Mid East Peace Plan/Palestine

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I think the new change in the Israel-Sudan, and Sudan-west relations is more significant than most people, particularly Israelis, believe.

Sudan is a sort of a land bridge between the north African states, and the southern ones, giving some long term trade options.

It is a poor state with a fairly large population. This gives Israel great export potential for technologies that may vastly improve local quality of life (desalination, water re-use, agriculture, power generation, defense, hi-tech, overall more job opportunities).
It's possible that Israel will quietly lobby the US to increase the current proposed $800 million aid package to accelerate Sudan's advancement.
Israeli-Emirati, and Israeli-Bahraini economical ties may be mostly limited to oil shipping (through an Israeli Red Sea - East Med pipeline to bypass the Suez canal) and tourism, which in the long term isn't as great (but better short term).

Israel also has a small issue with illegal immigrants. It has asylum seekers from Sudan and Eritrea that it cannot keep detained, but are considered a major hazard. Deporting them back to Sudan and Eritrea was not considered a viable option because most of them would die or would be killed on the spot.
But with good relations with Sudan, Israel could negotiate a deal to ensure Sudan gives them a safe home and an economical safety net.

There is also the symbolic part, which should be particularly meaningful to the Arab world.
Sudan's capital city, Khartoum, hosted in 1967 the Arab League's summit in which the famous "3 No's" were declared.
No peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel.

Sudan could be somewhat of a trigger not only for more open ties between Israel and the gulf states, but also for some African states.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
What would be the advantage of bypassing the Suez Canal? Offloading oil to pump it a fairly short distance then load it into another tanker would be expensive & slow. Would avoiding Egypt be worth that?

A pipeline direct from the Gulf to the Mediterranean would make economic sense, but obviously, there are political difficulties.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
The Suez canal is extremely busy, is narrow, and for geopolitical reasons (no trade between Israel and the energy giants), it was a monopoly in oil trade.

IIRC the passage fee for a ship of any size is $400,000.

Having 2 ships make 2 shorter trips than 1 ship doing 1 long trip, is not necessarily more expensive. The only expense is doubling the crew but that's hardly a significant factor in the shipping sector, as far as I know.

You send 2 ships simultaneously - 1 from the destination, and 1 from Arabia. Both dock in Israel at the same time. One is pumped, another is filled. Then off they go.

Building more pipes and maintaining existing ones is easier than maintaining and expanding the canal.
The only real problem right now is that Israel will have to evacuate quite a lot of civilians from the areas surrounding its southern city Eilat to make a new port.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
There's already a pipeline from Eilat to Ashkelon. It's 60 years old or so, built for strategic reasons. It gets trade from VLCCs, very large tankers that are too big to go through the canal fully laden. Presumably the low operating cost per ton of such ships makes transhipment worthwhile.

There's also a pipeline (Sumed) in Egypt with a terminal for VLCCs at each end, & twice the capacity of Eilat-Ashkelon. It's owned by Egypt - & Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE & three Kuwaiti companies. It's currently operating at about 25% of capacity because of the covid-19 slump.

BTW, it's been reported that the Saudis & Egyptians are considering linking Sumed to the trans-Saudi pipeline.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
You make a good point. However, the Israeli pipeline is in constant use. Making more pipelines will give Israel an ability to compete with Egypt in transit prices.

Two factors come to play here:
1)Egypt is not a particularly stable country, with a bad record of keeping its pipelines operational, primarily due to local insurgent threat.
2)An Israel-Saudi-UAE pipeline project is also a highly vulnerable one to outside attacks, and its defense would be very difficult.

What I had in mind, at one point, is a railroad between Israel and UAE, but that's a very expensive project.
 

JohnWolf

Member
I found this interesting -

"Four Arab countries — United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco — have recognized Israel because of Kushner’s diplomatic efforts."
So they named a few square meters of pavement for him;

It appears to be a healthy trend, but will it be able to continue this way now?

