scale back on what it's doing because Syria occupies a very important place in Russia's strategic calculus. Perhaps we should also ask if Iran's continuedcontinues presence in Syria works to Russia's favour. In the past it was short of troops and Iranian Pasdaran were useful for combating IS; with support from Russian airpower but things have changed.

Something which has occurred to me is whether we're putting too much into the reports that Iran provide some military relief to Russia. Apart from UASs is there anything else the Iranians are able to help with?

I'm keeping a close watch on Iranian/Gulf Arab ties because it also has a bearing on Syria. For the Gulf Arabs better ties with Syria has certain benefits including perhaps lessening in some ways the dependence Assad has on Iran.

Syria no doubt would be aware that against Israel a lot of traditional options just won't do but I'm looking at this from a wider angle; that goes beyond Israel; Assad's priority is to maintain and strengthen his grip on power and improve ties with fellow Arab countries; creating mote tensions with Israel does nothing for him and is not on his priority list. Raising tensions with Israel has no pay off for Assad.
 
Last edited:

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Syria no doubt would be aware that against Israel a lot of traditional options won't do but I'm looking at this from a wider angle; thAt goes beyond Israel and Assad's priority is to maintain and strengthen his grip on power and improve with fellow Arab countries; creating mote tensions with Israel does nothing for him and is not on his priority list
We can't automatically assume the Arab and Muslim nations are doing only what is logical and in their best interests. In the west, what's in the best interests of the country tends to align with the interests of the people.
But in Arab nations, where dictatorship is the norm, the interests of the people are an obstacle, and survival of the leadership is the top priority.

So yeah, none sane would think war between two peaceful nations would benefit anyone. The only merit in war is self defense and deterrence.
But if lil Assad thinks staying on a collision course with Israel (or any other Arab nation for that matter) is what'll secure his reign, then that's what he'll do.
Otherwise the whole region would be a sandy Europe.

Assad is already probably beyond the tipping point for the west. He's likely seen as irredeemable, if not merely too much of a negative figure. He could align with the west and go the Israel-Jordan model where Israel and the US protect him from outside influences, but it's too late for him, and he's too worried about internal problems anyway.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
We can't automatically assume the Arab and Muslim nations are doing only what is logical and in their best interests.
That's a simplistic assumption in my view. We can't automatically assume otherwise. Despite all their flaws the Arabs can and have made the right decisions [from their perspective] when they have to [the long standing strategic relationship with the U.S; uniting when there's shared interests, collaboration with Israel on certain issues; the Syrian intervention on the side of the Christians in Lebanon; etc] and we must understand that the things that drive them to do what they do can be better understood if viewed from their perspective.

is what'll secure his reign
What will secure his reign is the elimination of internal threats [largely done already]; his ability to dish out patronage and things improving [the Gulf Arabs have spoken on the possibility of reconstruction and other forms of assistance]. Creating trouble with Israel isn't going to gain him any support from ordinary Syrians or the military.

Like his father before him [after 1973]; Assad's main agenda is regime survival - period full stop. Unnecessary tensions with Israel only endangers his hold on power; provides no added value; only risks.

As for it being too late for Assad maybe but then again this is the Middle East: the unexpected can happen and better ties with the Gulf Arabs only strengthens his position. If he ingratiates himself with the Gulf Arabs; who have demonstrated a desire for improved ties; things can get slightly more comfortable for him despite being shunned by the international community.
 
Last edited:

andrewrose

New Member
In my mind, iran’s goals are to destabilize and weaken, not to conquer. Once something is weakened, victory comes less by way of climatic conflict, but inevitable demise. (Russia strategy of expanding its borders) is similar.

What I think will happen is Iran will attempt to throw Russia out of Syria and then cut a deal with Russia to let it keep the assets it (Russia) wants, and in return Iran will become a major arms supplier for Russia, and itself could buy Russian technology for its domestic industry.
I don’t think iran will overtly attempt to throw out Russia, and I don’t see why.
Is there a strategic goal that iran has to remove Russia from Syria? Syria is no longer a country. It’s a landmass of cantons. What cantons does Iran want that Russia has and at what cost would tensions with its ‘ally’ have
C why frontload the navy? None of your listed strategic goals rely upon navy power. Iran’s ability to sell oil to china isn’t threatened nor is it improved with a stronger navy.

Iran can win by destabilizing militias with small arms, drones, rockets etc. I don’t see how a better navy will achieve its goals. The world cares about ships being hijacked or destroyed, especially if they have oil on them. The world doesn’t care if one country, far away with sand and oil gets some busiess as usual rocket or destbalizing attacks.