(BTW- how do I highlight quotes taken from other sources as such here?)
 
I found this interesting -

"Four Arab countries — United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco — have recognized Israel because of Kushner’s diplomatic efforts."
So they named a few square meters of pavement for him;

It appears to be a healthy trend, but will it be able to continue this way now?

(BTW- how do I highlight quotes taken from other sources as such here?)
I believe that Israel is after bigger and non-Arab Islamic nations. The Arab GCC bloc accepting Israel is very predictable now. KSA is only a matter of time. Behind the scenes major visits by officials from both sides have already taken place as reported by various media outlets.

Israel also wants recognition from other non-Arab Islamic states. That is not going to happen anytime soon I think.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Robert H. Scales and Douglas Ollivant have observed that 'Terrorist armies fight smarter and deadlier than ever'. This frightening new age is emerging due to several factors that neither the United States nor Israeli forces fully anticipated and I would recommend reading the article for the four reasons they gave. Beyond the four reasons, at a broad level, the traditional comparative advantage of a professional army, like the IDF, has diminished, relative to terrorist groups like Hamas. These terrorist groups are increasingly able to turn their para-military organisations into effective fighting forces, often pairing their fanatical dedication with newly acquired small unit tactical skills. Over the years, Hamas has evolved in its tactical proficiency, and in:-
I know it's an old post but it's an interesting point I want to respond to.
OPSSG I respect your dedication to writing long and detailed comments.

Unfortunately the article is not available to me (behind a paywall), but nonetheless I disagree that the IDF's advantage diminishes in light of these changes. To the contrary.
Since the early 2000's until today, what changed in terrorist organizations that made them more effective and more terrorizing? They have adopted new technologies. And these technologies are not incremental upgrades that evolve their capability, but enabling technologies.

So the past IED specialists evolved into saboteurs more trained in combat, who receive explosive devices from some sort of industry, and can later contribute to an ensuing engagement before proceeding to the next operation.
The RPG slingers have become operators of advanced ATGMs, and in great enough numbers to turn this once exclusively AT weapon into a precision strike weapon against any target within LoS.
They have utilized massed artillery, civilian drones, advanced comms, and so on.

Combine this with the inherent traits of a terrorist organization in what is today called hybrid warfare, and you get countless small attack cells, which in itself creates countless opportunities.
But that's not only what terrorists are doing today. There's a big downside here in that it creates a very heterogenous military.
To acquire enabling tech and new capabilities faster, in a more streamlined fashion and to everyone, the whole process must be industrialized and organized. There has to be some organizational structure. And suddenly they want capabilities that a single cell cannot hold so they start forming companies, then battalions, then brigades, and hopefully divisions too.

And when you do that, you're creating centers of balance for the organization. And something with a center of balance can be tipped over.

So the raw capabilities that Hizbullah builds, for example, are worrying the IDF. But it's restructuring itself more like an army following the Syrian experience, and that's something that the IDF is whole heartedly welcoming, and hoping Hizbullah will continue into the future.
Of course, Hizbullah are aware of this, but it is in my assumption that they're giving a lot of weight to 2 factors:
1. Hizbullah must present itself as the legitimate army of Lebanon and strive to replace the LAF. For that it needs such structure.
2. It may be subordinated to Iran, but its chief goal is domination of Lebanon for its leadership. So it will avoid conflict with Israel if it may result in them being toppled, plus the deterrence equation between Israel and Iran may convince them a forced conflict is not on the horizon.

In the meantime, to deal with threats that are not trying to restructure as armies, the IDF is in the process of quite a massive structural reform of its own. It is going full speed ahead (at least as much as possible given the IDF does not really have a budget due to the political crisis) into all-domain ops, specialized strike cells in regional units, and battalion level operational independence in maneuvering units, as well as streamlined data and strike capabilities for the platoon level, and expanded target generation capabilities on all levels.
The goal is to create many small strike cells of its own and turn enemy small strike cells into an easy prey, without the main inherent flaws of a massive organized army that are felt strongly today.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I believe that Israel is after bigger and non-Arab Islamic nations. The Arab GCC bloc accepting Israel is very predictable now. KSA is only a matter of time. Behind the scenes major visits by officials from both sides have already taken place as reported by various media outlets.

Israel also wants recognition from other non-Arab Islamic states. That is not going to happen anytime soon I think.
You mean like Azerbaijan? Bosnia?
 
You mean like Azerbaijan? Bosnia?
Indonesia, Pakistan and Malaysia just to name a few. These are indeed bigger Islamic countries compared to Azerbaijan and Bosnia. Would you agree or disagree?

Particularly Pakistan is high on the list. We understand why the GCC bloc pressures Pakistan to accept Israel.



Such overtures are nothing new, but they are destined to fail. When the foundation is weak and not established on sincerity the structure is always feeble.


 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
I know it's an old post but it's an interesting point I want to respond to. OPSSG I respect your dedication to writing long and detailed comments.
I know I am long winded. The older I get, the more serious the issue, it seems. :)

...nonetheless I disagree that the IDF's advantage diminishes in light of these changes. To the contrary.
Thank you for sharing your perspective.

Since the early 2000's until today, what changed in terrorist organizations that made them more effective and more terrorizing? They have adopted new technologies. And these technologies are not incremental upgrades that evolve their capability, but enabling technologies.

So the past IED specialists evolved into saboteurs more trained in combat, who receive explosive devices from some sort of industry, and can later contribute to an ensuing engagement before proceeding to the next operation.

The RPG slingers have become operators of advanced ATGMs, and in great enough numbers to turn this once exclusively AT weapon into a precision strike weapon against any target within LoS.

They have utilized massed artillery, civilian drones, advanced comms, and so on.

Combine this with the inherent traits of a terrorist organization in what is today called hybrid warfare, and you get countless small attack cells, which in itself creates countless opportunities.
As a father of a young infantry platoon commander, it sounds like a source of worry. My son was so bad at reading ECAs, when he was a cadet, I really worry for his men. But he has matured after he was commissioned, thanks to the polishing he got from OCS. He completed NS after 22 months of service.

But that's not only what terrorists are doing today. There's a big downside here in that it creates a very heterogenous military.
I understand your line of reasoning. I am thinking that it does help when the enemy becomes a lousier mirror version of you, to fight you.

And when you do that, you're creating centers of balance for the organization. And something with a center of balance can be tipped over.

So the raw capabilities that Hizbullah builds, for example, are worrying the IDF. But it's restructuring itself more like an army following the Syrian experience, and that's something that the IDF is whole heartedly welcoming, and hoping Hizbullah will continue into the future.
The more conventional they are, the more predicable they become. This I agree.

A typical conscript Singapore infantry battalion from 1 to 6 SIR, 1st Guards & 3rd Guards (with an army of 40,000 to 45,000 NSF conscripts) have a 22 month cycle, as part of force generation process. The Guards in particular, run a 3 week Guards conversion course, run by cadre from 7SIB. Each NSF infantry battalion:

(a) has 3 rifle companies, and in these rifle companies the only full time experienced military professionals are at Company Commander and CSM level (typically ADF*, SF, Commando, Recce or Ranger trained or certified). Even the platoon sergeant is typically newly minted (and on his 1st tour in an operational unit) and 70% to 85% of the section commanders are NSFs;​

(b) each rifle company has its own Spike SR anti-tank section, team of designated marksman (M110 equipped); a MG section; and class 2 medic (who will upgrade the skills of the class 1 platoon medics), which skills are learnt externally, via sending them to school houses that maintain a cadre of trainers and specialist knowledge — for these Company support weapons;​