Iran’s navy has never achieved a strategic objective to my knowledge.
(c) Iran will frontload investment in its navy.
(d) In Jordan, Iran will seek to expand its smuggling network and perhaps even some military presence, albeit chances of success are very low.
D agreed, smuggling drugs and destabilizing activities such as water and infrastructure damage would do more than armed resistance. Jordan is 10 days without water from a revolution.
(d) In Jordan, Iran will seek to expand its smuggling network and perhaps even some military presence, albeit chances of success are very low.
(e) Iran will also try to create a new front in the West Bank, and maybe expand operations in the Sinai.
e) i think iran will continue to supply weapons to both areas, but as per west bank. However, I don’t know if iran has a clear strategy. Here, destabilization would destroy the PA, invite Israeli response, which would quickly lead to increased stability due to Israeli intervention. I suggest that weapons supply without a clear objective is more likely.

f) agreed, iran will increase hezbollahs strength, but its objectives (Lebanon destabilized )have been achieved.
(a) In Iraq, Iran will keep trying to create a Lebanon 2.0.

(b) In Yemen, Iran will likely uphold the ceasefire agreement for a while to remain peaceful, then commit a huge flow of advanced arms to the Houthis for a renewed offensive in an attempt to take the entire Yemen.
A agree,

B interesting foresight, and agreed

Previously banned poster Mr Rosenthal using fictitious account to post. Permanently banned.

Ngatimozart
 
Last edited by a moderator:

koxinga

Well-Known Member
In my mind, iran’s goals are to destabilize and weaken, not to conquer. Once something is weakened, victory comes less by way of climatic conflict, but inevitable demise. (Russia strategy of expanding its borders) is similar.
The goal of any power is to have a regional and international environment that is conducive to their objectives (e.g through installing friendly proxies or keeping rivals occupied with internal issues), while physical conquest is limited to certain, jaundiced historical narratives (e.g Russia in Ukraine, China in the SCS).

Keeping their regional rivals weak and off balanced is cheaper than a outright conventional conflict/invasion and trying to hold and run a country.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
In my mind, iran’s goals are to destabilize and weaken, not to conquer.
It's goal is to have an arc of influence across a wide area comprising various countries; from Afghanistan to Syria. This is for a variety of reasons in line with its interests; not necessarily to weaken or destabilise but the opposite.

Iran's strategic position was strengthened by the U.S. invasion of Iraq; it's extremely grateful to the Americans for overthrowing Saddam. Iran was able to exert it's influence in Iraq with its Shia brethren and had a land corridor to Syria a strategic ally since the 1980's.
 
Last edited:

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Short on time so I will reply to some comments later, just dropping this here because it's important:

US forces attacked again by IRGC-linked unit, this time the name Kataib Hezbollah was given (not to confuse with Lebanon's Hezbollah).

It was also revealed elsewhere the US was attacked ~30 times by Iranian proxies in 2022.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Interesting overview on the U.S. presence in Syria.


"Speaking last year, Brett McGurk, the White House coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, said the US had four main objectives in Syria: to reduce violence, maintain military pressure on ISIL, address Syria’s humanitarian crisis, and to support Israel".

With regards to the Israeli angle this is to be expected as a lot of what it does is with Israel in mind. As for reducing violence and addressing humanitarian concerns I have no idea how actually how much the troop presence actually contributes to this.

It's ironic [like many things in the region] but maintaining the pressure on IS actually benefits Assad whom at one point U.S. politicians and policy makers actually hoped would be deposed by democratic Western friendly Syrians; such was the illusion. As far as I can tell there was no instance in the past when U.S. strikes on IS actually directly benefited Assad troops, as unlike Russia which deployed its airpower as flying artillery. U.S. airpower was deployed at various other levels to degrade IS [in Afghanistan we had the bizarre situation when U.S. provided support to Talibs who were in combat with IS].

Its to be expected that as part of the easing of ties between Assad and the Gulf Arabs; Assad will be offered economic aid and we can safely assume that the Gulf Arabs will pressure him on Iran.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Iran can win by destabilizing militias with small arms, drones, rockets etc. I don’t see how a better navy will achieve its goals. The world cares about ships being hijacked or destroyed, especially if they have oil on them. The world doesn’t care if one country, far away with sand and oil gets some busiess as usual rocket or destbalizing attacks.

Iran’s navy has never achieved a strategic objective to my knowledge.
Despite the ban of @andrewrose, I'll still reply because I like being challenged.

A navy for Iran does not need to compete with major powers like the US. It does, however, need to allow Iran greater flexibility and shorter planning and reaction times within the gulf, and extend operations to the Red Sea.

If properly built, Iran could threaten local Arab navies and further dominate the gulf shipping.
A navy would also allow Iran to monitor gulf and red sea movements of assets of nations deemed enemies, and will allow it to distribute its capabilities like long range munitions being launched from sea.

Additionally, it would extend Iran's early warning and air defense array, and allow it to protect smuggling vessels wherever needed.

Lastly, a submarine force consisting of more than just midget subs, would provide Iran with the most potent form of nuclear deterrent, if and when a nuclear weapon is developed.