(c) each motorised infantry battalion has a scout platoon, a spike LR platoon and a mortar platoon equipped with the 120mm SRAMS MkII on the Belrex (along with the ATK XM395 or ST Engineering’s 120mm precision munition** mortar rounds). Compared to the previous infantry mortar, the Belrex Mortar Variant requires less manpower and deployment time. Additionally, a higher rate of fire is enabled through an Ammo Loading System. The Belrex Mortar Variant is designed to interoperate with the Mortar Ammunition Carrier Variant to speed up ammunition replenishment during operations. Although not designed to replace unguided mortars, precision munition** mortar rounds allows mortar platoons to eliminate point targets that would require 8-10 rounds using one or two. This lengthens the amount of time a vehicle with 25 rounds can operate and increases the number of targets it can engage without needing resupply; and​
(d) 70% to 80% of our infantry officers (trained for 9 + 38 weeks before Commissioning) are also conscripts, on their first tour of leading a platoon. It is the platoon NCOs (trained by the cadre at the School of Infantry Specialists) that provide the day-to-day leadership at the fighting core of these rifle platoons — who are in turn guided on finer points of TTPs, by the chief trainer — the CSM.​

*ADF stands for Singapore’s Army Deployment Force, which is an all professional infantry battalion, whose members have served in war zones; and benchmark with the US Marines. A lot of the TTPs in ADF is evolved from joint exercises in the US or from 6 years of serving in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**
PM120 — is GPS guided with a maximum range of up to 8.5 km and a CEP of 10 m. The HE warhead contains 2.8 kg of TNT. ER HE also contains 2.8 kg of TNT and is fitted with a DM111A4/A5 nose mounted fuze. Maximum muzzle velocity was being quoted as 408 m/s; with the extended range round having a maximum range of up to 9 km. The ER RP contains three smoke canisters and is fitted with a MTSQ DM93 fuze, with a maximum muzzle velocity of 408 m/s and a maximum range of up to 9 km, ST Engineering said. The ER illuminating round has the same fuze, muzzle velocity, and range as the ER RP and has an illuminating intensity of 1.25 million cd. There is also the option of IR Illuminating.

Of course, Hizbullah are aware of this, but it is in my assumption that they're giving a lot of weight to 2 factors:
1. Hizbullah must present itself as the legitimate army of Lebanon and strive to replace the LAF. For that it needs such structure.
2. It may be subordinated to Iran, but its chief goal is domination of Lebanon for its leadership. So it will avoid conflict with Israel if it may result in them being toppled, plus the deterrence equation between Israel and Iran may convince them a forced conflict is not on the horizon.

In the meantime, to deal with threats that are not trying to restructure as armies, the IDF is in the process of quite a massive structural reform of its own.
I am very interested in what we in Singapore can learn from the IDF. Even the SAF has changed — thanks to the introduction of new training methods, and motorisation (with the Terrex and the Belrex, which provides the last mile logistics). The quality of training given is so much better thanks to improved facilities. What took my generation of soldiers 3 days to learn, is now compressed to 1 day.

Our Army’s willingness to take risk by using tempo and aggression has increased. It’s good to see the increased tempo, and the level of aggression in the attack plans for young officers. Part of this aggression comes from better equipment pushed to each individual infantry platoon. The other part comes from the support a young 2LT/LT can expect to get from his company commander’s support weapons that drives a young 2LT’s need for speed.

It is going full speed ahead (at least as much as possible given the IDF does not really have a budget due to the political crisis) into all-domain ops, specialized strike cells in regional units, and battalion level operational independence in maneuvering units, as well as streamlined data and strike capabilities for the platoon level, and expanded target generation capabilities on all levels.
Not easy to change, the IDF have my respect for starting the journey. Would love to hear more in due time.

The goal is to create many small strike cells of its own and turn enemy small strike cells into an easy prey, without the main inherent flaws of a massive organized army that are felt strongly today.
Interesting.
 
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