Iran does not need high quality for submarines. By buying Chinese or locally producing a bought design, Iran with its larger economy than Israel (if sanctions are removed) and low wages, as well as low wages in China, Iran's purchasing power will allow it to acquire a sizable submarine force, which with size as its main merit will allow to throw off the low number of Israeli subs, from recon along Iran's shores to surveiling for underwater threats. Same goes to an extent vs US deployments, as the US will be deterred by a higher amount of troops and assets necessary to conduct ops.
agreed, smuggling drugs and destabilizing activities such as water and infrastructure damage would do more than armed resistance. Jordan is 10 days without water from a revolution.
Jordan has an assured water supply from Israel.

i think iran will continue to supply weapons to both areas, but as per west bank. However, I don’t know if iran has a clear strategy. Here, destabilization would destroy the PA, invite Israeli response, which would quickly lead to increased stability due to Israeli intervention. I suggest that weapons supply without a clear objective is more likely
Iran is one of the biggest killers of Palestinians. They hardly care about their wellbeing. They certainly don't care for the PA.
  • Iran has its representatives to lead the Palestinians and that's the PIJ. They are more obedient than Hamas.
  • If given the opportunity, Iran would have the PIJ overthrow Hamas and the PA, but they're still relatively weak. They are growing steadily though.
It's ironic [like many things in the region] but maintaining the pressure on IS actually benefits Assad whom at one point U.S. politicians and policy makers actually hoped would be deposed by democratic Western friendly Syrians; such was the illusion. As far as I can tell there was no instance in the past when U.S. strikes on IS actually directly benefited Assad troops, as unlike Russia which deployed its airpower as flying artillery U.S. airpower was deployed at various other levels to degrade IS [in Afghanistan we had the bizarre situation when U.S. provided support to Talibs who were in combat with IS].
It was never about ISIS. At least not in Syria. The US helped Iraq defeat ISIS locally but failed to curb Iran's involvement which created something equally as bad in their place - PMF.

ISIS was not a real threat. It redirected existing fighters with existing training and experience, and gave the whole thing some bomb-ass marketing. It was known they could not do real damage. As long as the sum of Syrian and Iraqi insurgents did not have the capacity to overthrow their respective governments, neither did ISIS. On the maps it looked big and scary because it occupied large chunks of empty desert between the few cities it had.

What could both Russia and the US want? Each in his own way, to curb foreign influences that could abuse the apparent temporary chaos.
  • The US needed to keep Jordan and Iraq safe. And what they don't really state in their mission is that right now, when there are still sanctions, there is very high value in operating vs Iran, because every hit would be felt more strongly, as things are less replaceable.
  • It is a force multiplier vs Iran and other hostile regional actors.
Had the middle east been as important in the minds of westerners as Europe, Iran would be seen as the same level of aggressor as Russia. And hurting its operations now when it doesn't have the resources and nukes, is important.

Its to be expected that as part of the easing of ties between Assad and the Gulf Arabs; Assad will be offered economic aid and we can safely assume that the Gulf Arabs will pressure him on Iran.
With the sheer incompetence of Arab nations in matters of security, what makes you think they can sway Assad from cooperating with the region's most dominant country?

Iran has vast forces in the region ready to reignite the Syrian civil war if Assad betrays them.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

STURM

Well-Known Member
The US helped Iraq defeat ISIS locally but failed to curb Iran's involvement which created something equally as bad in their place - PMF
It would have been impossible to curb Iran's involvement because Iraq is Iran's neighbour and both countries are deeply intertwined in key areas. Lest it be forgotten until U.S. airpower got involved it was Iranian elements with Iraqi Shia militias which stopped the IS advance after the Iraqi army collapsed. The U.S. also benefited from having Iran there and vice versa and that's exactly why although both didn't cooperate, both also did not the interfere in what each was doing.

As long as the sum of Syrian and Iraqi insurgents did not have the capacity to overthrow their respective governments, neither did ISIS. On the maps it looked big and scary because it occupied large chunks of empty desert between the few cities it
If we're talking about the same insurgents here IS captured territory the size of England and routed the Iraqi army and captured various key cities and friend; the danger was real. Might not appear scary to you when viewed on a map in another country but let me assure you to ordinary Iraqis and to the Iranians who share a border with Iraq; it was extremely "scary"'

With the sheer incompetence of Arab nations in matters of security, what makes you think they can sway Assad from cooperating with the region's most dominant country?
Iran has vast forces in the region ready to reignite the Syrian civil war if Assad betrays them.
It hasn't always been a history of sheer incompetence and you put it. The Arabs also have a history of making the right security related decisions when they have to. It's great to apply or reach generalistic and simplistic statements driven perhaps by prejudices or other things but doesn't enable an accurate picture.

No this is not a pro Arab rant on my part
because I'm not pro Arab, anymore than I'm pro Israeli, American or Ugandan.

Also the intention is not to "sway"' Syria away from Iran because that would be impossible but to perhaps lessen its influence and gain further leverage over Assad. As for Assad's betrayal of the Iranians if you understand or are aware of the dynamics at play and the history behind it you'll understand that any betrayal is unlikely. You may say it's only history and give a Napolean analogy again but history is important and explains a lot of what we have now on terms of partnerships and strategic alliances.
 
Last edited:
Top